The North Vietnamese Communists do not want anybody to know three things at Pleime battle: one, there was no infiltration of North Vietnamese troops into South Vietnam; two, there were no Chinese Communist advisors; and three, there were no North Vietnamese troops chained to machine guns.
People's Army Troops/National Front Liberation Troops
To deceive international opinion that North Vietnamese Communists had no intention of invading South Vietnam by military force, North Vietnamese Communist troops were disguised as National Front Liberation troops when they were sent to the South. The South Vietnamese and the Americans called them Viet Cong without discrimination.
General Nguyen Nam Khanh, in his memoir, recounts that when 304th Division received the order to go the Central Highlands, South Vietnam, to join forces with 32nd and 33rd Regiments to attack Pleime-Pleiku, he, as Lieutenant Colonel Deputy Political Commissar, was summoned to the Joint General Staff along with Colonel Hoang Kien, 304th Division Commander, to get the order on August 15, 1965. Lieutenant General Deputy Chief of General Staff sent them off with a word of caution as following:
Chinese Communists Advisors At Pleime
The North Vietnamese Communists did not also want the international opinion to know that they were assisted by Red China in the first big battle at the regimental level at Pleime, especially that the Chinese Communist advisors were present at Pleime battlefield.
According to General Moore, in his book We Were Soldiers Once … and Young, page 63, the radio relay intercept team belonging to II Corps overheard a coded message which appeared to be a report on the military situation in Mandarin, emitting from the foothill of Chu Pong Massif. This indicated the presence of Chinese Communist advisors at B3 Forward Command Post.
It was likely that Chinese Communist advisors working with the B3 Forward Command Post at Chu Pong sent a military situation of the battlefield to Chinese Communist advisors present in Pnom Penh. II Corps Command through its book Why Pleime reveals:
Besides, in the report of activities of G-5, the psywar section, Major Horace E. Jordan addressed to II Corps Senior Advisor and G-5 Advisor, made mention of the presence of Chinese Communist Advisor in Pleime area:
In a news conference on November 16, 1965, in Saigon, three Viet Cong prisoners revealed that each regiment that infiltrated South Vietnam was accompanied by a Chinese advisor.
Viet Cong Chained to Machine Guns
The fact of a Viet Cong combatant chained to his machine gun mentioned in the report of the psywar section and depicted in the leaflet originated from the report made by defenders storming of the camp to the command of 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne):
Furthermore, Why Pleime states:
The information about the presence of Chinese Communist advisors and acertain numbers of dead Viet Cong were found chained to machine guns, and anti-aircraft batteries at Pleime battlefield are credible, because if not, the leaflets would lose their persuasive effect in coaxing the Viet Cong to defect if they contained falsified facts. If the Viet Cong combatants knew there were no Chinese Communist advisors and none of their comrades was chained to machine guns as depicted in the leaflets, they would not believe in the promise of a good life. Approximately 179 VC ralliers quitted their units to surrender as a result of the psychological leaflet operations.
The psywar report indicates that
Nguyen Van Tin