Iadrang Battle Presented at Armchair General Forum V

What you still may not know about the Ia Drang Valley battle
(A transcript from Armchair General Forum )

Section V : from #1201 to #1459
(http://www.armchairgeneral.com/forums/showthread.php?t=116167&page=81)

#1201 28 Aug 12, 12:19

samtn99: Phieu, if I'm not mistaken, I think you are trying to imply something nefarious about the recon not being put in first. You've said all along that Moore had no idea what his "real" mission was, so this contention doesn't make sense.

No, au contraire. I will come to that later. Let me add another question: was it common practice that the battalion commander jumped in first?

Phieu

#1202 28 Aug 12, 12:22

Phieu, I don't care which buttons you decide to use when communicating with you. I am still waiting for your comment on my points that I mentioned to you (2nd comment of mine going back from this one).

I have thick skin but at the same time, ask for some respect from you and I will continue to show respect to you.

DeltaOne

#1203 28 Aug 12, 12:27

samtn99 : It's actually an interesting point for discussion, we should crowdsource this a bit:

Was the Recon Platoon tied up elsewhere? Although I only made a cursory look at Moore's AAR, I didn't see a reference as to what the recon platoon was doing on 12-13 Nov (Moore mentions the battalion was doing saturation patrolling and a civic action program).

What was Moore's general attitude towards the Recon Platoon? Or as an alternative, how did Moore typically use his Recon Platoon?

I myself for the most part agree with holding the recon platoon for a later lift into X-Ray. First priority for an air assault is LZ security, not the best use for recon for a battalion assault; as Don said they would not be the best choice. Also, I would understand Moore wanting coherent units being put into the LZ to maximize security, so my priority would go to the line companies.

HAD Moore selected LZ Victor though, the recon platoon might have made more sense.

Thoughts anyone?

Phieu, if I'm not mistaken, I think you are trying to imply something nefarious about the recon not being put in first. You've said all along that Moore had no idea what his "real" mission was, so this contention doesn't make sense.

Here's something to consider that I think makes sense. If the Recon platoon was loaded in a later lift, it would give Moore time to organize his forces before conducting his MTC....kinda like reverse chalk order for all you old Airborne troopers out there. You get the most important stuff on the ground first. Recon was not needed until the offensive operation was ready to roll. By that I mean, Moore would likely utilize his recon element as the point of the formation. Ergo, there was greater cost/benefit to insert line companies and the weapons company first. "When" recon platoon hit the LZ is really just a minor point. The main point is, the actual operational plan never developed past the insertion. Moore never got to the "Search" part of the search and destroy mission.

don744

#1204 28 Aug 12, 12:32

Phieu : No, au contraire. I will come to that later. Let me add another question: was it common practice that the battalion commander jumped in first?

Probably only for the absolute best leaders. Moore was no coward, was he? Always with the "later" like you are going to present some mind-boggling conclusion that will makes sense of everything. Sometimes I think you use "later" as a delaying tactic to see how you can fit the new piece of info into your scenario...or to conduct an internet search to figure out that the poster is talking about.

don744

#1205 28 Aug 12, 12:54

I think another factor for the recon element being held back was that they knew there was a regiment out there. Should they stumble across it, they would have little chance of surviving the contact.

Don 744 - you make some excellent points on why this group was held back. I believe the points are very solid.

It could also alert the enemy that a US action was about to be landed and could possibly have led the enemy to cover each landing zone in an attempt to ambush Moore's unit. The enemy would know where all the suitable landing zones were in the area. Due to the limited number of men being able to land in one lift, it could have been a slaughter house. Also, it could have led to the death or even worse, the capture of Moore who would no doubt be tortured in order to give information on the concept and tactics used by air assault units at this early stage in the war. In addition, could you imagine the headlines on the front pages of every newspaper and headline stories on each of the major t.v. stations around the world??

DeltaOne

#1206 28 Aug 12, 13:14

don744 : Probably only for the absolute best leaders. Moore was no coward, was he? Always with the "later" like you are going to present some mind-boggling conclusion that will makes sense of everything. Sometimes I think you use "later" as a delaying tactic to see how you can fit the new piece of info into your scenario...or to conduct an internet search to figure out that the poster is talking about.

�

Phieu

#1207 28 Aug 12, 13:32

Phieu, you've really got to read the book. It addresses everything you've touched on.

By now the word had gone out to Tony Nadal and Bob Edwards to pull their men in from the bush and assemble them in the largest clearings available in their areas for helicopter pickup at first light the next day. Both companies were operating about six miles south of Plei Me. John Herren's Bravo Company was already assembled at brigade headquarters and would lift out of there.
[...]
'Since Bravo Company is already in one location and will be brought back early, it will be the assault company,' I told the gathering. 'Plan for a twenty-minute artillery prep followed by thirty seconds of aerial rocket artillery, then thirty seconds by the gunships. Bravo Company will land right after the gunship run. I will go in with Bravo Company in the lead assault ship. Tell the commanders to have their men carry the maximum load of ammunition, on C-ration and two canteens per man. That's it for now. Questions?' There were none.
[...]
In the American Civil War it was a matter of principle that a good officer rode his horse as little as possible. There were sound reasons for this. If you are riding and your soldiers are marching, how can you judge how tired they are, how thirsty, how heavy their packs weigh on their shoulders?
I applied the same philosophy in Vietnam, where every battallion commander had his own command-and-control helicopter. Some commanders used their helicopter as their personal mount. I never believed in that. You had to get on the ground with your troops to see and hear what was happening. You have to soak up firsthand information for your instincts to operate accurately. Besides, it's too easy to be crisp, cool, and detached at 1,500 feet; too easy to demand the impossible of your troops; too easy to make mistakes that are fatal only to those souls far below in the mud, the blood, and the confusion.
With me in that first ship would be Sergeant Major Plumley; Captain Tom Metsker; My radio operator, Specialist Bob Ouellette; and our interpreter, Mr. Nik, a Montagnard.
[...]
...I had to maximize the impact of the eighty men who would be on the ground alone during the first critical half-hour. Standard operating procedure in the new science of airmobile warfare dictated that the lead elements scatter out over 360 degrees and secure the entire perimeter. Not this time. I had been thinking about a new technique that seemed tailor-made for this situation. Bravo Company would assemble in a central location in the landing zone as a reserve and strike force. Four seven-man squads would be sent out in different directions to check out the perimeter and surrounding area. If one of those squads encountered enemy forces I could then shift the rest of the company in that direction and carry the fight to the enemy well off the landing zone. [1]

Moore's intel told him that there was a possible battalion in the vicinity. He was concerned he would be landing under fire with just shy of a Company. Bravo was assembled and ready, they drew the slot. I think that's about it. He led from the front. Where's the controversy?

Notes

1. Moore, Harold G., and Joseph L. Galloway. We Were Soldiers Once...And Young: Ia Drang--The Battle That Changed The War In Vietnam. 1st ed. Random House, 1992. pp. 37-38, 40-41.

Lucky 6

#1208 28 Aug 12, 15:13

Lucky 6 : Phieu, you've really got to read the book. It addresses everything you've touched on.

I have read the book, alright.

I applied the same philosophy in Vietnam, where every battallion commander had his own command-and-control helicopter. Some commanders used their helicopter as their personal mount. I never believed in that. You had to get on the ground with your troops to see and hear what was happening. You have to soak up firsthand information for your instincts to operate accurately. Besides, it's too easy to be crisp, cool, and detached at 1,500 feet; too easy to demand the impossible of your troops; too easy to make mistakes that are fatal only to those souls far below in the mud, the blood, and the confusion.

This quote does not explain why Moore had to ride with the head helicopter. It only says Moore liked to be on the ground with his men.

Furthermore, the problem arises when Moore did not seem to execute his operation as a search and destroy in the air assault tactic fashion.

Moore's intel told him that there was a possible battalion in the vicinity. He was concerned he would be landing under fire with just shy of a Company. Bravo was assembled and ready, they drew the slot. I think that's about it. He led from the front. Where's the controversy?

Was Moore's intel correct in telling him that, just one battalion? He was immediately attacked by two battalions. Brown should have concealed the exact intel about the number NVA units in the vicinity, right? Seems like Brown concealed a whole lot more than that from Moore, things Moore did not need to know in order to achieve his - concealed - mission.

No controversy at all, I am just trying to make sense out of multiple inter and intra contradictions of various accounts of the battle.

I don't think you can solely rely on Moore's saying to reach an understanding of what and why thing happened as it was. He didn't have a clue himself and try to rationalize thing too!

Phieu

#1209 28 Aug 12, 15:19

DeltaOne : I am still waiting for your comment on my points that I mentioned to you (2nd comment of mine going back from this one). D1

Do you mind indicate the location of your question with the post number; your coordinates that you give are too imprecise.

I am also still waiting for your comment on my post # 1173 before I can resume posting my presentation where it was left off when it was derailed with hostile comments.

Phieu

#1210 28 Aug 12, 17:12

Phieu,

Let's just move forward from here. I don't really care at this point to argue over numbers of men on the ground. We have beaten that point to death from both perspectives.

In my post at 1180:

"Phieu - I am not in any way taking this lightly. It should be alright to consider different points otherwise, how do we learn from past engagements. I think you are taking this personal, as an insult to your brother perhaps. I have already stated that I have great respect for him. Because I am trying to wrap my head around what took place and have questions does not take away from his service in behalf of South Vietnam. You perhaps have forgot that we are vets who served there. This all has great importance to us.

To use the button is really over reacting. You should be happy that we have an interest in this action and are not just writing of the thread as 'Phieu's Views'.

If you have ever come under fire, even 1 hour 20 mins. feel like lifetimes. Moore seemed quite convinced that he would be facing a force of superior strength. Even if it was to distract the enemy, without knowing exactly where the enemy was and what size it was, it potentially put a battalion of men in a dangerous spot and we know how it all played out. A lot of young men paid the ultimate price, a lot of US blood was shed. It is too bad Aloha Ronnie hasn't posted here as he was there.

Anyways, AGAIN, , don't take this personally. The more the comments, the more the questions, the more you make people think, the more you make sure no one forgets what happened there, the more pleased you should be."

I was trying to explain that while all his men were still coming in, they faced hell on earth. Was this as a result of poor planning? Was it just poor luck? Why the fk did it play out the way it did? I'm not sure. I know one thing for certain though - in a real short time frame, it turned into a clusterfk big time.

Let's just agree to move on from here.

DeltaOne

#1211 28 Aug 12, 17:57

I see now. The subject is too emotional for you. It is not possible for you to look at it with a clear head.

Maybe it is better that you not continue to read this thread, and let me carry on with my presentation ...

At least while I discuss about X-Ray and Albany ...

Phieu

#1212 28 Aug 12, 18:36

No, I think that you need to address the issues that are repeatedly brought out. To just say "later" or " I'll get to that" 10 months into a thread shows there are problems with the storyline.

don744

#1213 28 Aug 12, 18:39

�

Phieu

#1214 28 Aug 12, 18:53

Phieu : Seems like Brown concealed a whole lot more than that from Moore, things Moore did not need to know in order to achieve his - concealed - mission.

Are you really suggesting that COL Brown concealed the mission from Moore?

samtn99

#1215 28 Aug 12, 18:56

Phieu : �

I've noticed your with the questions on every hard post. The questions are hard to answer, no? I'm sure Altus is sitting back grinning right now because you lack the understanding to be able to answer the questions of professional Soldiers. There is more than just me asking. Heck, I am only pointing out the obvious regarding basics. Some deeper thinkers have found logistical issues, and others have pointed out intel gaps. The master plan was poorly conceived...and every bit American by what I have been able to garner. From the beginning I have thought the battle at X-Ray was not a good plan. Not every operation is a resounding success. But I will say this...we put a hurting on the PAVN. In the long run, the VN leadership couldnt capitalize on the support of the US.

don744

#1216 28 Aug 12, 19:12

Affirmative! And words of sympathy as well, as you, Don The Infidel, now you officially are out of the circle of trust! Your precious privilege of being spoken to by the speaker has been revoked! Serve you right!

altus

#1217 28 Aug 12, 19:17

Phieu : Dạ, kh�ng c� chi.

The General hasn't changed, has he? It would be interesting that you tell us here his interesting stories on Ia Drang.

Member Phieu - Thank you, but no. It was 20+ years ago....I would rather not chance misrepresenting the General, nor do I wish to detract from your thread with war stories.

Cham

#1218 28 Aug 12, 20:05

altus: Affirmative! And words of sympathy as well, as you, Don The Infidel, now you officially are out of the circle of trust! Your precious privilege of being spoken to by the speaker has been revoked! Serve you right!

Aha!! I caught you! I used the "luring the tiger down from the mountain" tactic to get you to post again. In 60 pages, this was my master plan! Fake East, attack west! You lose...comrade.

don744

#1219 28 Aug 12, 20:28

don744 : I've noticed your with the questions on every hard post. The questions are hard to answer, no? I'm sure Altus is sitting back grinning right now because you lack the understanding to be able to answer the questions of professional Soldiers. There is more than just me asking. Heck, I am only pointing out the obvious regarding basics. Some deeper thinkers have found logistical issues, and others have pointed out intel gaps. The master plan was poorly conceived...and every bit American by what I have been able to garner. From the beginning I have thought the battle at X-Ray was not a good plan. Not every operation is a resounding success. But I will say this...we put a hurting on the PAVN. In the long run, the VN leadership couldnt capitalize on the support of the US.

�

Phieu

#1220 28 Aug 12, 20:30

Cham: Member Phieu - Thank you, but no. It was 20+ years ago....I would rather not chance misrepresenting the General, nor do I wish to detract from your thread with war stories.

Roger!

Phieu

#1221 28 Aug 12, 20:50

samtn99: Are you really suggesting that COL Brown concealed the mission from Moore?

Let me go over this cautiously. Who on the American military authority side were aware about the master plan conceived by Colonel Hieu. For sure, J3/MACV like General DePuy who controlled Arclite strike operations; for sure, IFFV Commander, General Larsen through which orders were channeled out at various phases of the execution of the master plan; for sure, General Knowles, whose Forward Division Command Post was set up next to II Corps Headquarters, and who coordinated closely with II Corps Command (I did mention though that, for unknown reason, General Knowles chose to act as he had no clue and chose not to advise General Kinnard about this master plan, as reflected in Knowles/Pleiku Campaign, Coleman/Pleiku, Moore).

General Knowles might not have told Brown either. If such was the case, then it was General Knowles.

Phieu

#1222 28 Aug 12, 20:56

Just wanted to capture this in a quote before it is edited. Maybe we can find some documents from DePuy, Larsen, or Knowles that might corroborate your story. Americans are like that...we live for producing documentation of our part in executing a master plan.

don744

#1223 28 Aug 12, 21:08

�

Phieu

#1224 28 Aug 12, 21:58

So wait, is the master plan written down anywhere? Is there the equivalent to an OpO somewhere?

thejester

#1225 28 Aug 12, 22:03

Phieu : Let me go over this cautiously. Who on the American military authority side were aware about the master plan conceived by Colonel Hieu. For sure, J3/MACV like General DePuy who controlled Arclite strike operations; for sure, IFFV Commander, General Larsen through which orders were channeled out at various phases of the execution of the master plan; for sure, General Knowles, whose Forward Division Command Post was set up next to II Corps Headquarters, and who coordinated closely with II Corps Command (I did mention though that, for unknown reason, General Knowles chose to act as he had no clue and chose not to advise General Kinnard about this master plan, as reflected in Knowles/Pleiku Campaign, Coleman/Pleiku, Moore).

General Knowles might not have told Brown either. If such was the case, then it was General Knowles.

So you think that Depuy and Larsen would have known, but never mentioned it. What about Mataxis? Nada, zip, zilch from him too. All three carried it to their graves? I find this highly unlikely.

Would Knowles have a motive to not let the subordinate commanders know what was going on?

samtn99

#1226 28 Aug 12, 22:43

Phieu : I see now. The subject is too emotional for you. It is not possible for you to look at it with a clear head.

Maybe it is better that you not continue to read this thread, and let me carry on with my presentation ...

At least while I discuss about X-Ray and Albany ...

To say that I am too emotional about the subject is like 'the pot calling the kettle black'. I have no vested interest other than understanding what took place and why. On the other hand, you are trying to defend your brother's decisions and actions. I think you are much more emotional than all the rest of us put together. I make this point not to ridicule or disrespect you. When you are telling the info regarding the actions of a loved one, this case being your brother, sometimes it is hard to deal with the questions raised by others that may to you, seem harsh.

Now, for the last time, I am in NO way, trying to tarnish your brother's actions or story.

- peace

DeltaOne

#1227 29 Aug 12, 02:38

thejester: So wait, is the master plan written down anywhere? Is there the equivalent to an OpO somewhere?

The fact you cannot find a BDA report about

�There was at least one occasion where Australian units had their PLAF counterparts on the ropes and then were forced to pull back for a B-52 strike �

are you going to deny it ever happened?

Could the Arclite strike at Chupong which succeeded in annhilating the bulk of three NVA regiments en masse take place without a master plan?

Who could possibly conceived that plan, 1st Air Cavalry or II Corps?

Who else at II Corps, if not Colonel Hieu?

Phieu

#1228 29 Aug 12, 03:43

samtn99 : So you think that Depuy and Larsen would have known, but never mentioned it.

Do you think DePuy would execute the Arclite strike operational concept of Colonel Hieu blindly? and Larsen would agree to play along with the operational concept also blindly?

What about Mataxis? Nada, zip, zilch from him too.

Yes.

And I have something special about Mataxis to tell you. I met him for the first time at the 2001 Annual Conference of the Vietnam Center when he sat in at the first row of the auditorium listening to my presentation about Pleime

1:15 p.m. Session SEVEN
Panel Chair: Colonel Roger Donlon, USA (Ret)
Christopher Ives, Ohio State University, �US Army Special Forces Advisors and the Montagnard Mutiny: Between a Rock and a Hard Place.�
Tin Nguyen, �The ARVN Experience as viewed through the personal experience of Major General Nguyen Van Hieu�
Ken Jacobsen, �Naval Advisors: Who we were, why we did it, and what we learned.�

At the end, he came up to me to congratulate me and introduce himself as II Corps Senior Advisor and said he knew my brother without mentioning a word about Pleime, letting me the impression he had left Pleiku prior to Pleime Campaign.

I met him the second time the following year at the 2002 Symposium

1:30 p.m. Session 12d: RVN Armed Forces Issues Room 111-2
Introduction: Dr. James R. Reckner, Texas Tech University
"Why Did Vietnamization of the Vietnam War Fail?" Mr. Tin Nguyen. Author of Major General Nguyen Van Hieu, ARVN, and Webmaster of generalhieu.com
"Political Warfare in the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces." Michael Do, B.A., B.S, M.S., ex-Captain, VNAF, President of the Vietnamese Veterans Association of Austin, Texas

I asked him about my brother. He just said that he might have some photos of the two of them together buried somewhere in boxes tuck in the basement of his house. When he have time, he would try to find them and send to me. He never did.

I met him for the third time at the 2005 Symposium

3:15 PM. Session 8a: Army of the Republic of Vietnam
Moderator: Earl H. Tilford, Grove City COllege
"Were the ARVNs Any Good? (Before, During and After the Americanization)." Nguyen Tin, Author
"VNAF: The Rise and Fall of the World's Fourth Largest Air Force." Quang X. Pham, Former USMC Pilot and author

This time around Mataxis seemed to avoid me.

He died the following year, if I am not mistaken.

All three carried it to their graves? I find this highly unlikely.

Yes, apparently but not unlikely.

By the way, I forgot to mention that General Vinh Loc was sitting next to Mataxis in 2001. I introduced him as the Commander of the Pleime battle and told the audience to address their questions to him at the Q&A time rather than to me. He left the auditorium before it!

I met Vinh Loc again at the 2002 Symposium. He too ducked me!

Amazing, no!

I wonder why nobody wants to give credit to my brother for what he did at Pleime! Can you tell me?

For me, it is either because at times it was a top secret matter or jalousie.

Would Knowles have a motive to not let the subordinate commanders know what was going on?

Do Commanders let their subordinates know everything that is going on?

Transparency does not apply to military operations. I am not right?

Phieu

#1229 29 Aug 12, 04:06

Phieu: Amazing, no!

I wonder why nobody wants to give credit to my brother for what he did at Pleime! Can you tell me?

This is self-obvious to anyone but you!

Because nobody believes you brother did what you claim he did, and you fail to prove it in any meaningful way.

altus

#1230 29 Aug 12, 04:07

re 03:06 - hmmm:

re 03:14 - hmmm:

Phieu

#1231 29 Aug 12, 05:41

It is quite amusing: all those who claim not to believe me continue to read me!

Phieu

#1232 29 Aug 12, 06:34

DeltaOne : To say that I am too emotional about the subject is like 'the pot calling the kettle black'. I have no vested interest other than understanding what took place and why. On the other hand, you are trying to defend your brother's decisions and actions. I think you are much more emotional than all the rest of us put together. I make this point not to ridicule or disrespect you. When you are telling the info regarding the actions of a loved one, this case being your brother, sometimes it is hard to deal with the questions raised by others that may to you, seem harsh.

Now, for the last time, I am in NO way, trying to tarnish your brother's actions or story.

- peace

I have inadvertently stepped on a minefield ... of some sort ...

- peace to you too ...

Phieu

#1233 29 Aug 12, 08:39

Phieu : It is quite amusing: all those who claim not to believe me continue to read me!

Keeps my mind sharp...and it is also amusing, just in a different way. You keep posting and I'll keep reading.

don744

#1234 29 Aug 12, 08:56

Think of it as a clinical research, or watching troll for amusement, or a trainwreck theory experiment.

altus

#1235 29 Aug 12, 09:13

Here�s another point to consider as the prisoner incidents have kinda been glossed over. Important to note is that it wasn�t just Moore that got intel from the prisoners.

From Moore�s AAR:

After securing the LZ and launching a couple of platoons to expand the security zone, they captured the first prisoner and interrogated him. What Moore says next in his AAR is important, I think.

�My command chopper was called in and the prisoner was taken back immediately for interrogation at the Brigade CP.�

Then, after contact with the enemy was initiated, and the B Co. Platoon cut off, the following passage discusses an event that happened with A Co.:

�A Company took two prisoners who were later evacuated to Brigade.�

OK, so at this point Brigade had three prisoners that could provide intel on the size, disposition, and morale of the enemy forces. As a Brigade Commander, what could you discern from this HUMINT? A battalion was in the midst of a regiment, with two more in the AO? Would that not prompt a call to Division to see about what assets were available (read: Arclite) to deal with a Division formation? That could have been the impetus for Kinnard to decide on an ARCLITE as an option, and get his ALO working the coordination. If you go back and read the paper by COL Stoner on Tactical Air Operations that I linked to earlier, The B-52s were integrated into the scheme of maneuver, meaning they were a resource available if needed.

So, does it make sense that once intel provided a picture of the forces arrayed against 1/7 CAV that the division cammander could consider this option based on the situation on the ground? Or does it make better sense the whole thing was a pre-planned strike on a specific grid coordinate days before Moore even selected what would eventually be the site of the battle?

don744

#1236 29 Aug 12, 10:05

don744 : Keeps my mind sharp...and it is also amusing, just in a different way. You keep posting and I'll keep reading.

!!!

Phieu

#1237 29 Aug 12, 10:06

altus : Think of it as a clinical research, or watching troll for amusement, or a trainwreck theory experiment.

!!!

Phieu

#1238 29 Aug 12, 10:07

don744:

Here�s another point to consider as the prisoner incidents have kinda been glossed over. Important to note is that it wasn�t just Moore that got intel from the prisoners.

From Moore�s AAR:

After securing the LZ and launching a couple of platoons to expand the security zone, they captured the first prisoner and interrogated him. What Moore says next in his AAR is important, I think.

�My command chopper was called in and the prisoner was taken back immediately for interrogation at the Brigade CP.�

Then, after contact with the enemy was initiated, and the B Co. Platoon cut off, the following passage discusses an event that happened with A Co.:

�A Company took two prisoners who were later evacuated to Brigade.�

!!!

Phieu

#1239 29 Aug 12, 10:26

Hey Altus and Don.

It appears that your recent posts infringe on the ACG rule pertaining to respect

RESPECT
This is a site which enjoys the company of members from all over the world. While healthy debate is encouraged, please have the courtesy to respect the views of others. Please do not use obscene or offensive language, or engage in personal attacks or "flaming" of other members. This will not be tolerated.

Let's see how long it takes for Boonie or Miss Saigon to intervene.

I don't think Boonie will do anything.

Miss Saigon is on vacation.

If they tolerate your line of behavior, it will be ok with me. I am used to hackers.

Phieu

#1240 29 Aug 12, 11:05

No violations here Phieu. Dissenting viewpoints are not personal attacks. BTW...you dont have to respond to every post of mine with a . You can simply not reply if you dont have anything to add. I am currently posting information I've found on the Airforce Tactical Air Operations I have found that explains why B-52s were used at Chu-Pong and who ordered the strike. I have had several positive comments from the class on content.

don744

#1241 29 Aug 12, 11:16

I did specify: "line of behavior". Not a particular post or posts.

I leave the matter to the moderators. And as I said, it's ok with me if they act or not.

Phieu

#1242 29 Aug 12, 11:31

Phieu : Could the Arclite strike at Chupong which succeeded in annhilating three NVA en masse take place without a master plan?

This is an incorrect statement.

Three NVA regiments were not annhilated (I assume you meant regiments, rather than "three NVA").

samtn99

#1243 29 Aug 12, 11:32

That's a funny picture. What does it have to do with the post?

samtn99

#1244 29 Aug 12, 11:36

samtn99 : This is an incorrect statement.

Three NVA regiments were not annhilated (I assume you meant regiments, rather than "three NVA").

Thanks. I made the correction.

Phieu

#1245 29 Aug 12, 11:36

don744: I am currently posting information I've found on the Airforce Tactical Air Operations I have found that explains why B-52s were used at Chu-Pong and who ordered the strike. I have had several positive comments from the class on content.

To add to that, the 1 Cav Combat Operations After Action Report states:

"The original plan to employ strategic bombers in support of the division was presented by the Assistant Division Commander (ADC-A) through Field Force Vietnam Commanding General to the J-3 of US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam."

Samtn99

#1246 29 Aug 12, 11:37

Phieu: Thanks. I made the correction.

I meant that three NVA regiments were not annhiliated.

samtn99

#1247 29 Aug 12, 11:38

samtn99 : That's a funny picture. What does it have to do with the post?

I pluck it from Miss Saigon's vacation thread.

I guess it means, that's what happens when the shepherd is not around; the sheep get bullied with impunity by the wolf!

Phieu

#1248 29 Aug 12, 11:48

samtn99: I meant that three NVA regiments were not annhiliated.

You are right. Colonel Hieu had to call in the Airborne Brigade to finish the two remaining battalions off with the surgical Than Phong 7 operation.

Maybe I should be more precise by stating instead, the bulk of the entire B3 Field Front forces comprising three regiments.

Phieu

#1249 29 Aug 12, 11:55

samtn99 : To add to that, the 1 Cav Combat Operations After Action Report states:

Well, I guess that puts that issue bed. Pull that one, and the whole house of cards collapses.

don744

#1250 29 Aug 12, 12:05

samtn99 : To add to that, the 1 Cav Combat Operations After Action Report states:

Well, that was what Knowles told to Kinnard or had it written on the report (Kinnard did not dictate that AAR, Knowles did).

Who was in possession of the real time intelligence on the enemy situation by the days, hours, and minutes, which was a sine qua none requirement for the scheduling of a precise Arclite strike? Knowles or Hieu?

By the way, I think this is one of the reasons why Knowles kept Kinnard on the dark about whose idea was to jump into Chupons on Nov 14:

Kinnard:The choice to go into the Chu Pong, a longtime enemy sanctuary [near the Cambodian border]) into which ARVN had never gone, was not mine. It was either that of General Knowles or the brigade commander. We hadn't looked at the area. It wasn't intelligence that led us there. If anything, it was the lack of intelligence, and this seemed a logical place. (Cochran)

When he arrived, Knowles showed him the situation map he had propped up against a palm tree. Kinnard took one look and said, �What the hell are you doing in that area?� Obviously, someone hadn�t kept the boss informed about Larsen�s guidance to get after the enemy even if it meant walking away from the dry holes in the east. Knowles told Kinnard, �The object of the exercise is to find the enemy, and we sure as hell have!� Knowles remembers an awkward pause before Kinnard said quietly, �Okay, it looks great. Let me know what you need.� (Coleman, page 219)

and more

- 11/14/65 18:50H: 1st Air Cav Div (Lt Col Buham) Gen Kinnard discussed with Gen Larsen the possibility of having a B-52 strike in the Long Reach area �X� Gen Larsen was in favor of this.

(G3 Journal/IFFV)

After learning from Larsen the surprised news of using Arclite strike which had been pre-planned without his knowledge, Kinnard should have questioned Knowles about it. And guess what, Knowles lied to him in taking credit of the idea!

I have said multiple times already, you won't get the truth by relying solely on Pleiku Campaign AAR.

Phieu

#1251 29 Aug 12, 12:16

I do not view things as a personal attack in any Phieu. If I have offended you, I apologize. I just want to discuss the events that took place involving 1/7 Cav.. Your brother was involved in the defense of S. Vietnam and as such, I have deep respect for him. At the same time, I want to know exactly what happened. Some of the questions may strike you as very personal but they need to be asked anyways.

I won't get into a flame war with you or anyone else here on this site. I have had enough of that crap in the past and I will leave there, in the past.

I think you should consider answering the questions of the other members here so as not to look like you are avoiding the truth or have something to hide.

With respect,

DeltaOne

#1252 29 Aug 12, 12:19

don744 : Well, I guess that puts that issue bed. Pull that one, and the whole house of cards collapses.

Tough luck. See previous post.

It is obvious that you fell asleep during my class ...

Phieu

#1253 29 Aug 12, 12:25

Phieu: Who was in possession of the real time intelligence on the enemy situation by the days, hours, and minutes, which was a sine qua none requirement for the scheduling of a precise Arclite strike? Knowles or Hieu?

Where again did Hieu get his intel?

If I recall correctly, you state Hieu was personally listening in to Chinese advisors on the radio?

samtn99

#1254 29 Aug 12, 12:29

DeltaOne: I want to know exactly what happened.

Me too and I am telling you as I see it through my brother's eyes; things that you do not know yet. Ask questions for clarification if what I say is not clear to you. Once understood, take it or reject it as you please. That's the best I can offer. Don't have an attitude like Boonie, Altus, Don, and al.

Some of the questions may strike you as very personal but they need to be asked anyways. (...)

I think you should consider answering the questions of the other members here so as not to look like you are avoiding the truth or have something to hide.

I did, and still do. Don't you see that? I always give an answer to legitimate questions. I just do not

#1255 29 Aug 12, 12:30

samtn99 : Where again did Hieu get his intel?

If I recall correctly, you state Hieu was personally listening in to Chinese advisors on the radio?

How many time do I have to repeat myself?

Is this some kind of question leading to a trap?

Why don't you just go right to the point?

Phieu

#1256 29 Aug 12, 13:41

I'll take that as a yes.

You believe II Corps intel came from COL Hieu listening in on Chinese advisors who were providing details on the B3 Fronts operations down to the day hour minute.

samtn99

#1257 29 Aug 12, 14:23

Yes, whenever the Chinese advisors communicated with each other on the radio.

I know, your next question will be: How is it possible for an individual to sit at the radio listening device 24/7?

Well, he was one among his team of Vietnamese radio interceptors of Chinese ethnicity who knew Mandarine, and they took turn listening.

Sam, I hope your next question will be a legitmate one. Otherwise I would just ignore it.

Tell me: so far are you satisfied with my responses to all of your questions, or just took them without believing them to be truthful?

By now, if you are still doubtful, if you still believe like

�I believe that you have no idea what a staging area or assembly area is. Once again, you're grasping at little pieces of information that fit into your mindsets. �

if you still don't believe Colonel Hieu conceived the Arclite strike operational concept,

if you still don't believe all maneuvers during Long Reach/Truong Chinh operation, which included the LZ X-Ray battle, were executed in support of, in function of the Arclite strike,

then, just stop asking me more pecadillos questions: once you do not get it, you are never going to get it.

And let me carry on with my presentation. I have spent enough times with you.

Phieu

#1258 29 Aug 12, 21:01

Believe?

I do in fact believe its POSSIBLE that COL Hieu concieved the operational concept.

Could also have been Knowles as was stated in the 1 Cav after action report; maybe Knowles stole the idea and credit, I don't know. 1 Cav gives him credit on paper, so that's a little stronger for me than guesswork. Or maybe it was the II Corps G3, or II Corps commander. Record keeping at II Corps HQ seems to be either badly managed as practice, or lost, destroyed, or held by the victors. Maybe someday we'll see some better information.

As to the maneuvers all being done to support a B-52 strike...no Phieu, no. So many holes have been pointed out in this area that a PAVN regiment could go through them.

The X-Ray battle theory of yours loses all meaning if you think it part of a master plan. Again, too many holes. For only one example, WHAT IF Moore went to Victor? This was possible. Then your entire idea washes out.

Your answers about staging areas and assembly areas were incoherent. Maybe your ability to say what you mean in English caused an issue. That isn't a personal attack, it's an observation. Note I said "maybe".

I have no idea why you think I or anyone else is preventing you from continuing your presentation. It's a message board.

samtn99

#1259 29 Aug 12, 21:09

OK. Then I will just move on with my presentation in my next post.

Please feel free to post your comments addressed not to me but to each other about my presentation. I will read them and would response to the ones that fit into my current ongoing presentation.

I don't want to convince anybody. I just present thing as a see it. Take it, if you like it; leave it, if you dislike it.

Let me tell you right at the outset: my interpretations of what and why things happened at LZ X-Ray are radically different from your current beliefs, for the simple reason of the difference in our premises:

- You believe it was a search and destroy operation; I, a distractive one;

- You believe the maneuvers were reactive; I, were proactive;

- You believe the maneuvers were decided independently to each other; I, in function of the Arclite strike.

So don't continue to read me; you won't find anything that makes sense to you. All it does is to get you upset.

And yes, Sam, it will be a presentation, not a discussion; this latter part will come later, at the end.

You contend the problem lies on the lack of discussions. Well, see what happened after a long time we spent discussing recently. We haven't progressed an inch!

Phieu

#1260 30 Aug 12, 04:38

Before I resume my presentation I deem important to address to two points of yours in your last post:

1. Knowles conceived the operational concept.

Could also have been Knowles as was stated in the 1 Cav after action report; maybe Knowles stole the idea and credit, I don't know. 1 Cav gives him credit on paper, so that's a little stronger for me than guesswork. Or maybe it was the II Corps G3, or II Corps commander. Record keeping at II Corps HQ seems to be either badly managed as practice, or lost, destroyed, or held by the victors. Maybe someday we'll see some better information.

Who is the author of the 1 Cav after action report?

I have stated multiple times that it was not Kinnard; it was Knowles who dictated it to Coleman who later on wrote his book Pleiku, The Dawn of Helicopter Warfare in Vietnam 1988. Just recently I indicated that like this: Knowles/Pleiku Campaign, Coleman/Pleiku.

So when you read, 1 Cav gives him credit on paper, you have to understand, Knowles gives to himself credit on paper.

Now you know: Knowles took credit and he lied. And don�t assume

Or maybe it was the II Corps G3, or II Corps commander. Record keeping at II Corps HQ seems to be either badly managed as practice, or lost, destroyed, or held by the victors. Maybe someday we'll see some better information.

2. Meaning of assembly and staging areas

Your answers about staging areas and assembly areas were incoherent. Maybe your ability to say what you mean in English caused an issue.

I quote Pleiku Campaign AAR

Intelligence summary
Nov 11: The division [Field Front] headquarters set the date for attack at 16 November, and issued orders to its three regiments. The next five days were to be spent in preparation for and movement to the attack.
Nov 12: Field Front units continued preparations and rehearsals for the scheduled attack on Pleime.
Nov 13: Field Front forces began staging in the Chu Pong-Iadrang areas in preparation for movement to Pleime and the projected 16 November attack. Some recon parties and transportation units already had moved out.

You have to pardon my English as a second language which enables me to come up this much:

- Assembly areas are where troops were ordered to assemble for rehearsals, reorganization, reequipement;

- When B3 Front begins staging in preparation for movement to attack, troops get closer in tight formations.

Furthermore, I think as bad as my English as a second language is, I still read into Pleiku Campaign AAR in terms of finding out exactly the closing timeline of 1/7 Air Cav at LZ X-Ray more accurately in comparison to somes:

- At 1210H, the bulk of 1/7 Bn had landed on X-Ray: Company B, Company C, Company D, and the bulk of Company A.
- At 1500H, the remainder of Company A and the recon team.

Nobody seems to notice the pace of quick for the bulk and slow for the remainder with a 2 hour and 50 minute pause in between of helicopters' activities in disgorging the entire battalion.

Nobody, it seems, was able to quantify "the bulk of the battalion": 50, 60, 70, 80 or 90 percentage wise. Some get angry because it took 4, 5 hours to disgorge the entire battalion, causing it to lack troops when the enemy launched their assaults and to sustain heavy casualties due to poor planning.

Phieu

#1261 30 Aug 12, 06:01

Phieu : Nobody seems to notice the pace of quick for the bulk and slow for the remainder with a 2 hour and 50 minute pause in between of helicopters' activities in disgorging the entire battalion.

It should be pretty easy to figure out the percentage of the battalion that was on the ground, and when. It can also be explained very easily why it slowed down. Off the top of my head, I think the majority of the BN, A and B Companies made it in before contact was made. Once contact was made, the LZ was closed several times for inbound flights due to the intensity of the fighting. When I can get on a computer vice iPhone later this morning, I'll try to be more precise.

don744

#1262 30 Aug 12, 06:29

Interesting this quote kicked a little of the cobwebs from my mind on something:

Phieu : Yes, whenever the Chinese advisors communicated with each other on the radio.

I know, your next question will be: How is it possible for an individual to sit at the radio listening device 24/7?

Well, he was one among his team of Vietnamese radio interceptors of Chinese ethnicity who knew Mandarine, and they took turn listening.

Sam, I hope your next question will be a legitmate one. Otherwise I would just ignore it.

Sounds highly unlikely a Chief of Staff was "on-call" 24/7 to rush to a radio room to personally monitor radio communications. The question is, "how would anyone know if COL Hieu did or didn't monitor transmissions?" Here's a quote from a rather erudite and hot-headed friend. His words make much sense.

Max Alcibiades : Don

Good luck.

If you entirely rely upon the 'psychic pen' method of historic research, there can be need for such botherments such as: sources, other corroboration or any other external confirmation of blind assertions or bald assumptions.

I do encourage you and others, following this thread to google �psychic pen� to see where this is all coming from.

Logic, reasoned argument and a liberal application of the clue bat will get you nowhere.

Nonsense, all of it, and an utter waste of bandwidth besides.

Poor Max...would be awesome if he was still around. He brought so much to this forum. Anyway, here's the crux of the matter:

Phieu : My brother only provided me and/or pointed out to me the written sources. He did not tell me the facts "in person" but showed me where to find them - in written sources or oral testimonies. That's what I basically mean by "psychic pen"!

Somebody pointed out that I have been modest in attributing the ease of digging out sources and understanding them accurately to "psychic pen" instead of to my personal diligence and intelligence.

Now, where did he tell you to look to find written sources or oral testimony that indicated he was personally monitoring radio broadcasts in mandarin? That one should be pretty easy since that is the linchpin-pin of his master plan. Minute to minute intel on size, disposition, morale, etc. of the enemy formation.

What about the "secret agents" you keep talking about? Are you calling the Chinese advisors secret agents? Did they know they were secret agents, or do you actually mean there were traitors in the enemy formation with access to comms equipment that would sneak off and call COL Hieu?

don744

#1263 30 Aug 12, 06:51

don744 : Now, where did he tell you

What about the "secret agents" you keep talking about? Are you calling the Chinese advisors secret agents?

Are you addressing to me?

Please stop addressing to me. (Addressing to others? By all means.)

And let me get to my presentation.

Phieu

#1264 30 Aug 12, 07:53

But Phieu, this is your thread. The whole purpose of a forum is for others to be able to introduce information, and present arguments for and against other peoples opinions. To imply I am not welcome to address you makes me feel...I don't know...sad? I am asking hard questions which you can not address factually. Remember the discussion over the "take no prisoners" order you said the PAVN issued? You stated an opinion that because they did bayonet training, they were told to take no prisoners. I then countered that bayonet training is a basic function, especially when you will engage in close combat. You dismissed my observation, and I provided a written source that showed prisoners were taken at Albany. You then gave me the hand wave and said you would continue with your class. This time I am utilizing a combination of The Eagle Lunges technique and the Grabbing the Belt technique. Gonna use the best of both sides. I am a quick learner.

don744

#1265 30 Aug 12, 10:15

Let me make an exception for the last time.

Firstly, you and I had come to the point of we agree to disagree and if you don't get it once, you are never going to get it no matter how many proofs more. I am here just to inform, not to convince. Ask question for clarification. Once that is achieved, take it or leave it. That the best I can offer. And don't start accusing me of this and that, and expressed sarcams.

Secondly, at this point, I have requested everybody, not only you, to hold their thoughts - if directed to me - and give me a chance to resume my presentation until the end of my presentation. (Because I feel like forced to react immediately).

Phieu

#1266 30 Aug 12, 10:31

If you do not want dialogue, then why not just point everyone to GeneralHieu(dot)com? There is your presentation. If you are going to post up points here, I will continue to ask hard questions when things dont make sense. Its hard to believe that after 10 months there is anything different you will ad to this presentation. You have already glossed over the whole thing 4 or 5 times. As far as the agree to disagree thing...got it. But just because I disagree, doesnt mean I should not be silent. I have some professional stuffs to offer, after all. If you are not going to get my points about things, you are never going to get it, either.

Furthermore, I didnt "accuse" you of anything. I pointed out exactly what happened. All of the other members here can go back and read thru that exchange. Its still there. There are no personal attacks going on at all. This is simply direct, pointed discussion over the scenario you have painted.

don744

#1267 30 Aug 12, 10:39

Don is right. The nature of these forums means that these threads are two way streets. You cannot control the content in a thread just because you don't like it.

There are only two ways a thread can be controlled. If it strays too far off topic, or if it becomes aggressively confrontational.

Phieu, if people want to make comments on your "presentation" they are free to do so. You are free not to respond if you don't want to, but you cannot stop them from posting on the subject in your thread.

Miss Saigon

#1268 30 Aug 12, 10:42

Thank you MS. I promise I will take care to keep my dialogue courteous.

don744

#1269 30 Aug 12, 12:47

Miss Saigon : Phieu, if people want to make comments on your "presentation" they are free to do so. You are free not to respond if you don't want to, but you cannot stop them from posting on the subject in your thread.

Glad you are back to your mod post.

Did I not say the same thing to Sam: "Please feel free to post your comments addressed not to me but to each other about my presentation. I will read them and would response to the ones that fit into my current ongoing presentation."?

So, I guess the best way in my case, is not to respond if I don't want to, huh ...

Don, you were lucky that Miss Saigon walked in the classroom while you looked like you were in your best behavior and I was the naughty one!

I wish she caught you, Altus and Boonie red handed bullying me, the innocent sheep, instead!

Phieu

#1270 31 Aug 12, 00:27

No one is accusing anyone of being the naughty one. I just want things to stay reasonably peaceful.

I wish she caught you, Altus and Boonie red handed bullying me, the innocent sheep, instead!

No one gets to be bullied on my watch. Please understand that just because someone disagrees with someone else, it doesn't mean that there is any bullying going on. There is a lot of disagreement on these forums, and that will never change. It is my job to just try to see to it that disagreement doesn't cross the line into petty bickering and insults.

So, keep presenting all you want, just be aware that others may post disagreements while you are doing so. How you handle that will be up to you.

As for Boonie, I am not sure what would happen if I tried to send the MP's to arrest him

Miss Saigon

#1271 31 Aug 12, 03:37

Miss Saigon,

I just said things in a humoristic way. The funny photo attests to that.

Anyway, I just brush away this episode that I consider rather amusing ...

I feel totally safe grazing peacefully under your tender loving care crook ...

(Courtesy of Boonie)

Phieu

#1272 31 Aug 12, 10:37

A dialogue with Sam has allowed me to establish something I have been asserting all along: Colonel Hieu, not General Knowles was the one who conceived the operational concept of using Arclite strike to destroy the three NVA regiments en masse at Chupong massif.

General Knowles, as Forward Air Cav Command Post Commander seemed to be the only Air Cavalry high ranking officers who knew this fact which he concealed from General Kinnard. For what reasons? I don�t want to speculate. I just want to caution that, as a consequence, since General Knowles is the real author of Pleiku Campaign After Action Report, the contents of which he dictated to Captain Coleman, one should read it with that reality in mind: if he acted as he was the architect of the operational concept, he also gave a narrative of the troop maneuvers as they were executed according to his planning and not of Colonel Hieu, with whom he worked in close collaboration in this joint Air Cav-II Corps operation (Forward 1st Air Cav Command Post was established next to II Corps Headquarters).

I moved a forward CP [Command Post] to Pleiku with one of my assistant division commanders, Gen. Dick Knowles. This was my "modus operandi" whenever the action got hot. My own leadership style had always been to give absolute and maximum latitude to people all the way down the line. I did not want to handmanage this thing from back in An Khe.

(Cochran)

After setting up his field headquarters just outside the II Corps command in Pleiku City, Knowles [�], he called Kinnard and said, �Hey boss, communications being what they are, we have potential for problems with the setup the way it is. If you and Swede don�t have enough faith in me, then get someone up here who does.� Knowles didn�t have to work hard to convince Kinnard, who was a strong believer in delegating to subordinates. But Kinnard had to convince Larsen that Knowles needed to have the flexibility to operate. This was still very early in the active American involvement in the war, and senior commanders were generally tiptoeing their way into positions of dominance. So Knowles�s orders were amended to read: �Assist the ARVN if called upon to do so, and seek permission if time and communications permit.� Essentially, it was a carte blanche for Knowles.

(Coleman, page 87)

One should also expect in the report subtle measures were used to erase traces of all II Corps influence and 1st Air Cav dependency. This might be a plausible reason why Truong Chinh/Long Reach operation had been changed to Pleiku Campaign.

Furthermore, since Colonel Hieu, not General Knowles was the architect of Long Reach operation, in order to comprehend troop maneuvers executed in this operation, you have to see it through the eyes of Colonel Hieu. He was a meticulous operational planner who was great in anticipating all eventualities. All troop moves were intended toward achieving a goal. He was equally great in reading the enemy�s mind and executed troop moves to entice the enemy to react according to his intention.

As for his style of command, he was very clever in imparting orders such a way his subordinate commanders think they acted on their own initiatives. He was persuasive rather than invasive.

Those preliminaries said, I will start my presentation in the next post by showing that the maneuvers executed by 1/7 Air Cav, 2/7 Air Cav and 2/5 Air Cav at LZ X-Ray from Nov 14 to 15 were to distract the B3 Field Front forces into immobility at their staging areas in support of Arclite strike scheduled for Nov 15 with TOT 1600H.

One should be aware that this operation is like a hunting party.

The enemy perception of things is the most important factor. He should perceive the drop of 1/7 Air Cav as just a minor and temporary distraction that requires some time of pondering; not a big and permanent threat that would scattered him immediately into the jungle.

The ideal is that the enemy stays immobile pending a new decision until the 11151600H TOT.

If the enemy decides to deal with the new minor threat posed by 1/7 Air Cav Bn, then the forces he committed would be one or no more than two battalions so as the bulk of their forces remains immobile.

One should also be aware that the enemy was watching the Air Cav�s moves and reacted accordingly.

Phieu

#1273 31 Aug 12, 15:41

Sidebar: October 1965 1st Air Cav Air Assault Search Concept (Coleman)

(Coleman, Pleiku, 1988, page 100)

The division was given the mission of searching out, fixing, and destroying enemy forces that provide a threat to Pleime, Pleiku and the entire central highlands.
(�)
Its concept was to conduct an intensive search for the enemy, looking everywhere � in the villages, in the jungles, and along stream beds. By widespread dispersion, made possible by excellent communications and helicopter lift, the brigade was to sweep large areas systematically. Each battalion was to be deployed with supporting artillery and then was to further be deployed with supporting artillery and then was to further disperse its companies. Vigorous and intensive patrolling from company bases was to be conducted. When contact was established, a rapid reaction force was to be assembled swiftly and lifted by helicopters to close with the enemy. The immediate artillery strike capability would be provided by the unique aerial rocket artillery batteries, along with prepositioned tube artillery.

Phieu

#1274 01 Sep 12, 03:00

Sidebar: October 1965 1st Air Cav Air Assault Search Concept (Cochran)

(Cochran, 1984)

Kinnard: Right after the Plei Me siege was broken, I felt that it was up to me to find these guys who had been around the camp. So we came up with a search �modus operandi� in which the Cav Squadron was going to range widely over a very large area and I was going to use one infantry brigade to plop down an infantry battalion and look at an area here and there. I felt that we had to break down into relatively small groups so we could cover more area and also the enemy would think he could fake us. You couldn�t put down a whole battalion out there and go clomping around. You had to break down into company and platoon-sized units. You had to rely upon the fact that with the helicopter you could respond faster than anyone in history. I then learned, totally new to me, that every unit that was not in contact was, in fact, a reserve that could be picked up and used. This is my strategy. Start from somewhere, break down into small groups, depending upon the terrain, and work that area while the Cav Squadron roamed all over. The name of the game was contact. You were looking for any form of contact � a helicopter being shot at, finding a campfire, finding a pack, beaten-down grass.

Phieu

#1275 01 Sep 12, 05:02

lots of thoughts on this passage. After the siege was broken, and there was uncertainty on where the enemy formation had moved, it seems entirely logical to begin a search utilizing the "technique" described above. The description is not "THE" Air Assault tactic, it is simply a way to conduct an area reconnisaince. The intel picture was unclear. Moore at least had limited intel that showed a possible enemy Battalion in the vicinity. There is nothing to say he would not have begun to conduct an area reconnisaince himself, utilizing the roughly the same technique outlined in the above passage. I'll be back in a sec...I want to go check out the OPORD and review the scheme of maneuver.

OMG!!! Gentlemen, I just may have hit the mother load! I will share more info on Tuesday. Nothing I can do over the weekend. I'll explain later, no matter how this works out, one way or the other.

Don744

#1276 01 Sep 12, 11:35

Pleiku Campaign, Nov 14 states:

Few units that have a rendezvous with destiny have an inkling of their fate until the historical moment touches them. So it was with the 1/7 Cav on the morning of 14 November. It was to be a routine operation, in so far as any operation deep in enemy territory can be routine.

�A routine operation�? Hardly. Otherwise, in light of October 1965 Air Assault Search Concept, it would

- start with a company sized unit, instead of a battalion;

- not get prep fires;

- have the recon platoon on the lead helicopter instead of closing in with the last helicopter at 1500H;

- react swiftly with piling troops, when the enemy rushed in one battalion, instead only B 2/7 Cav was helilifted into LZ X-Ray at 1800H and 2/5 Cav was deposited at LZ Victor and marched in on land and closed in the next morning.

- keep 1/7 Cav, instead of being relieved the next day, and joint force with 2/7 Cav and 2/5 Cav to pursue the enemy.

Obviously, Moore was not sent in Chupong to execute an air assault search operation.

What was the real mission then? Just to distract the enemy into immobility in support of Arclite strike.

Phieu

#1277 01 Sep 12, 19:30

Moore was sent in to search for, and destroy, the possible enemy Battalion. All of the artillery prep and ARA was SOP for a forced entry into enemy held territory. METT-T dictates tactics. For those that were not formally schooled, that's Mission, Enemy,Time, Troops, and Terrain. Not every operation is executed in a cookie cutter fashion. And throwing the term "Air Assault" in front of "search operation" means little. Helicopters are only a way to get to work.

Obviously, according to numerous written sources, Moore was conducting a "Search" and Destroy operation. I heard the words come out of his mouth during interviews, and seen it written in his book. I'll take his word for it.

don744

#1278 01 Sep 12, 19:42

don744: OMG!!! Gentlemen, I just may have hit the mother load! I will share more info on Tuesday.

Is it Tuesday already?

othing I can do over the weekend.

Today is Saturday!

Phieu

#1279 01 Sep 12, 19:58

Silly, I meant specifically about my early morning post. Don't need to wait until Tuesday to comment on the Air Assault Search tactic.

don744

#1280 01 Sep 12, 20:00

Oh ...

Phieu

#1281 01 Sep 12, 21:39

don744: I heard the words come out of his mouth during interviews, and seen it written in his book. I'll take his word for it.

Moore did not know what he was talking about, nor Kinnard and Knowles chose not tell the whole truth.

I thought I went through this multiple times already ...

Phieu

#1282 01 Sep 12, 21:48

Phieu : Oh ...

Now that is what I like to see

Miss Saigon

#1283 01 Sep 12, 21:57

Phieu - Just one question for you at this time - why is it that you always say the US never knew anything? Are you saying that S. Vietnamese military officials did not trust the US? ...or that they didn't feel the need for them to know the whole picture despite the facts that it was US servicemen on the ground, not S. Vietnamese? Why wouldn't Moore be told if you say he wasn't?

I think this is important to understand at this point of the conversation.

DeltaOne

#1284 02 Sep 12, 03:52

DeltaOne: Phieu - Just one question for you at this time

See what I meant when I asked everybody to hold their thoughts at this point for a while so I can make my presentation without interruptions?

First Don, next you, then Sam, next Lucky, then the Jester, next Altus, then Boonie, next RR (just to show off his wit!), etc.

I am trying to tell you what you still do not know about Iadrang, and I have been constantly bombarded with what you � not specifically you � already know that I knew are wrong.

That said, OK let me answer just this one question of yours and resume my presentation.

- why is it that you always say the US never knew anything?

I never say that, "the US". General Knowles knew, General Larsen knew, General DePuy knew about the operational concept of Arclite strike. They would not play along with Colonel Hieu, if he did not tell them the whole truth and if he did not win their heart and mind on this �crazy� idea of him. Am I not right?

Are you saying that S. Vietnamese military officials did not trust the US?

It was mostly the other way around. That was why the US yanked the wheel of the Vietnam War from the Vietnamese military officials' hands.

...or that they didn't feel the need for them to know the whole picture despite the facts that it was US servicemen on the ground, not S. Vietnamese?

Again, it was the other way around most of the time and especially when the US abandoned South Vietnam all of a sudden� The US went in and got out South Vietnam with a cavalier attitude. Am I not right?

Why wouldn't Moore be told if you say he wasn't?

Does a battalion commander needed to be told everything about the operation? Especially when the outcome depends on the maintenance of total secrecy?

Moore was given all the means and was told all he needed to be told to accomplish his assigned task.

I think this is important to understand at this point of the conversation.

I do understand. I hope you do too now so that you can hear what I am going to tell you next about LZ X-Ray.

PS - Sam, I think one thing has been bogging you down and prevent you from seeing things with a cool and clear mind: the thoughts of your fallen brothers in arm due to negligence of their commanders.

I gave you my assurance that Colonel Hieu was a compassionate commanders. You said you took my words for it, but you did not mean it deep down, did you?

Phieu

#1285 02 Sep 12, 04:56

Phieu : Moore did not know what he was talking about, nor Kinnard and Knowles chose not tell the whole truth.

I thought I went through this multiple times already ...

I suppose you have gone thru this multiple times...but it doesn't make any more sense the 5th recounting. Now, please...continue with your presentation.

don744

#1286 02 Sep 12, 06:33

don744: I suppose you have gone thru this multiple times...but it doesn't make any more sense the 5th recounting.

Not from your perspective ... for sure ... even after the nth times ...

Now, please...continue with your presentation.

Oof ! ... finally ... I got your permission ... Thank you, thank you!

Phieu

#1287 02 Sep 12, 11:07

Before I resume my presentation, I would like to introduce an element that most of you are not aware of, that is B3 Field Front knew quite well 1st Air Cav tactical routines down to the minute details.

In other words, they had 1st Air Cav in their pockets, so to speak.

And Colonel Hieu knew how to exploit his opponent�s intelligence and knowledge to his advantage in his hunting game at LZ X-Ray.

So, let me show you a NVA document captured after Pleime Campaign that attests to this effect: B3 Field Front knew 1st Air Cav tactical routines quite well.

Characteristics of the 1st US Air Cavalry Division Through Their Activities at Pleime and Ia Drang From 24 October to 19 November 1965:
I. Main Activities
a) 1st Phase: cooperate with Vietnamese troops to lift the siege at Pleime (24 to 28 October 1965).
b) 2nd Phase: use small detachments and coordinate with Vietnamese Special Forces Rangers to conduct raids into our rear (28 Oct to 11 Nov 1965).
c) 3rd Phase: use larger forces to launch raids deeper into our rear at Chu Pong and Ia Drang (14 to 19 November 1965).
II. Tactical Characteristics
Through their activities at Pleime and Ia Drang, the 1st US Air Cavalry Division has conducted the following kinds of operations:
- Reinforce Vietnamese troops to lift the siege at Pleime.
- Conduct separate activities in a separate area or in coordination with small detachments of Vietnamese SF Rangers.
I - Tactics
a) Helilift followed by foot displacement to objectives.
- In the operation to lift the siege at Pleime, the Americans use a Task Force composed of two Cavalry battalions and one 105 How battery.
- On 24 Oct, one battalion is helilifted to 1km5 SW Phu My then progresses on road together with 20 armored vehicles and one 105How Battery to Plei Ngol Ho (25 Oct), until Plei Xom at 4km North of Pleime (26 Oct), behind the 3rd Armored Task Force. In general, their progression takes place carefully and slowly.
b) Vertical landing by "frog leaps" into our rear by helicopters (28 Oct. to 10 Nov. 1965).
- forces used: from one battalion to one company of US troops or two companies of US troops coordinated with Vietnamese SF Rangers.
- Purposes: conduct raids, reconnaissance or harass our rear; disrupt our supply routes; destroy our aid-stations, CP's, information and telephone stations; capture isolate soldiers, destroy caches; designate targets for airstrikes. Their purpose could be also to harass our rear, to compel us to withdraw our troops, which are encircling Pleime in order to facilitate their own withdrawal from Pleime to Pleiku. While conducting raids into our rear, the enemy also uses forces of company or battalion size to sweep around their bases in the vicinity of Le Phong, Duc Nghiep, Xung Quen (South of Bau Can and Tan Lac).
- Activities: quick raids into our weak positions followed by quick withdrawals. Right after landing, the enemy could attack quickly the objective. When isolate groups of our soldiers are sighted, they use from 2 to 6 helicopters to make a landing and to capture them. They also helilift a platoon or company size force to cultivated spots, hills and establish their position on the edge of forests to set ambushes along trails which they suspect to be our supply routes (PleiBonGa, Pleithe). Sometimes they occupy high grounds as vantage points to control our axes of movement, for instance the hill 475 and Kuenh Xom. The activities of these detachments could last for a few hours or up to 2 days.
- Remarks on enemy tactics: thanks to their high mobility the enemy could raid with high speed and surprise into our objectives in our rear. In our movements and halts, we must have contingency plans to counter-attack enemy heliborne troops and to protect our rear, our wounded personnel. Isolate groups must be armed. Our observation and reconnaissance systems must be reorganized to keep us abreast of the enemy situation. All units from company size up must set observation posts at halts or in operations.
c) Vertical landing of large bodies of troops to conduct larger-scale raids into our rear (Chu Pong, Ia Drang from 14 to 19 November 1965).
- Forces used: one reinforced Cavalry brigade composed of 4 battalions (the 1/7, 2/7, 1/5, c2/3) and possibly the whole 2/3 battalion, one composite 105-155 How battery, one helicopter squadron (the 9th Hel Squadron belongs to the 1st Air Cav Div.) with strong support by Air Force and B52's bombers.
- Purpose: conduct deep raids into our rear to destroy or neutralize a part of our forces, destroy our infiltration routes, our caches, conduct reconnaissance, detect targets for artillery and strikes. Duration: 6 days from 14 to 19 November.
- Activities: After landing, the 3rd brigade form 3 battalion positions and one artillery position:
* the 1/7 Bn East of Chu Pong 02-90
* the 1/5 Bn West of Ba Bi 06-04
* the 2/7 Bn at 04-98
* the Arty Position West of Quenh Kla 06-00, 08-98, 06-02.
The Brigade CP is at Bau Can which serves also as its rear and base of departure. The 9th Hel Squadron at Pleiku.
- Remarks: Thanks to their high mobility (by helicopters), they could attack with high speed and surprise into our flanks and our rear. They could land in many places and then concentrate to attack an objective or one of our units.
II - Tactics Tips
a) Before landing.
Reconnaissance of landing zones by repeated air reconnaissance or by small Vietnamese SF Rangers teams.
Prestrikes over landing zones. Usually there are no prestrikes when small landing is conducted. For large landing of troops battalion size, sometimes prestrikes are not conducted to achieve surprise. During prestrikes, smoke bombs are also used.
b) Landing zones (in rough terain)
- Small landing: the enemy could land almost everywhere, on small cultivated spots, on tops of hills, on slopes (15 degrees), on clearings with a diameter of 30m, for instance at Kuenh Xom and Hill 475.
- Landing of battalion size forces: the enemy needs large landing zones but could land even in places covered with high elephant grass or in valleys. The width of the LZ is approximately 200m. Most of the time LZ are selected in the vicinity of trails (Plei The, East of Chu Pong, Ba Bi). The enemy does not need to establish their positions near water sources and is supplied by helicopters.
c) Landing of troops.
- Small landing: from 2 to 6 helicopters at one time or separately, one after the other.
- Large landing: from 8 to 10 helicopters (sometimes 20) at one time; each landing lasts for 2-5 minutes. The helicopters land on the ground or hover over the LZ 1 to 2m and the soldiers will jump off.
Small landing is supported by 2-4 armed helicopters. Large landing is covered by fighter and jet aircrafts. The flight formation used by helicopters is one or two columns. In small landing, the helicopters fly straight to the objectives. In large landing they usually hover over other areas before heading for the objective.
Vietnamese SF Rangers or US reconnaissance elements always land first to secure the LZ for the landing of riflemen, fire support elements and CP.
d) After landing.
- Right after landing, the enemy could raid immediately into the objective: capture isolate groups of our soldiers, destroy our information stations, aid stations. For two times, they have raided into the 2nd battalion of the 33rd regiment on 6 Nov and the 9th battalion on 14 Nov.
- They can move into blocking positions on trails or in the vicinity of axes leading toward our rear (Kuenh Xom, Lang Ga, Hill 475).
- Their positions, either in ambushes or in defense are always established near the LZ to facilitate resupply and withdrawal.
- The Vietnamese SF Rangers usually push far in patrols.
e) Air support. -
During the lift of the siege at Pleime, the average of enemy air sorties amounts to 200 per day (maximum: 240 sorties)
- Permanent air cover ensured by 10 to 12 jets and 8 to 10 fixed wings fighter aircraft.
- During the activities at Chu Pong and Ia Drang the average of enemy air sorties is 120 per day (night not included) with a maximum of 162 sorties per day. Maximum of B 52's sorties: 18 per day.
III - Equipment
(See organization charts of Air Cavalry Division and battalions already distributed)
- The Division is equipped with many helicopters and possesses a high degree of mobility: It can conduct raids with speed and surprise and thrust deeply into our rear. The Division has from 450 to 600 aircrafts. The aviation squadron of the Division has 250 aircrafts, among which are 220 helicopters. The Air Cavalry battalions and companies have respectively 88 and 27 helicopters according to their TO and E (The Infantry Battalions of the Division are not equipped with helicopters).
- The Division is equipped with a great amount of modern means for reconnaissance (reconnaissance helicopters) enabling the enemy to detect targets quickly.
- The firepower of the Brigades and of the Division is very strong, reinforced by armed helicopters, artillery and Air Force.
28 December 1965
Chief of Section 2

(Why Pleim, chapter IX)

Wow! ...

Colonel Hieu never underestimated his opponents ... he just outsmarted them ...

Phieu

#1288 02 Sep 12, 13:10

So, what you are saying is...the PAVN were clever little buggers. They would actually study the tactics, techniques, and procedures of the enemy, and then develop counter tactics? Total, and utter Genius!

don744

#1289 02 Sep 12, 14:39

I thought I had you off my back for a while, after getting your permission to proceed...!

No, they seem to know the Kinnard's air assault doctrine a little better than you!

And the genius part lies in he just outsmarted them !

OK, that's enough. Let's get serious and keep quiet. I am about to resume my presentation ...

Phieu

#1290 02 Sep 12, 15:36

Sure, you've said that 6 or 7 times already. Do you know much of the doctrine currently taught comes directly from lessons learned in Vietnam? I doubt "they" know more about Air Assault tactics than I do...we have evolved greatly from those early days. So, rather than respond to this post, please feel free to ignore it and add something new. It's been awhile since I learned something I did not know about Ia Drang.

don744

#1291 02 Sep 12, 15:41

Okidoki ...

Phieu

#1292 02 Sep 12, 16:02

Great!

don744

#1293 02 Sep 12, 21:56

I think that at the battalion level, the commander MUST know what he is up against. He needs to know whether he should land his troops in on LZ such as LZ X-Ray or whether he should have his companies split up and have them come into various LZ's. The fact that Moore chose one speaks volumes to me that he knew what he was up against and that he chose to hit it full on. This was no hammer and anvil action. It was a gunfight like the OK corral. The lines were drawn and it was a slugfest to see who would blink first. Commo wire and well treaded trails were observed and despite low flying patrols took no fire, it became obvious that the enemy was here.

Just on a side note, LZ-Xray could take 8-10 hueys at once. When it was seen that there was a shortage of hueys available, did they attempt to employ some chinooks and were turned down or were these all tied up also?

DeltaOne

#1294 03 Sep 12, 01:34

Chinooks were never employed in air assaults on potentially hot LZs.

Boonierat

#1295 03 Sep 12, 04:58

DeltaOne: I think that at the battalion level, the commander MUST know what he is up against.

I told you already that Moore was told everything he needed to be told by Brown.

Looming in the back of his mind was that big red star on the G-2 and S-2 situation maps, and for this reason, he told Moore to keep his rifle companies within very close supporting range of one another. (Coleman, page 200)

He needs to know whether he should land his troops in on LZ such as LZ X-Ray or whether he should have his companies split up and have them come into various LZ's?

Did Brown not emphasize that he must keep his rifle companies within very close supporting range of one another?

Colonel Brown arrived and I walked him through the plan. He agreed with everything, including the selection of X-Ray as the assault landing zone. He chatted with some of the officers and troopers for a few minutes. Then, just before he left, he did something out of the ordinary. Says Matt Dillon: "Colonel Brown called Moore and me aside. He told us: 'I want you tow to be especially careful on this operation.' He looked concerned." As we walked Brown to his helicopeter he repeated his instructions: "Stay tight" and "don't let your companies get separated". (Moore, page 66)

The fact that Moore chose one speaks volumes to me that he knew what he was up against

Sure, he also saw that big red star that was looming in the back of his mind was that big red star on the G-2 and S-2 situation maps,

and that he chose to hit it full on.

Knowing quite well that once the contact is made, a full and mighty reaction force of Air Cav will follow suite ....

This was no hammer and anvil action. It was a gunfight like the OK corral. The lines were drawn and it was a slugfest to see who would blink first.

No, it was a hunting game action and it was a slugfest to see who - the hunter or the hunted - would blink first.

Just on a side note, LZ-Xray could take 8-10 hueys at once.

Moore (page 83) said, up to 8 at one time and Coleman (page 204) said Moore think, up to 10 birds in formation.

When it was seen that there was a shortage of hueys available, did they attempt to employ some chinooks and were turned down or were these all tied up also?

3rd Cav Brigade had 24 hueys at its disposition. Brown assigned 16 to LZ X-Ray. Not counting the other hueys from the two other brigades it could call upon.

Knowles got on the horn and called Harry Kinnard back at An Khe, asking for another infantry battalion, more artillery, and both troop- and medium-lift helicopters. Kinnard replied, �They�re on the way, but what�s going on?� (Coleman page 219)

Go tell Kinnard that his 3rd Cav Brigade was operating in a shortage of huyes condition � and you will see the General's face color turns crimson - if it was right - or livid - if it was wrong!

Phieu

#1296 03 Sep 12, 06:35

Boonierat: Chinooks were never employed in air assaults on potentially hot LZs.

So they knew it was a hot LZ? Or was it just a precaution? Where did the intel come from?

DeltaOne

#1297 03 Sep 12, 07:19

DeltaOne: So they knew it was a hot LZ? Or was it just a precaution? Where did the intel come from?

Read Moore's book. The intel came from signal intercept.

altus

#1298 03 Sep 12, 08:27

D1,

There were probably several sources. One came from a 1 CAV radio intercept team outside of Pleime. There were also ther divisional assets like infrared imaging (red haze reports) that provided pieces. Then, there is the possibility of HUMINT, which could have come from any prisoners taken at Pleime or the relief column ambush site. That is speculation, however. Don't know if there were any prisoners taken. Lastly, intelligence taken from most sources is highly scrutinized. There is such a thing as disinformation. We used it extremely well at Midway when we transmitted in the clear a problem with the water system to get the IJN to identify their target.

don744

#1299 03 Sep 12, 10:18

Quiet, please.

Phieu

#1300 03 Sep 12, 10:19

May I have your attention, please.

Phieu

#1301 03 Sep 12, 10:21

Class is about to start.

Thank You.

Phieu

#1302 03 Sep 12, 10:31

So, as soon as Colonel Hieu learned on Nov 13 that B3 Field Front starts staging its three regiments for the movement to attack Pleime camp, he notifies General DePuy to set the TOT for 11151600H.

Now he needs to have the three regiments stay immobile at their staging spots until that TOT time. To achieve that, he needs to distract them from going out toward Pleime camp and refocus their attention toward a new threat.

They have to perceive the new threat is serious enough as not to ignore it. At the same token the new threat should not be perceived as a great punch that would make them scattered into hiding again.

The arrival of an Air Cav battalion is just about right. A company sized force would be too small as a threat; they would just ignore it and carry on moving out of the assembly areas which will be emptied in a couple of hours.

B3 Field Front Saw Only One Air Cav Battalion

So, the Air Cav announces its arrival with a 20 minute artillery prep fire, followed by a �large, majestic armada of sixteen ships� (Coleman, page 213), with the battalion commander on the lead helicopter, instead of the recon platoon.

Air Cav succeeds in attracting B3 Field Front�s attention. By 1120H, B3 Field Front sent a message to Air Cav through a so called �prisoner� captured: �don�t you dare attack us; we are three battalions strong and anxious to kill you�. (Coleman, page 210)

By 12:10H, B3 Field Front understands the signals giving out by Air Cav: we are coming to attack you, alright, but not immediately (we left our recon platoon behind).

By this time the bulk of 1/7 Cav has closed in: Company B, Company C, Company D and the bulk of Company A.

The distraction sought is achieved: B3 Field Front decides to postpone the attack of Pleime camp and intends to get rid of the small nuisance with two battalions while the bulk of it forces remain immobile at staging locations. It thinks it can do that in no time and resume the movement to attack:

they were too confident that their attack would disorganize the 1/7 battalion very quickly. (Why Pleime, chapter V)

As B3 Field Front decides to attack 1/7 Cav with two battalions, the remainder of 1/7 Air Cav is rushed in at 1500H and 2/7 Cav and 2/5 Cav are put on alert as reaction forces. B 2/7 Cav closes in at 1800H.

At 1850H, while inspecting the X-Ray battlefield, General Larsen broke to General Kinnard the news of an Arclife strike scheduled for tomorrow at 1600H:

- 18:50H: 1st Air Cav Div (Lt Col Buham) Gen Kinnard discussed with Gen Larsen the possibility of having a B-52 strike in the Long Reach area �X� Gen Larsen was in favor of this. (G3 Journal/IFFV).

Later on that night, General Kinnard questions General Knowles about this. General Knowles lies to him in not revealing it is Colonel Hieu�s operational concept:

The original plan to employ strategic bombers in support of the division was presented by the Assistant Division Commander (ADC-A) through Field Force Vietnam Commanding General to the J-3 of US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. (Pleiku Campaign, page 9)

B3 Field Front Saw Only Two Air Cav Battalions

Since B3 Field Front only commits one to two battalions, Colonel Hieu advises General Knowles not to commit more than two battalions, so that B3 Field Front would not rush in more troops in reactive response and the targets for Arclite strike would evaporate in smokes.

At this point, General Knowles is put on a difficult posture: as soon as there is a contact made, he should pile in troops immediately; that�s Kinnard�s air assault tactics.

Knowles got on the horn and called Harry Kinnard back at An Khe, asking for another infantry battalion, more artillery, and both troop- and medium-lift helicopters. Kinnard replied, �They�re on the way, but what�s going on?� Knowles responded, �We�ve got a good fight going. Suggest you come up as soon as possible.� After setting the reinforcement wheels in motion, Kinnard choppered over from An Khe and met Knowles at Catecka. When he arrived, Knowles showed him the situation map he had propped up against a palm tree. Kinnard took one look and said, �What the hell are you doing in that area?� Obviously, someone hadn�t kept the boss informed about Larsen�s guidance to get after the enemy even if it meant walking away from the dry holes in the east. Knowles told Kinnard, �The object of the exercise is to find the enemy, and we sure as hell have!� Knowles remembers an awkward pause before Kinnard said quietly, �Okay, it looks great. Let me know what you need.� (Coleman page 219)

Oof, General Kinnard let General Knowles do as he sees fit: only one additional battalion�

The next morning by 0915H on 11/15, company A 2/7 Cav lands to reinforce 1/7 Cav.

As the Air Cav units present at LZ X-Ray are still not able to rescue the isolated platoon, 2/5 Cav was ordered in by foot from LZ Victor undetected so as B3 Field Front is left to believe (2/5 Cav closes in at 1205H) there are still only two Air Cav battalions at X-Ray and does not feel the need to rush in units of 32nd Regiment to the amazement of General Kinnard:

Neither has there been an explanation for the failure to commit the 32d Regiment which apparently held its positions 12-14 kilometers to the northwest on the north bank of the Ia Drang. (Pleiku Campaign, page 88)

Arclite strikes at 1600H.

Mission accomplished for 1/7 Cav!

1/7 Cav is relieved by 2/7 Cav and 2/5 Cav and is helilifted out of X-Ray at noon 11/16.

2/7 Cav and 2/5 Cav are ordered out by foot the next day 11/17 to make room for Arclites to strike X-Ray itself.

A Hunting Game

You have cornered an animal.

You are about to shoot when the animal decides to move away.

You make a little bit of noise to draw his attention.

He stares at you, and stands still.

You avoid making anything else that he would perceive as a threat and would run away.

He stands still and you shoot.

Phieu

#1303 03 Sep 12, 11:00

Good recap. Minor footnote...the military uses a format for expressing dates and times called a Date Time Group (DTG). The format combines numbers and letters to express the specific like so ... Day/hour/time zone/month/year. using the arclite strike as an example, it would look like this:

151600HNOV65. The whole 11151600H thing took a second to figure out.

Just a note.

don744

#1304 03 Sep 12, 11:20

Taken from the G3, IFFV journal.

[14 NOV]-18:50H: 1st Air Cav Div (Lt Col Buham) Gen Kinnard discussed with Gen Larsen the possibility of having a B-52 strike in the Long Reach area �X� Gen Larsen was in favor of this. The following info is furnished. On 4 Nov Enemy Bn confirmed vic YA8205, assumed to be moving south. Know secret base �Chupony� vic YA 9000. On 6 Nov had secondary explosion vic YA 8703 as result of Air strike. 12.7mm AA fire received from these guns vic YA 8803. On 14 Nov from line YA 9399 est 1 VC regt ID elem of 2 Bn attaching to W in determined effort using human wave tactics. This confirms Cav to believe they are defending something big � something Cav should hit � such as supply base a hold up forces. VC cap in this area were wearing steel helmets-POW have ID their unit as 66th Regt 304th Div. Cav would like to get going in request for B-52 strike knowing the time frame. If Cav can help to develop target they are ready and will provide the help we need. This has been passed to G2 and G3 air. G3 Air (Capt Green) recommended CG consider requesting a div[version] of a planned strike to bring in a strike.

Reads as if no decision had been made until early evening, 14 November. If a decision was made days prior, nobody knew about it. Not even DePuy. Had there been a pre-planned strike, the AF would have notified the ALO that there was already one coordinated. Also, the red highlighted text explains how they were able to turn the request so quickly. They diverted a planned strike. Took me a minute to figure it out until I was able to make the connection that "div" was really short for diversion.

In addition, if Kinnard was clueless to the plan to use B-52s...why was he the one at IFFV approaching Larsen with the option of using an ARCLITE?

don744

#1305 03 Sep 12, 11:38

G3 Journal/IFFV recorded

- 11/14/65 18:50H: 1st Air Cav Div (Lt Col Buham) Gen Kinnard discussed with Gen Larsen the possibility of having a B-52 strike in the Long Reach area �X� Gen Larsen was in favor of this.

Who, General Kinnard or General Larsen, initiated the idea of �having a B-52 strike in the Long Reach area �X�?

At first, one might think it was General Kinnard who raised the idea first and General Larsen concurred.

But in reality, General Larsen was with tact and subtlety breaking the news of the preplanned use of B-52 strike by J3-MACV in coordination with II Corps, 1st Air Cav CP Forward (General Knowles) and IFFV without General Kinnard�s knowledge.

As a matter of fact, the preplanning B-52 strike started as early as November 4. Continuation of quote:

The following info is furnished. On 4 Nov Enemy Bn confirmed vic YA8205, assumed to be moving south. Know secret base �Chupony� vic YA 9000. On 6 Nov had secondary explosion vic YA 8703 as result of Air strike. 12.7mm AA fire received from these guns vic YA 8803. On 14 Nov from line YA 9399 est 1 VC regt ID elem of 2 Bn attaching to W in determined effort using human wave tactics. This confirms Cav to believe they are defending something big � something Cav should hit � such as supply base a hold up forces. VC cap in this area were wearing steel helmets-POW have ID their unit as 66th Regt 304th Div.

Clearly, General Larsen "furnishes" the information obtained since Nov 4 to General Kinnard about various positions of the enemy units that became targetable to B-52 strike (with 4-digit coordinates). Not the other way around.

Just like after being stunned momentarily by the troop insertion into LZ X-Ray, General Kinnard regained his poise and said: �Okey, it looks great. Let me know what you need�, after momentarily stunned by the suggestion of using B-52 strikes, he might have regained his poise and said to General Larsen: �Okey, it looks great. Let me know what you need�. He then proceeded to have his 1st Cav men provide the targets:

- 11/14/ 65 at 21:00H: 1st Air Cav (Capt Parham) Coord for B-52 strike in Code � YA 870000, YA 830000, YA 830070, YA 870070.

Wasn't it too hasty? The Time Over Target was

- 11/15/65 at 06:00H: MACV Capt McCabe � Ref Arclight tgt, TOT is 151600H.

The B-52 folks needed a 72 hour notification. 151600H-142100H=20 hrs were barely sufficient!

Everybody got an electric jolt, from General Larsen through General Knowles to General DePuy who were in the Arclite pre-planning coordination team in 1st Air Cav CPF and J3-MACV respectively. Instead of saying: �Good idea. What is your plan?� And General Larsen just had to break in the news of the pre-planned arclite already set at: �YA 8607, YA 9007, YA 9000, YA 8600� for Nov 15 at 16:00H. Now they had to deal with General Kinnard�s I-am-in-charge attitude. General DePuy tried to throw at General Kinnard a couple of hurdles: he needed to get pre-approval from II Corps Commanding General and would the ground troops be able to vacate the restricted areas on time? When all those attempts failed, he just made known his preference for alternate targets.

- 11/15/65 at 10:30H: MAVC J3 (Gen DePuy) Gen DePuy called Col Barrow and asked if Arc Light had been cleared with CG II Corps. Col Barrow replied yes, CG II Corps has approved Arc Light. Target area approved by Col Barrow and Col McCord. Also Gen DePuy wanted to know if the elem of 1st Cav had received the 151600H restriction on not going west of YA grid line. Col Barrow informed Gen De Puy that the 1st Cav had acknowledged receipt of the restriction and would comply. Gen DePuy personally changed target configuration.
- 11:45H: To: 1st Cav (Capt Coller) 1st Cav inquired on whether 1st Cav has any objections on new target area as changed by J-2 MACV. Ref: Secret Message AVCGT 1511651XF DT 6417052Z. 1st Cav stated they are quite satisfied particularly with the reaction time.

General DePuy might have puffed out a huge sigh of relief! Because, not only he did not suspect anything, General Kinnard even offered to have his 1/9 Cav Squadron go into the airstrike area for body damage assessment in the afternoon.

- 11/15/65 at 18:15H: FFV Adv (Maj Boyle) Passed fm 1 Cav (Gen Kinnard): Elements of 1/9 Cav Sqdn went into the airstrike (arclite) target area this afternoon.
- 18:55H: 1st Cav (Lt Temple) Arc light bombing strike 1602H-1632H, area YA 8607, 9007, 8600, 9000; all aircraft on target except one whose load dropped in general area, YA 8015, 8215, 8212, 8412, results being investigated.

General DePuy gave a pat on the shoulder to General Kinnard for his role in the arclite strike:

- Gen DePuy stated that this is the fastest a strike of this nature had ever been laid-on.

Just 20 hrs instead of 72 hrs!

Do you think, after getting a pat on the shoulder, General Kinnard relented? Au contraire, he gave everybody another jolt by making a request for a second arclite strike! That request turned upside down the entire pre-planned arclite strike schedule on Nov 16 and 17, with a strike right on LZ X-Ray on Nov 17. And yet, when pressed, he said he had no ready plan; and Major Turner, who acted as liaison officer, were tired of going back and forth without a clear and definite answer from your 6 and my 6.

- 11/15/65 at 20:40H: 1st Air Cav (Capt Parham) Request for arclight NLT 17 Nov, preferred 16 Nov. Primary YA 830050, YA 850050, YA 843000; Alternate: YV 890980, YV 910980, YV 890950, YV 910950. In approx. 2 hrs a FLASH TWX will follow request.
-11/16/65 at 07:15H: To: 1st Air Cav (Capt Brady) Question: If second B-52 strike approved does Cav plan to exploit? � 0715 Answer from Capt Brady. � yes if not overly committed and if sufficient day light left.
- 08:30H: 1st Cav (Maj Anderson) 1. What are plans for Exploitation of yesterday�s strike? 2. Does 1st Cav plan to commit another Bn. For a total of 5 in Plei Me area? If so we need to know ASAP. 3. If primary tgt for today is approved what are plans for exploitation? Approval of plan is pending on above answers.
- 09:15H: 1st Cav (Maj Anderson) Ref: exploitation of Arclight Tgt. Commander on the ground had plans to send in 1st Cav however at present all units are engaged. When En vic Points X Ray and Lime are defeated. 1/9 will make recon of area. If a stronger force is needed another unit will reinforce. No results of the first light recon. No results.
- 11:35H: 1st Cav Maj Turner � (Encoded) � Present plan extract 1/7 and B/2/7 today, then pull back 2000 meters to defensive position. After ARC tomorrow will follow plan TURNER gave you last night.

The arclite coordination team scrambled in trying to accommodate General Kinnard�s whimp. They did not expect that he flatly refused to budge his troops to a 3000m safety distance at first. It took General Larsen (my 6) to meet him (your 6) right on LZ X-Ray to have the problem solved.

- 11/16/65 at 12:35H: FFV TOC Maj Murray to 3d Bde Adv 1st Cav � Ref your last msg. 3000 meter withdrawal. My 6 called your 6 who said no such plans, plans to remain and also to go into yesterday�s strike area. If the situation has changed and withdrawal necessary suggest you contact your 6 as �He is on the spot� notify this HQ ASAP of decision.
- 12:53H: MACV Maj Kirky � Kirby � I have just talked to the big 6 (Gen Westmoreland). He wanted to know if everything was ok with the Cav, did they have enough air and are troops ok. Ans: To the best of our knowledge and believe yes. Should anything occur you will be notified.
- 12:57H: 1st Cav Maj Turner � The last info (3000 meter w/d) was correct it is a long range plan. We have so much on the ground, that it will take a little time but they plan to move up on high ground to the east (from the bottom of the saucer to the eastern rim) but, whatever our 6 said we will do. I have not talked to 6 yet, perhaps he is unaware of these plans. The Bde also plans to send an element to MACON. Maybe I should not pass any more info to you. I am in the way here and tie up commo. But these are the plans as of now, will let you know outcome.
- 14:00H: Fm G3 TOC SP Howell to 1st Cav Capt Cook � (Encoded) Ref MAC msg � Pull back 3000 meters. General Larsen spoke to Gen Kinnard. Kinnard said no plans to pull back. Elements are going to investigate arclite area bombed yesterday. Suggest you touch base with Kinnard for verification of plans. Notify this HQ ASAP of plans.
- 15:35H: MACV Maj Oneil � What is the status of arclight #1745 Sphinx 160325Z. Ans: Currently being staffed at MACJ 237. II Corps CG concurs with msg number 1745.
- 15:35H: 1st Cav Maj Custer � Request fm Gen Kinnard Status of Arclite requests? One in processing at MACV. CG has approved. Most recent (161520) being processed in this HQ. Gen Kinnard request the latest be afforded highest priority although previous request stand. Hunter is with Kinnard and concurs on target and priority.- 16:25H: Fm TOC to MACV � Arclight request YV 932985, YV 936996, YA 898005, YA 898019. TOT 171300, Not later than 171700.
- 18:50H: II Corp (Capt McConnell) CG II Corps does concur with Arclite.
- 20:25H: G-3 1st Air Cav (Capt Parham) Ref Arc Light MACV advises 3 KM minimum separation target area and frdy troops. Request info this HQ ASAP if 3KM separation can be guaranteed and minimum lead time necessary to provide separation. Fr TOC Lt Bol Benton.
- 20:40H: 1st Air Cav (Capt Parham) CO 3d Bde 1st Cav can meet 3KM separation necessary Arc light and frdy troops by time specified in Msg.
- 22:45H: 1st Air Cav (Capt Parham) Call to say that B-52 Targets Number 34, 35, 36 are OK and Troops will meet 3km safety limits -1st Arc Cav will notify this HQ Units move not safety limit.
- 23:10H: II Corps (Maj Sanabria) Maj Sanabria call to pass concurrence of CG ARVN II Corps on B-52 targets 34, 35, and 36 for 17 Nov.

The G3 Journal/IFFV reveals the following points:

- General Kinnard was not aware of the pre-planned arctlite strike on Nov 16. He said he preferred to have it on Nov 16 rather than on Nov 17.

- General Kinnard was oblivious to the 72 hour notification when he suggested the strike for Nov 16 on Nov 15.

- When he was advised that the Nov 17 arclite strike would be at LZ X-Ray itself, General Kinnard at first refused to budge his two battalions on the ground to a 3,000 meter safety distance. He finally relented to the relief of everybody.

General Kinnard through his ignorance and arrogance almost jeopardized the Arclite strike operational concept meticulously designed by II Corps Command.

He naively thought he could use B-52 strategic weapons as tactical weapons.

G3 Journal/IFFV left no doubts who was in command and control of B-52 airstrike in Long Reach operation.

- 11/15/65 at 10:30H: MAVC J3 (Gen DePuy) Gen DePuy called Col Barrow and asked if Arc Light had been cleared with CG II Corps. Col Barrow replied yes, CG II Corps has approved Arc Light. Also Gen DePuy wanted to know if the elem of 1st Cav had received the 151600H restriction on not going west of YA grid line. Col Barrow informed Gen De Puy that the 1st Cav had acknowledged receipt of the restriction and would comply. Gen DePuy personally changed target configuration. Gen DePuy stated that this is the fastest a strike of this nature had ever been laid-on.
- 19:00H: 1st Cav (L/C Buchan) Target completely covered; best coverage he had seen; one rack of bombs out of target area vic YA 820122-808142, cords not accurate. Between 1700-1730 had Mohawk photo coverage and aerial recon, smoke too thick to observe target area; 1st light 16 Nov will have recon in area. Cav plans to request another strike, will call info to FFV by 2000. Not an immediate, II Corps will make similar request for same area. Mohawk photo now in lab.
11/16/65 at 15:35H: MACV Maj Oneil � What is the status of arclight #1745 Sphinx 160325Z. Ans: Currently being staffed at MACJ 237. II Corps concurs with msg number 1745.
- 18:50H: II Corp (Capt McConnell) CG II Corps does concur with Arclite.
- 23:10H: II Corps (Maj Sanabria) Maj Sanabria call to pass concurrence of CG ARVN II Corps on B-52 targets 34, 35, and 36 for 17 Nov.

Note: there were no ARVN troops present in the Air Cav TAOR on 11/14, 15, 16 and 17.

II Corps Command continued to direct B-52 strikes well into Than Phong 7 operation.

- 11/21/65 at 22:00H: II Corps Capt Neary and Capt Martin - (Encoded) Request time of Abn Bde atk on obj vic YA 810055. Is Abn Bde aware of Arc Lite #4 at 221210H.
- 22:50H: II Corps Capt Neary - Ref encoded msg (log item #60). This request for info is for confirmation that subject (arc lite) is well coordinated. It also pertains to II Corps sec msg, cite number 174, which affects some subj (Arlite msg, gives southern boundary of area of opns which falls within Arc lite tgt. No times are included for movement south). Confirmation of time of movement is required as well as confirmation that subj of encoded msg (Arc lite) is coordinated.
11/22/65 at 01:00H: II Corps Capt Neary - Ref inquiry made by Maj Amey: The Abn Bde will not move south toward their objective area in the south until after Arc light. Actual time is unk, but will be coordinated with Arc light.
- 14:50H: G3 Air (Capt Green) Arc Light strikes were not on time. No results as yet.

That is understandable once we know only II Corps Command - not MACV Command, not IFFV Command, not 1st Air Cav Command, and not 1st Air Cav Forward Command - had at all times a perfect and total situation of the enemy due to its �special agents�.

Phieu

#1306 03 Sep 12, 13:54

altus: Read Moore's book. The intel came from signal intercept.

I have read Moore's book. years ago though. I couldn't remember if they had certain info in regards to LZ X-ray being hot. There were combat assaults through out the war where chinooks were used, some of which turned out to be hot.

DeltaOne

#1307 03 Sep 12, 14:16

DeltaOne: There were combat assaults through out the war where chinooks were used, some of which turned out to be hot.

Any verifiable sources?

Boonierat

#1308 03 Sep 12, 14:34

DeltaOne : I have read Moore's book. years ago though. I couldn't remember if they had certain info in regards to LZ X-ray being hot. There were combat assaults through out the war where chinooks were used, some of which turned out to be hot.

No Chinooks were requested, only "troop- and medium-lift helicopters".

Knowles got on the horn and called Harry Kinnard back at An Khe, asking for another infantry battalion, more artillery, and both troop- and medium-lift helicopters. Kinnard replied, �They�re on the way, but what�s going on?� (Coleman, page 219)

Phieu

#1309 03 Sep 12, 14:37

Phieu : Who, General Kinnard or General Larsen, initiated the idea of �having a B-52 strike in the Long Reach area �X�?

Kinnard of course. If it had been the other way around, the entry would have read "Larsen summoned Kinnard to his HQ do tell him of the Arclite strikes", or words to that effect.

At first, one might think it was General Kinnard who raised the idea first and General Larsen concurred.

But in reality, what source can you show that verifies this? If there is none, then you simply provide conjecture that "surely this must have happened".

Umm...remember, it was Kinnards forces that were engaged with those enemy units, so surely he was well aware of their locations.

Who said he was momentarily stunned when he told Larsen he had a plan to use B-52s?

Wasn't it too hasty? The Time Over Target was

The B-52 folks needed a 72 hour notification. 151600H-142100H=20 hrs were barely sufficient!

Not if an already approved and prepped strike was diverted to this new objective. That cuts the planning execution factors considerably.

Hey, do you have any "new" info for this presentation. I've seen all this before. There has to be some "new" info to present that will make better sense of everything. That is what you have been promising for awhile.

don744

#1310 03 Sep 12, 14:41

Phieu : No Chinooks were requested, only "troop- and medium-lift helicopters".

Chinooks are medium-lift helicopters.

Boonierat

#1311 03 Sep 12, 15:03

don744 : Kinnard of course. If it had been the other way around, the entry would have read "Larsen summoned Kinnard to his HQ do tell him of the Arclite strikes", or words to that effect.

But in reality, what source can you show that verifies this? If there is none, then you simply provide conjecture that "surely this must have happened".

Umm...remember, it was Kinnards forces that were engaged with those enemy units, so surely he was well aware of their locations.

Who said he was momentarily stunned when he told Larsen he had a plan to use B-52s?

Not if an already approved and prepped strike was diverted to this new objective. That cuts the planning execution factors considerably.

�

Phieu

#1312 03 Sep 12, 15:25

The Battle of Kham Duc resulted in the loss of a ch-47. Whether it was a combat assault or flying into a hot LZ to drop supplies is splitting hairs in my mind. The CH-47 was also used for medical evacs from hot zones which resulted in deaths of pilots, crew members and those in the aircraft.

DeltaOne

#1313 03 Sep 12, 15:28

DeltaOne : The Battle of Kham Duc resulted in the loss of a ch-47. Whether it was a combat assault or flying into a hot LZ to drop supplies is splitting hairs in my mind.

One was shot down over FSB RIPCORD while transporting supplies and crashed in the 105mm storage area resulting in the top of the hill being blown off, still that doesn't count a combat assault.

Boonierat

#1314 03 Sep 12, 15:54

Boonierat : Chinooks are medium-lift helicopters.

I think that's what they used to ferry the Artillery units around.

don744

#1315 03 Sep 12, 15:57

Phieu : �

Words work better than smileys to convey thoughts. In this case I would have to assume you meant my post did not make much Sense.

don744

#1316 03 Sep 12, 16:06

don744 : I think that's what they used to ferry the Artillery units around.

Mostly yes, but they could also transport troops in ferry missions or salvage crashed helicopters. They were also employed in combat missions, like dropping cans of CS or Napalm over enemy positions or inserting troops with ladders where no LZ existed, but that was exceptional.

Boonierat

#1317 03 Sep 12, 16:59

Miss Saigon: As for Boonie, I am not sure what would happen if I tried to send the MP's to arrest him

What are the charges?

Lucky 6

#1318 03 Sep 12, 17:01

don744: I think that's what they used to ferry the Artillery units around.

Boonierat : Mostly yes, but they could also transport troops in ferry missions or salvage crashed helicopters. They were also employed in combat missions, like dropping cans of CS or Napalm over enemy positions or inserting troops with ladders where no LZ existed, but that was exceptional.

...and hauling blivets. But, not enough.

Lucky 6

#1319 03 Sep 12, 17:21

3rd Air Cav Brigade was supported by 229th Avn Battalion at LZ X-Ray in terms of troop transportation. I don't see Chinooks.

Phieu

#1320 03 Sep 12, 17:40

That's because the Chinooks were used to transport the artillery to their spot, and the fuel to theirs. Nobody claimed there were any chinooks at X-ray. Those assets are limited and need to be protected, just lie the Q36 and Q37 radars...BTW, have you any "new" info to present?

Don744

#1321 03 Sep 12, 17:52

don744 : BTW, have you any "new" info to present?

I don't know what new info means for you.

If you kindly provide a list of all info I have provided that are no more "new" for you, I would gladly tell you if I have any "new" to present to you.

Meanwhile, I don't think this thread comes to an end yet.

#1322 03 Sep 12, 18:25

We will see if it is at and end yet. If you are holding back info...you should probably present it now. If it is the same old "cut and paste", I've already seen it. Many times over. Maybe sometime next week I'll be able to provide something new. At least I hope so.

don744

#1323 03 Sep 12, 19:24

If it is the same old "cut and paste",

I have been quoting back up "sources".

I've already seen it. Many times over.

but haven't digest them properly yet.

Maybe sometime next week I'll be able to provide something new. At least I hope so.

I hope so too.

Phieu

#1324 03 Sep 12, 19:55

don744: I think that's what they used to ferry the Artillery units around.

The Operations Report Lessons Learned Report 3-66 (page 3) states that the Chinooks:

Airlifted the "equivalent of 67 x artillery batteries"

Airlifted over 6800 tons of supplies

Flew over 7,500 sorties

samtn99

#1325 03 Sep 12, 20:00

My point on chinooks was whether or not they could have been used. It quickly became the 'they were never used' which my only question is 'how did everyone know that every lz was going to be cold?'

Regardless, they were used in other battles for medevac reasons, they were used to move in artillery and were fired upon many times.

I never said they were used at LZ X-ray - period!

Perhaps now some can let their bowels settle down!

DeltaOne

#1326 03 Sep 12, 20:37

Yes Delta, Chinooks could have been used. Interesting thought.

LTC Moore states in his AAR that Chinooks were used to ferry B CO/1-7 Cav (conducted Bde CP security duty the night of 13 Nov) back to Plei Me (PZ for the X-Ray infil) "shortly after first light at 0630" on 14 Nov. These same aircraft were used to move the artillery into LZ Falcon to support X-Ray.

I suppose the same 47s could have went back to Plei Me, picked up the infantry and then gone to X-Ray.

That said, Moore indicates X-Ray could handle about 8 x UHs; that's like what, 2-3 x 47s, tops?

samtn99

#1327 03 Sep 12, 21:22

That being said, would he have been better off tactically by bringing in more men at once rather than the turn around time for the hueys? I guess it doesn't really matter if we don't know if any chinooks were available. I personally think until they knew it was a hot LZ for sure(especially the first one), they just may have had their assets on the ground quicker, allowing Moore to arrange his men before coming under fire. Its just a thought. Hindsight is 20/20 though. He did the best he could under the circumstances and was heroic in his leadership.

DeltaOne

#1328 04 Sep 12, 01:26

You're the one who said Chinooks were used for CA, not me, now you're back pedaling like crazy and the only example you could find was a resupply CH-47 being shot down over Kham Duc. 1st Cav Div had only 28 organic Chinooks in its 228th Assault Support Helicopter Battalion and they were not meant for CAs.

Boonierat

#1329 04 Sep 12, 03:49

Thanks Boonie: your intervention has allowed me to gain a better understanding about the respective roles of 229th Aviation Battalion and 228th ASH Battalion for 1st Air Cav Division: 229th with its hueys and 228th with its 48 - not 28 - CH-47s.

228th ASHB was the 1st Cavalry Division's Chinook Battalion. The Bn had three companies of CH-47 aircraft. Each company had 16 "Hooks."

(www.228th.org)

Phieu

#1330 04 Sep 12, 04:15

Boonierat: You're the one who said Chinooks were used for CA, not me, now you're back pedaling like crazy and the only example you could find was a resupply CH-47 being shot down over Kham Duc. 1st Cav Div had only 28 organic Chinooks in its 228th Assault Support Helicopter Battalion and they were not meant for CAs.

Whatever. I never said they were used at LZ-Xray. So get your bowels under control. Chinooks were used in CA's. No back pedaling here. Lets get back to the topic at hand. We can start another thread about the CH-46 and the CH-47.

DeltaOne

#1331 04 Sep 12, 04:19

DeltaOne : That being said, would he have been better off tactically by bring in more men at once rather than the turn around time for the hueys? I guess it doesn't really matter if we don't know if any chinooks were available. I personally think until they knew it was a hot LZ for sure(especially the first one), they just may have had their assets on the ground quicker, allowing Moore to arrange his men before coming under fire. Its just a thought. Hindsight is 20/20 though.

Brown had made sure Moore had adequate men on the ground at LZ X-Ray at all times when attacked by one to two NVA battalions:

Nov 14

1210H: the bulk of 1/7 - company B, company C, company D and the bulk of company A.

1300H: the entire 1/7.

1600H: 1/7 + B 2/7.

Nov 15

0915H: 1/7 + B 2/7 + A 2/7.

1205H: 1/7 + 2/7 + 2/5.

He did the best he could under the circumstances and was heroic in his leadership.

General Vinh Loc agrees with you on this point

(and Colonel Hieu too, for sure.)

Phieu

#1332 04 Sep 12, 06:48

Trivia note: In 2008, about 45% of the Army's CH-47 fleet was manufactured prior to 1966. Wow! Talk about longevity.

don744

#1333 04 Sep 12, 10:29

Phieu:

Brown had made sure Moore had adequate men on the ground at LZ X-Ray at all times when attacked by one to two NVA battalions:

Nov 14

1210H: the bulk of 1/7 - company B, company C, company D and the bulk of company A.

1300H: the entire 1/7.

1600H: 1/7 + B 2/7.

Nov 15

0915H: 1/7 + B 2/7 + A 2/7.

1205H: 1/7 + 2/7 + 2/5.

Why Pleime, Chapter V recorded the NVA attacks at LZ X-Ray as following:

14 November 1965
Around 1245 hours, lead elements of company B began to engage in a fire fight of moderate intensity.
Shortly afterwards, at approximately 1330 hours, the company commander reported that he was being attacked heavily by at least two companies of enemy and that his right platoon 2B1/7 was in danger of being surrounded and cut off from the rest of the company by a numerically superior force.
The fire fight became intense. Also a few rounds of 60 and 81 mm mortar fire began falling in the LZ and on company B.
(...)
Concurrently, company A minus also made heavy contact with a large force of at least one enemy company which was driving in and along a dry creek bed parallel to the western edge of the LZ. A very heavy firefight immediately broke out. Company A was taking light casualties and extracting a heavy toll from the enemy. One platoon was in such a position that it was able to bring close-in flanking fire on 50-70 VC as they continued moving across their front.
(...)
Just as company A firefight broke out, the last elements of company C and the lead elements D landed. The C company commander directed his elements into position alongside his other elements which had landed previously within five minutes, a force of 175-200 enemy headed for the LZ and ran headlong into company C. They were held off and numerous of them killed in the process of trying to get to the landing zone. The action continued for approximately one hour and a half until the enemy, disorganized and decimated, pulled off under heavy friendly artillery and air fires, dragging many of his dead and wounded.
15 November 1965
Due to the heavy losses they had received in the afternoon, the enemy made only some light probes around the perimeter at night. As for the cut-off platoon, it received three separate attacks from the enemy but thanks to the protection by continued close-in artillery fires, when daylight broke, numerous enmy dead were seen around the platoon.
But as first light came, the enemy reappeared and simultaneously attacked from three directions: from the south, south west and south east.
By 0730 hours, the enemy had moved almost to the perimeter foxholes despite taking severe losses from artillery, mortar and close air support. There was considerable hand fighting.
16 November 1965
The night was relatively quiet until 0400 hours when a force of 250-300 enemy attacked from the south east. Flareship illumination was called for and continuous until 0545 hours. The attack was beaten off by small arms and artillery fires.
At 0432 hours, another attack by 200 enemies came in from the same direction but the artillery took a heavy toll.
By 0500 hours, the weight of the enemy attack had shifted more to the southwest but repulsed half an hour later.
At 0627 hours, another attack came directly toward the CP. At 0641 hours, the enemy had been beaten off and was dragging off bodies under fire.

1/7 Cav was able to hold the line. The heavy casuaties were due to the resolve of NVA combatants wanting to finish off rapidly with the battle in order to resume the interrupted movement to attack Pleime camp in resorting to human waves and close embrace tactics.

Their tactics relied mostly on the "human waves" and they were too confident that their attack would disorganize the 1/7 battalion very quickly. (Why Pleime, chapter V)

Phieu

#1334 04 Sep 12, 10:53

don744: Trivia note: In 2008, about 45% of the Army's CH-47 fleet was manufactured prior to 1966. Wow! Talk about longevity.

Love the Chinook!

#1335 04 Sep 12, 11:20

Me too. Got a HALO jump out of one down in Florida. Was pretty cool. That was one of the few HALOs I had done that, due to the slow speed of the aircraft, that I actually had a falling sensation on exit.

Don744

#1336 04 Sep 12, 17:01

Can you top this: a 60 seconde free fall jump from 13,000 ft?

I skydive!

Phieu

#1337 04 Sep 12, 17:26

Absolutely..can you top a 24000 foot 2:30 second free fall at night with O2 and Combat Equipment?

Did it for a living. But it is an accomplishment for you and just a way to get to work for me. Not a lot of fun involved in Army parachuting.

don744

#1338 04 Sep 12, 17:35

�

Phieu�

#1339 05 Sep 12, 10:48

On November 14 when the news of the first contact was made by 1/7 Cav at LZ X-Ray, instead of sprinting into action and swiftly piling in a great amount of reaction forces as dictated by Kinnard�s air assault tactics,

Knowles got on the horn and called Harry Kinnard back at An Khe, asking for another infantry battalion, more artillery, and both troop- and medium-lift helicopters. Kinnard replied, �They�re on the way, but what�s going on?� Knowles responded, �We�ve got a good fight going. Suggest you come up as soon as possible.� After setting the reinforcement wheels in motion, Kinnard choppered over from An Khe and met Knowles at Catecka. When he arrived, Knowles showed him the situation map he had propped up against a palm tree. Kinnard took one look and said, �What the hell are you doing in that area?� Obviously, someone hadn�t kept the boss informed about Larsen�s guidance to get after the enemy even if it meant walking away from the dry holes in the east. Knowles told Kinnard, �The object of the exercise is to find the enemy, and we sure as hell have!� Knowles remembers an awkward pause before Kinnard said quietly, �Okay, it looks great. Let me know what you need.� (Coleman page 219)

How do you explain this seemingly contradiction considering

- 1) Knowles insisting in being given carte blanche:

After setting up his field headquarters just outside the II Corps command in Pleiku City, Knowles [�], he called Kinnard and said, �Hey boss, communications being what they are, we have potential for problems with the setup the way it is. If you and Swede don�t have enough faith in me, then get someone up here who does.� Knowles didn�t have to work hard to convince Kinnard, who was a strong believer in delegating to subordinates. But Kinnard had to convince Larsen that Knowles needed to have the flexibility to operate. This was still very early in the active American involvement in the war, and senior commanders were generally tiptoeing their way into positions of dominance. So Knowles�s orders were amended to read: �Assist the ARVN if called upon to do so, and seek permission if time and communications permit.� Essentially, it was a carte blanche for Knowles. (Coleman, page 87)

-2) Kinnard�s commanding style of laissez-faire

I moved a forward CP [Command Post] to Pleiku with one of my assistant division commanders, Gen. Dick Knowles. This was my "modus operandi" whenever the action got hot. My own leadership style had always been to give absolute and maximum latitude to people all the way down the line. I did not want to hand manage this thing from back in An Khe. (Cochran)

The only plausible explanation is that Knowles was acting under Colonel Hieu�s guidance in sending only one additional battalion as not to provoke B3 Field Front into escalating the number of troops at LZ X-Ray and into maintaining the bulk of its forces where Arclite strike was scheduled the next day at 1600H.

Knowles needed to pre-empt Kinnard�s take-charge propensity: He might show up suddenly at the command and control room at Air Cav Forward CP/II Corps Command, take over the command of the operation and bark out orders to piling in immediately a lot of more troops, which would jeopardize the whole master plan with the enemy units scattering into small groups and disappearing into the dense jungle.

Knowles remembers an awkward pause before Kinnard said quietly, �Okay, it looks great. Let me know what you need.�

Phieu

#1340 06 Sep 12, 10:41

Moore�s account regarding the timetable of his 1/7 Cav Battalion disgorging on LZ X-Ray is the cause of some misunderstandings. It gives the impression that it was too slow and he did not have enough men on the ground when the enemy attacked, causing his battalion to suffer a heavy toll that was not called for. Some people accuse the unnecessary heavy losses to poor planning.

The night before the attack, Moore estimated that �it would take more than four hours to get all of his men on the ground� (Moore, page 45), based on the number of helicopters, the size of LZ X-Ray that could take 8 hueys at a time, the 30 minute round trip helicopter shuttle, etc.

He remembers that �the first wave of hueys touched ground at 10:48 a.m.� (Moore page 69) and �the last battalion troop lifts began arriving around 3:20 p.m.�, (Moore page 134) and that around 11:20 a.m., when a prisoner was caught, he only had �160-plus American currently on the ground here�. (Moore, page 73)

Moore�s memory seems to be somehow fuzzy. Pleime Campaign AAR writes that

- At 1210H, the bulk of 1/7 Bn had landed on X-Ray: Company B, Company C, Company D, and the bulk of Company A.
- At 1500H, the remainder of Company A and the recon team.

What does �the bulk of 1/7 Bn�. It means �almost of 1/7 Bn�. 1/7 Cav comprised "Alpha Company 115 men; Bravo Company, 114 men; Charlie Company, 106 men; and Delta Company, 76 men� (Moore, page 45). A total of 411 men. Since �the remainder of Company A and the recon team�, which needed only a couple helicopters as transport, should amount to less than 40 men, 371 men should be already on the ground by 12:10 p.m.

NVA intelligence document notes Air Cav troop landing performance: �- Large landing: from 8 to 10 helicopters (sometimes 20) at one time; each landing lasts for 2-5 minutes. The helicopters land on the ground or hover over the LZ 1 to 2m and the soldiers will jump off.�

Yes, it took four hours (from 10:50 a.m. to 3:00 p.m.) for the entire 1/7 Cav to be on the ground, but Moore did not seem to notice that there was a long pause from 12:10 p.m. to 3:00 p.m., not due to the lack of helicopters but due to an intentional action taken by Knowles in executing a distraction move.

Phieu

#1341 06 Sep 12, 11:22

Are we sure that Moore did not notice the the long pause? In a all out firefight where you are grossly out numbered and KIA's and WIA's are beginning to mount and you have trapped with no way out, I believe you may be too busy to think hard on it but I believe he knew exactly what was happening. I just can't accept that American officers had no idea what was taking place. If that is the case, I believe it would break all ties of trust and would drive a large wedge between the two forces.

DeltaOne

#1342 06 Sep 12, 12:15

DeltaOne: Are we sure that Moore did not notice the the long pause?

It seems like it, based on his timeline account of the battle.

In a all out firefight where you are grossly out numbered and KIA's and WIA's are beginning to mount and you have trapped with no way out, I believe you may be too busy to think hard on it but I believe he knew exactly what was happening.

In no times, NVA attacking troops out numbered 1/7 Cav troops.

There are discrepancies between Moore's account and Pleiku Campaign AAR.

I just can't accept that American officers had no idea what was taking place.

Don't you think, Moore ever wonder where the hell were the reaction forces when he made contact with the enemy? instead he got only piece meal reinforcement of B 2/7 Cav at 18:00 p.m. on Nov 14, A 2/7 at 9:05 a.m. and 2/5 Cav at 12:05 p.m. on Nov 15?

If that is the case, I believe it would break all ties of trust and would drive a large wedge between the two forces.

What two forces?

Phieu

#1343 06 Sep 12, 17:17

Between the American forces and the ARVN. I would be pretty pi$$ed if I found out that information or exact battle strategy was not shared with me. Especially because it is a American Battalion that is out there facing their possible end. Just me but IF that happened to me, I would in that command center and bitch slap whoever was responsible.

DeltaOne

#1344 07 Sep 12, 09:54

DeltaOne : Between the American forces and the ARVN.

It was to avoid such friction and to ascertain a smooth and amicable joint collaboration that Colonel Hieu laid out a clear "modus operandi" that stipulates "shared operational concepts" and "separate command".

I would be pretty pi$$ed if I found out that information or exact battle strategy was not shared with me. Especially because it is a American Battalion that is out there facing their possible end. Just me but IF that happened to me, I would in that command center and bitch slap whoever was responsible.

Colonel Hieu shared his operational concept of the joint Long Reach/Truong Chinh operation with General Knowles. If General Knowles chose not to tell Moore and even Kinnard about it, then you have to �bitch slap� General Knowles.

Moore himself - it seemed � attempted to do just that, he did walk in - not the command center in Pleiku - but the one in Saigon and �bitch slap� General DePuy (or was it the other way around?) Indeed, he was whisked to Saigon early in the morning of November 16 to meet with DePuy.

Nov 15 21:05H: 1st Cav (Col Beaty) Lt Col Moore will arrive Saigon 1130 in morning (to brief Gen DePuy) (G3/IFFV)

It is interesting to note that Moore never mentioned this seemingly secret wood shed session in his book or elsewhere.

In extrapolation, don't ever assume that Moore said it all about Ia Drang battle in his book.

Anyway, talking about trust and mistrust, here is Moore�s personal feelings before and after the LZ X-Ray battle:

Knowles, Brown and I were comfortable with each other. We had worked together for the last eighteen months. They knew their stuff on airmobility and helicopter warfare, and I had gone to school on them. They knew they could count on me, and I knew they would provide all the support I needed, sometimes even before I knew I needed it. General Harry Kinnard had fostered that kind of leadership in the 1st Cavalry Division. Kinnard came out of the great Airborne school of thought that authority has to be pushed down to the man on the spot, because you never know when leaders will land when units jump out of airplanes. What was true for parachute operations was likewise true for fast-moving airmobile combat units leapfrogging across difficult terrain. (Moore, page 38)

By the way, D1, were you Air Cav or just SF?

Phieu

#1345 07 Sep 12, 11:06

"Just" SF? Bwahahahahaha!!!! I know what you were trying to say...it just made me laugh the way it could come across.

don744

#1346 07 Sep 12, 11:48

�

Phieu

#1347 07 Sep 12, 19:00

Roger.

I agree with you when you are operating in a small scale.

It is a total different ball game when you are a part of a big scale operation.

Anyway, Moore did not seem to share your concerns at LZ X-Ray.

Phieu

#1348 07 Sep 12, 19:05

Okido.

Phieu

#1349 08 Sep 12, 12:15

Phieu : Roger.

It is a total different ball game when you are a part of a big scale operation.

Anyway, Moore did not seem to share your concerns at LZ X-Ray.

Or he did share your concerns. He was comfortable with Knowles and Brown, but definitely not with Larsen.

On November 9, Colonel Brown and I went to the division's forward command post in Pleiku for a briefing on the battlefield situation. The intelligence map hanging on the wall had a large red star on the Chu Pong massif above the Ia Drang Valley, west of Plei Me. I asked one of the briefers what significance that star had and he replied: "Enemy base camp". The next day my battalion was flown from An Khe to brigade field beadquarters in the Catecka Tea Plantation, where Colonel Brown's staff briefed us and gave me my mission to conduct an air assault five miles east of Plei Me and find and kill the enemy. I was surprised and puzzled . After all 1st Brigade contact with the enemy had been west of Plei Me, yet they were ordering us to beat the bushes in a different direction. Then there was that big star on the intelligence map, which indicated that the biggest target of all was way out west. (Moore page 34)

and then

We continued patrolling south and east, finding nothing and growing more frustrated by the hour.
Turns out we weren't the only one who were frustrated. General Dick Knowles was decidedly unhappy with the lack of results. Says Knowles: "Conventional wisdom indicated that the enemy had drifted into an area southeast of Pleiku and we were directed to conduct operations there. Shortly after the operation started, Major General Stanley (Swede) Larsen, the Corps commander, visited us and asked how things were going. I told him we had no contact to speak of and didn't expect any.
Whereupon Larsen asked, 'Why are you conducting operations there?' My respopnse: 'That's what your order in writing directed us to do.' The general answered that our primary mission was: find the enemy and go after him."
Knowles knew what to do with that kind of guidance. In the late afternoon of November 12, he flew south from Pleiku in his command helicopter looking for Colonel Tim Brown, who was with me in the field. He climbed out of the chopper, cigar in hand, and ask how it was going. Brown, who seldom wasted words, replied: "Dry hole, sir." Knowles turned to me: What do you think? "Nothing here, General: we're just wearing out the troops." He turned back to Brown: "Tim, what do you think about heading west - a long jump into the Ia Drang Valley?" Brown said that would be better than here: "From what I remember, your G-2 said something about a base camp out there."
Knowles gave us the go sign. Later he would say that he gave the order "based on strong instincts and flimsy intelligence." (Moore page 37)

However Knowles did not reveal to Moore that on November 10 Larsen told him

the movement and shift in emphasis from west to east was to further stimulate a forthcoming decision from NVA division headquarters. (Pleiku Campaign Nov 10)

and on November 11, Larsen gave a further precision about that decision

the decision was to regain its early advantage with an attack. The target once again was the Pleime CIDG camp. The division headquarters set the date of attack for November 16. (Pleiku Campaign Nov 11)

Why did Knowles conceal all this info to Moore? Hard to speculate.

Any way, Moore should have gone ballistic when his 1/7 Cav Battlalion made contact with the enemy and reaction forces were not piled in immediately, instedc reinforcement came in piece meals with B 2/7 Cav closing at 1800 hours on Nov 14 and A 2/7 Cav at 0905 hours and 2/5 Cav at 1205 hours on Nov 15.

Thus, to calm Moore down, he was whisked early morning of Nov 16 to meet with General Depuy in Saigon at 1130 a.m. wherein General Depuy briefed Moore about the master plan conceived by II Corps Command.

Fore sure, Moore was sworn into secrecy ... and so never mentions about this secret meeting.

Phieu

#1350 08 Sep 12, 12:30

You make some good points here Phieu. They are the same points that I touched on with the exception that it wasn't the S. Vietnamese II corp command that didn't share info, it was Moore's superiors. Why - I have no idea.

DeltaOne

#1351 08 Sep 12, 15:05

Perhaps, the operational concept was too complex for Knowles to attempt to explain and for Moore to comprehend?

As I said also, Knowles did not share the info with Kinnard either... the motive of which might be easier to fathom...

Phieu

#1352 09 Sep 12, 10:21

Phieu : Perhaps, the operational concept was too complex for Knowles to attempt to explain and for Moore to comprehend?

Am I underestimating Moore's intelligence? Not at all.

Look how many pages, how many posts, how many months, how many ways, how many times, how convincing, how objective, how many sources, how much evidence, how many didactic methods, etc. it takes me to explain Colonel Hieu's operational concept about Iadrang Valley battle, and yet Altus, Boonie, Sam, Don, Dan, TheJester, RR, Leonardo, etc... (all highly regarded in this Vietnam War forum) still not only don't get it but even go as far as accusing me of being deranged and crazy!

How do you expect that Moore could have understood the concept while under pressure of an imminent difficult and risky operation...

Phieu

#1353 09 Sep 12, 10:25

While Moore was whisked to Saigon to meet with General DePuy on November 16, B-52�s continued to strike at YA 830050, YA 850050, YA 843000 after the first waves attack at YA 8607, 9007, 8600, 9000 on November 15. General Kinnard also appeared to have gone ballistic when he found out that his piling in troop phase of his air assault tactics was not applied. He wanted to helilift immediately his troops out of LZ X-Ray and to pursue the enemy, not being aware that he might send his troops into the Arclite�s strike zones. General Larsen forced him to have his troops stay 24 hours longer in preparation for pre-scheduled Arclite to strike LZ X-Ray itself.

At the time of the Xray fight, Swede Larsen was under pressure from the news media on why we left the battlefield. They didn't understand how our unit fought. With an air assault unit, we don't give much of a damn about terrain. You can go anywhere. The focus is on the enemy. You go where he is. At Xray, the enemy broke off, we didn't quit. We were no longer interested in Xray. That piece of ground meant nothing to me. I wanted to go on to where the enemy was. But Swede ordered me to stay in that spot, and I stayed there an extra 24 hours. (Cochran)

11/16/65 at 12:35H: FFV TOC Maj Murray to 3d Bde Adv 1st Cav � Ref your last msg. 3000 meter withdrawal. My 6 called your 6 who said no such plans, plans to remain (...) If the situation has changed and withdrawal necessary suggest you contact your 6 as �He is on the spot� notify this HQ ASAP of decision.

- 12:57H: 1st Cav Maj Turner � The last info (3000 meter w/d) was correct it is a long range plan. We have so much on the ground, that it will take a little time but they plan to move up on high ground to the east (from the bottom of the saucer to the eastern rim) but, whatever our 6 said we will do. I have not talked to 6 yet, perhaps he is unaware of these plans.

- 14:00H: Fm G3 TOC SP Howell to 1st Cav Capt Cook � (Encoded) Ref MAC msg � Pull back 3000 meters. General Larsen spoke to Gen Kinnard. Kinnard said no plans to pull back. Elements are going to investigate arclite area bombed yesterday. Suggest you touch base with Kinnard for verification of plans. Notify this HQ ASAP of plans. (G3/IFFV)

and finally had 2/7 Cav and 2/5 march out of LZ X-Ray toward LZ Albany and LZ Columbus respectively into blocking positions in support of Arclite strikes at YV 932985, YV 936996, YA 898005, YA 898019 on November 17 and at Priority 1. 9201-9401-9298-0408. Priority 2. 9099-9299-9096-9296. Priority 3. 8306-8506-8303-8503 on November 18.

Meanwhile, II Corps decided to finish off the Long Reach/Truong Chinh operation by bringing in ARVN Airborne Brigade, which made General Kinnard angrier because he wanted to pursue the enemy into Cambodia territory with his 2nd Air Cav Brigade instead.

I recommended to Swede and up through the chain that I be allowed to pursue them into Cambodia. This is not well known, but my request was approved up through channels to include Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge but disapproved in Washington ... I wanted to destroy the enemy. This would have been my next step, this is what I wanted the 2nd Air Cav Brigade to do... (Cochran)

Instead, he was resigned to have 2nd Air Cav Brigade play a supportive role to Airborne Brigade and assume the security of the artillery fire base established at LZ Crooks in support of Than Phong 7 operation.

Phieu

#1354 09 Sep 12, 10:47

Phieu : Look how many pages, how many months, how many ways, how many times, it takes me to explain Colonel Hieu's operational concept about Iadrang Valley battle, and yet Altus, Boonie, Sam, Don, Dan, TheJester, RR, Leonardo, etc... (all highly regarded in this Vietnam War forum) still not only don't get it but even go as far as accusing me of being deranged and crazy!

No amount of pages, months, ways, or times will help you properly make your case until you argue it in a convincingly objective, coherent and logical manner.

altus

#1355 09 Sep 12, 10:48

See, I told you so ...

For your level of intelligence, if not conditionned, only a hint might suffice ...

Phieu

#1356 09 Sep 12, 18:37

Phieu,

In general, listing off names of those who post here and then say 'because they can't get it, then Lt. Col. Moore couldn't' is not a factual deduction. Moore was an excellent tactician and combat leader. His men would follow him through the gates of hell because of their respect for him. His men were 'green' yet his training and leadership led to a great victory.

When you slam him and other Americans and only heap eternal praise on your brother, it rubs people the wrong way. It also can appear to some that you are willing to make things fit in order to bring him praise. You are free to feel as you may about us but I wouldn't go as far as you have regarding Moore. Remember, he had to follow the order that were handed down to him. I my mind, his is an exceptional leader.

Chow,

DeltaOne

#1357 09 Sep 12, 18:58

Phieu : Am I underestimating Moore's intelligence? Not at all.

How do you expect that Moore could have understood the concept while under pressure of an imminent difficult and risky operation...

Seeing as Moore went on to a Brigade command shortly thereafter, and retired as a Lieutenant General, I scoff at the assertion that he couldn't have grasped the concept. He was regarded as one of the best, if not the best, battalion commanders in the division.

No one here has found it difficult to understand the point that you're trying to make; we obviously remain unconvinced, not confused. It's always appeared to me as if you've decided on a narrative, and attempted to find supporting evidence that's ambiguous enough to leave room open for the possibility of your version of events, but neither positively proving any of your points nor negatively disproving the accounts of others.

I'd like to consider myself reasonable, and I don't believe I'm splitting hairs. If you claimed someone had told you these conversations had happened, that there was some sort of grand design for II Corps on paper and it was simply lost like any other frag, or even that there was a rumor of such, I'd be more receptive. But you've simply declared this all as the definitive version of events, despite the absence of any first hand account on any side, primary documents, second-hand accounts, or even hearsay/scuttlebutt: and that all those who were privy to the plan purposely left their subordinates ignorant of all details, or took it to their grave in a cover-up involving all levels of the CoC from Brigade to MACV.

I think a healthy skepticism is warranted.

Lucky 6

#1358 09 Sep 12, 19:39

I'd rep you if I could...forum says I've flicked too many boogers your way...

don744

#1359 09 Sep 12, 19:56

Some may even think that you (Phieu) are suffering from hero worship. I am sure that you did look up to your brother and yes, he was a good soldier. I am not sure what the age difference is between you and he. When I was growing up, I had an older cousin and he could no wrong in my eyes. When he would do something, I made it sound even bigger.

Now you are much older than my personal note here, but at times it appears you may be doing this. Like I said, he was a good man/soldier. Just tell his story without making it sound like everyone around him were idiots and morons.

I again will say it, I respect him for who he was and what he did despite never meeting him.

Peace,

DeltaOne

#1360 09 Sep 12, 21:53

Did I ever say that I put down Moore anywhere?

When did I slam him?

I might criticize General Kinnard, but I don't think what I said about him - arrogance, aggressive, take charge type, etc - was wrong or exaggerate.

I praise about my brother, yes. But by exaggeration? I don't think so. I did it with enough evidence. If in doing so I rub people the wrong way, it's their problem, not mine.

By the way, General Hieu - and indirectly the ARVN only got praised from one voice, a tiny voice of his little brother. Meanwhile American generals and the USAF already got showered by myriads of voices! What's the fuss, here?

Phieu

#1361 09 Sep 12, 22:04

Lucky 6 : Seeing as Moore went on to a Brigade command shortly thereafter, and retired as a Lieutenant General, I scoff at the assertion that he couldn't have grasped the concept.

Let me clarify further, Moore could grasp the concept, alright. I have said that even a third grader can grasp such a concept. But I am sure he would be incredilous that it could be carry out.

I think a healthy skepticism is warranted.

It's very so simple:

- B3 Field Front forces were destroyed by B-52 strikes not by Air Cav ground forces.

- For B-52 strikes to be possible and successful, it has to have a plan.

- Who can possibly conceive that plan? Not Knowles, not Kinnard, not Larsen, for sure. Only II Corps Command. Who in II Corps? Colonel Hieu.

I should not need to back that fact up with evidences. But I did with all those sources that I have provided.

I make my case. You are free to believe or not. My interpretation and perspective make more sense than interpretations and perspectives that have been offered by authors, scholars and historians though.

But, actually, it's not my perspective. It's the perspective given by Why Pleime, the after action report offered by Colonel Hieu, II Corps Chief of Staff. I just elicit it.

Phieu

#1362 09 Sep 12, 22:21

DeltaOne : Some may even think that you (Phieu) are suffering from hero worship.

Suffering? I am quite healthy! and I only worship God!

Before I started studying him in 1998 - at the age of 54 - I only knew him as a so-so general and had never heard about any of his military exploit, especially Pleime.

I am sure that you did look up to your brother and yes, he was a good soldier. I am not sure what the age difference is between you and he. When I was growing up, I had an older cousin I he could no wrong in my eyes. When he would do something, I made it sound even bigger.

This does not apply in my case.

My brother has proven he was the only genuine combat fighting general in the Vietnam War with at least six major battles under his belt while all the other generals be it ARVN, US, VC or NVA had no more than two. He has also shown in Pleime that he was a military genius. Can I make it sound bigger than he was?

Just tell his story

I am doing just that.

without making it sound like everyone around him were idiots and morons.

Do I make myself sound like that? I never intend to sound like that.

When someone is not capable to understand something, I don't attribute it to lack of intelligence, but just to prejudice, envy, jalousie or pre-conditioning.

Often times, too much intelligence, too much stuffing knowledge, clouds one's mind ...

Phieu

#1363 09 Sep 12, 22:40

That said, let me go back telling you my story about Iadrang valley battle.

Phieu

#1364 10 Sep 12, 03:22

Phieu, please continue your points on the Ia Drang battle. My personal observations were just that. No disrespect was intended.

DeltaOne

#1365 10 Sep 12, 06:06

Phieu : It's very so simple:

- B3 Field Front forces were destroyed by B-52 strikes not by Air Cav ground forces.

You have not proved this, other than citing dubious estimated figures.

- For B-52 strikes to be possible and successful, it has to have a plan.

Yes, we can agree, this one is simple.

- Who can possibly conceive that plan? Not Knowles, not Kinnard, not Larsen, for sure.

You have not proved this either.

Only II Corps Command. Who in II Corps? Colonel Hieu.

Not proved as well.

But I did with all those sources that I have provided.

No, what you did was to bring in a myriad of related documents, none of which provided any single direct evidence to your main conjectures. You just cherry picked fragments which were , as Lucky 6 pinpointed, ambiguous enough to leave room open for the possibility of your version of events.

But, actually, it's not my perspective. It's the perspective given by Why Pleime, the after action report offered by Colonel Hieu, II Corps Chief of Staff. I just elicit it.

Isn't it telling that its author chose to, in your own words, ignore you and your presentations?

Altus

#1366 10 Sep 12, 06:21

What can I say!

You are addressing to statements in my summary!

I was way beyond the phase of proving Colonel Hieu was the architect of Long Reach/Truong Chinh operation.

Allow me to quote you, "wading into the same river a second time, is not my cup of tea"!

But if you want to prolong this thread to another 90+ pages, by all means!

If you cannot see it on your own, I won't be able to make you see it with a million proofs and evidences.

As I already told you, "with your level of intelligence, just a hint would suffice; that is if you have not been conditioned by some kind of indoctrination".

Let me get back to telling my story.

Stop listen to it, if you find it nonsense. It is that simple.

Or at least, let's make it that simple.

Phieu

#1367 10 Sep 12, 10:54

Why Pleime states:

For five consecutive days, from 15 to 19 November, the giant B52 bombers had flown a total of 96 sorties. One after the other, the areas of the Chu Pong massif - each of 20 square miles - underwent a systematic earthquake spreading from West to East. VC bunkers and trenches which so far had resisted the strikes by tactical aircraft and artillery began to score direct hits by the 750-pound bombs. The heavy canopy of the jungle ceased to be effective in both concealment and cover. The "back door" into Cambodia was closed and to escape, the VC remnants were reduced to utilize the narrow valley of the Ia Drang.
The intelligence estimate on enemy capabilities, made on 17 November indicated that nearly 2/3 of their strength had been wiped off through the engagements in Phases I and II. This time the main effort was conducted by the ARVN Airborne Brigade whose mission consisted of destroying the fleeing VC units and all their installations around the Ia Drang valley. The 1st Air Cavalry Division which had thus far borne the burden of the attack would continue to exert a pressure from East to West and to provide artillery support for the Airborne Brigade. The operation - dubbed "Th�̀n Phong 7" - began in the afternoon, 18 November when the brigade was helilifted to the area of operations, immediately upon arrival in Pleiku. (Why Pleime, chapter VI)

The Airborne Brigade was planned as reaction force at the outset of Long Reach/Truong Chinh operation:

On 26 October 1965, while the relief column and the garrison of Pleime were conducting a sweep around the Camp, a conference was held at II Corps TOC with the presence of US advisors and unit commanders.
All the information received and the analysis of the situation converged to the same conclusion.
The enemy units had withdrawn west in the direction of the Cambodian border. This would be their only chance of escape because in addition to the advantages of the terrain, the base of Chu Pong and the sanctuary of Cambodia provided not only shelters but also supplies and replacements of which the 32nd and 33rd Regiments were running short.
For the first time since the war broke out on the Indochinese peninsula, friendly forces had the opportunity to come to such a conclusion. Throughout the hostilities since 1948, the enemy has always been able to leave the battlefield and to withdraw safely, to give up the fighting at their own will.
Thus the chance which was offered to friendly forces had not to be overlooked: the two NVA Regiments were to be pursued because if not, the danger would persist and the enemy would have time to reorganize their units.
Besides that, the above decision could this time be made possible because reserve forces were available, with the presence of the 1st US Air Cavalry Division stationed in An Khe, a major unit which possesses the highest degree of mobility all over the world and also the most up-to-date equipment and weaponry.(1)
(�)
The decision made by II Corps Command to exploit the results of the first phase and to pursue the enemy was fully concurred by the US military authorities and agreement was reached to establish a close cooperation in operational activities. The 1st US Air Cavalry Division made the main effort with the Long Reach Operations and the ARVN Airborne Brigade acted as reserve, ready to participate on Corps order. (Why Pleime, chapter IV)

And yet look how Coleman wrote about this episode of bringing the Airborne Brigade in, as it had not been pre-planned and the ARVN were hungry and wanted a piece of the pie:

The movement off XRay was part of a larger maneuver being designed by division headquarters to put the NVA in a nutcracker. Now that some sort of victory could be anticipated on the western plateau, the ARVN wanted a piece of the action. In order to be in on the kill, the ARVN high command was even willing to commit a couple of its palace guard battalions in Saigon, the Airborne Brigade. (Coleman page 248)

Phieu

#1368 10 Sep 12, 11:20

Ok, let's say we have two conflicting pieces of information. How does one decide which one is closer to the truth?

Lucky 6

#1369 10 Sep 12, 11:50

II Corps Command was at the center of the action, in control of the entire Long Reach/Truong Chinh operation comprising All the Way, Bayonet I, Than Phong 7/Bayonet II. Coleman was just a mere captain, and got his info from General Knowles who, I had shown, had a lot of things to hide.

Phieu

#1370 11 Sep 12, 10:38

Just as the intervention of Airborne Brigade in the last phase of Long Reach/Truong Chinh operation was pre-planned at the outset of the operation, the use of Arclite strike was also pre-planned. As a matter of fact, all the operations - All the Way, Bayonet I, Bayonet II/Than Phong 7 - were executed in function and in support of the Arclite strike.

When, on November 17, Colonel Hieu determined that 2/3 of B3 Field Front forces were wiped out through the actions of 1st Air Cav Brigade in All the Way operation, of 3rd Air Cav Brigade in Bayonet I operation and of the three day Arclite strike, even more precisely when he learned from his 'special agents' s reports that there were only two enemy battalions remaining, the 635th and the 334th, on their way to escape toward the Cambodian borders, he called in the Airborne Brigade comprising five battlions to execute the surgical strike to "finish'em off".

Just imagine what would happened to this five battalions venturing into the lion's den, if Colonel Hieu was wrong in the number of enemy still combat effective units, especially when the enemy troops were leaking their wounds and felt cornered.

While the Airborne Brigade units were operating, Arclite strike still continued until November 20. Thus, Than Phong 7 was executed as a support to the main action done by Arclite strike.

Phieu

#1371 12 Sep 12, 10:38

All the while ground forces were operating during Bayonet I by 3rd Air Cav Brigade and during Than Phong 7/Bayonet II by Airborne Brigade and 2nd Air Cav Brigade, Arclite strikes were bombarding B3 Field Front forces under the control of II Corps Command.

G3 Journal/IFFV left no doubts who was in command and control of B-52 airstrike in Long Reach operation.

- 11/15/65 at 10:30H: MAVC J3 (Gen DePuy) Gen DePuy called Col Barrow and asked if Arc Light had been cleared with CG II Corps. Col Barrow replied yes, CG II Corps has approved Arc Light. Also Gen DePuy wanted to know if the elem of 1st Cav had received the 151600H restriction on not going west of YA grid line. Col Barrow informed Gen De Puy that the 1st Cav had acknowledged receipt of the restriction and would comply. Gen DePuy personally changed target configuration. Gen DePuy stated that this is the fastest a strike of this nature had ever been laid-on.
- 19:00H: 1st Cav (L/C Buchan) Target completely covered; best coverage he had seen; one rack of bombs out of target area vic YA 820122-808142, cords not accurate. Between 1700-1730 had Mohawk photo coverage and aerial recon, smoke too thick to observe target area; 1st light 16 Nov will have recon in area. Cav plans to request another strike, will call info to FFV by 2000. Not an immediate, II Corps will make similar request for same area. Mohawk photo now in lab.
11/16/65 at 15:35H: MACV Maj Oneil � What is the status of arclight #1745 Sphinx 160325Z. Ans: Currently being staffed at MACJ 237. II Corps CG concurs with msg number 1745.
- 18:50H: II Corp (Capt McConnell) CG II Corps does concur with Arclite.
- 23:10H: II Corps (Maj Sanabria) Maj Sanabria call to pass concurrence of CG ARVN II Corps on B-52 targets 34, 35, and 36 for 17 Nov.

II Corps Command continued to direct B-52 strikes well into Than Phong 7 operation.

- 11/21/65 at 22:00H: II Corps Capt Neary and Capt Martin - (Encoded) Request time of Abn Bde atk on obj vic YA 810055. Is Abn Bde aware of Arc Lite #4 at 221210H.
- 22:50H: II Corps Capt Neary - Ref encoded msg (log item #60). This request for info is for confirmation that subject (arc lite) is well coordinated. It also pertains to II Corps sec msg, cite number 174, which affects some subj (Arlite msg, gives southern boundary of area of opns which falls within Arc lite tgt. No times are included for movement south). Confirmation of time of movement is required as well as confirmation that subj of encoded msg (Arc lite) is coordinated.
11/22/65 at 01:00H: II Corps Capt Neary - Ref inquiry made by Maj Amey: The Abn Bde will not move south toward their objective area in the south until after Arc light. Actual time is unk, but will be coordinated with Arc light.
- 14:50H: G3 Air (Capt Green) Arc Light strikes were not on time. No results as yet.

Without info found in G3/IFFV, one would believe General Knowles through Pleiku Campaign AAR is telling the truth in taking credit of Arclite strike, while he was only an Air Cav member of the Arclite strike coordination team:

The original plan to employ strategic bombers in support of the division was presented by the Assistant Division Commander (ADC-A) through Field Force Vietnam Commanding General to the J-3 of US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.

Phieu

#1372 13 Sep 12, 09:43

In the next posts, I will review successively Than Phong 7/Bayonet II operations as narrated by Pleiku Campaign/Knowles, Pleiku/Coleman, We Were Soldiers/Moore, It Doesn't Take a Hero/Schwarzkopf, G3/IFFV, and Why Pleime/Hieu.

There are lots of lessons to be learned from this exercise about getting to the bottom of what really happened, about gaining the truth, the whole truth of this operation conducted by Airborne Brigade under the guidance of Colonel Hieu, II Corps Chief of Staff.

Phieu

#1373 13 Sep 12, 10:04

Than Phong 7/Silver Bayonet II Operations as narrated by Pleiku Campaign.

Pleiku Campaign/Knowles does not seem to want to talk about Than Phong 7 as shown in its "Contents", which stops at LZ Albany battle:

Nevertheless, the narration also covers the period from November 20 to November 26, which encompasses Than Phong 7 and Silver Bayonet II operations:

and

Although Knowles only spoke sparsely about Airborne Brigade's activities, he

was quick in taking credit in imparting to the ARVN unit the art of using artillery:

Besides simply cooperating with the ARVN forces, I believe we enhanced their professional capabilities in many ways such as the techniques of employing artillery supports. I feel that a boost in their morale resulted from their increased abilities and that their confidence was bolstered by seeing our power as it was applied to the enemy. (Pleime Campaign, contents)

and

US advisors too have become more optimistic, not so much about the eventual defeat of the Viet Cong, but that the ARVN commanders will be more receptive concerning adoption of concepts that heretofore have been belittled or rejected. For example, advisors with the ARVN Airborne Brigade are confident tht that the dramatic demonstration of what close support artillery can do for infantry will go far to convince the brigade of the desirability of training officer forward observers (at the time of the engagement, not a single officer F.O was assigned to any of the 32 rifle companies in the ARVN Airborne Brigade). (Pleiku Campaign, page 124)

Phieu

#1374 14 Sep 12, 10:50

Than Phong 7/Silver Bayonet II Operations as narrated by Pleiku/Coleman.

Coleman, who was the scribe of Pleiku Campaign added some more details on Than Phong 7/Silver Bayonet II operations in his book, Pleiku, in 1988. Blockquote>

The last vestiges of the battles in the Chu Pong-Ia Drang complex disappeared by 5:00 P.M. when Bravo Company 1/5 closed out Columbus and lifted to a new LZ named Golf where two batteries of the 21st Artillery were put in position to fire in support of the ARVN airborne battalions. This fitted in with the scheme of maneuver of the 2nd Brigade, which would be taking over the battle as of noon on the 20th. The two ARVN battalions, supported by the 52nd Aviation Battlion out of Camp Holloway, were slowly making their way along the Cambodian border toward the Ia Drang. Part of the ARVN agreement for a share of the action was to place the ARVN Marine brigade on roadrunner duties to keep Highway 19 open from An Khe to Pleiku.

By noon of the 20th, Colonel William R. �Ray� Lynch had moved his forward command post to Duc Co to co-locate it with headquarters of the ARVN Airborne Brigade.

[�]

Late in the afternoon of the 20th, the 3rd and 6th battalions of the Airborne Brigade cornered a battalion of the NVA 32d Regiment that had been too slow in heeding Field Front�s order to retreat out of Vietnam to Cambodia. The four batteries on Golf and Crooks, using American advisors with the ARVN as forward observers, literally blew the NVA battalion apart/ The ARVN had never seen artillery delivered in such massive doses and at such close ranges. The ARVN habitually deployed artillery in two-tube increments and rarely fired close support in tighter than two hundred meters. At Golf, the fire direction center monitored a message directly from one of the paratrooper battalions. It said: �artillery too close! But very nice! Keep shooting!� An advisor told a reporter long after the battle that the tough ARVN paratroopers could talk of little else for months afterward except that incredible artillery support. The incident led the ARVN Airborne Brigade to train forward observe r officers to work with each rifle company. As for the battle itself, when the smoke cleared, the ARVN swept forward and the advisors told Lynch that they had found 127 bodies on the battlefield, most of them victims of cavalry artillery. The Cav had finally tangled, albeit with indirect fire, with the last regiment of the NVA division.

[�]

From the 20th to the 24th of November, Lynch sent his four battalions on a series of company and platoon sweeps, searches, and patrols. There was occasional contact, generally with squad-sized units or smaller. Field Front had told its forces to get out of Vietnam and avoid contact and, by the 24th, it was becoming increasingly apparent that there were no more enemy soldiers in that part of South Vietnam.

[�] On the day after Thanksgiving, Lynch and Knowles met reporters at the brigade�s rear base at Catecka and told them that there were no more North Vietnamese in the western plateau of Pleiku Province; that they had fled to the Cambodian sanctuary. The Pleiku Campaign was over. By noon on Saturday, November 27, all 1st Cavalry units had been extracted from the filed and were back at the base camp in An Khe. (Coleman pages 227-283)

Phieu

#1375 14 Sep 12, 11:06

Based on Pleiku Campaign/Knowles and Pleiku/Coleman, you get more information about Silver Bayonet II activities conducted by 2nd Air Cav Brigade than Than Phong 7's conducted by Airborne Brigade.

With these two narratives, it looks like the Airborne Brigade comprised only two battalions, the 3rd and the 6th (while it actually comprised 2 Task Forces and 5 battalions - TF 1: 3rd, 5th, 6th and TF 2: 7th and 8th), and more emphasis was put on the artillery support activities and results than the Vietnamese paratroopers' maneuverings.

#1376 15 Sep 12, 10:21

Than Phong 7/Silver Bayonet II Operations as narrated by Moore.

You expect General Hal Moore to talk only about LZ X-Ray Battle that he conducted as 1/7 Air Cav Battalion Commander in his book, �We Were Soldiers, ��. However, he did expand his narrative and talked briefly about Than Phong 7/Silver Bayonet II operations. His source, though, seem to come from Pleiku Campaign/Knowles and Pleiku/Coleman, with an additional source from Major Schwarzkopf.

In furtherance of that plan, at midday on November 18 Brown had sent Lieutenant Colonel Bob Tully�s 2nd Battalion, 5th Cav on an air assault into a clearing designated Landing Zone Crooks (6.5 miles northwest of Columbus). Once they had secured Crooks, Brown airlifted the artillery form LZ Falcon to Crooks. From there the artillerymen would provide initial support to the 2nd Brigade and to the South Vietnamese Airborne battalions that were planning to move south from Duc Co camp on November 19 and take up blocking positions along the Cambodian border to harass the North Vietnamese on their retreat from the Ia Drang Valley.
On November 19, Brown moved the artillery and the 1st Battalion, 5th Cav from Columbus to a new landing zone designated Golf, 7.5 miles northwest. Now all the pieces were in place for continued operations against the enemy, with Brown�s 3rd Brigade handing off the job to Colonel Ray Lynch�s 2nd Brigade and to the ARVN Airborne task force.
[�]
At noon, November 20, Colonel Tim Brown turned over control of the Ia Drang Valley operation to the division�s 2nd Brigade, commanded by Colonel William R.(Ray) Lynch. Lynch was a battlefield veteran of World War II and Korea. He and his three battalions now assumed responsibility for the continuing operations in Pleiku province.
Late in the afternoon of the twentieth, the 3rd and 6th battalions of the South Vietnamese Airborne Brigade made contact with a battalion of General Chu Huy Man�s battle-weary People�s Army troops hard by the Cambodian border, north of where the Ia Drang crosses. The hapless North Vietnamese battalion had been a bit slow on the withdrawal toward sanctuary in Cambodia and now they would pay the price.
The radio message received by the American gunners who had twenty-four 105mm howitzers set up on LZ Golf and LZ Crooks described the target: �Enemy in the open!� The American advisers with the Vietnamese Airborne task force adjusted the artillery fire by radio, ripping the enemy battalion apart. They reported that at least 127 bodies were strewn over the killing field when the barrage lifted, and that the South Vietnamese were amazed and delighted at the pinpoint accuracy of the American artillerymen. A Vietnamese radio message was received by one of the batteries firing during the action. Translated, it said: �Artillery too close! Artillery too close! But very nice! Keep shooting!�
Drang Valley that day was a big, burly American major, H. Norman Schwarzkopf, West Point class of 1956. Schwarzkopf remembers that the sudden appearance of the South Vietnamese troops on the North Vietnamese route of withdrawal shocked the enemy battalion.
�They were tired and beaten and almost home free,� Schwarzkopf says. �They had had all they wanted. When we opened up with small arms and artillery they threw down their guns and ran for it. No resistance. Later, the Airborne Brigade commander and I sat resting under a big tree while the men searched the woods policing up enemy equipment. They brought in rifles and machine guns by the armload, piling them in front of us. The pile of captured gear grew so large that I accused the Vietnamese general of having brought all those weapons out from Pleiku just to impress me. He laughed like hell, but invited me to go out in the brush and see for myself where it was all coming from�. (Moore pages 341- 370)

Phieu

#1377 16 Sep 12, 08:18

Than Phong 7/Silver Bayonet II Operations as narrated by Schwarzkopf.

The Ia Drang Valley campaign was a landmark for me, because it introduced me to the most brilliant tactical commander I'd ever known.

Colonel Ngo Quang Truong was General Dong's chief of staff. He did not look like my idea of a military genius: only five feet seven, in his midforties, very skinny, with hunched shoulders and a head that seemed too big for his body. His face was pinched and intense, not at all handsome, and there was always a cigarette hanging from his lips. Yet he was revered by his officers and troops-and feared by those North Vietnamese commanders who knew of his ability. Any time a particularly tricky combat operation came up, Dong put him in command.

The airborne was alerted to prevent the North Vietnamese regiments defeated in the Ia Drang Valley from escaping back into Cambodia. I was half asleep in my room at the Manor BOQ after a big meal of curried chicken and beer when the call came to get out to the airport. Truong had assembled an unusually large task force of some two thousand troops to go to the Ia Drang the following morning, and had chosen me as his advisor.

We flew in transports to the red clay strip at Duc Co, my old stomping ground, then by chopper south to the river valley. From the minute we stepped off our helicopters we were involved in skirmishes and firefights. The valley was about twelve miles wide at the point where the Ia Drang flowed westward into Cambodia-and somewhere in those miles of dense jungle the main body of the enemy was on the move. We had landed to the north, and Truong ordered the battalions to cross the Ia Drang and take up positions along the Chu Prong Mountains, which formed a series of steep ridges to the south. It was fascinating to watch him operate. As we marched, he would stop to study the map, and every once in a while he'd indicate a position on the map and say, "I want you to fire artillery here." I was skeptical at first, but called in the barrages; when we reached the areas we found bodies. Simply by visualizing the terrain and drawing on his experience fighting the enemy for fifteen years, Truong showed an uncanny ability to predict what they were going to do.

When we set up our command post that night, he opened his map, lit a cigarette, and outlined his battle plan. The strip of jungle between our position on the ridges and the river, he explained, made a natural corridor-the route the NVA would most likely take. He said, "At dawn we will send out one battalion and put it here, on our left, as a blocking force between the ridge and the river. Around eight o'clock tomorrow morning they will make a big enemy contact. Then I will send another battalion here, to our right. They will make contact at about eleven o'clock. I want you to have your artillery ready to fire into this area in front of us," he said, "and then we will attack with our third and fourth battalions down toward the river. The enemy will then be trapped with the river to his back."

I'd never heard anything like this at West Point. I was thinking, "What's all this about eight o'clock and eleven o'clock? How can he schedule a battle that way?" But I also recognized the outline of his plan: Truong had reinvented the tactics Hannibal had used in 217 B.C. when he enveloped and annihilated the Roman legions on the banks of Lake Trasimene.

But, Truong added, we had a problem: the Vietnamese airborne had been called into this campaign because of high-level concern that American forces in pursuit of the enemy might otherwise venture too close to the Cambodian border. He said, "On your map, the Cambodian border is located here, ten kilometers east of where it appears on mine. In order to execute my plan, we must use my map rather than yours, because otherwise we cannot go around deeply enough to set up our first blocking force. So, Thieu ta Schwarzkopf"-thieu ta (pronounced "tia-tah") is Vietnamese for "major"-"what do you advise?"

The prospect of letting an enemy escape into a sanctuary until he was strong enough to attack again galled me as much as it would any soldier. Some of these fellows were the same ones I'd run into four months earlier at Duc Co; I didn't want to fight them again four months from now. So why should I assume that my map was more accurate than Truong's?

"I advise that we use the boundary on your map."

Long after he'd issued his attack orders, Truong sat smoking his cigarettes and studying the map. We went over the plan again and again late into the night, visualizing every step of the battle. At dawn we sent out the 3rd Battalion. They got into position and, sure enough, at eight o'clock they called and reported heavy contact. Truong sent the 5th Battalion to the right. At eleven o'clock they reported heavy contact. As Truong had predicted, in the jungle below us the enemy had run into the 3rd Battalion at the border and decided, "We can't get out that way. We'll double back." That decision violated a basic principle of escape and evasion, which is to take the worst possible route in order to minimize the risk of encountering a waiting enemy. Had they climbed out of the valley up the Chu Pong Mountains, they might have gotten away. Instead they followed the low ground, as Truong had anticipated, and now we'd boxed them in. He looked at me and said, "Fire your artillery." We shelled the area below us for a half hour. Then he ordered his two remaining battalions to attack down the hill; there was a hell of a lot of shooting as we followed them in.

Around one o'clock, Truong announce, "Okay. We'll stop." He picked a lovely little clearing, and we sat down with his staff and had lunch! Halfway through the meal, he put down his rice bowl and issued some commands on the radio. "What are you doing?" I asked. He'd ordered his men to search the battlefield for weapons: "We killed many enemy, and the ones we didn't kill threw down their weapons and ran away."

Now, he hadn't seen a damn thing! All the action had been hidden by jungle. But we stayed in that clearing for the remainder of the day, and his troops brought in armful after armful of weapons and piled them in front of us. I was excited-we'd scored a decisive victory! But Truong just sat, smoking his cigarettes.

General H. Norman Schwarzkopf
It Doesn't Take A Hero (1992)

Phieu

#1378 17 Sep 12, 09:32

General Schwarzkopf complements the narratives given by Pleiku Campaign/Knowles, Pleiku/Coleman and Moore which only talk about the first ambush happening on November 20 by adding the second ambush occurring on November 24, 1965, as illustrated in the following tactical map provided by Colonel Hieu in Why Pleime.

Phieu

#1379 18 Sep 12, 09:33

General Schwarzkopf was mesmerized by LTC Truong's ability to sense the enemy's positions, while he did not see a damn thing. Each time Truong gave him order to fire artillery into the jungles, it was with pinpoint accuracy. Furthermore, he could not figure out why was it possible for Truong to anticipate the enemy troops' withdrawal paths, then to block them at two ends in order to box them in against the Ia Drang River. Major Schwarzkopf of the year 1965 and even General Schwarzkopf of nowadays - he published his memoir in 2002 - assumed with na�vet� that "simply by visualizing the terrain and drawing on his experience fighting the enemy for fifteen years, Truong showed an uncanny ability to predict what they were going to do."

If in fact LTC Truong, upon receiving order to bring his troops from Saigon to the Highlands in search of enemy troops on their withdrawal to Kampuchea, selected on his own the landing zones amidst the vast jungles of Chu Pong massif, sniffed out on his own the enemy troops on the move, anticipated on his own the enemy's withdrawal paths and set up accurate ambush sites, the ways Major Schwarzkopf depicted, then Truong was indeed an exceptional commander with a uncanny and unmatched sixth sense. However, the reality was not as such.

General Schwarzkopf was na�ve in thinking that LTC Truong acted on his own when he lead the Vietnamese airborne battalions in the Than Phong 7 Operation. In reality, he merely executed orders issued from II Corps General Staff from the outset through the conclusion of this operation. It is unthinkable that LTC Truong could have possessed the superhuman ability to sensing the enemy troops on the move under the cover of the dense canopies in the vast Chu Pong massif areas.

LTC Truong was operating under the tactical guidance of Colonel Hieu.

Phieu

#1380 19 Sep 12, 10:08

Than Phong 7/Silver Bayonet II Operations as narrated by Colonel Hieu.

"Finish 'Em"

The operation - dubbed "Th�̀n Phong 7" - began in the afternoon, 18 November when the brigade was helilifted to the area of operations, immediately upon arrival in Pleiku.

I should like to take advantage of this opportunity to cite the outstanding achievement of the C130's Squadron of the 7th US Air Force which, within only a few hours had airlifted:

- The Airborne Brigade Headquarters,

- The Airborne 1st and 2nd Task Forces Headquarters,

- Five Airborne battalions: the 3rd, 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th

from different distant places, such as Saigon, Bien Hoa, Vung Tau and Phu Yen to Pleiku. It was thanks to their contribution that the operation had been able to commence exactly as scheduled.

Sauve Qui Peut

During ten days of "search and destroy" - from 18 to 26 November - numerous engagements had occurred in the valley of the Ia Drang river between the Airborne units and the enemy. But most of them were only minor contacts with scattered VC elements. The disintegration of enemy units had been described by a platoon leader of the 32nd NVA Regiment in his diary in the following terms:

"I have just been assigned as platoon leader for a few days when suddenly enemy airborne troops were thrown into the vicinity of our location. We began to move at midnight on 18 November. We kept on moving to get out of the enemy encirclement on the next day, overnight and until 20 November. At 0130 hours on 21 November, we were ordered to be ready for an attack. At 0700 hours we came to the village... and at 0730 hours to the assembly area. The enemy must have recently bombed the area because the ground was marked with large craters. We could not help becoming anxious. We had just dispersed when suddenly enemy aircrafts appeared again and strafed into our position. My platoon had three comrades killed. We also lost a large amount of ammunitions and equipment..."

The third phase of the battle of Pleime was characterized not only by the rout of the enemy but also by the increasing depression of their morale. Numerous VC weapons were found thrown into bushes along the trails or stream-beds. It was during this time that a political officer of the NVA 33rd Regiment - Lieutenant Bùi Văn Cường - had been able to surrender to friendly troops.

The biggest engagement in the third phase happened at 1440 hours on 20 November, North of the Ia Drang river. For the second time in the battle of Pleime, the VC fell into a friendly ambush and suffered severe losses (the first ambush on 3rd November, by elements of the 1st Air Cavalry Division). The 32nd NVA Regiment which remained uncommitted and unscratched throughout the second phase, was finally found and forced to fight, although it had tried to avoid contact as much as possible.

In the morning of that day, the 3rd Airborne battalion was ordered to move southward to link-up with the 6th battalion. Both units had on the previous day conducted a thorough search on two different axes from the landing zone westward. During its displacement the 3rd battalion was stealthily followed by a battalion-sized enemy. But once the link-up was made between the two friendly battalions, the VC unit on its turn was caught within the field of fire of the 6th battalion and the very center of an ambush. Nearly 200 VC were killed in this fortuitous engagement.

In their search for enemy installations in the area of operations, the Airborne Brigade destroyed 3 training centers, a cache of equipment and 75 houses.

The search and destroy operations were also conducted south of the Ia Drang river but only small skirmishes with scattered VC elements happened.

On 24 November, as no more contacts were made with the enemy, the Airborne Brigade withdrew from the area of operations, terminating the third phase of the Battle of Pleime with 265 VC killed (BC), 10 others and 58 weapons captured.

(Why Pleime, chapter VI)

Phieu

#1381 20 Sep 12, 10:03

Airborne Brigade during Than Phong 7 operation:

Brigadier General Du Qu�́c Đ�́ng, Brigade Commander

Lieutenant Colonel Ng� Quang Trưởng , Field Commander

Major Norman Schwarzkopf, Advisor

= Task Force 1: Lieutenant Colonel Ng� Xu�n Nghị

- 3rd Battalion: Major Khi�́u Hữu Di�u

- 5th Battalion: Major Nguy�̃n Khoa Nam

- 6th Battalion: Captain Nguy�̃n Văn Minh

= Task Force 2: Lieutenant Colonel Trương Quang �n

- 7th Battalion: Major Nguy�̃n Bá Trước

- 8th Battalion: Major Nguy�̃n Văn Thọ

Phieu

#1382 21 Sep 12, 09:55

The tactical map provided by Why Pleime depicted the entire Than Phong 7 operation from Nov 18 to Nov 24, 1965.

The first ambush on Nov 20, 1965 was narrated in detail by Colonel Hieu in Why Pleime.

In the morning of that day, the 3rd Airborne battalion was ordered to move southward to link-up with the 6th battalion. Both units had on the previous day conducted a thorough search on two different axes from the landing zone westward. During its displacement the 3rd battalion was stealthily followed by a battalion-sized enemy. But once the link-up was made between the two friendly battalions, the VC unit on its turn was caught within the field of fire of the 6th battalion and the very center of an ambush. Nearly 200 VC were killed in this fortuitous engagement.

The second ambush on Nov 24, 1965 was narrated in detail by General Schwarzkopf in It Does Take a Hero:

Long after he'd issued his attack orders, Truong sat smoking his cigarettes and studying the map. We went over the plan again and again late into the night, visualizing every step of the battle. At dawn we sent out the 3rd Battalion. They got into position and, sure enough, at eight o'clock they called and reported heavy contact. Truong sent the 5th Battalion to the right. At eleven o'clock they reported heavy contact. As Truong had predicted, in the jungle below us the enemy had run into the 3rd Battalion at the border and decided, "We can't get out that way. We'll double back." That decision violated a basic principle of escape and evasion, which is to take the worst possible route in order to minimize the risk of encountering a waiting enemy. Had they climbed out of the valley up the Chu Pong Mountains, they might have gotten away. Instead they followed the low ground, as Truong had anticipated, and now we'd boxed them in. He looked at me and said, "Fire your artillery." We shelled the area below us for a half hour. Then he ordered his two remaining battalions to attack down the hill; there was a hell of a lot of shooting as we followed them in.

The enemy was "boxed in": 221350H-231115H-240845-241030H.

Phieu

#1383 22 Sep 12, 07:16

After being transported by the C130's Squadron of the 7th US Air Force from Saigon, Bien Hoa, Vung Tau and Phu Yen to Pleiku, the five battalions of the Airborne Brigade staged their Than Phong 7 operations from Duc Co camp. They were supported by 52nd Aviation Battalion.

18 November: The 52d Aviation Battalion staged II Corps (ARVN) Operation Than Phong 7 from Duc Co. The 52d elements, ten UH1Ds, twelve UH1Bs and eleven UH1Bs (A) were reinforced by twenty UH1Ds and six UH1Bs (A) from the 229th Avn Bn, 1st Air Cav Div. Fifteen hundred (1500) troops were lifted in five lifts from Duc Co to Landing Zone YA 841092. Two (2) UH1Ds from the 155th Avn Co sustained light damage from ground fire, no injuries. A major factor in the operation was a first for the Battalion in refueling twelve aircraft at a time from prepositioned pods, without shutting the aircraft down.

Extracts pertaining to Pleime Campaign from

History of the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion � 1 January 1965 to 31 December 1965

(prepared by Office of the S-3, 12th Aviation Group, MASCV, USA Pacific, Ryuku Islands)

Phieu

#1384 23 Sep 12, 07:40

I was previously wrong in presuming that Colonel Hieu did ask the 1st Air Cav for help in transporting paratroops of Airborne Brigade in Than Phong 7 operation and that his request was denied. It turns out that the 229th Aviation Battalion of 1st Air Cav did reinforce the 52nd Aviation Battalion with �twenty UH1Ds and six UH1Bs� on Nov 18, 1965.

The helilifts were executed in three separated days (see tactical map):

- On Nov 18 from 1500H to 1800H, 1500 paratroops of TF1, 3rd Bn, 5th Bn and 6th Bn were dropped at YA 841092, in preparation for the first ambush happening on Nov 20;

- On Nov 20, at 1745H, paratroops of 8th Bn were dropped at YA 821076;

- And on Nov 22, at 1100H, paratroops of TF2 and 7th Bn were dropped at YA 821076 in preparation for the second ambush occurring on Nov 24.

Phieu

#1385 23 Sep 12, 11:04

Operation Hastings

Sir,

Do you have any info on the use of tear used by the 324B NVA on Marines in July of 1966?

Thanks

hh1636

#1386 23 Sep 12, 18:53

don744: The US Army Chemical Corps is currently headquartered at Ft Leonard Wood, MO. Maybe you contacted a subordinate chemical unit, or a National Guard unit? Follow this link for the Chemical Corps:

http://www.wood.army.mil/wood_cms/usacbrns.shtml

Maybe you can contact the regimental historian or the curator of the chemical museum? As far as a FOIA request, here is an example request:

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/foia_requestsA.html

Good luck. Whenever you find outanything, please post the results here.

Don.

Did you ever try to contact the Army Chemical Center and School at Ft Leonard Wood? Try the regimental historian. You will get more information there than in the Ia Drang Thread. If you need contact info after you peruse the chem school site, drop me a PM. I'll see what I can do.

don744

#1387 23 Sep 12, 20:27

hh1636: Sir,

Do you have any info on the use of tear used by the 324B NVA on Marines in July of 1966?

Thanks

No, I don't. You might want to contact Altus who might get info from the 324B NVA unit.

Phieu

#1388 24 Sep 12, 13:29

Do you think LTC Ngo Quang Truong decided on his own in the selection of the various landing zones and worked out the schedule of the troop insertion on his own?

I don't think so. He operated Than Phong 7 operation under the tactical guidance of Colonel Hieu, II Corps Chief of Staff.

Phieu

#1389 25 Sep 12, 10:45

After their insertion at YA 841092, the 3rd Battalion and the 6th Battalion were ordered by Colonel Hieu to sweep westward along two parallel axis on November 18, at 1800H. As soon as the sweep operation began, Colonel Hieu learned that the 3rd Battalion that it was stealthily shadowed by a battalion sized enemy force. He ordered the 6th Battalion to set up an ambush site at YA 805080. At 1100H on November 19, when the 3rd Battalion reached YA 810095, it was ordered to veer southward to link with the 6th Battalion, and in so doing, to lead the enemy battalion to the ambush site. At 1440H on November 20, the enemy unit entered the center of the ambush and �was caught within the field of fire of the 6th battalion.�

All the above actions were unfolding while LTC Truong �did not see a thing�; he was executing under the guidance of Colonel Hieu.

It looks like Major Schwarzkopf did not accompany TF1, 3rd Battalion and 6th Battalion in the first drop on November 18, and did not participate in the first ambush scheme, since he did not describe it in his book. Or it might also be that he did not recall this battle, only the second one on November 24 that he narrated in his book.

Phieu

#1390 26 Sep 12, 10:12

As soon as one NVA battalion was destroyed at the ambush site at around 1440H on Nov 20, Colonel Hieu made plan for ambushing the remaining NVA battalion.

The assembly area was set at YA 821075. On Nov 20, at 1745H, the 8th Battalion was inserted at the assembly spot. On Nov 22, at 1100H, it was the turn of TF2 and the 7th Battalion. On Nov 22, TF 1, the 3rd Battalion and the 6th Battalion marched on foot to rejoin TF2 and closed in at the assembly area around 1350H,.

The entire Airborne Brigade crossed over to the south Ia Drang River and marched to the ambush staging area located on the peak of a mountain at YA 810055 and closed in at 1110H on Nov 23.

Schwarzkopf narrated: �We had landed to the north, and Truong ordered the battalions to cross the Ia Drang and take up positions along the Chu Prong Mountains, which formed a series of steep ridges to the south. It was fascinating to watch him operate. As we marched, he would stop to study the map, and every once in a while he'd indicate a position on the map and say, "I want you to fire artillery here." I was skeptical at first, but called in the barrages; when we reached the areas we found bodies.�

From there, LTC Truong made plan to box in the enemy unit along the only escape corridor by positioning on Nov 24 the 3rd Battalion at YA 802070 around 0845H and the 5th Battalion at YA 820063 around 1030H. He then had Schwarzkopf called in the artillery �to shell the area below them for a half hour. Then he ordered his two remaining battalions - 7th and 8th - to attack down the hill�.

Phieu

#1391 27 Sep 12, 10:49

In Why Pleime, Colonel Hieu only identifies the NVA units pursued in Than Phong 7 operation as belonging to the 32nd NVA Regiment:

The biggest engagement in the third phase happened at 1440 hours on 20 November, North of the Ia Drang river. For the second time in the battle of Pleime, the VC fell into a friendly ambush and suffered severe losses (the first ambush on 3rd November, by elements of the 1st Air Cavalry Division). The 32nd NVA Regiment which remained uncommitted and unscratched throughout the second phase, was finally found and forced to fight, although it had tried to avoid contact as much as possible.

(Why Pleime, chapter VI)

Pribblenow - citing The Plei Me Offensive, 55-56 � identifies the two remaining NVA battalions of B3 Field Front forces as the 635th Battalion and the 334th battalion of the 32nd Regiment:

On 20 November, South Vietnamese airborne forces, supported by US artillery, encountered the 320th Regiment's 635th and 334th Battalions along the Cambodian border. The 635th.s commander, whose unit had suffered heavy losses during the South Vietnamese relief column ambush in October, refused to engage the enemy and retreated without authorization, leaving the sister battalion alone on the battlefield.
The two units lost hundreds of men and weapons, and it was several days before the 320th Regiment managed to reestablish contact with the 635th Battalion. A PAVN analysis admits the regiment did not accomplish its assigned mission.

(Pribblenow, The Fog of War: The Vietnamese View of the Ia Drang Battle) One could safely assume that the 334th Battalion was attacked at the first ambush site on November 20 and the 635th Battalion at the second ambush site on November 24.

Phieu

#1392 28 Sep 12, 09:06

In term of damages inflicted to the two 32nd Regiment�s battalions - 635th and 334th,

-Schwarzkopf states:

As we marched, he would stop to study the map, and every once in a while he'd indicate a position on the map and say, "I want you to fire artillery here." I was skeptical at first, but called in the barrages; when we reached the areas we found bodies.
We stayed in that clearing for the remainder of the day, and his troops brought in armful after armful of weapons and piled them in front of us.

- Coleman states:

As for the battle itself, when the smoke cleared, the ARVN swept forward and the advisors told Lynch that they had found 127 bodies on the battlefield, most of them victims of cavalry artillery.

- Pribblenow states:

The two units lost hundreds of men and weapons.

- G3/IFFV states:

25 November 1965, - 01:35H: II Corps (Capt Martin) Rec'd by Capt Elliott, Period 18 to 24 Nov Than Phong 7 Wrap up - 265 VC KIA (BC) 12 VCC.

- Colonel Hieu states:

In their search for enemy installations in the area of operations, the Airborne Brigade destroyed 3 training centers, a cache of equipment and 75 houses.
On 24 November, as no more contacts were made with the enemy, the Airborne Brigade withdrew from the area of operations, terminating the third phase of the Battle of Pleime with 265 VC killed (BC), 10 others and 58 weapons captured.

Phieu

#1393 29 Sep 12, 15:06

It is interesting noting that Colonel Hieu did not narrate the second ambush in Than Phong 7 operation that occurred on November 24, but only describe the first ambush that happened on November 20.

On 24 November, as no more contacts were made with the enemy, the Airborne Brigade withdrew from the area of operations, terminating the third phase of the Battle of Pleime with 265 VC killed (BC), 10 others and 58 weapons captured.

He was contented to just illustrate both ambushes on a tactical map posted in Why Pleime. What is the reason for this oversight: modesty, classified military operation?

Fortunately, General Schwarzkopf gave an account of this incredible military feat in his book, �It Doesn�t Take a Hero�. He was flabbergasted by what he witnessed with his own eyes. He would certainly not believe it if he heard the story from somebody else.

The perfect match of General Schwarzkopf�s account (1992) and Colonel Hieu�s tactical map (1966) left no room for doubting that such an unbelievable military operation did really ever happen.

When we set up our command post that night, he opened his map, lit a cigarette, and outlined his battle plan. The strip of jungle between our position on the ridges and the river, he explained, made a natural corridor-the route the NVA would most likely take. He said, "At dawn we will send out one battalion and put it here, on our left, as a blocking force between the ridge and the river. Around eight o'clock tomorrow morning they will make a big enemy contact. Then I will send another battalion here, to our right. They will make contact at about eleven o'clock. I want you to have your artillery ready to fire into this area in front of us," he said, "and then we will attack with our third and fourth battalions down toward the river. The enemy will then be trapped with the river to his back."
I'd never heard anything like this at West Point. I was thinking, "What's all this about eight o'clock and eleven o'clock? How can he schedule a battle that way?" But I also recognized the outline of his plan: Truong had reinvented the tactics Hannibal had used in 217 B.C. when he enveloped and annihilated the Roman legions on the banks of Lake Trasimene.

Who should get credit for it, LTC Ngo Quang Truong, Airborne Brigade Field Commander or Colonel Nguyen Van Hieu, II Corps Chief of Staff?

General Schwarzkopf, unaware of Colonel Hieu�s active role in the Than Phong 7 operation, was at awe of LTC Truong�s uncanny performance. He was kind of na�ve, was he not, in thinking Truong was acting on his own, relying on his sixth sense?

Phieu

#1394 30 Sep 12, 15:02

Could it be possible that when he was called in from Saigon to Pleiku on November 18, 1965 to lead the Airborne Brigade in the Than Phong 7 operation that LTC Ngo Quang Truong was capable of

- choosing to insert TF1, 3rd Bn, 5th Bn and 6th Bn precisely at YA 841092 on November 18,

- knowing that the 3rd Bn was immediately shadowed by a NVA battalion,

- having the 6th Bn set up an ambush site at YA 805080,

- ordering the 3rd Bn to lure the NVA battalion toward that ambush site,

- choosing an assembly area at YA821075 for the entire Airborne Brigade,

- having TF1, the 3rd Bn, the 5th Bn and the 6th Bn marched to that assembly area and close in on November 22,

- having the 8th Bn close in there by helilift on November 20,

- having TF2 and the 7th Bn close in there by helilift on November 22,

- choosing the staging area for the second ambush at YA 810055 and close in on November 23 capable of accomplishing all the above actions just by �drawing on his experience fighting the enemy for fifteen years� (Schwarzkopf) ?

The obvious answer is an emphatic no way, Jose!

Phieu

#1395 01 Oct 12, 11:29

In fact, Colonel Hieu was the architect of the Than Phong 7 operation.

He was the one who determined on November 17, that considering the 2/3 of B3 Field Front forces� losses, it was time to call in the Airborne Brigade to execute the surgical strike.

On that day, he requested the Air Cav to create a new artillery firebase closer to the coming operational area than the ones already in existence (Falcon, Colombo, Golf, Albany) at LZ Crooks (YA 875125) and secured by 2nd Air Cav Brigade.

On November 18, he requested the 7th US Air Force to collect the scattered Airborne Brigade�s five battalions in Saigon, Bien Hoa, Vung Tau and Phu Yen and to bring them in Pleiku with its C130�s Squadron.

Then he requested the 52nd Aviation Battalion reinforced by twenty UH1Ds and six UH1Bs (A) from the 229th Avn Bn, 1st Air Cav Div to insert TF1, 3th Bn, 5th Bn and 6th Bn at YA 841092 on November 18; 8th Bn at YA821075 on November 20; and TF2 and the 7th Bn at this same assembly spot on November 22.

At the same token, he had the 6th Bn set up an ambush site at YA 805080, and ordered the 3th Bn to lead the NVA battalion that was stealthily shadowing it to that ambush site.

After the annihilation of that NVA battalion, he ordered TF1, 3th Bn, 5th Bn and 6th Bn to proceed by foot to the assembly area at which location the TF1 two battalions were helilifted in on November 20 and 22.

When the entire Airborne Brigade closed in at the assembly area, he ordered the 5 paratroop battalions to cross south the Ia Drang River toward the staging area on top of a mountain at YA 810055, where LTC Truong could set up an ambush site along the unique escapade corridor along the Ia Drang River and corner the last surviving enemy battalion.

Phieu

#1396 02 Oct 12, 10:55

Am I being delirious in saying that Colonel Hieu planned and executed Than Phong 7 in which he ambushed not only once but twice two NVA battalions consecutively within four days apart on Nov 20 and Nov 24, right in the heart of the enemy rear base where the Airborne Brigade found three training centers and destroyed 75 houses, just I am accused of delirium whenever I say he is the architect of Long Reach/Truong Chinh operation that Air Cav insists it was her operation and renames it Pleiku campaign?

General Kinnard describes Pleiku campaign as comprising three phases: (1) All the Way conducted by 1st Air Cav Brigade, (2) Silver Bayonet I conducted by 3rd Air Cav Brigade and (3) Silver Bayonet II conducted by 2nd Air Cav Brigade.

Colonel Hieu describes Pleime campaign as comprising three phases: (1) Dan Thang 21 conducted by 3rd Armored Task Force, (2) Long Reach - All the Way (1st Air Cav Brigade), Silver Bayonet I (3rd Air Cav Brigade) - conducted by 1st Air Cav Division and (3) Than Phong 7/Silver Bayonet II conducted by Airborne Brigade/2nd Air Cav Brigade.

Phieu

#1397 03 Oct 12, 06:11

posted in its own thread.

don744

#1398 03 Oct 12, 10:33

Allow me to review some of those criticisms pertaining to Colonel Hieu being the architect of Long Reach/Truong Chinh operation.

- #1111 - What a load of crap...Your whole thread is nothing more than amateurish revisionist history and proves how damaging a single individual can be at spinning historical facts to suit his own agenda. (Boonierat)
- #1147 - A Chief of Staff is many things, but planner is not one of them. I asked the following about 4 months ago, and you deflected the question as is typical of hard questions. What is the doctrinal role of a Chief of Staff? (Don744)
- #1222 - Just wanted to capture this in a quote before it is edited. Maybe we can find some documents from DePuy, Larsen, or Knowles that might corroborate your story. Americans are like that...we live for producing documentation of our part in executing a master plan. (Don744)
- #1224 - So wait, is the master plan written down anywhere? Is there the equivalent to an OpO somewhere? (thejester) - #1225 - So you think that Depuy and Larsen would have known, but never mentioned it. What about Mataxis? Nada, zip, zilch from him too. All three carried it to their graves? I find this highly unlikely. (Samtn99)
- #1229 - nobody believes you brother did what you claim he did, and you fail to prove it in any meaningful way. (Altus)
- #1262 - Sounds highly unlikely a Chief of Staff was "on-call" 24/7 to rush to a radio room to personally monitor radio communications. The question is, "how would anyone know if COL Hieu did or didn't monitor transmissions?"
Now, where did he tell you to look to find written sources or oral testimony that indicated he was personally monitoring radio broadcasts in mandarin? That one should be pretty easy since that is the linchpin-pin of his master plan. Minute to minute intel on size, disposition, morale, etc. of the enemy formation.
What about the "secret agents" you keep talking about? Are you calling the Chinese advisors secret agents? Did they know they were secret agents, or do you actually mean there were traitors in the enemy formation with access to comms equipment that would sneak off and call COL Hieu? (Don744)
- #1357 - No amount of pages, months, ways, or times will help you properly make your case until you argue it in a convincingly objective, coherent and logical manner (Altus)
- #1356 - make things fit in order to bring him praise (Delta One)
- #1357 - you've decided on a narrative, and attempted to find supporting evidence that's ambiguous enough to leave room open for the possibility of your version of events, but neither positively proving any of your points nor negatively disproving the accounts of others.
I'd like to consider myself reasonable, and I don't believe I'm splitting hairs. If you claimed someone had told you these conversations had happened, that there was some sort of grand design for II Corps on paper and it was simply lost like any other frag, or even that there was a rumor of such, I'd be more receptive. But you've simply declared this all as the definitive version of events, despite the absence of any first hand account on any side, primary documents, second-hand accounts, or even hearsay/scuttlebutt: and that all those who were privy to the plan purposely left their subordinates ignorant of all details, or took it to their grave in a cover-up involving all levels of the CoC from Brigade to MACV. I think a healthy skepticism is warranted.(Lucky 6)
- #1358 - I'd rep you if I could (Don 744)
- #1359 - Some may even think that you (Phieu) are suffering from hero worship. (Delta One)
- #1365 - what you did was to bring in a myriad of related documents, none of which provided any single direct evidence to your main conjectures. You just cherry picked fragments which were , as Lucky 6 pinpointed, ambiguous enough to leave room open for the possibility of your version of events.
Isn't it telling that its author chose to, in your own words, ignore you and your presentations? (Altus)

Phieu

#1399 04 Oct 12, 11:41

This time around, all the time I have been establishing that Colonel Hieu was, not only the architect of Than Phong 7, but even that he planned and executed this operation, from post #1372 to post #1398 , I have not heard any objections/criticisms from the above mentioned ACG members.

Is this an indication that I have strongly and irrefutably proved my case?

And yet, just like in the case of Long Reach/Truong Chinh operation,

I continue to be an amateurish revisionist [�] spinning historical facts to suit his own agenda;

- I claim Colonel Hieu as A Chief of Staff is the planner of the operation;

- I do not find some documents from DePuy, Larsen, or Knowles that might corroborate your story. Americans are like that...we live for producing documentation of our part in executing a master plan.

- I do not have the master plan written down anywhere.

- I do not hear Depuy and Larsen whowould have known, but never mentioned it. What about Mataxis? Nada, zip, zilch from him too. All three carried it to their graves? I find this highly unlikely.

- I fail to prove it in any meaningful way and nobody believes you brother did what you claim he did,

- No amount of pages, months, ways, or times will help you properly make your case until you argue it in a convincingly objective, coherent and logical manner;

- I do not say that someone had told you these conversations had happened, that there was some sort of grand design for II Corps on paper and it was simply lost like any other frag, or even that there was a rumor of such, I'd be more receptive. But you've simply declared this all as the definitive version of events, despite the absence of any firs thand account on any side, primary documents, second-hand accounts, or even hearsay/scuttlebutt: and that all those who were privy to the plan purposely left their subordinates ignorant of all details, or took it to their grave in a cover-up involving all levels of the CoC from Brigade to MACV. I think a healthy skepticism is warranted;

- I still am suffering from hero worship.

Phieu

#1400 05 Oct 12, 10:32

I contended that Colonel Hieu was the architect of Than Phong 7, which means its planner.

I have been anticipating that Don would jump in with (he didn�t):

A Chief of Staff is many things, but planner is not one of them. I asked the following about 4 months ago, and you deflected the question as is typical of hard questions. What is the doctrinal role of a Cohief of Staff? (post #1147)

And he hasn�t yet, this time around. So I dare go further and say, Colonel Hieu not only planned, he even executed the operation. In other words, he was in control and in command of the operation.

That is definitively not a �doctrinal role of a Chief of Staff�.

I wholeheartedly concur with you, Don. Normally, once II Corps Command calls in the Joint General Staff�s general reserve force from Saigon, such as the Airborne Brigade, it would lay off its hands and let the Field Commander plan and execute all the tactical moves.

Well, it was not the case in this particular Than Phong 7 operation. The TOC duty officer of I Field Force Vietnam in Nha Trang notes the following observation in the 11/19/1965, 16:55H entry of the daily log:

- 16:55H: 1st Cav (Rear) Capt Parham - Fwd CP states the elem's in Abn TF area was coordinated at higher levels than Fwd G3. The Abn TF knows about it.

Meaning: Captain Parham at the rear Air Cav Headquarters in An Khe says that 1st Air Cav Forward Command Post in Pleiku states that the three battalions of the Airborne Task Force 1 (on 11/19, only TF1 with its three battalions - 3th, 5th and 6th � were present on the ground of the operational area; TF 2 with its two battalions � 7th and 8th � were to be helilifted in only on 11/20 and 11/22) were coordinated not at G3/TF1 level but at G3/II Corps Headquarters level. And Airborne Task Force 1 acknowledges the fact its tactical maneuvers are dictated at G3/II Corps Headquarters level .

Let me further put faces at the various command post locations:

- Air Cav Headquarters in An Khe (rear) : General Kinnard;

- Air Cav Forward Command Post in Pleiku: General Knowles;

- Airborne G3/Task Force 1 in Ia Drang Valley: LTC Ngo Quang Truong;

- G3/II Corps Command in Pleiku: Colonel Hieu.

Phieu

#1401 06 Oct 12, 11:16

- #1222 - Maybe we can find some documents from DePuy, Larsen, or Knowles that might corroborate your story. Americans are like that...we live for producing documentation of our part in executing a master plan. (Don744)
- #1224 - So wait, is the master plan written down anywhere? Is there the equivalent to an OpO somewhere? (thejester)
- #1225 - So you think that Depuy and Larsen would have known, but never mentioned it. What about Mataxis? Nada, zip, zilch from him too. All three carried it to their graves? I find this highly unlikely. (Samtn99)

This time around, with Than Phong 7, where it is undeniable, irrefutable that Colonel Hieu was its architect,

- No, I cannot find documents from DePuy, Larsen, or Knowles that might corroborate my story �

- No, the master plan is not written down anywhere �

- Yes, I think that Depuy and Larsen would have known, but never mentioned it. Mataxis, nada, zip, zilch from him too.

As matter of fact even General Ngo Quang Truong never mentions that he was operating Than Phong 7 under Colonel Hieu�s direct guidance. When I met him in Virginia about six, seven years ago and inquired about my brother, he just dryly said, �he was a competent officer�. He certainly would not like to lose the credit attributed to him by General Schwarzkopf in his book, It Doesn't Take a Hero, published in 1993.

I certainly do not need them in finding out the main role played by Colonel Hieu in Than Phong 7 operation - and for that matter of fact in Long Reach/Truong Chinh operation, do I?

Phieu

#1402 07 Oct 12, 11:35

- #1357 - you've decided on a narrative, and attempted to find supporting evidence that's ambiguous enough to leave room open for the possibility of your version of events, but neither positively proving any of your points nor negatively disproving the accounts of others.
I'd like to consider myself reasonable, and I don't believe I'm splitting hairs. If you claimed someone had told you these conversations had happened, that there was some sort of grand design for II Corps on paper and it was simply lost like any other frag, or even that there was a rumor of such, I'd be more receptive. But you've simply declared this all as the definitive version of events, despite the absence of any first hand account on any side, primary documents, second-hand accounts, or even hearsay/scuttlebutt: and that all those who were privy to the plan purposely left their subordinates ignorant of all details, or took it to their grave in a cover-up involving all levels of the CoC from Brigade to MACV. I think a healthy skepticism is warranted. (Lucky 6)

This assessment from Lucky6 of my presentation of Ia Drang valley battle/Long Reach operation, the outcome of which is �healthy skepticism�, doesn�t apply to my presentation of Than Phong 7, or does it?

- It�s still a narrative and I still attempt to find supporting evidence that's ambiguous enough to leave room open for the possibility of your version of events.

- I still do not claim someone had told me it had happened the way I see it. General Schwarzkopf even said it was LTC Truong, not Colonel Hieu.

- I still do not claim someone had told me that there was some sort of grand design for II Corps on paper and it was simply lost like any other frag, or even that there was a rumor of such. General Schwarzkopf even said everything happened like magic, based on LTC Truong uncanny sixth sense.

- I still declare this all as the definitive version of events. However, fortunately this time around I have a primary document in Colonel Hieu�s tactical map that illustrates the operation, buffed by another primary document in G3 Journal/IFFV in which it was mentioned that the operation was coordinated at higher level than G3/TF1.

- I still maintain that all those who were privy to the plan purposely left their subordinates ignorant of all details, or took it to their grave in a cover-up involving all levels of the CoC from Brigade to MACV. Except General Schwarzkopf � although he did not see things right - everybody else those who were privy to the plan purposely left their subordinates ignorant of all details, or took it to their grave in a cover-up involving all levels of the CoC from Brigade to MACV. Even General Truong, when I saw him in Virginia six, seven years ago, kept his mouth shut and took it to his grave in January 2007.

The crux of the matter in my interpretation of the two events � Long Reach and Than Phong 7 � resides in the fact I have to determine who the architect was

- in Long Reach: between an American (Knowles) and a Vietnamese (Hieu)

- in Than Phong 7: between a Vietnamese (Truong) and another Vietnamese (Hieu).

It appears that people are more receptive and less skeptical in the latter than in the former. The reason for it, I have said it in various instances: prejudice.

Phieu

#1403 07 Oct 12, 11:46

Phieu, why don't you give this thread a rest? you've made your point and nobody cares about it. I'm getting tired of you reposting the same stuff over and over again just to bump your precious thread up. My patience with you has nearly reached it's limit and you're one finger away from getting your arse kicked out from this forum.

Boonierat

#1404 07 Oct 12, 11:54

Boonierat: Phieu, why don't you give this thread a rest? you've made your point and nobody cares about it.

I beg to differ, based on the number of viewers who keep on reading it.

I'm getting tired of you reposting the same stuff over and over again just to bump your precious thread up.

If you are tired of me, all you have to do is to stop reading me.

My patience with you has nearly reached it's limit and you're one finger away from getting your arse kicked out from this forum.

What language is it, French?

I do not violate any ACG forum rules.

But you have that priveledge to kick me out for the wrong reasons, for personal vendetta.

Just do it.

It's worse than living under a Communist regime.

Am I in the USA, the land of free speech?

Phieu

#1405 08 Oct 12, 11:23

Now, how was it possible that Colonel Hieu knew precisely where and when to have the Airborne Brigade set up successfully the second ambush on November 24, 1965?

It appears like the hand of the surgeon guides the surgical knife without hesitation straight to the point of incision:

- (1) Nov 19, TF1, 3th Bn, 5th Bn and 6th Bn were directed toward the assembly area at YA 821075 by land.

- (2) Nov 20, 7th Bn was helilifted to that spot.

- (3) Nov 22, TF2 and 8th were helilifted to that spot.

- (4) Nov 22, the entire Airborne Brigade - TF1, 3th Bn, 5th Bn and 6th; TF2 , 7th Bn and 8th � were directed to march from here toward the staging area at YA 810055 and to close in on Nov 23.

- (5) Nov 24, at around 8:45H, 3th Bn was placed at YA 802070.

- (6) Nov 24 at around 10:45H, 5th Bn was placed at YA 820063.

How did he anticipate that a NVA battalion will borrow that precise escape path in the morning of Nov 24? He successfuly threw a hail mary ball!

And how was it possible that Colonel Hieu knew precisely that a NVA battalion shadowed immediately 3th Bn upon its landing at YA 841092 on November 18?

And how was it possible that Colonel Hieu communicated to LTC Truong where to have the artillery shell accurately on enemy positions while he was marching his troops from the assembly area to the staging area on Nov 23?

It is unlikely that Colonel Hieu relied on his sixth sense like LTC Truong whom General Schwarzkopf said had sixteen years of combat operation experience which allowed him to pinpoint the enemy unit positions just by looking at the terrain configuration.

What�s the plausible explanation of all the above how's then?

Is there any written official document, primary oral and/or written source that states the how's ? None that I am aware of.

Phieu

#1406 08 Oct 12, 12:17

Phieu � What�s the plausible explanation of all the above how's then?

No explanation needed. Each side had only a vague idea where the adversary was. No precise intelligence was available. At the battle unfolded, both sides began to acquire better and better grasp of the situation. However, even the B-52 coordinates were the best guestimates available to US forces.

End of the story.

altus

#1407 08 Oct 12, 13:15

I see that you are not a chief of staff!

You sully the honor of the chiefs of staff of both sides, NVA who had professionally planned the Pl�yme campaign and ARVN, the Pleime campaign.

You are as na�ve as General Schwarzkopf in your statement.

Yes, end of story as far as you are concerned!

Glad that you still hang around, though.

Phieu

#1408 09 Oct 12, 09:59

What intelligence sources did Colonel Hieu relied upon in order to be able to pinpoint - round the clock 24/7 - the time and location of the two remaining NVA Battalions, the 635th and the 334th? And to ambush them?

Mind you: ambush the enemy in the heart of their rear bases! Should it be the other way around? !

I have indicated that the various intelligence sources available to II Corps Command in the Pleime Campaign were:

- from the 1st Air Cav side: radar and infra-red reports from aerial surveillance and target acquisition platoon and Radio Research Unit;

- from II Corps intelligence apparatus: interrogation of prisoners and ralliers, recon missions by Montagnard Eagle Flight teams, VN Airborne Ranger recon teams, radio intercept reports, documents and maps captured.

We can safely speculate that Colonel Hieu relied mainly on three particular sources: enemy maps captured, Airborne Ranger recon teams and radio intercept reports which allowed him to draw up the master plan of Than Phong 7.

- The map of troop displacement routes captured by 1st Air Cav at the hospital site on Nov 3.

Stockton also decided to immediately evacuate � what eventually became a couple of duffel bags full of documents. It was, as Oliver noted, �a G-2 dream come true.�
In the midst of these documents, was a valuable map that revealed the supplies and march routes.
It was a beautifully preserved sketch map that showed the major infiltration trails leading from Cambodia throught the Ia Drang Valley into the Chu Pong Massif and, from there, the attack positions at Plei Me. Besides showing the principal routes of approach used by the 33rd and 32nd Regiments, it pinpointed many important unit locations and other valuable data. (Why Pleime, Pleiku, Coleman)

Colonel Hieu showed it to LTC Truong. It indicated clearly the unique narrow escape corridor the enemy units would use in their attempt to cross into Cambodia.

He said, "On your map, the Cambodian border is located here, ten kilometers east of where it appears on mine. In order to execute my plan, we must use my map rather than yours, because otherwise we cannot go around deeply enough to set up our first blocking force. So, Thieu ta Schwarzkopf"-thieu ta (pronounced "tia-tah") is Vietnamese for "major"-"what do you advise?"

- The Airborne Ranger recon teams inserted deep inside enemy territories

- 10:35H: II Corps (Sgt Minney)(encoded) Request Delta Team locations and no fire zones for them.
- 11:00H: II Corps (Capt Ushijima) Ref your encoded msg (Concerning loc of Delta Tms). II Corps has no knowledge of their locations. (G3 Journal/IFFV, 29 October 1965)

acted as artillery forward observers and Colonel Hieu whispered to LTC Truong where to have Major Schwarzkopf call in the artillery barrages.

As we marched, he would stop to study the map, and every once in a while he'd indicate a position on the map and say, "I want you to fire artillery here." I was skeptical at first, but called in the barrages; when we reached the areas we found bodies.

- The radio intercept reports, in particular of Chinese Advisors open communications, on November 17 let Colonel Hieu know that B3 Field Front had given ordered to the surviving units after the initial B-52 strikes to withdraw to Cambodia. And he acted on this info by calling the Airborne Brigade.

The intelligence estimate on enemy capabilities, made on 17 November indicated that nearly 2/3 of their strength had been wiped off through the engagements in Phases I and II.
II Corps Command thought it was time to throw in the reserve in order to put an end to the battle which had lasted for about one month. Besides suffering heavy losses, the enemy was compelled to fall into the trap set by friendly forces and canalized into the routes of withdrawal which we had foreseen. (Why Pleime, chapter VI)

- The radio intercept reports, in particular of Chinese Advisors open communications, also let Colonel Hieu know the exact withdrawal timing that B3 Field Front Headquarters or its Regimental Command Post provided to the last NVA battalion to enter the unique escape corridor in its marching back to Cambodian rear bases.

At dawn we sent out the 3rd Battalion. They got into position and, sure enough, at eight o'clock they called and reported heavy contact. Truong sent the 5th Battalion to the right. At eleven o'clock they reported heavy contact. As Truong had predicted, in the jungle below us the enemy had run into the 3rd Battalion at the border and decided, "We can't get out that way. We'll double back." That decision violated a basic principle of escape and evasion, which is to take the worst possible route in order to minimize the risk of encountering a waiting enemy. Had they climbed out of the valley up the Chu Pong Mountains, they might have gotten away. Instead they followed the low ground, as Truong had anticipated, and now we'd boxed them in. He looked at me and said, "Fire your artillery." We shelled the area below us for a half hour. Then he ordered his two remaining battalions to attack down the hill; there was a hell of a lot of shooting as we followed them in.

- The radio intercept reports, in particular of Chinese Advisors� open communications also let Colonel Hieu know that a NVA battalion had reported back to either B3 Field Front Headquarters or its Regimental Command Post that it was stealthily shadowing the 3th Bn since its insertion at YA 841092 on Nov 18.

Phieu

#1409 10 Oct 12, 09:48

So solid and precise intelligence is the key element to the success of both operations - Than Phong 7 and Pleime Campaign.

The battle from phases 2 and 3 also introduced an aspect never seen up to now because for almost 20 years, during the Franco-Vietnamese war, seldom pursuit operation was considered after each time the enemy made appearance and when it was conducted, no significant results had been achieved. Therefore this time around, the determination not to allow the enemy to escape, coupled with the solid intelligence on the enemy situation had permitted the battle to develop to maximum degree and scale and at the same token lead to the biggest victory ever achieved by the ARVN and its Allied. ( Pleime, Tr�̣n Chi�́n Lịch Sử page 94)

Phieu

#1410 11 Oct 12, 11:15

And what is unique in terms of intelligence sources in Pleime campaign were the open communications between the Chinese Advisors at divisional and regimental levels in Mandarin. The information obtained through this source was so precise and so accurate that the NVA cadres were convinced there ought to be �spies� among them and that the Air Cav folks were keenly curious in knowing and were told by the ARVN folks there were �special agents� who were privy to top secret information at divisional and regimental command levels that could not be obtained by other intelligence sources. Without the acquisition of these types of information, the planning for B-52 strikes to destroy an entire force comprising three regiments, the interception of the two last battalions on their escape routes would not be possible.

II Corps Command was able to keep B3 Field Front Command guessing about these �spies� and Air Cav about these �special agents� so as these damaging telligence leaks remain unplugged throughout the Pleime campaign.

Even to these days, it still intrigues Air Cav and the NVA folks.

The question of Chinese advisers was no less sensitive to the North Vietnamese. The battlefield commander in the Ia Drang then � lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Huu An, says that it was a point of pride that the People�s Army � which had Chinese army advisers down to the regimental level during the French war � did not have any foreign advisers in the field at any time during the war with the Americans. Asked about U.S. Army Signal Intelligence intercepts of radio transmissions in the Mandarin Chinese dialect in the vicinity of his headquarters on the Chu Pong massif on November 14, 1965, An said: �We had that language capability and sometimes used it to confuse whoever might be listening.� (Moore, page 364)

Phieu

#1411 12 Oct 12, 10:22

�We had that language capability and sometimes used it to confuse whoever might be listening.�

I hope General Hal Moore is just merely reporting General An�s statement, but is not that na�ve so as to take An�s words at face-value.

What is General An talking about? Whom is he kidding?

�Sometimes�?

The Mandarin communications were leaking 24/7, gushing out a torrent of information: units� positions, morale, casualties, cadres� intentions, deliberations, planning, decisions, etc�!

It is really ironic indeed, General An was denying or unaware of the very element that caused the demise of the entire B3 Field Front Forces in the Pleime campaign.

Phieu

#1412 12 Oct 12, 12:15

You have no evidence for this other than your own ridiculous conjectures.

altus

#1413 12 Oct 12, 12:19

Can you tell me then from which intelligence sources all the plethora of information - units� positions, morale, casualties, cadres� intentions, deliberations, planning, decisions, etc� - were obtained, if not from the 24/7 leaks of open Mandarin communications ?

Phieu

#1414 13 Oct 12, 08:19 Those other intelligence sources being

- from the 1st Air Cav side: radar and infra-red reports from aerial surveillance and target acquisition platoon and Radio Research Unit;
- from II Corps intelligence apparatus: interrogation of prisoners and ralliers, recon missions by Montagnard Eagle Flight teams, VN Airborne Ranger recon teams, documents and maps captured.

You have, as I recall, tried to recruit RadioResearcher, our ACG SINGINT expert into rallying to your cause in this matter, when you saw that he also has doubt on this Mandarin source � !

Phieu

#1415 13 Oct 12, 09:04

They were inserted post factum, with full hindsight. Others were the best intelligence estimates available.

altus

#1416 13 Oct 12, 11:26

You missed the precise point: we are talking how those intel info were obtained ... by which methods ... through which sources...

Phieu

#1417 13 Oct 12, 11:41

You have no idea which info was obtained by which method, but that did not prevent you from formulating your ridiculous "up to the minute" thing. You then made an pathetic attempt to "deduct" that it had to be Chinese advisors communicating in the open using Mandarin.

But that's is hardly surprising. It's all you.

altus

#1418 13 Oct 12, 15:26

I do have an idea. It seems like you don't. I have said it multiple times already. I should have told you to go back on my previous lessons. But as a courtesy, let me repeat just for you alone. I am talking about the intel that allowed Colonel Hieu to pre-plan the Nov 15 B-52 strikes and the Nov 24 ambush. He needed to obtain them ahead of times, not in hind sights.

Phieu

#1419 13 Oct 12, 17:37

He didn't have them, he didn't plan anything, and your "ideas" are no more than a couple of baseless guesses to fit your unfounded conjectures.

altus

#1420 13 Oct 12, 21:38

How is it possible a chief of staff operates without a plan?!

Phieu

#1421 14 Oct 12, 04:00

It is possible because he was sitting all days long 24/7 in the radio relay station listening to non-existent Chinese advisors. When you listen you don't plan.

altus

#1422 14 Oct 12, 07:42

altus: It is possible because he was sitting all days long 24/7 in the radio relay station

Yes, it is impossible. But he did not.

listening to non-existent Chinese advisors.

General An could fool General Moore. Do you think you can fool me as well?!

When you listen you don't plan.

Why not, if you are excellent in multi-tasking.

That said, let's get serious: You echo Sam and Don on this point.

#1262 - Sounds highly unlikely a Chief of Staff was "on-call" 24/7 to rush to a radio room to personally monitor radio communications. The question is, "how would anyone know if COL Hieu did or didn't monitor transmissions?"
Now, where did he tell you to look to find written sources or oral testimony that indicated he was personally monitoring radio broadcasts in mandarin? That one should be pretty easy since that is the linchpin-pin of his master plan. Minute to minute intel on size, disposition, morale, etc. of the enemy formation.
What about the "secret agents" you keep talking about? Are you calling the Chinese advisors secret agents? Did they know they were secret agents, or do you actually mean there were traitors in the enemy formation with access to comms equipment that would sneak off and call COL Hieu? (Don744)

I remember having told Samn99 about this point.

- post #1257: Yes, whenever the Chinese advisors communicated with each other on the radio.
I know, your next question will be: How is it possible for an individual to sit at the radio listening device 24/7?
Well, he was one among his team of Vietnamese radio interceptors of Chinese ethnicity who knew Mandarin, and they took turn listening.

Colonel Hieu did not monitor the Chinese Advisors� open communications alone. He had a bunch of Mandarin speaking signal operatives recruited from Vietnamese of Chinese ethnic communities.

In terms of �capabilities� as mentioned by General An, Colonel Hieu was undoubtedly the best linguitics among both sides of the of ARVN and NVA SINGINT operatives alley, since he was born in Tianjin where the Mandarin dialect is spoken and he had attended the Chinese Aurore University in Shanghai and was also fluent in Cantonese and Shanghainese... He would certainly not be confused by the NVA TRU impersonating Chinese Advisors.

PS- Altus, I find it really annoying having to repeat what I have already said multiple times, just because you don't pay enough attention in my classroom, or play hooky too often.

But it is ok though, I don't mind having to explain again for you. It allows me to clarify myself for the benefit of everybody.

Phieu

#1423 15 Oct 12, 10:52

Phieu : How is it possible a chief of staff operates without a plan?!

Let�s take the specific case of the ambush on November 24, which is described clearly and concretely on the black and white tactical map with precise times and coordinates

and corroborated by the colorful narrative of General Norman Schwarzkopf on pages 140-144 of �It Doesn�t Take A Hero�, he who had witnessed with his own eyes the event.

- On November 20, Colonel Hieu, upon learning that B3 Field Front Command had given order to its 334th Battalion to withdraw back to Cambodia and to pass through the narrow corridor along side of Ia Drang River by November 24, made plan to have this battalion intercepted at that location.

- On November 20 sometime around 1600H � after the first ambush was over - he ordered Airborne TF1 with its three Battalions � 3rd, 5th and 6th � to march on land from YA 805085 to the assembly area located at YA 822075 to close in on November 22; they would be met by TF2 with its two Battalions - 7th and 8th - at this location.

- On November 20 at 1745H, he ordered Airborne 8th Battalion to be helilifted from Duc Co camp to the assembly area located at YA 822075;

- On November 22 at 1100H, he ordered Airborne TF2 and its 7th Battalion to be helilifted from Duc Co camp to the assembly area located at YA 822075;

- On November 22, after the entire Airborne Brigade comprising TF1 with its three Battalions � 3rd, 5th and 6th � and Airborne TF2 with its two Battalions - 7th and 8th � had closed in, he ordered the entire brigade to cross the Ia Drang River to the south side and march on land to the staging area located at the peak of a mountain at YA 810055 where it closed in on November 23 at around 1115H, ahead of time of the NVA 334th Battalion;

- On November 24, early in the morning, he had the 3th Battalion set up a blocking position at YA 802070;

- On November 24, latter in the morning, he had the 5th Battalion set up a blocking position at YA 820064.

And so he boxed in the NVA 334th Battalion and annihilated it at the precise location at YA 815070.

Now you are telling me he executed that ambush operation without precise and advanced intelligence knowledge? That the encounter between the NVA 334th Battalion and the Airborne Brigade just fortuitously occurred ?! That they just strolled leisurely in the valley and suddenly bumped into each other?!

Don�t you see how ridiculous you are in your statement?

"He didn't have them, he didn't plan anything, and your "ideas" are no more than a couple of baseless guesses to fit your unfounded conjectures. �.

Phieu

#1424 15 Oct 12, 18:47

Phieu : Now you are telling me he executed that ambush operation without precise and advanced intelligence knowledge?

e did not. Schwarzkopft did not mention him. You simply speculated.

You are using an account by Schwarzkopft on one single incident, the part of your brother in which was highly dubious, to prove your agenda for the whole campaign.

That's all you as usual.

altus

#1425 15 Oct 12, 22:02

altus : He did not. Schwarzkopft did not mention him. You simply speculated.

You say Colonel Hieu did not just because Schwarzkopf did not mention him?!

Schwarzkopf did not mention the name of the operation either: Than Phong 7 operation. That makes he was narrating another operation other Than Phong 7 operation?

He did not mention about the first ambush happening on November 20 either. Does that make, it did not happen either?

Who orchestrated Than Phong 7 operation? Who narrated that operation in Why Pleime? Who draw up that tactical map of the operation posted in Why Pleime?

Not only Colonel Hieu brought in the Airborne Brigade from Saigon, Bien Hoa, Vung Tau, Phu Yen, he even got involved directly in the tactical maneuvers of the operation as recorded in G3/IFFV, 19 Nov 1965 entry:

- 16:55H: 1st Cav (Rear) Capt Parham - Fwd CP states the elem's in Abn TF area was coordinated at higher levels than Fwd G3. The Abn TF knows about it.

Let me further put faces at the various command post locations:

- Air Cav Headquarters in An Khe (rear) : General Kinnard;

- Air Cav Forward Command Post in Pleiku: General Knowles;

- Airborne G3/Task Force 1 in Ia Drang Valley: LTC Ngo Quang Truong;

- G3/II Corps Command in Pleiku: Colonel Hieu.

Just go back and review my post #1400!

As usual you have been falling asleep in my classes or playing hooky !

BTW, Schwarzkopf did not mention the names of the other Airborne commanders. Does that make they did not participate in the operation?

- Task Force 1: Lieutenant Colonel Ng� Xu�n Nghị
= 3rd Battalion: Major Khi�́u Hữu Di�u
= 5th Battalion: Major Nguy�̃n Khoa Nam
= 6th Battalion: Captain Nguy�̃n Văn Minh
- Task Force 2: Lieutenant Colonel Trương Quang �n
= 7th Battalion: Major Nguy�̃n Bá Trước
= 8th Battalion: Major Nguy�̃n Văn Thọ

Phieu

#1426 16 Oct 12, 02:50

Phieu : You say Colonel Hieu did not just because Schwarzkopf did not mention him?!

It was you who brought Schwarzkopft in as a supporting source. As usual, he did not support your claim, that your brother did this, your brother did that. You were merely speculating. That ARVN operation might as well be planned by Col. Trưởng or Gen. Vĩnh Lộc. Oh, he walked out on your presentation, didn't he?

altus

#1427 16 Oct 12, 07:41

altus : It was you who brought Schwarzkopft in as a supporting source. As usual, he did not support your claim, that your brother did this, your brother did that.

I brought Schwarzkopf in to corroborate Colonel Hieu's narrative of the operation Than Phong 7. I did not need Schwarzkopf�s support to establish Colonel Hieu�s role as architect of the operation. You did not go back and review my post #1400, as I suggested, did you?

That explains your next statement:

You were merely speculating. That ARVN operation might as well be planned by Col. Trưởng or Gen. Vĩnh Lộc.

Let me repeat it here again.

G3/IFFV, Nov 19, 1965, 16:55H: 1st Cav (Rear) Capt Parham - Fwd CP states the elem's in Abn TF area was coordinated at higher levels than Fwd G3. The Abn TF knows about it.
Meaning: Captain Parham at the rear Air Cav Headquarters in An Khe says that 1st Air Cav Forward Command Post in Pleiku states that the three battalions of the Airborne Task Force 1 (on 11/19, only TF1 with its three battalions - 3th, 5th and 6th � were present on the ground of the operational area; TF 2 with its two battalions � 7th and 8th � were to be helilifted in only on 11/20 and 11/22) were coordinated not at G3/TF1 level but at G3/II Corps Headquarters level. And Airborne Task Force 1 acknowledges the fact its tactical maneuvers are dictated at G3/II Corps Headquarters level .
Let me further put faces at the various command post locations:
- Air Cav Headquarters in An Khe (rear) : General Kinnard;
- Air Cav Forward Command Post in Pleiku: General Knowles;
- Airborne G3/Task Force 1 in Ia Drang Valley: LTC Ngo Quang Truong;
- G3/II Corps Command in Pleiku: Colonel Hieu.

You are not that clever in your following comment in attempting to discredit me either.

Oh, he walked out on your presentation, didn't he?

You are alluding to my post #608, I guess?!

It is clear that you attempt to twist my story into making people believe that General Vinh Loc disavows me. Au contraire �.

Yes, he walked out on my presentation, but not for the reason you hint at, but because he was afraid he would not be able to respond to the questions that the audience might ask him since he did not know the detail of that operation, not being its architect.

Allow me to repost the story:

My Very First Presentation of Pleime Campaign
When I walked up to the podium to present the Pleime Campaign, I saw at the corner of my eyes General Vinh Loc and Brigadier General Mataxis sitting right there in the middle of the first row. The view, to be honest, startled me a little bit and I panicked thinking I would make a fool of myself talking about Pleime campaign in front of those two individuals: the commanding general and the chief advisor of that campaign!
I inaugured my presentation with a note of caution: �Ladies and Gentlemen, we have here among the audience the distinguished presence of General Vinh Loc and Brigadier General Mataxis. They would surely fill up the gaps of my amateur account of the Pleime campaign, and would be glad to entertain your questions at the Q&A session after my presentation.
By the end of my presentation, I noticed that General Vinh Loc quietly sneaked out of the auditorium. As of Brigadier General Mataxis, he referred back to me all the questions raised by the listerners. When the session ended, he walked up to me and said, �Mon G�n�ral, well done!� I responded, �I am only General Hieu�s brother�. �I know. How come you know so well about the campaign? Were you within the inner circle of II Corps general staff team? I did not see you there �" "No, I was never there. I was a civilian at that time."
Later on when I met General Vinh Loc during break time, I asked him why he had left the auditorium suddenly and ahead of time. His answer was, "You would handle the questions better than me. Your brother was really a good chief of staff."

Did Martaxis walk out of my presentation?

Phieu

#1428 16 Oct 12, 07:44

Did he maintain contact with you, answer you questions afterward or did he not?

altus

#1429 16 Oct 12, 07:46

What do you think?

YES

We met several times again at Lubbock until he passed away.

And each time he sat in my various presentations in which I continued to talk about Pleime with Colonel Hieu as its architect, without him ever contradicting me or disavowing me.

By the way, I also met General Vinh Loc a second time also at Lubbock and he also sat in my presentation that year. We even sat together at lunch and dinner.

During our encounters, we had the opportunity to chat about one of our mutual acquaintance. A person by the name of T�n Tằng, that he addressed to as "Aunt T�n Tằng", him being a Vĩnh, who happened to be the fianc�e of one of other brothers!

Am I not lucky? Otherwise you would have the pretext of accusing me of lying because the dead cannot talk for themselves ... !

I pre-empt your next attacking move, don't I?!

Phieu

#1430 16 Oct 12, 16:38

Phieu : What do you think?

For the time being I'll register that you no longer suggest that Mataxis and Vĩnh Lộc had explicitly display forthright disapproval to your baseless speculations.

altus

#1431 16 Oct 12, 16:41

You are twisting things again!

You are putting your words into my mouth!

You sound like Obama !

Phieu

#1432 17 Oct 12, 10:34

Did Major Schwarzkopf knew Colonel Hieu while he was up in Pleiku? He might know by sight the II Corps Chief of Staff, but not by name, just like LTC Hal Moore had professed to me he did not know �that individual�.

I am the one who discover the connection between General Schwarzkopf�s narration of the unnamed operation he described in It Doesn�t Take A Hero in which he was first introduced to LTC Ngo Quang Truong and Than Phong 7 operation as narrated in Why Pleime.

And I am the one who points out General Schwarzkopf�s na�vet� in his understanding, interpretation of what he was witnessing going on in that operation.

The matching of the two narrations - Colonel Hieu's (1966) and General Schwarzkopf's (1999) -provides a stark and precise description of Than Phong 7 operation, though.

Phieu

#1433 18 Oct 12, 11:38

It goes without saying, in terms of historical domaine, Colonel Hieu�s narrative is more valuable than General Schwarzkopf�s.

The only significant contribution that Schwarzkopf provides is the name of LTC Ngo Quang Truong, who at that time was the chief of staff of the Airborne Brigade, and was assigned as field commander of the operation by Brigadier General Du Quoc Dong, the Airborne Brigade Commander.

Besides that, everything else is imprecise: name, time and location of the operation.

Schwarzkopf�s narrative indicates he only participates part of the Than Phong 7 operation. He is not present in Ia Drang valley when the first ambush takes place on November 20.

Colonel Hieu�s narrative fills in all the gaps in General Schwarzkopf�s.

Major Schwarzkopf accompanies LTC Truong and flies into Duc Co camp with TF2 comprising 7th Bn and 8th Bn on November 18. He remains at the camp and is helilifted to the assembly area located at YA 825075 with TF2 and 8th Battalion on November 22 at 1100H. He joins TF1, 3rd Bn, 5th Bn, 6th Bn and 7th that has closed in Nov 20 at the assembly area ahead of him. From there, around 1350H, he crosses the Ia Drang River to its south side with the entire Airborne Brigade and marches toward the staging area located at the peak of a mountain (YA 810055) where the entire closes in around 1115H on November 23. That night he witnesses with amazement LTC Truong�s never-seen-before planning for the ambush of the NVA 334th Bn.

When we set up our command post that night, he opened his map, lit a cigarette, and outlined his battle plan. The strip of jungle between our position on the ridges and the river, he explained, made a natural corridor-the route the NVA would most likely take. He said, "At dawn we will send out one battalion and put it here, on our left, as a blocking force between the ridge and the river. Around eight o'clock tomorrow morning they will make a big enemy contact. Then I will send another battalion here, to our right. They will make contact at about eleven o'clock. I want you to have your artillery ready to fire into this area in front of us," he said, "and then we will attack with our third and fourth battalions down toward the river. The enemy will then be trapped with the river to his back."
I'd never heard anything like this at West Point. I was thinking, "What's all this about eight o'clock and eleven o'clock? How can he schedule a battle that way?" But I also recognized the outline of his plan: Truong had reinvented the tactics Hannibal had used in 217 B.C. when he enveloped and annihilated the Roman legions on the banks of Lake Trasimene.

Colonel Hieu fills in the left out coordinates of the first and second blocking positions as YA 802070 and YA 820063 respectively. And the NVA 334th Bn is pinned against the Ia Drang River at YA 815070.

Phieu

#1434 19 Oct 12, 09:58

General Schwarzkopf wrote his authobiography It Does Not Take A Hero with the help of Peter Petre, who had no military background whatsoever.

This explains why the section pertaining to Than Phong 7 operation lacks all the detail of a military operation report. Should General Schwarzkopf have sought the assistant of a military personnel such as a major or a captain who knows how to do research in the military archives, the narration would have taken a more military like tone. General Schwarzkopf was more interested in literary splendor than military historical strictness.

And yet Altus attempts to use him for refuting my contention that Colonel Hieu is the architect of Than Phong 7 operation and Pleime campaign!

Peter Petre was executive editor at Fortune, where he directed coverage of information technology, biotechnology, medicine, industrial technology, and science. He co-authored Alan Greenspan�s memoir, �The Age of Turbulence: Adventures in a New World.� Published in 2007, the book was No. 1 on the New York Times bestseller list. Mr. Petre has co-written two other NY Times bestsellers: General H. Norman Schwarzkopf�s �It Doesn�t Take A Hero� and Thomas J. Watson, Jr.�s �Father, Son & Co.: My Life at IBM and Beyond.� He assisted on Steven Rattner�s �Overhaul: An Insider�s Account of the Obama Administration�s Emergency Rescue of the Auto Industry� and on Robert S. McNamara�s �In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam.� He is a director of the Authors Guild, America�s largest association of book writers.

Phieu

#1435 19 Oct 12, 12:59

Phieu : General Schwarzkopf was more interested in literary splendor than military historical strictness.

I see. When he described Ng� Quang Trưởng's unique, nearly clairvoyant combat planning, then he was number one. When he failed to mention your brother, he was number ten.

altus

#1436 19 Oct 12, 13:01

You say so ... number one/number ten. Not me. I have pointed out General Schwarzkopf's na�vet� long long time ago ...

You should not have left out my next sentence:

�And yet Altus attempts to use him for refuting my contention that Colonel Hieu is the architect of Than Phong 7 operation and Pleime campaign!�

Phieu

#1437 19 Oct 12, 13:13

Phieu: my contention that Colonel Hieu is the architect of Than Phong 7 operation and Pleime campaign

You have absolutely no evidence for your contention than a bunch of completely unfounded speculations. The closest thing you could bring in for this "chess playing" thingy was that account by Schwarzkopft. To your dismay however he did not make any mention about your brother.

That's about it.

altus

#1438 19 Oct 12, 14:18

I do not have to say it to a blinded fold person, heavily conditionned by VC endoctrination.

I should no more waste my time dialoguing with someone that is anchored in prejudice. I said multiple times already: even with millions of proofs, you won't be able to see clear ...

have spent way too long time entertaining you - just you alone - from post #1406 to post #1432.

Enough is enough ...

Just stay and enjoy my thread or walk away and have a peace of mind ...

Maybe you should start a thread refuting all I said in this thread that is wrong ... Let's see if you can carry on to 95th plus page ... instead of bits and pieces of jabing attacks full of hollow pomposity ...

As I had said multiple times, it's becoming very annoying and fruitless like responding to a hacker ...

And yes, That's about it.

Phieu

#1439 19 Oct 12, 14:46

It is very simple, Phieu.

Whatever you believe in is subjective.

Whatever I believe in is equally subjective.

However, how you argue for what you believe in, how you present evidence, sources and deduction is objective and can be verified by everyone.

Either you have a supporting evidence or you don't have one.

Either your deduction is logically sound or it is merely speculations/conjecture.

This is objective and easily verifiable in complete independence of whatever prejudice/agenda the verifier may harbor.

So, "even with millions of proofs, you won't be able to see clear" is simply a statement admitting that you have no proof.

View count doesn't matter. You can repeat your worn out nonsenses over a million pages. One post suffices to point out they are baseless.

altus

#1440 19 Oct 12, 14:47

I did not bother to read the previous post #1439.

Did we both not say - you in post #1437, I in post # 1438, That's about it already ?!

Phieu

#1441 20 Oct 12, 05:07

The NVA map captured by Air Cav might provide to Colonel Hieu the withdrawal route of the 334th Battalion. But the knowledge that that battalion would reach the narrow corridor on November 24 certainly could only have been obtained by listening to radio intercepted communications, not between B3 Field Front Command and the 334th Battalion, who for sure took precaution of using secret codes, but more likely between Chinese Advisors at divisional and regimental levels, who could afford to be carefree speaking in Mandarin in the open.

In any eventualities, Colonel Hieu had to base on advanced and precise information originated from B3 Field Front Command to pre-plan the ambush operation that the Airborne Brigade executed in a surgical precision manner: the hand of the surgeon guides the surgical knife without hesitation straight to the point of incision.

Phieu

#1442 28 Oct 12, 10:16

Colonel Hieu appears to be modest in the narrative of Than Phong 7 operation in his English version Why Pleime, catered specifically to the American readers. He gives a more detailed account of this operation in his Vietnamese version of Pleime, Tr�̣n Chi�́n Lịch Sử, catered specifically to the Vietnamese readers. Following is the translation of the Vietnamese version, followed by the English version for comparison purpose.

Phieu

#1443 28 Oct 12, 10:19

Vietnamese version translated into English

(Pleime, Tr�̣n Chi�́n Lịch Sử)

The biggest engagement in the third phase happened at 1440 hours on 20 November, North of the Ia Drang river. From the standpoint of tactical perspective, this battle was only the natural outcome of the Airborne Brigade�s action, but based on its unfolding and results, this is an unusual battle that could only be explained by the misfortune of the VC unit that participated in the Pleime battle. In the morning of November 19, following the insertion on November 18 evening, the Airborne Task Force broke into two prongs marching westward with the intention of herding the enemy, but not allowing them an escape route. There were several contacts with the enemy but not significant. In the morning of November 20, the upper paratroop group of 3rd Airborne Battalion veered down southward to link with the lower paratroop group of the 6th Airborne Battalion; however to avoid any unwanted risk of friendly encroachments in the case both groups displace at the same time, the latter was ordered to stop moving and wait. While 3rd Battalion was on the move, a VC battalion-sized unit stealthily followed behind. Although aware of this, 3rd Battalion did not react and kept advancing, and notified 6th Battalion. When 3rd Battalion went through 6th Battalion�s area and the enemy had emerged, 6th Battalion had only to open fire and the VC unit was caught in a frontal ambush configuration.

The paratroopers participating in this battle narrated that in all the battles they had participated, never had them shot that happily; all they had to do was to lay down still at their positions and shoot and watch the enemy fall down one layer after the next. Another no less unusual fact was that 3rd Battalion made contact with another enemy company-sized unit after they passed through 6th Battalion�s spot. It was fortunate for this Battalion that otherwise would risk being �held down by the head while being kicked on the rear�. Just in these two engagements, nearly 200 VC were left on the spot. During the night of November 21, the enemy attempted using faking east attacking west tactic to seek entering the area to pick up bodies, but in so doing suffered further casualties.

In their search for enemy installations in the areas of operation, the Airborne Brigade destroyed 3 training centers at Hill 185, YA 801080 and YA 797097 in the two following days, November 21 and 23, along with a cache of equipment and 75 houses.

On November 24, as no more contacts were made with the enemy, the Airborne Brigade withdrew from the area of operations and the 3rd phase of Pleime campaign ended at 18:45H on November 26 with 265 VC killed (BC), 10 others and 58 weapons captured.

Phieu

#1444 28 Oct 12, 10:22

English version ̣

(Why Pleime)

In their search for enemy installations in the area of operations, the Airborne Brigade destroyed 3 training centers, a cache of equipment and 75 houses.

The search and destroy operations were also conducted south of the Ia Drang river but only small skirmishes with scattered VC elements happened.

Phieu

#1445 29 Oct 12, 12:07

The Vietnamese version adds the following paratroopers� action to the English version:

Another no less unusual fact was that 3rd Battalion made contact with another enemy company-sized unit after it passed through 6th Battalion�s spot. It was fortunate for this Battalion that otherwise would risk being �held down by the head while being kicked on the rear�.

It also provides the locations of the three NVA training centers:

In their search for enemy installations in the areas of operation, the Airborne Brigade destroyed 3 training centers at Hill 185, YA 801080 and YA 797097 in the two following days, November 21 and 23.

Furthermore the English version gives you the impression that the operation ended on November 24.

On 24 November, as no more contacts were made with the enemy, the Airborne Brigade withdrew from the area of operations, terminating the third phase of the Battle of Pleime

The Vietnamese version specifies it really ended on November 26, 1965:

On November 24, as no more contacts were made with the enemy, the Airborne Brigade withdrew from the area of operations and the 3rd phase of Pleime campaign ended at 18:45H on November 26.

Phieu

#1446 30 Oct 12, 14:37

In Pleime, Tr�̣n Chi�́n Lịch Sử, instead of one synthesized tactical map like in Why Pleime, the different phases of Than Phong 7 operation are illustratred by three separate tactical drawings.

- First phase Nov 18-22: 1st ambush

- Second phase Nov 23-24: 2nd ambush

- Third phase Nov 25-26 : withdrawal

Phieu

#1447 31 Oct 12, 13:05

Colonel Hieu said that at the 1st ambush site, the Airborne 3rd Battalion was able to pre-empt the NVA hold down the head and kick the rear tactic. Following are some Eastern military tactics used by both sides during the Pleime Campaign:

Đi�̣u h�̉ ly sơn = Luring the tiger down from the mountain

Đại bàng xà xu�́ng = Eagle lunges

Lùa cá vào rọ = rounding up fish into the basket

Lùa ch�̀n vào b�̃y = herding foxes into a trap

Dương đ�ng kích t�y = Fake east attack west � Make noise east and attack west

Ti�̀n pháo h�̣u xa = artillery barrage ahead of tanks advance

Th�́ ch�n vạc = triangular formation

Nắm lưng qu�̀n mà đánh = grab the belts in fighting

Đánh đi�̉m di�̣t vi�̣n = attack an outpost to lure in and destroy the relief force

C�ng đ�̀n đả vi�̣n = lure and ambush

Đánh di�̣n di�̣t đi�̉m = Exert pressure against a secondary point and destroy the main point.

Nh�́t đi�̉m lưỡng di�̣n= one main attack and two diversionary attacks.

Ki�̀m thủ kích vĩ= hold down the head and kick the rear.

Phieu

#1448 01 Nov 12, 11:52

These Eastern military tactic expressions were only used in the Vietnamese narrative of Pleime, Tr�̣n Chi�́n Lịch Sử, not in the English narrative of Why Pleime. For the American readers, Colonel Hieu uses American doctrinal military terms.

The Dien Bien Phu Battle which ended the Indochina war (1947-1954) lasted for two months but was merely an encirclement of a stronghold in the Dien Bien Phu Bowl.
The Pleime Battle, quite different with many tactical aspects:
- Envelopment
- Counter-ambushes
- Relief
- Pursuit
- Ambushes
- Exploitation
- Attack and destroy
is no doubt the biggest battle from the last years.

(Why Pleime, Forewords)

Phieu

#1449 02 Nov 12, 09:26

In the Pl�yme campaign, the VC have coined the famous tactical expression, "Nắm gi�y lưng qu�̀n địch mà đánh" (General Nguy�̃n Chí Thanh), �When attack, grab the enemy by the belts� or �grab their belts to fight them� that the US translate as �close embrace� or �bear hug�.

In the Pleiku campaign, the US has coined the famous tactical expression �air assaults� (General Kinnard) that the VC translates as �frog leaps� or "eagle plunges". p>How about the ARVN in the Pleime campaign ? Is there one famous tactical expression coined by the ARVN? Anyone knows?

Phieu

#1450 03 Nov 12, 13:36

The ARVN did coin a tactical expression in the Pleime campaign, but it did not become famous because an American conspiracy had tried to render it oblivious by replacing it with Pleiku to sound more American and erase all ARVN vestiges.

That tactical expression is "Trường Chinh", "Long Reach" that the US would have translated as "Hail Mary Pass" tactic, that is if they grasp the operational concept of the Pleime Offensive into Chupong-Iadrang of using B-52 strike conceived by Colonel Hieu.

Colonel Hieu illustrates the implementation and execution of this operational concept in a map posted in Pleime, Tr�̣n Chi�́n Lịch Sử, showing the curve of the football trajectory if you connect the 8 dots!

1 Destruction of VC field hospital 11-1-65 ) herding move
2 Ambush of 66th Regiment 11-3-65) herding move
3 Discovery of a weapon cache 11-4-65 ) herding move
4 Destruction of one 33rd Regiment�s battalion 11-6-65) herding move
5 LZ X-Ray 11-14-65 ) distractive move
6 LZ Albany 11-17-65 ) distractive move
7 Artillery location 11-18-65 ) coup de gr�ce move
8 B-52 air strikes targeted areas 11/15-18/65) with B3 center of mass vicinity YA8702

Phieu

#1451 04 Nov 12, 09:05

In terms of Eastern military tactical terminology, Colonel Hieu would have used �t�́n ngang kích thủ�, �side kick overhead blow�. Paraphrasing:

- fake flank jab strike overhead blow

- fake horizontal ground attack strike vertical air attack

- fake horizontal ground Air Cav assaults strike vertical Arclite bombings

The VC counter the US Air Cav frog leaps tactic with grab the enemy by the belts tactic.

Colonel Hieu neutralizes it with fake horizontal ground Air Cav assault strike vertical Arclite bombing tactic in which the VC troops are kept at a 3 km pole length.

#1452 05 Nov 12, 10:19

What did the VC mean by �grab the enemy by the belts� tactic? General Nguyen Nam Khanh gives some precision.

I pondered deeply in order to visualize the proper tactics that would "demoralize" the enemy. After 2 days, the 304th Division Commander and I presented in person to comrade Chu Huy Man the content of the "demoralizing strike". One was to annihilate an American airmobile cavalry battalion; two was to attack at close range and with bayonets (in close combat).
In the preparation process, we encountered numerous difficulties, among which was an incident that stuck forever in my mind. It was that a section of cadres and combatants assessed mistakenly that American troops could not be attacked with close range combat using bayonets, and discarded almost all bayonets along Route 559 (from Route 9 to B3). I had to mobilize some political cadres together with the transportation unit to go back and gather bayonets from Route 9 to B3, succeeding in recuperating 300 pieces, sufficient to arm 3 infantry companies (one of 7th battalion and 2 of 8th battalion of 66th Regiment). The use of bayonets in this battle was not to be entrusted to just anybody, but to selected and highly motivated and determined combatants to defeat the American troops. Then to motivate, to train to the perfection the bayonet combat tactic, close range combat and light foot, under enemy fire, in order to ascertain close contact appropriate to the targeted Americans that we will face at Ia Drang valley.

(General Nguyen Nam Khanh - Crushing the American troops in Central Highlands)

Phieu

#1453 06 Nov 12, 10:27

Going into Chupong Iadrang, the 1st Air Cav troops were not as well prepared for combat as the NVA 66th Regiment

The green troops expended a lot of ammunition early on, firing mostly at shadows. During the early days at An Khe, the saga of Maggie the mule ended tragically. She wandered too far outside the perimeter one cloudy night and was shot by a spooked picket guard. The flailing about on the perimeter revealed a fundamental truth about the division for someone who was perceptive enough to see it: the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) that had just arrived in Vietnam was not an elite unit. True, the concept of airmobility was elite, but the troopers who were to provide the sinew for making the concept a reality were typical of the American infantry, artillery, and engineer soldiers the U.S. Army was providing to all of its line outfits in 1965.
So a lot of ammunition was fire off in those first days on the perimeter, until inexperienced troops began recognizing shadows for what they were and leaders began exercising the kind of control and fire discipline that was expected of a first-rate outfit. Step by step, the division began reaching a true wartime readiness; not the paper brand of readiness but that special kind of discipline marked by proficiency and dependability and automatic habits of combat not taught in any school. The division was striving to reach an elite status. The question was, would the enemy allow it the time?

(Coleman, page 53)

The eagles were mighty when up in the air with air and artillery supports. But once on the ground, as infantrymen, they were no match to the NVA troops - that were motivated, trained to the perfection in the bayonet combat tactic and close range combat and light foot, that grabbeb them by the belts.

Phieu

#1454 07 Nov 12, 12:02

General Kinnard really underestimated the enemy in thinking that he would wrap up his troops and bring them back home after a couple of weeks operating in the Highlands.

Cochran: Only a few weeks after your division arrived, you would begin sending troops home?
Kinnard: Yes, but you must remember that at that time it was a possibility that we might have to fight our way ashore if Vietnam was, in fact, cut in half. Also, if I had said that a man had to have a year to go, it would have destroyed the division - down to 45 percent strength. It was very important that we had a well-trained team to win the first battles. Still, it did make for an awkward situation with people beginning to go home as soon as we got there.

And right after the LZ X-Ray battle he wanted to have his 2nd Brigade pursue the enemy into Ia Drang Valley.

Kinnard: I wanted to destroy the enemy. This would have been my next step, this is what I wanted the 2nd Brigade to do. What better time to stay on the enemy's tail than when you have just chewed them up?

(Cochran)

It was fortunate that Colonel Hieu sent in the Airborne Brigade instead. Otherwise the 1/5 Air Cav Battalion and 2/5 Air Cav Battalion troops would be grabbed by the belts by the NVA 635th and 334th Battalion troops.

Phieu

#1455 08 Nov 12, 09:57

In terms of tactics, the Eastern military thinking seems to be more prolific, more thriving, more blossoming, more picturesque (crouching tiger, drunken monkey, hidden dragon, etc.) than the Western one�s. To the latter, besides the terms mentioned by Colonel Hieu in Why Pleime, I can only think of one more, �anvil and hammer� tactic.

The expressions in Eastern military tactical terminology are the same as the ones used in the Chinese martial arts and in particular in the Chinese chess, the pieces of which comprise: tướng (general), sĩ (general staff officer), tượng (elephant - heavy weaponry unit), xe (armor), pháo (artillery), mã (cavalry), t�́t (infantry); and the chessboard is the battlefield.

This explains a good military strategist/tactician officer can easily be a master in Chinese chess.

24. Americans working with him in MR-3 find him friendly and cooperative. In Bien Hoa, he lives in a trailer at MR-3 Hq and spends most nights there only occasionally taking an overnight leave to be with his family in Saigon. He frequently visits in the home of Bien Hoa Consulate General senior officers for long evenings of discussion or chess games (he is a master of Chinese Chess, and plays �Western� chess well). He played shortstop on his high school softball team in Shanghai, but apart from pistol and rifle target shooting does not seem to play any sport now. He often borrows books on world affairs from his American friends. He has made a detailed study of Red Army defeat of German invasion forces in Russia in World War II and obviously admires the Russian performance. While candid, courteous, and friendly with American officials in MR-3, a certain reserve and circumspection, perhaps a part of a Mandarin sense of dignity and position is always discernible.

(Ambassador Martin, Airgram A-231, November 7, 1974, Biographic Data on MG Nguyen Van Hieu, Deputy Commander, III Corps)

Phieu

#1456 09 Nov 12, 08:51

As early as 1959, when he was still a major Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations in I Corps and had not yet attended the Fort Leavenworth USCGSC, Hieu was viewed by the American Advisor Group as a potential eminent general officer. They would not be surprised seeing Colonel Hieu as II Corps Chief of Staff conceiving and executing the master plan of �side kick strike overhead blow� or �fake horizontal ground Air Cav assaulst strike vertical Arclite bombings� tactic at Pleime-Chupong-Iadrang.

6. On February 16, 1958, Hieu was assigned as the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations in I Corps. The Corps Commander was LTG Tran Van Don. In August of that year, Hieu received an evaluation from an American Advisor. It is apparent from the report that Hieu had, during the six months he had been in I Corps, left a very favorable impression on the American Advisory Group in Danang. Hieu was highly recommended for attendance at the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; lauded for his administrative abilities; for his skillful and proper utilization of personnel; and for his superior attitude toward receiving and accepting advice from US advisors. The advisor concluded his report by stating: �He is a man who possesses potential for highest rank in the Vietnamese Army. He should be sent to a CONUS school as soon as possible, preferably Ft. Leavenworth. He should be assigned to field command jobs to give him more command experience. This officer, properly handled and developed, could well become a future competent if not eminent general officer in the Vietnamese Army. His attitude toward the United States is strong, and his language fluency would be an invaluable asset to Allied operations.�
7. A little more than a year later, on October 6, 1959, Hieu received another evaluation which echoed his earlier one. He was again highly recommended for attendance at the Command and General Staff School. Hieu recently told a senior US official in MR-3 that he was denied promotion for an extended period because he believed it inappropriate as a military officer to join Diem�s Can Lao Party even though he was importuned to do so. This probably explains being passed over many times for Leavenworth. Hieu received his permanent promotion to major on October 26, 1961.

(Ambassador Martin, Airgram A-231, November 7, 1974, Biographic Data on MG Nguyen Van Hieu, Deputy Commander, III Corps)

Phieu

#1457 10 Nov 12, 07:54

The name of the American Advisor mentioned in the above posted airgram is Major Wagner. Checking with Corps this morning, I found out that the last airphibious operation, beginning last Saturday, has been more successful than the previous series of assaults undertaken by the Marine choppers on October 15.

This time, according to Maj. Wagner, the American operations adviser at I Corps, the Arvin discovered a couple of supply dumps that belonged to the VC and near there killed three VC, captured two prisoners, and recovered two trip grenades set up as booby traps, which fortunately were not detonated. In the fighting in that vicinity, one of the Arvin troopers was wounded and one of our automatic rifles was captured by the VC.

[...]

Maj. Wagner introduced me to the Vietnamese Deputy Chief of Operations in this Corps Area, Maj. Nguyen Van Hieu, a slight, alert, well-scrubbed individual whom Wagner, in an aside to me, characterized as "very bright." The Vietnamese operations chief spoke highly of the strategic hamlet program: "In each tactical area, the Army is responsible for support, barbed wire, and weapons, and we are making progress. Elections are being held in many of the strategic hamlets."

Phieu

#1458 11 Nov 12, 13:27

In his narrative of Than Phong 7 operation, Colonel Hieu has shown modesty in two respects: one, in not mentioning his personal and direct role into the conduct of the operation; two, in attributing the success of the operation more on VC�s ill fate than Airborne Brigade�s ingenuity.

The biggest engagement in the third phase happened at 1440 hours on 20 November, North of the Ia Drang river. From the standpoint of tactical perspective, this battle was only the natural outcome of the Airborne Brigade�s action, but based on its unfolding and results, this is a unusual battle that could only be explained by the misfortune of the VC unit that participated in the Pleime battle.

(Pleime, Tr�̣n Chi�́n Lịch Sử)

The Vietnamese paratroopers were also modest as well and attributed the success of the operation mainly to the artillery support provided by the 2nd Air Cav Brigade. The Americans were too happy to goble that praise. - Coleman (page 276)

Late in the afternoon of the 20th, the 3rd and 6th battalions of the Airborne Brigade cornered a battalion of the NVA 32nd Regiment that had been too slow in the heeding Field Front�s order to retreat out of Vietnam into Cambodia. The four batteries on Golf and Crooks, using American advisors with the ARVN as forward observers, literally blew the NVA battalion apart. The ARVN had never seen artillery delivered in such massive doses and at such close ranges. The ARVN habitually deployed artillery in two-tube increments and rarely fired close support in tighter than two hundred meters. At Golf, the fire direction center monitored a message directly from the paratrooper battalions. It said: �Artillery too close! But very nice! Keep shooting!� An advisor told a reporter long after the battle that the tough ARVN paratroopers could talk of little else for months afterward except that incredible artillery support. The incident led the ARVN Airborne Brigade to train forward observer officers to work with each rifle company. As for the battle itself, when the smoke cleared, the ARVN swept forward and the advisors told Lynch that they had found 127 bodies on the battlefield, most of them victims of cavalry artillery. The Cav had finally tangled, albeit with indirect fire, with the last regiment of the NVA division.

- Moore (page 369)

Late in the afternoon of the twentieth, the 3rd and 6th battalions of the South Vietnamese Airborne Brigade made contact with a battalion of General Chu Huy Man�s battle-weary People�s Army troops hard by the Cambodian border, north of where the Ia Drang crosses. The hapless North Vietnamese battalion had been a bit slow on the withdrawal toward sanctuary in Cambodia and now they would pay the price.
The radio message received by the American gunners who had twenty-four 105 mm howitzers set up on LZ Golf and LZ Crooks described the target: �Enemy in the open!� The American adviser with the Vietnamese Airborne task force adjusted the artillery fire by radio, ripping the enemy battalion apart. They reported that at least 127 bodies were strewn over the killing field when the barrage lifted, and that the South Vietnamese were amazed and delighted at the pinpoint accuracy of the American artillerymen. A Vietnamese radio message was received by one of the batteries firing during the action. Translated, it said: �Artillery too close! Artillery too close! But very nice! Keep shooting!�.

-Kinnard (page 124)

US advisors too have become more optimistic, not so much about the eventual defeat of the Viet Cong, but that the ARVN commanders will be more receptive concerning adoption of concepts that heretofore have been belittled or rejected. For example, advisors with the ARVN Airborne Brigade are confident that that the dramatic demonstration of what close support artillery can do for infantry will go far to convince the brigade of the desirability of training officer forward observers (at the time of the engagement, not a single officer F-O was assigned to any of the 32 rifle companies in the ARVN Airborne Brigade).

Phieu

#1459 12 Nov 12, 10:52

Kinnard was right about the US influence in the artillery benefit awareness among the ARVN commanders. The following month of Pleime campaign, the Airborne unit was expanded into Division and artillery support units were added to each airborne battalion in operation.

Phieu

Section I: post #1 � post #300
Section II: post #301 � post #600
Section III : post #601 � post #900
Section IV : post #901 � post #1200
Section V : post #1201 � post #1459

generalhieu