Iadrang Battle Presented at Armchair General Forum IV

What you still may not know about the Ia Drang Valley battle
(A transcript from Armchair General Forum )

Section IV : from #901 to #1200
(http://www.armchairgeneral.com/forums/showthread.php?t=116167&page=61)

#901 22 Jul 12, 10:42

The after-action report of operation Toan Thang 8B5 gives a good description of “movement to contact”:

(2) The movement to contact began on 25 October (D-Day) with the three task forces crossing the border into Cambodia between 0630-1105 hours. TF1, the lead task force, encountered many enemy mines implanted on QL13. At 0935 hours, 3km northwest of the border, 2/9 Battalion made the initial enemy contact by receiving flanking fire from an estimated enemy platoon. Contact was broken at 1000 hours with the enemy withdrawing to the east. Each task force had several assigned objectives of suspected enemy bases. Each objective was secured as rapidly as possible, quickly swept, and then the task force moved to the next objective. At 1645 hours, 10km south of Snoul, 4/9 Battalion made contact with an estimated enemy company. ARVN artillery fired in support of the contact. The enemy broke contact at 1710 hours and withdrew to the northwest. The 4/9 Battalion suffered one WIA while accounting for three enemies killed and three individual weapons captured.

Further down, it also gives a description of "movement to search":

(4) On 27 October TF 1 conducted search operations east of Snoul, while TF333 conducted operations southwest of the city. At 1700 hours, 5 km southeast of Snoul, 4/9 Battalion (-) made contact with an estimated enemy company. The TF9 Commander reinforced with 1/9 Battalion Headquarters elements and the 2nd Company from that battalion. The 5th Division Commanding General ordered the commander of TF1 to commit 1/1st ACR to the area. TF333 had one Ranger Battalion and an element of 18th ACR alerted, but they were not committed. A/53rd Artillery supported the contact with artillery fires. The enemy broke contact at 1800, and fled to the east. The 4/9 Battalion suffered seven KIA and nine WIA while accounting for two enemy KIA and one individual weapon captured.

To come back to Long Reach operation, the 1st Air Cav Brigade was conducting "search and destroy" missions with squad/platoon patrols during All the Way operation.

Phieu

#902 23 Jul 12, 11:18

Two opposite operational concepts in Long Reach operation:

1. General Kinnard: seal off the enemy units from their supplies and equipment bases and pursue them with squad/platoon sized heli-patrols;

2. Colonel Hieu: herd them back to their rear base camps where they get closer together for foods and re-equipment and destroy them in mass with B-52 strikes.

Phieu

#903 24 Jul 12, 10:19

Oh, my! Try to imagine what kind of predicament Colonel Hieu faced when the 1st Air Cavalry Division was attached to II Corps in Long Reach operation with General Kinnard who wanted to take charge and had a total and opposite operational concept.

On the afternoon of the 26th, Generals Westmoreland, Larsen, Kinnard, and Knowles met for a conference at the 1st Brigade’s command post, at LZ Homecoming. […] In the conference between Westmoreland and the division officers, Kinnard hammered on the theme that U.S. forces must now do more than merely contain the enemy or simply reinforce the ARVN. The NVA, he felt, must be sought out aggressively and destroyed. Of course, as far as Westy was concerned, Kinnard was singing to the choir; Westmoreland long had yearned for the opportunity to go on the offensive. Kinnard and Knowles also spent considerable time at the conference explaining to Westmoreland and Larsen exactly what the division could do and how well it could do it. Westmoreland eventually turned to Larsen and said: “Give Kinnard his head”.

(Coleman, J.D., "Pleiku, the Dawn of Helicopter Warfare in Vietnam", page 99,St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1988)

Phieu

#904 25 Jul 12, 11:08

Colonel Hieu needed the speed and the mobility of 1st Air Cav Division to herd the scattered units of the withdrawing two enemy Regiments – the 32nd and the 33rd – back to Chu Pong. He did not want its mighty air assault firepower though, which would scattered further the enemy units into smaller pieces.

How can he achieved that dissociation when General Kinnard demanded to take charge and was adamant that his air assault tactic was the best way in getting the job done?

"Give Kinnard his head". Oh, my!

Phieu

#905 25 Jul 12, 18:05

Really, how so? You claimed at one point I was being obtuse. Please, explain So I don't have to draw conclusions to your post.

don744

#906 25 Jul 12, 19:50

Be patient. I am ... although progressively and slowly ...

I am trying to make you walk through Colonel Hieu's mindset in the planning and execution of the Long Reach operation while was given a not that easy to deal with collaborator in the person of General Kinnard, who, as I said, was a take charge type and one air assault tactic set of mind.

PS- If you feel obtuse, please don't get upset. I think a lot of folks feel the same. Even General Kinnard did not get it then and still in Oct 1984 when he was interviewed by Cochran!

Phieu

#907 26 Jul 12, 12:25

What did General Westmoreland mean by, "Give Harry his head". Here is General Kinnard's take, while interviewed by Cochran:

I grew up during the period when Westy did not have many forces over there, and hadn't really stepped back and operated through his corps commander. And Westy would typically tell me something like, "Harry, I want you to go into the umpty-ump mountains in this area where I know they have been - because he had his own intelligence - and operate there for 48 hours." I go in there for 48 hours, maybe find a few, maybe it would be a dry hole. Finally I told Swede, who told Westy, that I don't know how to do these "go in there for 48 hours" operations. What I need is a mission-type order to go into some province and develop the situation. I can do that. And this is really what got us into the Ia Drang. When Westy said, "Give Harry his head," this was what he was talking about.

Phieu

#908 27 Jul 12, 12:50

On October 27, commanders at various headquarters of II Corps, First Force VN, 1st Air Cavalry Division, MACV and Joint General Staff, conferred frantically around the idea of having 1st Air Cavalry Division pursuing the enemy:

October 27, 1965
- 12:30H: Fm Capt Reich, II Corps (w/Gen Larsen): Gen's Larsen, Kinnard and Knowles, and Col Mataxis are now meeting with Gen Vinh Loc to work out extension or modification of present 1st Air Cav Div TAOR vic Plei Me to comply with MACV oral instructions to develop a big TAOR centered around Plei Me to find, fix and destroy the VC in that area. Gen Larsen called Gen Collins requesting MACV touch base with JGS so similar VN instructions can be passed to Gen Vinh Loc. 1st Cav has elements on ground vic Plei Me that are searching around the western side of the camp moving south. Opn being supported by mortars positioned 4K's due south of camp. ARVN is operating from 360 degrees to 270 degrees around camp at a radius of 3K's. Support being provided by tanks. However, the terrain is limiting this support.

The operational area assigned to 1st Air Cavalry was finalized on October 30.

October 30, 1965
At 292350 Col Williams called Col Hieu, CofS II Corps. II Corps requested that 1st Cav TAOR be extended to include the Plei Me area except the camp itself. From present line on NS grid line ZA14 east to NS grid line AR77, on EW grid line ZA/AR15, south on AR77 to EW grid line 00, then west to NW grid line ZA14. Col Buchan, Gen Knowes, Col Williams and Col Mataxis agree.
- 00:12H: II Corps Col Williams - Request extension of TAOR (as outlined in telecon fm Maj Black at 0005) be approved by FFV. Col Barrow notified; Request approved 0025; II Corps notified 0030; 1st Cav notified 0040.

(G3 Journal/IFFV)

So, as he requested, General Kinnard was given a wide 40 km by 50 km operational area stretching from Pleime Camp all the way to Chupong-Iadrang near the Cambodian border, in which he was free to develop and conduct operations in pursuit of the enemy as he saw fit.

Phieu

#909 28 Jul 12, 11:25

General Kinnard was given a separate operational area. However, the 1st Air Cavalry Division operated under the control of II Corps in the joint Long Reach operation.

In order to obtain a well-organized working relationship between the two allied commands, Colonel Hieu laid out a clear cut “modus operandi”: joint intelligence and support activities and commonly-shared concept of operations and results; but separate TAOR, command, deployment of forces, conduct of activities and reserve.

In phase III, the operations had been conducted through a close cooperation between ARVN and US Forces: that was the latest procedure ever put into application since the second World War. It is characterized by:
- Joint intelligence and support activities.
- Commonly-shared concept of operations and results.
- Separate TAOR.
- Separate command.
- Separate deployment of forces.
- Separate conduct of activities.
- Separate reserve.
The above procedure has brought many good results, especially in a country such as ours where the psychology of the people is charged with complexities and subtleties. I also find in that procedure a real competitive spirit between the two armed forces and between units.

(Why Pleime, chapter VIII)

It was also spelled out that the US Air Cavalry Division acted as the main force and the US Airborne Brigade as the reserved force, with the understanding that this latter would take over the main role when II Corps deemed appropriate.

The decision made by II Corps Command to exploit the results of the first phase and to pursue the enemy was fully concurred by the US military authorities and agreement was reached to establish a close cooperation in operational activities. The 1st US Air Cavalry Division made the main effort with the
Long Reach Operations and the ARVN Airborne Brigade acted as reserve, ready to participate on Corps order.

(Why Pleime, chapter V)

Phieu

#910 29 Jul 12, 10:19

The 1st Air Cav Brigade entered the first phase of Long Reach operation with the assignment of “search and destroy mission in All the Way operation using the air assault tactic, find the enemy with platoon sized patrols, once found fix them, then pile in with battalion or brigade sized troops. That would be effective, provided the enemy troops stood the ground and accepted the engagement, which they did not: they broke down into smaller groups and vanished.

General Kinnard did not seem to acknowledge the obvious futility and was willing to go on for months (or was it forever?):

Cochran: How do you now view your strategy for Ia Drang?
Kinnard: I did then and still do view it as a pursuit. I conducted it as a pursuit. I ran my guys and birds into the ground almost literally. With my helicopters, I knew that it would take me weeks or months to build them up again, but, when you have that kind of contact, you don’t want to lose it.

Coleman asserted that All the Way operation was merely a “walk in the park":

After the 1st Brigade battalions generally lost contact with the remnants of the 33rd Regiment on November 7, Kinnard said, in Army Magazine, that, “I had been planning to replace the gallant, but spent, First Brigade with the Third Brigade, commanded by Colonel Thomas W. Brown, and this seemed a logical time to do so.” The general might have been indulging in a bit of hyperbole. The units of the 1st Brigade unquestionably were gallant, but spent? The 2/12 Cav had spent the longest period in the field, eighteen days total – but its days in contact numbered about five. The 2/8 had fourteen days in the valley and only two days of hard contact. The 1/8 Cav’s one company had one day of contact, while the others had none. And the 1/12 Cav had only its reconnaissance platoon truly get shot at in anger. Compared to times in the field by units later in the war, this was a walk in the park.

(Coleman, page 186)

Phieu

#911 30 Jul 12, 10:35

From 1st Air Cav’s perspective, All the Way operation’s results did not amount to much in terms of search and destroy mission:

Cochran: After about 10 days of sporadic contact, during which the 1st Cav killed some 216 enemy by count and some estimated 610 more while suffering 57 killed and 192 wounded, you replaced the 1st Brigade with the 3rd Brigade.

However, it achieved what Colonel Hieu had in mind: to herd the scattered units of the 32nd Regiment and the 33rd Regiment back to Chupong-Iadrang complex where they would be destroyed in mass by B-52 strikes. As a matter of fact, by sharing with 1st Air Cav Brigade precise and accurate intelligence of various enemy unit positions, Colonel Hieu had 1st Air Cav Brigade operate along the enemy troop withdrawal axe going west bound from Pleime Camp to Chupong massif, interdicting them to settle mid-way and hastening their get together back to Chupong, instead of roaming blind-folded all over the 2,500 square mile operational area.

The strikes on various enemy troop positions were so accurate that 1st Air Cav believed II Corps Command intelligence apparatus had “special agents” (Coleman, page 119) and the VC were convinced there were spies within their headquarters:

- On 11/1, soon after arrival at Anta Village, the regimental cadres held a conference in an attempt to discover what was allowing the US forces to make such repeated, accurate air strikes. It was concluded that only spies within the ranks could be furnishing the location and movement of the regiment's elements.

(Pleiku Campaign, page 46)

While guiding All the Way operation with intelligence on enemy positions, Colonel Hieu monitored the herding progress through his "special agents":

On 10/27, the lead elements of the 33d had closed on it forward assembly area, the village Kro (ZA080030); on 10/28, the 32d Regiment had nearly closed its base on the north bank of the Ia Drang; on 10/29, the 33d Regiment decided to keep the unit on the move to the west, to Anta Village (YA940010), located at the foot of the Chu Pong Massif; on 11/1, the 33rd regiment headquarters closed in at Anta Village; on 11/2, by 0400 hours, the 2d, the regimental CP had arrived at Hill 762 (YA885106); on 11/05, units of 66th Regiment continued to close in the assembling areas in the Chupong-Iadrang complex; on 11/07, the depleted 33d Regiment licked its wounds and waited for its stragglers to come in, meanwhile the remainder of Field Front forces were quiet; on 11/08, only fragmented units and stragglers remained east of the Chu Pong-Ia Drang complex; on 11/09, the 33d Regiment gathered in the last of its organic units; on 11/11, the three battalions of the 66th Regiment were strung along the north bank of the Ia Drang river (center mass at 9104), the 32nd Regiment was also up north in the sam e area (YA820070), the 33rd Regiment maintained its positions in the vicinity of the Anta Village, east of the Chu Pong mountains.

(Pleiku Campaign)

Note that 1st Air Cav patrols did not attack the regimental headquarters although their positions were well-known, the real mission for All the Way operation was herding - not destroying the enemy, which would be achieved at the next phase with B-52 strikes.

Phieu

#912 31 Jul 12, 19:02

On 11/09/1965, General Knowles decided to execute a troop rotation maneuver in replacing 1st Air Cav Brigade with 3rd Air Cav Brigade.

By that time, Colonel Hieu assessed that all the scattered units of 32nd and 33rd Regiments had rallied in the Chupong-Iadrang complex and initiatee a diversionary move aiming at getting the enemy troops to get closer and become targetable to B-52 strikes. He had the 3rd Air Cav Brigade switch the operational direction from west to east, away from Chupong toward Pleime camp. This order startled General Knowles who was eager to attack the enemy in the Chupong areas.

Coleman (page 193) described 1st Air Cav’s perplexity in regard to this seemingly irrational suggestion:

Despite this plethora of intelligence to the contrary at the field commander level, Kinnard, acting on the orders from Task Force Alpha (the American command’s euphemism for a corps headquarters), told Brown to begin his search south and east of Pleime. For some reason, Swede Larsen and his staff, and probably the operations and intelligence people up the line at MACV as well, were convinced that some of the North Vietnamese had slipped away to the south and east to the hiss country about fifteen kilometers from the Plei Me camp, and they were adamant that the Cav should start turning over rocks in that area.

The real reason – enticement - for the switch in operational direction was progressively revealed to General Knowles:

- On 11/8 (Pleiku Campaign, page 67):

By this time Field Force Vietnam had asked the division to consider moving this operations east of Pleime if it appeared that was no further contact imminent in the west”.

- On 11/10 (Pleiku Campaign page 73):

The movement and shift in emphasis from west to east was to further stimulate a forthcoming decision from the NVA division headquarters.

- On 11/11 (Pleiku Campaign page 76):

With American units seemingly withdrawing to the east of Pleime, the decision was to attempt to regain its early advantage with an attack.

Why not attack the enemy troops when they are in defensive posture? They would avoid engaging and scattering again.

Why entice them to switch to the attack posture? They would assemble closer and become targetable to B-52 strikes.

Again the operational concept was not to destroy the three enemy regiments with ground forces, but rather with B-52 strikes.

Phieu

#913 01 Aug 12, 09:43

The operational concept of using B-52 strikes to destroy the withdrawing enemy troops was conceived by Colonel Hieu right at the outset of the planning of Long Reach operation. Through his “special agents, he knew that NVA B3 Field Front would not desist that easily after the botched attempt of overrunning Pleime camp. They would consider for revenge with a second attempt, pending the late arrival of NVA 66th Regiment.

- On 11/2, the NVA division headquarters (Field Front) got the news the 66th Regiment due to arrive soon in South Vietnam and begin moving into assembly areas in the Chu Pong-Ia Drang area.

(Pleime Campaign, page 49)

The arrival of this third regiment was confirmed on 11/3, when 9th Air Cav Squadron ambushed its forward party:

- On 11/03, at 2100 hours, an audacious ambush in the very heart of the Chu Pong - Ia Drang complex inflicted to the 8th Battalion of the newly-infiltrated 66th Regiment: 112 KIA (Body count), more than 200 others estimated KIA and WIA, 30 weapons captured.

(Pleime Campaign, page 52)

Through his “special agents”, Colonel Hieu learned that B3 Field Front felt for the bait:

-On 11/11, Field Front headquarters, after evaluating the situation, had reached a decision. With American units seemingly withdrawing to the east of Pleime, the decision was to attempt to regain its early advantage with an attack. The target once again was the Pleime CIDG Camp. The division headquarters set the date for attack at 16 November, and issued orders to its three regiments.

(Pleime Campaign, page 76)

Phieu

#914 02 Aug 12, 11:16

So on November 10, B3 Field Front took the enticement bait and decided a second attack on Pleime camp scheduled for 11/16. This meant there was a chance to use B-52 strikes because the enemy had to assemble to prepare for the attack.

Now came the tricky and delicate phase in the execution of B-52 strikes. In order for the B-52s to hit bull eye with the first drop, Colonel Hieu needed to master two factors: space and time.

- Space. The center of mass of the entire B3 Field Front forces (32nd, 33rd and 66th) must be within a 1,000x1,000 meter square; for that, he needed to provide a coordinate for the target as (vic XX’YY’).

This would be fairly easy to obtain when the three regiments assembled at the staging areas for movement to attack.

- Time. In one hand, B-52s must be notified 72 hours in advance and it took the stratospheres 8 hours to get to the target, taking off from Guam. In the other hand, the enemy troops would not linger long at the staging areas, approximately less than 12 hours. Colonel Hieu needed to set a precise Time Over Target for B-52's.

Besides those two factors, Colonel Hieu needed to adjust his timing to the enemy timing. He needed to know precisely when the enemy troops would move in their assembling areas and then to their staging areas.

Since B3 Field Front set up the D-Day for 11/16 and its troops needed one day march to get to Pleime camp areas, he calculated the enemy troops would move out their staging areas on 11/14.

The tricky point now was to lure the enemy troops to linger at the staging areas longer than normal, in order to provide more time to B-52's to arrive at the targets before the enemy troops dispersed. Colonel Hieu came up with a distractive move scheme to achieve a delay of movement.

Phieu

#915 03 Aug 12, 11:29

Here’s how Colonel Hieu took aim and shoot at the enemy at ChuPong-IaDrang complex.

- November 11, Colonel Hieu learned from his “special agents” that B3 Field Front B3 ordered troop units into assembling areas for reorganization, training and rehearsals.

- On this day the three regiments became targetable for B-52 strikes with the 66th center of mass (vic YA 9104); the 32nd (YA 820072), the 33rd (YA 940011), but only separately, not yet as a whole unit target.

- November 12, while the assembling phase was on going, he had General Larsen ordered General Knowles switch the operational directional to the west and get ready to insert a battalion at Chu Pong footsteps as a distractive ploy.

That day General Larsen was visiting the division’s forward command post at the II Corps compound. He asked Knowles how things were going. Knowles briefed him on the attack on Catecka the night before and then told him the brigade was drilling a dry hole out east of Plei Me. Larsen said, “Why are you conducting operations there if it’s dry?” Knowles’s response was, “With all due respect, sir, that’s what your order in writing directed us to do.” Larsen responded that the cavalry’s primary mission was to “find the enemy and go after him.” Shortly after, Knowles visited Brown at the 3rd Brigade command post and told him to come up with a plan for an air assault operation near the foot of the Chu Pongs.

(Coleman, page 196)

- November 13, Colonel Hieu learned from his “special agents” that B3 Field Front forces began staging in preparation for movement to attack to Pleime and that some recon parties and transportation units already had moved out.

- He scheduled the first B-52 attack for 11/15 on

YA 8607, YA 9007, YA 9000, YA 8600, TOT is 16:00H

(G3J/IFFV)

and advised General Knowles through General Larsen to have a battalion insert at Chu Pong foothills the next day.

He made sure that this Air Cav unit and its transport helicopters would not be harmed by anti-aircraft artillery and heavy mortars placed on the hills that dominated the landing zone:

The enemy has lost nearly all their heavy crew-served weapons during the first phase.

(Why Pleime, chapter V)

And the reinforcement of heavy crew-served weapons of 66th Regiment went directly to the Pleime areas for the 11/16 attack:

a battalion of 120mm mortars and a battalion of 14.5mm twin-barrel anti-aircraft guns were both en route down the infiltration trail and scheduled to arrive in time for the 11/16 attack.

(Why Pleime, chapter VIII)

Phieu

#916 04 Aug 12, 12:19

So, on November 14, the three NVA regiments were assembling at staging areas for movement to attack. In order to retain them cluster together longer there to give time to B-52 strikes, Colonel Hieu inserted 1/7th Air Cav Battalion not far away – 200 meters according to General Nguyen Huu An - as a distractive ploy. The sudden appearance of a sizable enemy unit diverted their attention to the new threath and froze their movement to attack, pending decision from B3 Field Force Command, which decided to postpone the attack and face the 1/7th Air Cavalry by committing its

7th Battalion and 9th Battalion of 66th Regiment.

(Pleiku Campaign, page 87)

Colonel Hal Moore was ordered to hold ground at LZ X-Ray and was reinforced with only an additional battalion – the 2/7th; just enough to withstand the enemy attack and not to pile in more troops - contrary to the air assault principile - which would make B3 Field Front to commit more troops in and in so doing would dilute their tight staging formation and render B-52 strike inefficient. The induced delay decision worked and the target was still there - immobile - when

- At 16:00H November 15, as scheduled, the B-52 ‘s strikes the enemy

at its center of mass (vicinity YA8702).

(Pleiku Campaign, page 88)

- On November 16, B-52’s came back to harass the enemy at

Primary YA 830050, YA 850050, YA 843000; Alternate: YV 890980, YV 910980, YV 890950, YV 910950.

(G3 Journal/IFFV)

meanwhile

The 1/7 battalion left LZ X-ray at 1040 hours on 16 November and was replaced by the 2/7 and 2/5 battalions.

(Why Pleime, chapter V)

- On November 17, 2/7th Air Cav Battalion and 2/5th Air Cav Battalion was ordered to move out of LZ X-Ray to a 3 km safety distance to allow B-52’s to strike on top of the landing zone itself.

Phieu

#917 04 Aug 12, 13:02 That move turned into a disaster! DeltaOne

#918 04 Aug 12, 16:11

You mean the LZ Albany battle, right? It was not that bad though:

On 17 November, the targets also included LZ X-ray and the two friendly battalions were so ordered to move 3 km away from the LZ, northward and northwestward to another called LZ Albany.
The displacement was also based on the estimate that the enemy had withdrawn in that direction. In the afternoon of the previous day, a friendly helicopter had been shot down over that area, the enemy movement could also aim at attacking the artillery position east of X-ray which had provided effective support to the 1/7 battalion during the last two days. The two battalions moved into different directions, the 2/7 northward and the 2/5 northwestward.
The first battalion fell afterwards into a VC ambush conducted by a battalion-size enemy unit, when it almost came near its objectives.
But once again, the VC had offered themselves as targets for air-strikes and artillery fire:
- KIA (body count): 403
- KIA (estimated): 100
- Weapons captured: 112

(Why Pleime, chapter V)

Phieu

#919 04 Aug 12, 23:05

I would say that had you or I been there, we would have thought it REALLY bad. Leadership on that move and the decisions made were poor.

DeltaOne

#920 05 Aug 12, 10:47

Yes, indeed.

Leadership on that move and the decisions made were poor.

The leadership on that move at battalion level was poor, but the decisions made at Forward Division CP/II Corps level were not (to pursue the withdrawing enemy, to secure the artillery fire base and especially to support B-52 airstrikes). Coleman wrote lengthily about that LZ Albany battle (page 247-269) and attributed the cause of that disaster to the combat inexperience of the 2/7th Air Cav Battalion Commander:

The real question, though, was not the order of march, but that it was a battalion column formation to begin with. (…) Most experienced battalion commanders would not have moved anywhere in the Ia Drang in just a simple column formation.
But that was the problem. McDade was very inexperienced.

(Coleman, page 249)

Phieu

#921 05 Aug 12, 11:23

But why would II corps order 2/7 to withdrawal to Albany when they had minute to minute intelligence and "knew" the 66th was sitting there waiting for them? That sounds like the second failure of II corps to capitalize on great intel.

don744

#922 05 Aug 12, 11:35

The 66th was not sitting their, they were also on the move. It was a fortuitous encounter in which the enemy had the advantage of a head-up notice (15-30 minutes) provided by its forward scouts and the 2/7th Air Cav Commander failed to exploit the prisoners captured prior to the colluded encounter.

I don't think II Corps could possibly have intel in the case of an improptu meeting, do you?

Anyway, McDade was warned he would encounter the enemy. The when and how were his responsibility.

I will quote Kinnard and Nguyen Huu An on this issue in the next two posts.

Phieu

#923 05 Aug 12, 11:43

Yes, very poor leadership. Who moves out in a single line without flankers out the sides.

DeltaOne

#924 05 Aug 12, 14:33

Phieu : I don't think II Corps could possibly have intel in the case of an improptu meeting, do you?

When you have minute to minute intelligence on the disposition, location, and morale of enemy forces...Yes. With that kind of intel, how do you "lose" a regiment (minus)? That's a third of the enemy's forces. Maybe the 66th didn't have Chinese advisors speaking mandarin in the open. You cant make Assertions about COL Hieu's awesome tactcal genious and perfect intel, then, when this huge gap is shown, turn it on American leadership. Either they had the intel and II corps had their second major intel failure in three days or the picture was not as clear as you have stated.

don744

#925 06 Aug 12, 10:51

don744: When you have minute to minute intelligence on the disposition, location, and morale of enemy forces...Yes.

No, II Corps did not have minute to minute intelligence on the disposition, location, and morale of enemy forces. Maybe by the hours, or more precisely, whenever its “special agents” spoke up!

With that kind of intel, how do you "lose" a regiment (minus)? That's a third of the enemy's forces. Maybe the 66th didn't have Chinese advisors speaking mandarin in the open.

There should be Chinese advisors speaking in the open at 66th Headquarters. I am note sure at LTC Nguyen Huu An’s light Forward Command Post though.

The personnel in the light forward command post comprised a recon company, an engineer company, a signal squad and a few general staff officers... totaling over thirty men. In the morning of November 14, we advanced toward Chu Pong massif. On the trails lied many muddy spots, a result of a pouring rain a couple of days ago.

(General Nguyen Huu An, Chien Truong Moi – Memoir, Quan Doi Nhan Dan Publishing House, Hanoi – 2002)

NVA radio communications were good at Pleime-Chupong-Iadrang, alright:

4) They are able to apply such tactics because adequate means of communications are now at their disposal.

(Why Pleime, chapter IV)

However not top down. At battalion level, especially in combat situation, communications had to be done by way of mouth-to-ear and by recon foot messengers:

Only later [11/15, not 11/14 as An asserted] that day did I meet the officer that commanded the 66th Regiment - La Ngoc Chau, the regimental political officer. Chau revealed that the regimental formation had been dismantled by the enemy, and he had lost communication and was only in control of 7th Battalion and the enemy situation close to this battalion.
(…)
I said:
- While advancing to the staging area, tell your company officers to walk by your sides, and while marching explain to them their tasks and plans of attack to the company and battalion commanders.
(..)
At the forward command post, we grasped a better control of the situation at this moment. 66th Regiment reported back: 9th Battalion was able to establish communication with 7th Battalion. Thus, the balance of forces in this narrow area was two battalions for each side, with the American side higher in troop numbers, not counting two artillery companies and air force enforcements.
On the night of 15 October, I gave order to political chef La Ngoc Chau (the regiment commander who got lost had not found his way back to his unit) to rapidly regroup his forces in order to attack at LZ X-Ray in the morning of 16 October. At the same moment, I dispatched Dong Thoai, of tactical support, to get into contact with 33rd Regiment; whichever battalion he encountered on his way, he was to assign it to attack the two artillery firebase at Quynh-co-la in coordination with 66th Regiment.
Simultaneously, I have a recon team carry out the order to 8th Battalion, 66th Regiment to turn back to the earlier position, ready to attack the enemy who was advancing toward the direction of 8th Battalion.

(Nguyen Huu An)

You cant make Assertions about COL Hieu's awesome tactcal genious and perfect intel, then, when this huge gap is shown, turn it on American leadership. Either they had the intel

I still can make assertions about Col Hieu’s awesome tactical genius and perfect intel – not by the minutes, perhaps by the hours or whatever time intervals which enabled him to conceive a precise scheduling to perform Arc Light strike, can I not?!

Had anybody succeeded in replicating his feat: stalking, herding, luring, fixing, aiming and destroying three regiments comprising 6,000 combatants en mass with B-52 strike? An operation that took 20 some days (Oct 27-Nov 15) to achieve! And while being a mere Vietnamese colonel situated at the bottom of the hierarchical totem and yet stealthily directing an imposing conglomerate of ARVN and US one, two and three star generals!

How could one possibly quarrel with such an extraordinary military exploit by looking for peccadillos, that is if they were any …

Shouldn't one be at awe instead of in contempt, blindfolded by prejudice (no way that couldn't have come out from the ARVN).

If you cannot see that on your own, then I would never be able to convince you, even with a million proofs … and it seems that you are still doubtful even with my second round of presentation of the Iadrang battle… or is it that you just poke me to make the thread livelier?

and II corps had their second major intel failure in three days or the picture was not as clear as you have stated.

Which other second major intel failure are you talking about?

Phieu

#926 06 Aug 12, 17:51

Phieu : No, II Corps did not have minute to minute intelligence on the disposition, location, and morale of enemy forces. Maybe by the hours, or more precisely, whenever its “special agents” spoke up!

Wait one minute...I have to go grab something....oh, here it is:

Colonel Hieu would not waste his time conceiving his operational concept of destroying the three NVA regiments with B52 air strikes if he was not sure he would always be in possession of solid intelligence on the enemy situation - intention, location, movement, morale, planning,etc - by the minutes, hours and days (see post #384 the intelligence factor). And he would not be able to execute his operational concept with the herding maneuver, the enticement maneuver, and the distractive maneuver, which cumulated in having the three NVA regimental units clinging to each other as seating ducks at staging areas, as ideal targets for B-52 air strikes.

And here:

In taking the initiative of exploiting the victory at Pleime camp by pursuing the enemy, II Corps Command had a plan and right at the outset, Colonel Hieu saw the possibility of using B-52 air strikes because he was in possession of the means to get real time intelligence on the enemy situation by the minutes, hours and days, as I have pointed out.

And here:

Colonel Hieu kept the margin of errors to the possible minimum with his exceptional clairvoyant ability to determine enemy units movement, location, and morale, down to the minute. That was the purpose of the distractive maneuver which kept the B3 Front unit forces lingering at staging areas, as seating ducks readied for the onslaught strikes by B-52s.

There are probably half a dozen more places where this was stated...but now I think you have had a moment of clarity as you now recognize it may have been more like "hours or days". I am still of the opinion it was more on the "days" side.

Which other second major intel failure are you talking about?

Failure to provide the Battalion "he" ordered to Chu Pong with the locations of the enemy forces arrayed against it. Lots of room in the vicinity of Chu Pong, ya know? How did he know Moore was going to insert at X-Ray instead of anywhere else in the 100+ sq km of the area? Moore didn't make the decision on the LZ until the day prior to the Operation. I have more to post, but will save it for later.

don744

#927 07 Aug 12, 06:18

Phieu: Shouldn't one be at awe instead of in contempt, blindfolded by prejudice (no way that couldn't have come out from the ARVN).

I never said or implied anything of the sort. I hold no prejudices or contempt with ARVN leadership. How the heck would I know how good or bad they were? I was born almost half a decade after the Ia Drang battle. I think you just might be gun shy and a little prejudice yourself. You think all Americans have a negative view of ARVN Officers?

don744

#928 07 Aug 12, 10:09

don744 : There are probably half a dozen more places where this was stated... by the minutes, hours and days (2) … down to the minute

does not mean minute to minute.

but now I think you have had a moment of clarity as you now recognize it may have been more like "hours or days". I am still of the opinion it was more on the "days" side.

I still think it also could be sometimes by the minutes.

Perhaps I did not express my thought clearly enough. Let me rephrase it: Colonel Hieu got the intelligence whenever the Chinese advisors communicated among themselves, and that could be by the days, by the hours, by the minutes – yes, down to the minute when the situations got very hot.

You might say it was an intel failure if Moore’s assigned mission was to search and destroy. But it was not, his was to distract the enemy into a frozen posture to allow B-52 strike - Moore had a general idea though: he saw those big red stars pinned on the tactical maps when he visited II Corps and Forward CP headquarters and knew there were three enemy regiments at Chupong – only the B-52’s folks needed to know the enemy exact positions.

Colonel Hieu could live with Colonel Brown’s, 3rd Air Cav Brigade Commander, practice to allow

his battalion commanders to select their own landing zones and to work out their schemes of maneuver.

(Coleman, page 199)

He only needed to make sure

- the landing zone Moore was going to select was not too close or not too far, so as to induce the effect of a distraction to the enemy and to freeze their movement to attack;

- there were not anti-aircraft artillery and mortars positioned on hillsides dominating the landing zone;

- Moore’s battalion would be properly reinforced as not to be overrun by attacking enemy troops while not allowing the piling air assault tactic as it would jeopardize the action of B-52 strikes.

He had the reputation of highly value the life of the foot soldiers. He would never put them in harm ways. He made sure that the enemy had no heavy common crew weapons placed on the hill sides that dominated the landing zone, that would surely gun down all the troop transport helicopters with anti-aircraft artillery and decimated ground troops prior to assaults with heavy mortars; and the 1/7th Air Cav Battalion would have sufficient reinforcement when attacked by two enemy battalions. In other words, as a good hunter, he used the bait to attract the wolf, but took all the precautions it would not be a sacrificial lamb.

General Hieu was my idol and I knew him since when he came to the 5th Division. At that time I was with an attached unit that jumped into a cross-border area which was under his loving tender care. When we were about to enter Krek, he gave the order to retreat. He said, "Without support, I refuse to commit my troops into combat." He was a honest general, a general who took great care of his men and virtuous. He deserves my greatest admiration.

(Major Khuc Huu Chap, Ranger)

Phieu

#929 07 Aug 12, 10:16

don744 : I never said or implied anything of the sort. I hold no prejudices or contempt with ARVN leadership. How the heck would I know how good or bad they were? I was born almost half a decade after the Ia Drang battle. I think you just might be gun shy and a little prejudice yourself. You think all Americans have a negative view of ARVN Officers?

I don't say you said or implied specifically "nothing could have come out from ARVN" (just an example). But anyway, am I right in assuming you are still incredilous about General Hieu being a military genius?

Or you are now at awe after I have shown you there were no such things as the two intel failures at LZ X-Ray and LZ Albany, and Colonel Hieu was very thorough in the planning and execution of his operation concept in the use of B-52 strike.

Phieu

#930 07 Aug 12, 12:20You make a number of unfounded assumptions here

1) In reference to LTC Moore knowing there were three enemy regiments at Chu Pong:

LTC Moore's after action report contains a written transcript of his oral operations order given at 0845 on 14 November prior to the assault into LZ X-Ray. Paragraph 1a Enemy shows his assessment of the enemy forces to be 1) Possible enemy battalion vicinity YA 903032 2) Possible enemy on Chu Pong Mountain vicinity YA 935010 and 3) Possible secret base vicinity YA 960020.

2) In reference to LTC Moore's mission:

Paragraph 1B and 2. Mission DO in fact state Moore's mission was Search and Destroy. The same reference indicates that COL Brown had the same understanding. Are you assuming or have evidence that II Corps or 1 Cav Division withheld information?

3) In reference to B-52 surgical strikes.

I make the assumption that B-52s in 1965 were not surgical strike weapons. I believe my assumption to be solid due to the bomb load capacity of the B-52.

**Does anyone reading this post have any data on error probabilities of B-52?**

4) In reference to the anti aircraft weapons.

Information as to the extent of losses of heavy machine guns would highly likely have been available concerning the 32 and 33 PAVN Regiments. Did someone have knowledge beforehand that there were no anti aircraft weapons in vicinity of X-Ray? Evidence please, or state you're making an assumption. The references you have used in the past have for the most part been POST BATTLE REPORTS.

(Edited to remove some typo's in the last sentence)

samtn99

#931 07 Aug 12, 13:07

Phieu : I don't say you said or implied specifically "nothing could have come out from ARVN" (just an example). But anyway, am I right in assuming you are still incredilous about General Hieu being a military genius?

Anh Phieu,

I think COL Hieu was probably a competent officer. As far as the "evidence" you present...I was, and still remain, skeptical of the plethora of unprovable information you have weaved into the historical recounting of the battle. You cant prove COL Hieu ordered Larsen to tell Kinnard to tell Knowles to send Moore's battalion to Chu Pong. I cant prove he didn't. That, Anh Phieu, is what I mean by unprovable info.

I can prove that stalking, herding, luring, fixing, aiming and destroying are not US Army doctrinal terms for maneuver, nor operational concepts. Well, "Fixing" and "destroying"...maybe. But, I digress...

You cant produce one document that directly shows the whole master plan to use B-52s to destroy the regiments. The military runs on paperwork. Always has, always will. The 1/7 CAV supply requisition form for rolls of toilet-paper dated September 1966 is probably sitting in the National Archives right now. We have unit historians that document the operations units are involved in. There are even regulations that require commanders at all levels to provide yearly histories of their commands so unit history can be preserved. Did you know that? Lack of documentation leads me to believe the plan as you have outlined it didn't exist.

No American Commander is going to commit Soldiers to a fight based on an ally's, "Hey, Man, I got this whole stalking, luring, herding thing going on right now over in the 'Pong. I need to to borrow a battalion to send over yonder so I can fix 'em. What's that? Nope, I cant tell you the plan...just trust me. Oh, by the way, Ive laid on some B-52s already so, I'll need you to have the troops move at some point if they are too close to coordinate XX/YY. Whats that, you say? You dont know what XX/YY means...dont worry about it, I've got you covered."

Now, what you can do is weave in a story line based assumptions and fictional dialogue to make it appear there was some great plan. But in the end it is just that assumptions and fictional dialogue. It is time you give up on trying to convert me. I will admit, you've provided a ton of good info and facilitated some good dialogue.

I also think we have learned well how to push each others buttons. Ive watched you steadily poke away for a while now, which has of course, prompted my response. You win on that count. You are a good button pusher.

don744

#932 08 Aug 12, 06:11

samtn99 : In reference to B-52 surgical strikes.

I make the assumption that B-52s in 1965 were not surgical strike weapons. I believe my assumption to be solid due to the bomb load capacity of the B-52.

**Does anyone reading this post have any data on error probabilities of B-52?**

I wonder, for use in the situation described in the Ia Drang battle, what the flash to bang time was for a B-52 strike. I have seen 72 hours thrown out somewhere in this thread. I can totally see that for a strategic strike...but I am sure that for a tactical strike, that time could be greatly reduced. Would like to also think that the crews had the ability to receive and change the targeting data enroute. That would only make sense.

don744

#933 08 Aug 12, 15:13

samtn99 : You make a number of unfounded assumptions here

1) In reference to LTC Moore knowing there were three enemy regiments at Chu Pong:

Not entirely unfounded. I assume that based on the knowledge of II Corps/Forward AC Division CP:

On 11/11, the 66th Regiment was at (center of mass vic YA 9104); the 32nd (YA 9400027); the 33rd (YA 820007)

(Pleiku Campaign)

and Moore saw the two big stars pinned on tactical maps at II Corps/Forward AC Division CP, as Brown (3rd Air Cav Brigade Commander)did:

- He had seen the menacing red star on both the G-2's and S-2's intelligence maps ...

(Coleman page 204)

- Brown was concerned about the possibility of heavy contact in the area, although there had been no American forces that far west; the closest the 1st Brigade came was the battle on November 4 about four kilometers northeast of Anta Village. Now Brown intended to send forces directly to the eastern slopes of the Chu Pongs. Looming in the back of his mind was that big red star on the G-2 and S-2 situation maps, and for this reason, he told Moore to keep his rifle companies within very close supporting range of one another.

(Coleman page 200)

2) In reference to LTC Moore's mission:

Paragraph 1B and 2. Mission DO in fact state Moore's mission was Search and Destroy. The same reference indicates that COL Brown had the same understanding.

The 1st Air Cav had been given only one mission which was to search and destroy whenever they operated using the newly developed air assault tactic – find, fix with squad/company units, then pile with more troops with battalion/brigade units if necessary and destroy the enemy. And it only knew and took great pride in doing the job as such.

When it was attached to II Corps, Colonel Hieu used 1st Air Cav unique capability for various missions depending on his planning, but definitely not to search and destroy with air assault tactic, which he knew was inefficient in dealing with the VC who only faced and engaged you when strong and scattered and vanished when weak like thieves:

During the entire war since 1948 till nowadays, the enemy always withdrew safely after the end of a battle at the moment of their choice and as they wished, always had the upper hands in attack as well as in defense posture. It was not that the enemy were formidable and their tactics marvelous; but only because of the kind of difficulties in catching the thieves at night.
Suốt trận chiến từ 1948 tới nay, bao giờ địch cũng rút lui được an toàn sau khi kết thúc trận chiến vào lúc chúng đã định và mong muốn, luôn luôn nắm được chủ động trong thế công lẫn thế thủ trong tay. Chẳng phải là địch ghê gớm ,chiến thuận kỳ diệu, mà chỉ vì nỗi khó khăn cũng như tìm bắt kẻ trộm lúc đêm hôm.

(Pleime, trận chiến lịch sử page 98)

In Dai Bang 800 operation in 1967, US 1st Air Cav could not find the enemy for three days while ARVN 22nd Division was able to lure in the enemy and to engage them in a battle that costed them 300 dead:

During the first 3 days, with ample helicopter supports, the American 1st Cavalry Division poured their units into the most secured areas of the Communists in Hoai An and Vinh Thanh districts, destroyed and burned up numerous rice storages of the Communists, the well protected rear service areas of Region 5 and of the 3 Yellow Stars Division. The American soldiers were very aggressive in their search and destroy the enemy, but the Communists were very clever in avoiding any contacts with the Americans because they knew the American units were very strong.
At 11:00 p.m. on day D+3, the Major General of the American 1st Cavalry Division's helicopter landed down at the 22nd Division headquarters. He went in to meet and confer with General Hieu. He requested that General Hieu abandon the attack into the direction West of district Phu My area and coordinated with the 1st Cavalry Division to attack into An Lao where he was convinced the 3 Yellow Stars Division had its units gathered. General Hieu called me in to confirm this intelligence information. I briefed General Hieu and the Commanding General of the 1st Cavalry Division that I had encountered a Viet Cong guerilla who resided in the mountainous areas west of Phu My district. I had spent a lot of money to feed this guerilla's family. A few days ago, he informed me that numerous units of the 3 Yellow Stars Division rallied at the boundary areas between Phu My and Hoai An districts. Based on previous confirmed information provided by this guerilla, I determined that he was believable. I reported to General Hieu and to the American General that a few regiments of the 3 Yellow Stars Division was hiding in the operational area above mentioned.
The American 1st Cavalry Division Commanding General said: "Today, I had a company of Rangers heli-lifted into that area to search and destroy the enemy, but no contact was made. I knew I did wrong in so doing because I stepped in the operational area of the 22nd Division, but because of my eagerness to destroy the enemy, I was forced to do so." He asked me: "Major (I was head of G2 Intelligence unit of the 22nd Division at that time), are you certain that the enemy is present in that area where the operation will be conducted?" I responded: "Major General, the Communists were extremely careful in avoiding to make contact with the American units because they were afraid of your fire-powers. I am convinced the 22nd Division will make contact with the 3 Yellow Stars Division at this target." General Hieu politely told the American General: "In the plan discussed by the three Vietnamese, American, Korean Divisions, our Division will go into our operational area tomorrow, we should not change our plan too early."

Colonel Hieu knew that the most efficient way to deal with those thieves was to kill them en mass with B-52 strike, with the help of Air Cav as ground support, and he had the means to achieve it at Chupong-Iadrang having the godsend intelligence provide by "special agents".

Are you assuming or have evidence that II Corps or 1 Cav Division withheld information?

I am assuming based on the following pattern:

- At the outset of All the Way operation, 1st Brigade went in with the mission of search and destroy. Colonel Hieu’s intention was to have them herd instead the enemy back to Chupong. He was able to made 1st Air Cav executed his intention by providing them with selective info on accurate position of enemy small units to attack and harass while leaving regimental headquarters alone.

- On Nov 8, General Larsen upon seeing that all the enemy scattered units had returned to Chupong ordered an operational direction switched from west to east at the bewilderment pf 1st Air Cav:

- By this time Field Force Vietnam had asked the division to consider moving its operations east of Pleime if it appeared that was no further contact imminent in the west.

(Pleiku, page 67)

- Despite the plethora of intelligence to the contrary at the field command level, Kinnard, acting on the orders rom Task Force Alpha (the American command’s euphemism for a corps headquarters), told Brown to begin his search south and east of Plei Me. For some reason, Swede Larsen and his staff, and probably the operations and intelligence people up the line at MACV as well, were convinced that some of the North Vietnamese had slipped away to the south and east to the hill country about fifteen kilometers from the Plei Me camps and they were adamant that the Cav should start turning over rocks in that area.

(Coleman, page 193)

The real intention was to lure the enemy into switching to an attack posture, which was shared with General Knowles, since it was recorded in Pleiku Campaign:

-Nov 10: The movement and shift in emphasis from west to east was to further stimulate a forthcoming decision from the NVA division headquarters.

(Pleiku Campaign , page 73)

-Nov 11: With American units seemingly withdrawing to the east of Pleime, the decision was to attempt to regain its early advantage with an attack.

(Pleiku Campaign , page 76).

- On Nov 13, while the enemy troops were ordered to gather at assembling areas, Larsen ordered General Knowles to revert his search back to the west without sharing the real intent of the switch - distractive move:

That day, General Larsen was visiting the division’s forward command post at the II Corps compound. He asked Knowles how things were going. Knowles briefed him on the attack on Catecka the night before and then told him the brigade was drilling a dry hole out east of Plei Me. Larsen said, “Why are you conducting operations there if it’s dry?” Knowles’s response was, “With all due respect, sir, that’s what your order in writing directed us to do.” Larsen responded that the cavalry’s primary mission was to “find the enemy and go after him.”

(Coleman, page 196)

3) In reference to B-52 surgical strikes.

I make the assumption that B-52s in 1965 were not surgical strike weapons. I believe my assumption to be solid due to the bomb load capacity of the B-52.

Did I ever say that?

You misread me: I characterized Than Phong 7 operation as surgical strike, not B-52 strikes which had been used to kill en masse the three enemy regiments!

Phieu

#934 09 Aug 12, 10:04

samtn99 : 2) In reference to LTC Moore's mission:

Paragraph 1B and 2. Mission DO in fact state Moore's mission was Search and Destroy. The same reference indicates that COL Brown had the same understanding.

As I had said, the expressed mission was Search and Destroy; but the real intended mission was to give support to B-52 strike in distracting the enemy and causing them to freeze longer at staging areas so as B-52’s still find them immobile on the spot at the scheduled TOT preset for the next day 1151600H.

If it was a mission of search and destroy, as dictated by air assault principles, Moore would have only dispatch a squad or a company, instead of a battalion. But then, it would not present a menace to the enemy; they would just ignore it and carried on the movement to attack and vacated the staging areas in a couple of hours; and at 11151600H, B-52’s would find the target empty!

Now let’s see how the scenario would unfold in the case Moore conduct a search and destroy mission with a battalion.

- 1. He would sweep immediately deep into Chupong; instead he remained at LZ X-Ray and set up defense perimeters;

- 2. When the enemy sent in two battalions to attack, Brown/Knowles would have piled in the entire brigade forces; instead only one battalion- 2/7th – was sent in to reinforce;

- 3. The next day, when 2/5th entered in action, it would be the commencement of a piling in process; instead it was only to relieve 1/7th;

- 4. On the following day, 11/17, when 2nd AC brigade entered into action, it would be a piling in maneuver; instead, it was only to secure LZ Crooks, a newly established artillery fire base to give support to ARVN Airborne Brigade which took over the Long Reach operation from 3rd AC brigade.

Why maintain the force strength at two battalions in phase 2 and 3? Just enough to contain the two enemy battalions; more troop units piling in would make the enemy rush in more troops to LZ X-Ray; then not only the staging areas would become empty targets, the two sides would be too close for B-52 strike.

Phieu

#935 09 Aug 12, 10:10

samtn99: Does anyone reading this post have any data on error probabilities of B-52?

G3 Journal/IFFV:

- 11151855H: 1st Cav (Lt Temple) Arc light bombing strike 1602H-1632H, area YA 8607, 9007, 8600, 9000; all aircraft on target except one whose load dropped in general area, YA 8015, 8215, 8212, 8412, results being investigated.
- 11171735H: 1st Cav Lt Brown – Debrief for Arclite post analysis. TOT – 1330. 2000 ft altitude. Post strike analysis. Tgt 1 – 100%, coverage, large craters and tree blowdown, no bodies observed. Tgt 2 -100%, coverage. Tgt 3 – 75% due to irregular terrain.

Phieu

#936 09 Aug 12, 15:10

Phieu: If it was a mission of search and destroy, as dictated by air assault principles, Moore would have only dispatch a squad or a company, instead of a battalion.

Source that please. I would love to read up on Air Assault principles and tactics from 1965 as they apply to Search and destroy missions. Do you have a doctrinal reference?

don744

#937 09 Aug 12, 16:18

Phieu : When it was attached to II Corps, Colonel Hieu used 1st Air Cav unique capability for various missions depending on his planning, but definitely not to search and destroy with air assault tactic, which he knew was inefficient in dealing with the VC who only faced and engaged you when strong and scattered and vanished when weak like thieves:

(Pleime, trận chiến lịch sử page 98)

You state repeatedly throughout this thread that the 1st CAV was "attached" to II Corps.

Can you provide more information on this? Some solid information or a statement of assumption on your part would greatly help in my understanding of your contentions. I'd request though that you not simply provide a link to your other writings on the interwebs as proof...

The term "attached" is a very precise military term, with requirements and obligations between the unit attached and the gaining unit.

In your post 889 and others, you yourself state the application used:

- Joint intelligence and support activities.
- Commonly-shared concept of operations and results.
- Separate TAOR.
- Separate command.
- Separate deployment of forces.
- Separate conduct of activities.
- Separate reserve.

These statements in NO WAY indicates attachment of 1st Cavalry units to II Corps (SV), in fact i suggest it indicates just the opposite.

samtn99

#938 09 Aug 12, 16:38

Phieu : In Dai Bang 800 operation in 1967, US 1st Air Cav could not find the enemy for three days while ARVN 22nd Division was able to lure in the enemy and to engage them in a battle that costed them 300 dead:

I do not see the relevance with this point. You bring information from an operation in 1967 to justify actions conducted 2 years prior???

However, since you brought the subject up, I do not at all understand so please clarify what you mean by this.

You discuss how the 1st Cav couldn't find the enemy because "the Communists were very clever in avoiding any contacts with the Americans because they knew the American units were very strong." I believe here you attempt to imply that search and destroy was bad because the enemy avoided contact. Is this correct?

Then you imply that the ARVN and GEN Hieu had a better technique and understanding of the enemy because the enemy wasn't afraid of fighting ARVN, and had learned to not gain contact with 1 CAV if possible? Does this make sense to you as a way to show your point, Phieu??

In both cases the enemy dictated the action, not the Cav or ARVN.

Do I have the correct understanding?

samtn99

#939 09 Aug 12, 16:44

don744 : Source that please. I would love to read up on Air Assault principles and tactics from 1965 as they apply to Search and destroy missions. Do you have a doctrinal reference?

I quoted Kinnard's air assault doctrine in his interview with Cochran a million - I am exagerating ! - multiple times on this thread. Would you mind go back and look it up yourself? I am sure you can find it. If you still have problem, then get back to me, I am more than happy to help you.

Phieu

#940 09 Aug 12, 18:05

Yeah, there was something developed by the Army called FM 7-8, The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad; FM 7-10, The Infantry Rifle Company; and FM 7-20, the Infantry Battalion. Those, coupled with FM 57-35, Airmobile Operations (dated 1963) provided the doctrine for airmobile operations.

Those are the documents that make up doctrine...not some transcription of Kinnards statements. Moore actually published a report about Air Assault Hunter Killer teams in his follow-on assignment after 1/7 Cav. I know you have read it...you pointed me to it. Reports like that are not doctrine. That is called Lessons learned, or "input" or "recommendations".

I had asked you before about "movement to contact". If you have not been to formal military schooling, you will miss the entire concept of this type of operation by focusing on the verbiage. The words do not necessarily convey what it is conceptually. Rather than explain, I'll leave you to do some research if you so choose.

don744

#941 10 Aug 12, 10:37

samtn99: 4) In reference to the anti aircraft weapons.

What’s wrong with post battle reports? Do you expect me to have accessed to live battle reports? Do you mean you only swear by on the spot oral battle reports? In general, I think we have to be content having access to post battle reports. That's the closest, I think, we can get to the real things. I am well aware though, being an official type of reports, they are very brief and dry; you need to have other sources to. The reports only say the main things and are at the mercy of their authors. They only offer part of the story that should be complemented with other sources. If something is not said in any after action report, that does not mean that it did not happen; it’s just the scribers omitted to register.

That said, fortunately in our case, I can satisfy you with the real time things. That’s what you want, right?

So my answer to you is Colonel Hieu did, naturally! In the Long Reach operation, he was blessed with “special agents” and got real time reports (not post battle reports!) on various unit’s losses and shared the intel info with 1st Air Cav. Pleiku Campaign – although a post battle report, do provide real time report - mentions specifically the case of 33rd Regiment

- On 11/8, the 33d Regiment began to assess its losses.
- On 11/9, the 33d Regiment began to count noses. There were many missing. The regimental muster brought these casualty figures:
(…)
Regt Mortar Company 120 50% KIA
Regt Anti Acft Company 150 60% KIA
(…)
Materiel losses were also heavy with the Regimental Anti-air-craft company losing 13 of its 18 guns and the Regimental mortar company losing 5 of its 9 tubes. Six more mortars were lost by the battalions, along with most of the recoilless rifles. The ammunition, food and medical supply losses also had been crippling.

Nota bene: those statistics were actual NVA reports, broadcasted by “special agents” embedded in enemy headquarters. They were not drawn up when writing Pleime Campaign post battle report.

I am pretty sure Colonel Hieu had knowledge of the losses in anti-aircraft guns and mortars of 32nd Regiment as well that he also shared with 1st Air Cav, but Pleime Campaign did not record them.

In any event, he stated in Why Pleime the fact there were no anti-aircraft guns and mortars on hillsides of Chupong mountain because

-The enemy has lost nearly all their heavy crew-served weapons during the first phase.

(Why Pleime, chapter V)

As for the anti-aircraft guns and mortars of 66th Regiment, his “special agents” let him know those two units would only arrive on time for the attack on Pleime set for 11/16. Pleime Campaign recorded this intel info on 11/11:

To add punch to the attack, Field Front also decided to commit a battalion of 120 mm mortars and a battalion of 14,5mm twin-barrel anti-aircraft guns. These two units were enroute down the infiltaration trail and were scheduled to arrive in time for the attack.

(Pleiku Campaign page 76)

Since the landing of Air Cav troops at LZ-X-Ray was a surprise to the enemy, they could not possibly carry those heavy common-crew weapons on hill sides surmounting the landing zone on time for their attacks, could they?!

Two cases, two different sources of intel:

-At Pleime camp, during its siege, Colonel Hieu got the intelligence of anti-aircraft guns and mortars surrounding the camp by dispatching a two-company team of US and Vietnamese Special Forces on October 20; he then determined it was better to relieve the besieged camp by land instead of by air and stopped Kinnard from sending the 1st Air Cav troops by air directly to the camp where all of the troop transport helicopters would be gun down.

-At Chupong, he got intelligence from his “special agents” and determined it was safe to have 1/7th Air Cav go into LZ X-Ray.

I take this opportunity to let you know that when you deal with Colonel/General Hieu, you should be aware that he never deployed troops without having prior solid intelligence on the enemy situation. He planned his operations to the minute details, no stones left unturned.

Phieu

#942 10 Aug 12, 11:01

Post battle reports are often all that is available, no issue there. However, I do find fault with your constant use of hindsight bias to justify actions taken in the past with but knowledge than what was available. Unless the post battle report indicates that the knowledge presented was known at the time of the decisions being made, then one should be careful about assumptions. I suggest assumptions are fine, if stated as such, and would recommend the use of a key assumptions check to give strength to the arguments.

I can write a report about what I did yesterday, but knowing the outcome of my day could very likely change the way I perceive the events of the day.

Furthermore, you state "If something is not said in any after action report, which does not mean that it did not happen; it’s just the scribers omitted to register".

This is possible, no argument at all from me on his point. It does not mean it did not happen.

OR...it may not have happened at all, which COULD explain why it was not recorded. Do you accept this as a possibility?

Phieu : What’s wrong with post battle reports? Do you expect me to have accessed to live battle reports? Do you mean you only swear by on the spot oral battle reports? In general, I think we have to be content having access to post battle reports. That the closest, I think, we can get to the real things. I am well aware though, being an official type of reports, they are very brief and dry; you need to have other sources to. The reports only say the main things and are at the mercy of their authors. They only offer part of the story that should be complemented with other sources. If something is not said in any after action report, which does not mean that it did not happen; it’s just the scribers omitted to register.

That said, fortunately in our case, I can satisfy you with the real time things. That’s what you want, right?

samtn99

#943 10 Aug 12, 11:37

Roger!

I am always careful in presenting founded assumptions based on cross-references of sources and study on "behavioral patterns" of my brother (ergo Dai Bang 800 operation, that I will address to this in another post when I respond specifically to your question about it)

Phieu

#944 11 Aug 12, 11:54

don744 : Anh Phieu,

I think COL Hieu was probably a competent officer.

Just probably?! Not for sure?! Even after I have shown you he was the only proven combat fighting general – with at least six major battles under his belt – in the Vietnam War, be it ARVN, US or NVA?

As far as the "evidence" you present...I was, and still remain, skeptical of the plethora of unprovable information you have weaved into the historical recounting of the battle. You cant prove COL Hieu ordered Larsen to tell Kinnard to tell Knowles to send Moore's battalion to Chu Pong. I cant prove he didn't. That, Anh Phieu, is what I mean by unprovable info.

You mean I cannot prove that with American documents? For sure I can’t: it would be too sensitive to American pride. But I can prove that by reasoning, by deducting, by intra- and extra-polating.

Did Larsen acted on his own when he ordered Knowles to switch operational direction from west to east on Nov 9, then back to the east on Nov 12 and into Chupong on Nov 13. How could he? He was stationed in Nha Trang while the Long Reach operation was controlled at II Corps/1ACD Forward CP headquarters in Pleiku. Did he have all the necessary intel info to plan for all the moves in consecutives phases? Who possessed solely those intel? II Corps, right? And who at II Corps? Colonel Hieu. Of course, Hieu was too clever not to tell, to order or to suggest Larsen to tell Knowles to do something. He did that through Colonel Mataxis , if that was sufficient, and General Vinh Loc if that was necessary.

Of course you can for the simple reason Long Reach operation was conceived by a Vietnamese colonel and executed with the help of 1st Air Cav. Although Colonel Hieu graduated from USC&GSC, he did not always play by the US war books. He was a creative individual who knew how to adjust to a new combat situation such as Chupong-Iadrang. Those are terms he used in Pleime, Trận Chiến Lịch Sử, the Vietnamese version of Why Pleime. Perhaps he preferred to use lay terms rather than US official doctrinal terms. You might tell me the doctrinal terms for

- stalking=monitoring the movement of the enemy;

- luring=entrapping (=enticement used in Pleiku Campaign)

- aiming= adjusting artillery, mortar, bombing etc. fire

Maybe you don’t only have the equivalent term for “herding” (lùa) - pushing, canalizing perhaps? -, which he used in the Vietnamese version but not in the Englsion version.

About luring, that’s the main tactic used my General Hieu - lure and destroy - when he saw that search and destroy did not work. Lure the tiger down the mountain, remember?

I might add that he used a not so orthodox term – an English slang, I might say -for phase III of the operation: “Finish’em off”!

BTW, are you obsessed with the trees to the point of not noticing the beautiful forest?

I have been several times at the National Archives and the Vietnam Center Archives. You just do not find in there everything … You are in a dream world on this…

Lack of documentation leads me to believe the plan as you have outlined it didn't exist.

Don’t you see that I have outlined the plan based on various accounts provided by primary sources: Hieu, Kinnard, Knowles, Coleman, Moore, An, G3/IFFV?

It did happen at Chupong-Iadrang, the Arc Light strike, no? Have I not shown to you that the operational concept for Long Reach operation consisted in using B-52 strike and not in 1st Air Cav ground forces?

I am well aware that everybody else up to now believes it was a ground force’s action. Well, I have proven everybody was wrong.

Well, in order to execute such an operational concept, you need a master plan, don’t you? You cannot just go out and shoot B-52 bombs out from your belt at the three scattered regiments, can you?

Are you rewriting my playwright script with a sarcastic tone of voice? It’s quite good, I might say, more dramatic and more animated. But yet that’s how it really happened behind-the-scenes at Chupong-Iadrang as recorded particularly in G3 Journal/IFFV.

Now, what you can do is weave in a story line based assumptions and fictional dialogue to make it appear there was some great plan. But in the end it is just that assumptions and fictional dialogue.

Am I not backing up all my “assumptions” (when lacking documents) with primary sources?

It is time you give up on trying to convert me.

I have said, “If you cannot see that on your own, then I would never be able to convince you, even with a million proofs”, haven’t I?

I will admit, you've provided a ton of good info and facilitated some good dialogue.

My pleasure. The problem though is that, for some reason - it is not prejudice as I have thought, what is it then? - you are not capable of properly digesting this “plethora of good info”.

Phieu

#945 11 Aug 12, 12:38

I think you lack understanding of what a primary source is...

Phieu :

Am I not backing up all by “assumptions” (when lacking documents) with primary sources?

Samtn99

#946 11 Aug 12, 12:53

Phieu : BTW, are you obsessed with the trees to the point of not noticing the beautiful forest?

Anh Phieu, this is an excellent point you make, we should all keep an open mind.

samtn99

#947 11 Aug 12, 13:32

samtn99 : I think you lack understanding of what a primary source is...

I thought I have been using primary sources: Hieu, Kinnard, Moore, An, Coleman ....

What is it, then?

Phieu

#948 11 Aug 12, 13:36

samtn99 : Anh Phieu, this is an excellent point you make, we should all keep an open mind.

…

Phieu

#949 11 Aug 12, 14:41

I can tell you what it is. Simply stated, it is "doctrine". The size of the element planned for insertion into X-ray was a battalion. Air Mobile tactics largely deal with how the elements get to the battlefield, and how they operate based on the limitations of equipment that can be brought in, and the logistics tail. Once the battalion was on the ground, they operate as any light infantry squad, platoon, company and battalion would. Doctrinally. The mission was search and destroy, and the battalion commander, once he has organized his forces, would conduct a movement to contact. Thats doctrine. In this case, time was the limiting factor as Moore did not have enough to properly organize. I still do not wish to give up the hidden secrets of the movement to contact (MTC) with you yet, as when you read the appropriate doctrinal reference, it may open your eyes to why the battle unfolded as it did, rather than as it was explained by you. I see pretty clearly why the battle unfolded as it did (as a search and destroy operation) rather than as an operation to sacrifice a battalion to freeze enemy forces in place. The selection of X-ray as the only LZ, instead of using multiple LZs, was a huge factor in how the battle developed.

don744

#950 11 Aug 12, 15:28

don744: The selection of X-ray as the only LZ, instead of using multiple LZs, was a huge factor in how the battle developed.

Would be really interesting to consider how it would have unfolded if Moore selected Yankee instead of X-Ray.

2/5 didn't seem to have much trouble (after action report shows 3 x enemy KIA and 1 x captured, with 7 x friendly WIA). The after action report doesn't show any reference to enemy contact on the move to x-ray on 15 Nov.

samtn99

#951 11 Aug 12, 21:26

Think of it like this...why not select multiple LZs? Albany, X-ray, Yankee, etc... What would have happened if there were multiple insertions in The immediate AO? Easy to hind-site it. If the 33rd had to deal with 3 simultaneous landings, how could that have impacted the battle. Maybe the enemy would

don744

#952 11 Aug 12, 23:05

don744: Think of it like this...why not select multiple LZs? Albany, X-ray, Yankee, etc... What would have happened if there were multiple insertions in The immediate AO? Easy to hind-site it. If the 33rd had to deal with 3 simultaneous landings, how could that have impacted the battle. Maybe the enemy would have had to spread its forces rather than concentrate the entire effort on one location.

Sorry for the loooooong post here, but true, spreading things out likely make decision making harder for the NVA. i think 33rd had some serious command and control problems during the X-Ray fight, Phieu's web site mentions some of those issues from the NVA perspective, but hard to judge the strength of the source. I believe he mentions that a lot of the leadership were either dead or wounded (seems like a solid assumption due to the fighting at Plei Me, but caveated because it's hard to know who was left), and/or that a leaders recon was underway for the projected 16 November attack (this also seems like a caveated assumption, Phieu's site does mention that a lot of the officers were gone). My hope would be that everyone reading the thread including Phieu could crowdsource this topic and try to get some more clarity.

If you go through Moore's AAR (http://www.lzxray.com/documents/aar-xray.pdf), he mentions that Tango was a "well" and too small (he says 3-4 x UHs, which with air density levels at that altitude might only mean 20 x troops going in on one go, whereas Yankee and X-Ray could take 8 lifts. A well would likely mean to come almost to a hover and slow descent into the LZ instead of the roll through and everyone jumping like you tend to see in the movies. Wells are pretty dangerous, you hand over the advantage to the bad guys.

To support your argument for multiple LZs, I can't recall if it is in "We Were Soldiers" or "We are Soldiers Still", but if i remember correctly, on one of Moore's trips to Vietnam he met some of the NVA leaders and there were some implications that the "lost platoon" really threw off the NVA as they were not able to identify the platoon as cut off and had some difficulty determining the size of Moore's force. I'll try to find a better sourcing on this.

samtn99

#953 11 Aug 12, 23:48

samtn99: 2/5 didn't seem to have much trouble (after action report shows 3 x enemy KIA and 1 x captured, with 7 x friendly WIA). The after action report doesn't show any reference to enemy contact on the move to x-ray on 15 Nov.

Do you ever wonder why 2/5 was not heli-lifted straight into LZ X-Ray like 2/7, instead of marching from LZ Victor?

Phieu

#954 11 Aug 12, 23:55

I'll take a SWAG (scientific wild assed guess). They were the reserve for the operation. They were not committed until the main force was in jeopardy of being overrun. What do you think Anh Phieu?

don744

#955 12 Aug 12, 08:35

1/7 was initially constrained by the fact that they had only a grand total of 16 slicks with which to move the entire battalion. Fully fueled, they could only transport around 80 men, less than a Company. The Hueys began the operation with full tanks, but as they burned off fuel, they could carry a heavier load in the follow on flights. It was a 30 minute round-trip, and Moore guessed it would take around 4 hours to assemble the entire battalion on the LZ. He was very concerned that he would be landing under fire and he wanted to keep his force concentrated.

Scouts from 1/9 also spotted comm wire just north of LZ X-RAY, and that essentially sealed the deal in favor that LZ. As samt99 noted, LZ TANGO was a well, leaving the ships incredibly vulnerable on approach. LZ YANKEE was bigger, but the scouts reported that it was covered with tree stumps making it unfavorable.

samtn99: Sorry for the loooooong post here, but true, spreading things out likely make decision making harder for the NVA. i think 33rd had some serious command and control problems during the X-Ray fight, Phieu's web site mentions some of those issues from the NVA perspective, but hard to judge the strength of the source. I believe he mentions that a lot of the leadership were either dead or wounded (seems like a solid assumption due to the fighting at Plei Me, but caveated because it's hard to know who was left), and/or that a leaders recon was underway for the projected 16 November attack (this also seems like a caveated assumption, Phieu's site does mention that a lot of the officers were gone). My hope would be that everyone reading the thread including Phieu could crowdsource this topic and try to get some more clarity.

[...]

They were very confused. This whole affair, imo, is a textbook "meeting" engagement —blind groping—. They were particularly confused by the artillery that was quickly deployed to LZ MACON, and then uprooted and moved to LZ COLUMBUS.

Phieu : Do you ever wonder why 2/5 was not heli-lifted straight into LZ X-Ray like 2/7, instead of marching from LZ Victor?

don744: I'll take a SWAG (scientific wild assed guess). They were the reserve for the operation. They were not committed until the main force was in jeopardy of being overrun. What do you think Anh Phieu?

That's pretty much it. 1/7 and some of 2/7 were absolutely worn out. Neither the campaign nor the war were over though, and both Knowles and Brown had further plans to support the operations south of Duc Co. They wanted to shift their attention further north. A/2/7 and B/2/7 were both in it pretty good at X-RAY also. So, 2/5 with A/1/5 were the last to the party, and the freshest.

Neither Moore nor Coleman seem to know why they weren't choppered out. Brown says that LZ ALBANY was only a stopping point on the way to his intended target for 2/5: LZ CROOKS. The way I look at it, there simply wasn't enough time to coordinate the move and chopper out two battalions quickly before the B-52 strikes impacted. It looks on the map to me, as if they were simply going to march them out of the danger area, regroup them at an LZ —apparently ALBANY— and then continue search and destroy operations in or around CROOKS.

Lucky 6

#956 12 Aug 12, 09:51

samtn99: You state repeatedly throughout this thread that the 1st CAV was "attached" to II Corps.

The term "attached" is a very precise military term, with requirements and obligations between the unit attached and the gaining unit.

By “attached” to II Corps, I mean “under the control” of II Corp.

The functional structure was as following:

The highest military authority was II Corps who made decisions; IFFV’s function was advisory; 1st Air Cav was attached to IFFV.

Now it so happened that whenever a US unit was “attached” to an ARVN unit, the US commander wanted to take charge.

In phase I of Pleime campaign:

- 1. a US Special Forces company was attached to II Corps. Colonel Hieu wanted to use it, jointly with an ARVN Airborne Ranger company, to recon the enemy unit deployment around the camp to determine its intention. The US 5th SF Group commander wanted his US company to jump immediately into the camp to help the camp commander to contain the rebellion of CIDG soldiers.

- 12:35H: Fm Lt Col Broughton G3 Adm for Col Barrow. II Corps would like the two Abn Rngr Co's and helilift moved ASAP to Camp Holloway Army Airfield Pku where they will stage for airmobile opn airlanded assault vic Plei Me.
- 18:25H: II Corps Capt Ushijima - Possibility of placing an Abn Ranger Co vic Plei My tonight. Col Bennett was told by SA II Corps, that the a/c would not be available until after 1900 and airlift impossible tonight. Col Bennett then requested 10 Americans be introduced into Camp to assist control of CIDG.
- 20:00H: Request of Lt Col Bennett, 5th SFG, to move 10 US into camp denied.

(G3 Journal/IFFV, 10/20/65)

- 2. US Task Force Ingram (2/12 Air Cav) was attached to II Corps with the mission to secure Pleiku City and provide artillery support to the relief column. Kinnard beefed up the attached unit to a brigade force (1st Air Cav Brigade) and wanted his troops to air assault the camp immediately.

- 23:50H: G3, Col Barrow - at approx 2300 CG rec'd call from Col Mataxis and Gen Knowles was with him. Based on info they passed to CG, CG approved commitment tomorrow of all or part of 1st Bde (PKU) at Gen Knowles's discretion. Gen Kinnard was with Gen Larsen. This info passed to Gen Knowles and Col Mataxis at approx 2315.

(G3 Journal/IFFV, 10/23/65)

Once the camp relieved, when II Corps requested 1st Air Cav to be attached II Corps to go on to the next phase without the risk of Kinnard taking over the control of the operation, Colonel Hieu conceived that “modus operandi”:

- Joint intelligence and support activities.
- Commonly-shared concept of operations and results.
- Separate TAOR.
- Separate command.
- Separate deployment of forces.
- Separate conduct of activities.
- Separate reserve.

Kinnard was “given his head” with separate TAOR, command, deployment of forces, conduct of activietes, reserve; and II Corps still stayed in control of the operation with joint intelligence and commonly-share concept of operations.

These statements in NO WAY indicates attachment of 1st Cavalry units to II Corps (SV), in fact i suggest it indicates just the opposite.

So yes, not attached, but “under the control”.

As a matter of fact, II Corps dictated when 1st Cav played the main role and Airborne Brigade, the secondary role (operation All the Way and operation Silver Bayonet I) and when the reverse began (operation Than Phong I/operation Silver Bayonet II) and how 1st Air Cav operated through IFFV.

II Corps viewed the Pleime campaign as comprising three distinctive but inseparable phases, all under its control:

- Phase I : Dân Thắng 21 operation;

- Phase II: Trường Chinh operation;

- Phase III: Thần Phong 7 operation.

You can see that II Corps was clearly in control in phase II of the operation - during operation Bayonet I and specifically during the battle at LZ X-Ray, when Arc Light strikes were called in:

- 11/15/65 at 10:30H: MAVC J3 (Gen DePuy) Gen DePuy called Col Barrow and asked if Arc Light had been cleared with CG II Corps. Col Barrow replied yes, CG II Corps has approved Arc Light.

- 15:35H: 1st Cav Maj Custer – Request fm Gen Kinnard Status of Arclite requests? One in processing at MACV. CG has approved.

-11/16/65

18:50H: II Corp (Capt McConnell) CG II Corps does concur with Arclite.

- 23:10H: II Corps (Maj Sanabria) Maj Sanabria call to pass concurrence of CG ARVN II Corps on B-52 targets 34, 35, and 36 for 17 Nov.

Furthermore, Larsen forced Kinnard to have 1st Air Cav troops linger at LZ X-Ray pending Arc Light strike while Kinnard wanted to pull them out immediately.

At the time of the Xray fight, Swede Larsen was under pressure from the news media on why we left the battlefield. They didn't understand how our unit fought. With an air assault unit, we don't give much of a damn about terrain. You can go anywhere. The focus is on the enemy. You go where he is. At Xray, the enemy broke off, we didn't quit. We were no longer interested in Xray. That piece of ground meant nothing to me. I wanted to go on to where the enemy was. But Swede ordered me to stay in that spot, and I stayed there an extra 24 hours.

(Cochran)

One indication of Kinnard not wanting to appear “attached” to II Corps can be found in the name given to phase II of Pleime Campaign. II Corps initially named it Trường Chinh (Long Reach) operation.

- Trường = Long;

- Chinh = Conquest.

Kinnard changed it to Pleiku Campaign to make it appeared that it was solely a US operation!

In conclusion – I use “attached” as a lay term, not as a “US military doctrinal” term.

In order to avoid misunderstanding, I should have been more precise by using “under the control” instead, uh ….!

Phieu

#957 12 Aug 12, 10:45

samtn99: I do not see the relevance with this point. You bring information from an operation in 1967 to justify actions conducted 2 years prior???

However, since you brought the subject up, I do not at all understand so please clarify what you mean by this.

Yes. NVA operated as thieves (said Colonel Hieu). As such, they vanished if you moved in in force.

Yes, that’s why he preferred to lure and destroy rather than search and destroy.

Does this make sense to you as a way to show your point, Phieu?

Yes.

In both cases the enemy dictated the action, not the Cav or ARVN.

Yes, by choosing to conduct guerilla warfare, the NVA had the upper hand in initiatives; they select the space and the time of their attacks. Indeed, most of the time, they acted and ARVN and US Air CAV reacted.

That’s why they had to be enticed to attack, letting them think the 1st Cav’s forces was at a lost, and then right at the moment they moved in staging areas, struck them over the head with B-52 bombs and killed them from where they least expected en masse.

Do I have the correct understanding?

Yes and I hope you also understand the relevance of bringing up Dai Bang 800 at this point.

Phieu

#958 12 Aug 12, 11:42

Phieu: - during operation Bayonet I and specifically during the battle at LZ X-Ray, when Arc Light strikes were called in:

- 11/15/65 at 10:30H: MAVC J3 (Gen DePuy) Gen DePuy called Col Barrow and asked if Arc Light had been cleared with CG II Corps. Col Barrow replied yes, CG II Corps has approved Arc Light.

- 15:35H: 1st Cav Maj Custer – Request fm Gen Kinnard Status of Arclite requests? One in processing at MACV. CG has approved.

-11/16/65

18:50H: II Corp (Capt McConnell) CG II Corps does concur with Arclite.

- 23:10H: II Corps (Maj Sanabria) Maj Sanabria call to pass concurrence of CG ARVN II Corps on B-52 targets 34, 35, and 36 for 17 Nov.

Phieu, what you're seeing here is what's called in military terms a "clearance of fire." From the US perspective there would be a need to ensure that no ARVN troops were going to be in the target area. Look at the notation at 1030 when COL Barrow asked if Arc Light had been cleared with CG II Corps.

samtn99

#959 12 Aug 12, 14:46

…

Phieu

#960 12 Aug 12, 15:06

Then why didn't the master planners at II Corps (SV) use an ARVN battalion to go into LZ X-Ray?

Then all three PAVN regiments might have moved towards the ARVN, as they would have seen a great opportunity! If I'm not mistaken you suggest that PAVN forces preferred to fight ARVN.

Two years of variables from 1965 amongst the various players would have influenced the events of 1967, Anh Phieu, I myself would be wary of making the assumption events in 1967 indicate some form of cause and effect in 1965.

I suggest we agree to disagree.

I'll reread through it all again though, I've been working on trimming the mesquite trees in my yard today and it's very hot, so I willingly admit the mesquite trees could have gotten in the way of the forest and affecting my ability to understand your point.

Samtn99

#961 12 Aug 12, 15:48

Phieu : One indication of Kinnard not wanting to appear “attached” to II Corps can be found in the name given to phase II of Pleime Campaign. II Corps initially named it Trường Chinh (Long Reach) operation.

- Trường = Long;

- Chinh = Conquest.

Kinnard changed it to Pleiku Campaign to make it appeared that it was solely a US operation!

This to me is an assumption on your part.

You say "Kinnard changed it to Pleiku Campaign to make it appeared that it was solely a US operation!".

You base your conclusion on what? Bias?

The 1 Cavalry Division Combat Operations After Action Report dated 4 March 1966 as sourced to your General Hieu tribute page uses the cover page title of "Pleiku Campaign" (http://www.generalhieu.com/pleiku-2.htm).

Paragraph 1 of the actual report specifically notes:

1. Name of Operation and Type: Operation Long Reach

If you read through the Forward, General Kinnard provides information as to why he called in a "Campaign" on the cover. He even mentions the contributions of "up to 5 x battalions of ARVN" and in the same sentence very substantial supporting forces of A-R-V-N, U-S-A-F and US Army."

However, if you look through the events that were given "Campaign" credit (http://www.ausa.org/publications/ilw...nStreamers.pdf) for the US Army in Vietnam, you will see that officially, "Pleiku Campaign" does not exist.

For the US Army, the designation of a "campaign" is the purview of the Secretary of the Army.

Kinnard's forward goes on to mention the close cooperation between II Corps (SV) and the Cav.

samtn99

#962 12 Aug 12, 16:01

Phieu: By “attached” to II Corps, I mean “under the control” of II Corp.

So yes, not attached, but “under the control”.

In conclusion – I use “attached” as a lay term, not as a “US military doctrinal” term.

In order to avoid misunderstanding, I should have been more precise by using “under the control” instead, uh ….!

Why would there be a need for a lay term? I suspect it is because you don't have a solid reference to draw from, and so you assume.

"Under the control," unless you mean a formal designation of OPCON (operational control), is no more precise than a lay term. If it was OPCON, then there would be a record of it. Maybe it was so, but it's suspicious that what you claim isn't to be found in ARVN nor US primary sources.

samtn99

#963 12 Aug 12, 16:40

samtn99: Phieu, what you're seeing here is what's called in military terms a "clearance of fire." From the US perspective there would be a need to ensure that no ARVN troops were going to be in the target area. Look at the notation at 1030 when COL Barrow asked if Arc Light had been cleared with CG II Corps.

Remember: separate TOAR? No ARVN troops in there!

Phieu

#964 12 Aug 12, 16:45

samtn99 : Then why didn't the master planners at II Corps (SV) use an ARVN battalion to go into LZ X-Ray?

Then all three PAVN regiments might have moved towards the ARVN, as they would have seen a great opportunity! If I'm not mistaken you suggest that PAVN forces preferred to fight ARVN.

I suggest we agree to disagree.

You forgot about separate TOAR ...

The master planners at II Corps sent in ARVN Airborne Brigade later with operation Than Phong 7, to that effect, in due time.

Phieu

#965 12 Aug 12, 19:28

samtn99 : Why would there be a need for a lay term? I suspect it is because you don't have a solid reference to draw from, and so you assume.

Because there is no formal term to encompass the concept of the "modus operandi “of joint intel/shared operational concepts and separate TAOR/ command/etc.

Do you think OPCON fit that frame of work laid out by Colonel Hieu? Which "was the latest procedure ever put into application since the second World War" (Colonel Hieu)

No, right? Then "attached', which is equivalent to OPCON, is preferable, because is has a looser "doctrinal" connotation.

Phieu

#966 12 Aug 12, 19:48

samtn99 : This to me is an assumption on your part.

You say "Kinnard changed it to Pleiku Campaign to make it appeared that it was solely a US operation!".

You base your conclusion on what? Bias?

On Kinnard's complex of superiorty toward the ARVN.

The 1 Cavalry Division Combat Operations After Action Report dated 4 March 1966 as sourced to your General Hieu tribute page uses the cover page title of "Pleiku Campaign"

(http://www.generalhieu.com/pleiku-2.htm).

Paragraph 1 of the actual report specifically notes:

1. Name of Operation and Type: Operation Long Reach

First of all, were you aware before I told you so, that II Corps gave to phase II that name Trường Chinh translated into Long Reach? Kinnard wanted to erase all vestige of ARVN fingerprints, and rename it Pleiku campaign ̣̣(He called it campaign instead of operation, because mainly of the duration)

He should stick to that name instead of renaming it Pleiku Campaign, which lead to more confusion, because people either thought it was an independent US operation (with contributions of ARVN troops) or forgot all about Pleime Campaign and only remember Pleiku Campaign.

And that's what happens.

Look how the 1st Air Cav website describes the Plieme Campaign in which you don't see ARVN troops mentioned at all.

On 19 October 1965, in Operation "Shiny Bayonet", the First Team initiated their first brigade-size airmobile action against the enemy. The air assault task force consisted of the 1st and 2nd Battalions 7th Cavalry, 1st Squadron 9th Cavalry, 1st Battalion 12th Cavalry and the 1st Battalion 21st Artillery. Rather than standing and fighting, the Viet Cong chose to disperse and slip away. Only light contact was achieved. The troopers had but a short wait before they faced a tougher test of their fighting skills; the 35-day Pleiku Campaign.
On 23 October 1965, the first real combat test came at the historic order of General Westmoreland to send the First Team into an air assault mission to pursue and fight the enemy across 2,500 square miles of jungle. Troopers of the 1st Brigade and 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry swooped down on the NVA 33rd regiment before it could get away from Plei Me. The enemy regiment was scattered in the confusion and was quickly smashed.
On 09 November, the 3rd Brigade joined the fighting. Five days later, on 14 November, the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, reinforced by elements of the 2nd Battalion, air assaulted into the Ia Drang Valley near the Chu Prong Massif. Landing Zone (LZ) X-Ray was "hot" from the start. At LZ X-Ray, the Division's first Medal of Honor in the Vietnam War was awarded to 2nd Lt. Walter J. Marm of the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry. On 16 November, the remainder of the 2nd Battalion relieved the 1st Battalion at LZ X-Ray, who moved on to set up blocking positions at LZ Albany. The fighting, the most intensive combat in the history of the division, from bayonets, used in hand-to-hand combat, to artillery and tactical air support, including B-52 bombing attacks in the areas of the Chu Pong Mountains, dragged on for three days. With the help of reinforcements and overwhelming firepower, the 1st and 2nd Battalions forced the North Vietnamese to withdraw into Cambodia.
When the Pleiku Campaign ended on 25 November, troopers of the First Team had paid a heavy price for its success, having lost some 300 troopers killed in action, half of them in the disastrous ambush of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, at LZ Albany. The troopers destroyed two of three regiments of a North Vietnamese Division, earning the first Presidential Unit Citation given to a division in Vietnam. The enemy had been given their first major defeat and their carefully laid plans for conquest had been torn apart.
The 1st Cavalry Division returned to its original base of operations at An Khe on Highway 19.

Phieu

#967 13 Aug 12, 09:02

samtn99: Then why didn't the master planners at II Corps (SV) use an ARVN battalion to go into LZ X-Ray?

Then all three PAVN regiments might have moved towards the ARVN, as they would have seen a great opportunity! If I'm not mistaken you suggest that PAVN forces preferred to fight ARVN.

A most astute point. One that I had not even considered. This line of thought totally opens up a new can of worms. As you suggested, use of ARVN would have provided a far better "lure". Entirely greater direct command and control for COL Hieu. He would not have had to pull the Jedi mind trick on Larsen, Kinnard, Knowles, Brown, and Moore. He could have just ordered 1 CAV to provide the transport and sent in the Airborne Brigade. The whole seperate TAOR is a non-starter. COL Hieu could have just said no to a seperate TAOR, I mean, it was his country...right? If he had the ability to order the CAV into Ia Drang, He coulda ordered them out of Ia Drang.

So far, there is only a couple one sentance posts addressing the TAOR thing, which is HUGE...and several posts on use of "lay" terms, which doesnt matter one way or another. Looks more like a "distracting" maneuver.

Sam...this is like playing a game of Jenga. You just pulled the block that has the whole stack teetering very precariously right now. Its Phieu's turn...interested to see his response.

don744

#968 13 Aug 12, 11:00

don744 : A most astute point. One that I had not even considered. This line of thought totally opens up a new can of worms.

Yes, but of rotten worms!

As you suggested, use of ARVN would have provided a far better "lure". Entirely greater direct command and control for COL Hieu.

The master plan was laid out as following:

- phase I: ARVN Armored TF with Dân Thắng 21;

- phase II:US Air Cav with Trường Chinh

- phase III: ARVN Airborne Brigade.

You cannot just make sudden unnessesary adjustments on the whim like that unless it is not so well thought out master plan!

He would not have had to pull the Jedi mind trick on Larsen, Kinnard, Knowles, Brown, and Moore..

That's the beauty of a military genius mind: "remote control".

He could have just ordered 1 CAV to provide the transport and sent in the Airborne Brigade.

What make you think Kinnard would graciously lend his transport helicopters? When Colonel Hieu sent in the Airborne Brigade, his request was flatly turned down by 1st Air Cav and he had to resort to 52nd AVN Bn instead:

In November, the 52d Avn Bn joined forces with the 1st Cav Div, in operations in the Ia Drang Valley, the largest single operation of the year. Not only did the Battalion transport 2500 II Corps (ARVN) troops from Duc Co into the operation area ...

I am pretty sure - let me say again - assume (to please Sam) that he did ask 1st Air Cav for help because the "modus operandi" stipulates, Joint intelligence and support activities.

The whole seperate TAOR is a non-starter.

Wrong, Kinnard fight tooth and nail for that condition, right?

On the afternoon of the 26th, Generals Westmoreland, Larsen, Kinnard, and Knowles met for a conference at the 1st Brigade’s command post, at LZ Homecoming. […] In the conference between Westmoreland and the division officers, Kinnard hammered on the theme that U.S. forces must now do more than merely contain the enemy or simply reinforce the ARVN. The NVA, he felt, must be sought out aggressively and destroyed. Of course, as far as Westy was concerned, Kinnard was singing to the choir; Westmoreland long had yearned for the opportunity to go on the offensive. Kinnard and Knowles also spent considerable time at the conference explaining to Westmoreland and Larsen exactly what the division could do and how well it could do it. Westmoreland eventually turned to Larsen and said: “Give Kinnard his head.”

(Coleman, page 99)

COL Hieu could have just said no to a seperate TAOR, I mean, it was his country...right? If he had the ability to order the CAV into Ia Drang, He coulda ordered them out of Ia Drang.

Yes, but he didn't. Was he in, to show he had authority and power or to have the job done?

Sam...this is like playing a game of Jenga. You just pulled the block that has the whole stack teetering very precariously right now. Its Phieu's turn...interested to see his response.

I welcome you two questioning me. It gives me the chance to clarify my presentation of Iadrang battle that I often "assume" (Sam) wrongfully already crystal clear.

One thing though: I have to confess aloud that oftentimes, I was attempted to tell you both, "didn't I say it already?" or "can you see it for yourself, look a little bit closer, it's there in the documents that I have quoted".

Phieu

#969 13 Aug 12, 16:26

Phieu: One thing though: I have to confess aloud that oftentimes, I was attempted to tell you both, "didn't I say it already?" or "can you see it for yourself, look a little bit closer, it's there in the documents that I have quoted".

Phieu, I would appreciate it if you do not give in to the temptation.

Personally, I often pose questions back to you 1) for the sake of discussion or 2) to ensure that I understand what you are saying. No offense to you personally Sir, but sometimes I have difficulty understanding your use of language vis a vis your intentional meaning. So, in the light of ensuring I understand the discussion as it stands at such and such a point, I ask questions. Obviously you're free to ignore any and all of my comments.

I will be direct in stating that I agree with almost none of the contentions based on your interpretation of available evidence, some of the evidence itself, and your assumptions. And that's ok, but it is what it is.

I do appreciate however the different perspectives that a message thread provides!

(I edited this post to remove a poorly worded statement on my part, no offense was intended)

samtn99

#970 13 Aug 12, 17:06

Roger!

Phieu

#971 14 Aug 12, 06:11

What About TACON?

"Definition: Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command."

Sam, any thoughts?

don744

#972 14 Aug 12, 09:58

don744 : Yeah, there was something developed by the Army called FM 7-8, The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad; FM 7-10, The Infantry Rifle Company; and FM 7-20, the Infantry Battalion. Those, coupled with FM 57-35, Airmobile Operations (dated 1963) provided the doctrine for airmobile operations.

There is a difference between Airmobile Operation and Air Assault Operation. General Kinnard might quarrel with you as he did with Cochran about “airmobile operations”

Cochran: What did you learn about air mobility in the Ia Drang?
Kinnard: I have to quarrel with you on the term “air mobility.” I like the term “air assault”. As I mentioned earlier, give a normal infantry division helicopters and it is airmobile. But for us, helicopters were prime – slicks, guns and hooks. That’s the real distinction. There is also a real distinction in the way that people learn who think who know that they are going to do everything with helicopters. They develop an air assault state of mind – minutes, not miles, air space and landing zone, not roads and bridges, focus on the enemy, not terrain. It’s a whole new ball game.

(Cochran)

Well, I am more interested in applied knowledge about air assault imparted by Kinnard – who is the author or co-author of books on air-assault tactics - than abstract unproven doctrine of airmobility in the study of Ia Drang.

Kinnard: Right after the Plei Me siege was broken, I felt that it was up to me to find these guys who had been around the camp. So we came up with a search “modus operandi” in which the Cav Squadron was going to range widely over a very large area and I was going to use one infantry brigade to plop down an infantry battalion and look at an area here and there. I felt that we had to break down into relatively small groups so we could cover more area and also the enemy would think he could fake us. You couldn’t put down a whole battalion out there and go clomping around. You had to break down into company and platoon-sized units. You had to rely upon the fact that with the helicopter you could respond faster than anyone in history. I then learned, totally new to me, that every unit that was not in contact was, in fact, a reserve that could be picked up and used. This is my strategy. Start from somewhere, break down into small groups, depending upon the terrain, and work that area while the Cav Squadron roamed all over. The name of the game was contact. You were looking for any form of contact – a helicopter being shot at, finding a campfire, finding a pack, beaten-down grass. You couldn’t put down a whole battalion out there and go clomping around. You had to break down into company and platoon-sized units.

(Cochran)

Why then, instead of company and platoon-sized units, Knowles dispatched one battalion into LZ X-Ray?

Wasn’t it because he had something else for Moore to do other than search and destroy: to distract the enemy, for example …

Nota bene- Kinnard still fine-tuned his “1963 doctrine” at Ia Drang in 1965: “I then learned, totally new to me, that every unit that was not in contact was, in fact, a reserve that could be picked up and used.”

I choose not to. I am not that interested in the concept of “movement to contact” here because Moore was not asked to apply it at LZ X-Ray. He was more likely asked to execute a “movement to distract”!

Phieu

#973 14 Aug 12, 16:32

Phieu: What make you think Kinnard would graciously lend his transport helicopters? When Colonel Hieu sent in the Airborne Brigade, his request was flatly turned down by 1st Air Cav and he had to resort to 52nd AVN Bn instead:

Phieu, this statement that you make is VERY important, and relates to the point Don and I have been trying to suggest to you is more important than maybe you would accept or even consider.

According to the History of the 52D Combat Aviation Battalion for 1 January 1965 to 31 December 1965 (http://www.virtual.vietnam.ttu.edu/c...8300010053.pdf).

On page 1 of Part I (Mission and Resources), the report states "Specifically stated in Vietnam, it is the responsibility of the 52D Aviation Battalion to provide direct aviation support to II ARVN Corps." Now as a history report, it is absolutely written with hindsight, hence the history part.

Based on the mission given in the reference, the 52D Avn Bn was in no way being "gracious" to II Corps (SV) in provided support, THAT WAS THE STATED MISSION of the 52D Avn Bn.

Don is much better than I at finding Vietnam era US Army Field Manuals, so maybe he can weigh in here with a 1965 or earlier reference to DIRECT SUPPORT, but using the modern version of DIRECT SUPPORT as a model for 1965, 52D Avn Bn with a support relationship of DIRECT SUPPORT to II Corps (SV) means that the battalion would be assigned its area of operation by II Corps (SV) and have its priorities set by II Corps (SV).

II Corps used 52D Av Bn because it was the correct use of the command and/or support relationship.

Show us something other than your assumptions that would indicate any need whatever for Kinnard to be "gracious" to II Corps (SV) with regards to its helicopters.

samtn99

#974 14 Aug 12, 17:26

Phieu : There is a difference between Airmobile Operation and Air Assault Operation. General Kinnard might quarrel with you as he did with Cochran about “airmobile operations”

So what? Kinnards desire to argue semantics over Air Assault and Air Mobile doesn't change The doctrine in place in Nov 1965. Sorry. p>Well, I am more interested in applied knowledge about air assault imparted by Kinnard – who is the author or co-author of books on air-assault tactics - than abstract unproven doctrine of airmobility in the study of Ia Drang.

Why don't you point out the specifics of what made the battle at X-Ray an air assault rather than an air mobile operation?

Regarding your comments on movement to contact: I choose not to. I am not that interested in the concept of “movement to contact” here because Moore was not asked to apply it at LZ X-Ray. He was more likely asked to execute a “movement to distract”!

That one statement is so awesome I don't need to comment much more. You have shown your level of competence in understanding doctrine. You lured me into these discussions, and I absorbed a lot of information. I have been able to listen to and question dissenting viewpoints. I have even changed my mind about things. You've done a decent job Anh Phieu, of making this interesting enough for me to dig into. Sometimes involving a lot of my time. But as the discussion lingers on, the more I see this is not a wise teacher promoting and prompting discussion by intelligent design...you are simply an immovable object that others want to prove wrong. Respect goes two ways. I respect you for being my elder. I respect the time and effort you put into making sense of the Pleiku Campaign. I respect you trying to preserve the history of your family, and the memory of your Brother. If you still have the inclination to "learn" something, I can help. If not. I'll still be here to argue. You're still in the upper half of my list of people I want to have a beer with.

don744

#975 14 Aug 12, 18:09

samtn99 : Phieu, this statement that you make is VERY important, and relates to the point Don and I have been trying to suggest to you is more important than maybe you would accept or even consider.

Well, you should ask Don instead of me, since he stated

He could have just ordered 1 CAV to provide the transport and sent in the Airborne Brigade

According to the History of the 52D Combat Aviation Battalion for 1 January 1965 to 31 December 1965 (http://www.virtual.vietnam.ttu.edu/c...8300010053.pdf).

I know that.

Based on the mission given in the reference, the 52D Avn Bn was in no way being "gracious" to II Corps (SV) in provided support, THAT WAS THE STATED MISSION of the 52D Avn Bn.

Did I say that about the 52D Avb Bn, being “gracious”? I am talking about General Kinnard, not being “gracious”.

II Corps used 52D Av Bn because it was the correct use of the command and/or support relationship.

In normal time yes, but not when the situation got hot.

Show us something other than your assumptions that would indicate any need whatever for Kinnard to be "gracious" to II Corps (SV) with regards to its helicopters.

The 52D Avn Bn did not have helicopters in abundance like the 1st Air Cav:

-the NVA knew that and tied down all three 52D AvnBn’s three helicopter companies in opering a secondary front when they attacked Pleime.

Objectively speaking, Pleime does not present any strategic value. But it has been selected as a main objective because the enemy always tries to marry up tactics and propaganda, to adjust combat activities with psychological warfare. They intended to surprise us because they were convinced that the operations in An Lao and Kim Son, North of Binh Dinh had bound 6 battalions of the ARVN General Reserve, 4 battalions of the 22nd ARVN Infantry Division and three US helicopter companies to the coast.

(WhyPleime, chapter VIII)

-the lifting of the two company team of US and ARVN SF from Nha Trang to Pleime was delayed due to shortage of helicopters. 1st Air Cav, meanwhile, had 500 helicopters, Colonel Hieu noted that.

(1) After the testing period which started in 1963, the Division was officially activated in June 1965 and came to Viet Nam in September 1965. In comparison with the other US Divisions, the 1st Air Cavalry has less troops (15787 instead of 15900) and vehicles (1600 instead of 3200) but more aircraft (435 instead of 101). The displacement of 3000 troops over a distance of 160 km takes only 59 minutes (US Army Information Digest, August 65, page 36)

(Why Pleime, chapter V, footnotes)

If you were Colonel Hieu, wouldn't you open your mouth to ask Kinnard for help?

And do you think (assume) he would "graciously" lend them to you? Or would he not hold tight on to his "prime" toys and brushed you aside?

for us, helicopters were prime – slicks, guns and hooks.

(Cochran)

Phieu

#976 14 Aug 12, 18:29

don744 : So what? Kinnards desire to argue semantics over Air Assault and Air Mobile doesn't change The doctrine in place in Nov 1965. Sorry.

Go tell that to Kinnard, and you will get a taste of his EGO:

- You’ve got to remember that I [General Kinnard] was the only one who had ever commanded an air assault division. (…)
- Only General Gavin had commanded longer than I.
- I knew in a way that no one else did the real capabilities and limitations of an air assault division.

(Cochran)

Why don't you point out the specifics of what made the battle at X-Ray an air assault rather than an air mobile operation?

Do I need to? My main point is to show that Moore's real mission - not that he was aware of that - was to distract rather than to search and destroy with air assault tactics.

My other point in drawing your attention to the difference is that your are looking X-Ray through the lens of airmobility instead of air assault.

You have shown your level of competence in understanding doctrine. You lured me into these discussions, and I absorbed a lot of information. I have been able to listen to and question dissenting viewpoints. I have even changed my mind about things. You've done a decent job Anh Phieu, of making this interesting enough for me to dig into. Sometimes involving a lot of my time. But as the discussion lingers on, the more I see this is not a wise teacher promoting and prompting discussion by intelligent design...you are simply an immovable object that others want to prove wrong. Respect goes two ways. I respect you for being my elder. I respect the time and effort you put into making sense of the Pleiku Campaign. I respect you trying to preserve the history of your family, and the memory of your Brother. If you still have the inclination to "learn" something, I can help. If not. I'll still be here to argue. You're still in the upper half of my list of people I want to have a beer with.

…

Phieu

#977 14 Aug 12, 19:21

See Phieu...that's what I mean. Immovable object. I can be as open and honest as I can and the Elder Brother can only bring sarcasm and insults. Great job bolstering your points. My comments in my last post still stand.

don744

#978 14 Aug 12, 20:55

don744: sarcasm and insults.

That's me, not you!

Great job bolstering your points. My comments in my last post still stand.

No comments.

As a second thought, let me make some comments in order to clear things up a little bit.

You have shown your level of competence in understanding doctrine.

As assessed by you? I can live with it.

You lured me into these discussions,

How so, lured you? Not as "entrapped", right?

and I absorbed a lot of information.

It will take you some times to digest them properly.

I have been able to listen to and question dissenting viewpoints. I have even changed my mind about things.

Not to the point of "being convinced" yet, I can see...

You've done a decent job Anh Phieu, of making this interesting enough for me to dig into.

Glad to know that.

Sometimes involving a lot of my time.

You haven't invested in as long as me yet - 20+ years.

But as the discussion lingers on, the more I see this is not a wise teacher promoting and prompting discussion by intelligent design...

I am that bad of a teacher?

you are simply an immovable object

Yes. It's because I believe that what I am presenting about Iadrang is the most accurate against everybody else, not just you and Sam - all the scholars and historians.

Why "Immovable"? Simply because well anchored ...

that others want to prove wrong.

Have they succeed yet? Or is it still the other way around?

All "they" could do was to accuse me of[I] "cockiness” (altus), delusion (he is no more here), loggorhea (Boonierat), ..." and even went so far as predicting, "I bet no one's reading your posts anymore"! (Boonierat)!

Respect goes two ways.

I have entertained all of your questions, haven't I?

I respect you for being my elder.

Is that's why you addressed to me Anh Phieu? No more lately it seems ... just plain Phieu. Not that I much care ...

I respect the time and effort you put into making sense of the Pleiku Campaign.

Not successful yet, since you do not called it Pleime Campaign instead ...

I respect you trying to preserve the history of your family, and the memory of your Brother.

That part - I think -is relatively mission accomplie when a Vietnamese history study group in Europe recognizes him as a fourth Vietnamese military genius.

If you still have the inclination to "learn" something,

Isn't it an insult?

I can help.

As a teacher, one always learns something from the students.

If not. I'll still be here to argue.

Even as a loosing side?

A note of friendly advise though: if you just want to - in joining "they" - attempt to prove me wrong, then, you are going to continue to find "dry holes" and waste your precious times.

You are even going to risk being "converted"!

You're still in the upper half of my list of people I want to have a beer with.

Phieu

#979 15 Aug 12, 05:02

Sixty-Six pages. Sixty-Six pages! What a success; you took me from knowing a little about the battle to a point where I'm unsure if even one American took part.

Congratulations.

skiplc

#980 15 Aug 12, 05:53

…

Boonierat

#981 15 Aug 12, 06:56

skiplc : Congratulations.

Wait for the "What you still may not know about what the USS Buchanan did that summer." topic.

altus

#982 15 Aug 12, 07:09

Waiting on pins and needles my friend.

skiplc

#983 15 Aug 12, 07:19

Look, Don, "they" are showing up again! However not to prove I am wrong with constructive criticism, but with "hacking" ...

I thought they said they quit my class for good!

Phieu

#984 15 Aug 12, 09:55

Its only a matter of time before this site undergoes a name change to armchairgeneralphieu. com

don744

#985 15 Aug 12, 10:28

…

Phieu

#986 15 Aug 12, 11:01

He is entitled to his threads and his opinions, just as everyone else here is.

If someone doesn't like it, they need not read what he has to say nor engage with him. We also have something called an ignore feature for those really bothered. No one is forcing anyone to agree with him or even participate in his threads. Nor is anyone being prevented from starting their own threads on whatever they want to talk about within the scope of the VN section.

As it stands I see no reason why he cannot continue to bring his perspective here as long as he wants to write.

Miss Saigon

#987 15 Aug 12, 11:28

Maybe you misunderstood that quote. It was an attempt at humor. He is surely entitled to post whatever he wants. I have NEVER advocated that Phieu not post, the thread be closed, or that others should ignore the thread. No admin has ever gotten a "report post" notice from me, and I block no one. I, and a couple of others have kept the discussion going at least 30 pages past where it should have ended. Phieu has taken several cheap shots at US leadership, and being an old Army guy, it kinda riles me up a bit sometimes. My dialogue, however, has remained respectful (which may be a subjective description), open, honest, and frank. Once again, the armchairgeneralphieu. com thing was a joke.

don744

#988 15 Aug 12, 12:24

Don774 - I think you have been very respectful in your responses regarding this thread. Phieu should expect some to question some of his posts and I think this has happened - all done respectfully.

I have learned a number of things on this thread and I encourage Phieu to keep it going as long as it is based on facts, not emotions. I think he has done a good job overall but I also think his 'view' of his older brother may jade his points from time to time.

I hope everyone keeps posting on this thread as long as it stays on subject. I am sure there are many other points that we are unaware of. We know what happened from the viewpoint of the Col. Moore and the Air Cav.

Now we get to see another side of the decision making team.

I hope to learn more.

DeltaOne

#989 15 Aug 12, 12:33

I understood the joke.

As the Mod here my only concern is that things remain civil. I pop in here daily just to make sure no one is getting out of line, and that is it. Disagreement is fine as long as it doesn't degenerate into name calling.

I like having Phieu here. He brings a unique perspective that I believe is valuable. The ARVN side is usually severely neglected, so despite what many think of Phieu, I like having him around.

As for cheap shots, well, both Phieu and I are very used to having the ARVN maligned and criticized so perhaps he is just giving what he is used to getting. I am not sure about that, as I haven't kept up with all that he is writing. As always, the strictly military matters were never my area so I have always let you guys hash through all that yourselves. I read it now solely just to make sure things are going OK, but have not really tried to digest it all.

One thing I can say though Don, is that whether you agree with Phieu or not, I am actually pleased that you have engaged with him in this thread.

Miss Saigon

#990 15 Aug 12, 12:33

altus : Wait for the "What you still may not know about what the USS Buchanan did that summer." topic.

Coming next? More likely

-"Impuissant mass murderer Uncle Ho under the spell of Le Duan"

- and "Hero General Giap, Minister of Birth Planning and Regulation."

Ngày xưa, tướng quân cầm quân /Before you lead troops.
Ngày nay, tướng quân cầm quần chị em/Now you hold up our sisters' pants.

and ̣a little bit salty:

Ngày xưa, tướng quân công đồn/Before you attacked outposts.
Ngày nay tướng quân xét lồn chị em/ Now you examine our sisters' (!)

Phieu

#991 15 Aug 12, 12:47

Oh, Phieu, I see you're at your usual level of civility. I'll give it a "no change" note entry.

I pop in here daily just to make sure this incessant source of subject data for my clinical research is assured. So do not by all means feel flattered.

altus

#992 15 Aug 12, 12:57

Miss Saigon : The ARVN side is usually severely neglected, so despite what many think of Phieu, I like having him around.

Well, if "two wrongs will make a right" is your choice, so be it. After all, I'm not the most qualified one to defend the honor of the ARVN, which Phieu has been doing a great disservice to on this board.

altus

#993 15 Aug 12, 13:01

skiplc: Sixty-Six pages. Sixty-Six pages!

You notice that?

What a success;

Do you really mean it?! No, right?

you took me from knowing a little about the battle to a point where I'm unsure if even one American took part.

Then I have not really succeed, because I lead you from one extreme to the other, from no Arvin to no American. I thought my presentation of the respective roles played by US, ARVN troops and leaders is pretty much fair and balance - my fault or your fault - Not like :

On 19 October 1965, in Operation "Shiny Bayonet", the First Team initiated their first brigade-size airmobile action against the enemy. The air assault task force consisted of the 1st and 2nd Battalions 7th Cavalry, 1st Squadron 9th Cavalry, 1st Battalion 12th Cavalry and the 1st Battalion 21st Artillery. Rather than standing and fighting, the Viet Cong chose to disperse and slip away. Only light contact was achieved. The troopers had but a short wait before they faced a tougher test of their fighting skills; the 35-day Pleiku Campaign.
On 23 October 1965, the first real combat test came at the historic order of General Westmoreland to send the First Team into an air assault mission to pursue and fight the enemy across 2,500 square miles of jungle. Troopers of the 1st Brigade and 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry swooped down on the NVA 33rd regiment before it could get away from Plei Me. The enemy regiment was scattered in the confusion and was quickly smashed.
On 09 November, the 3rd Brigade joined the fighting. Five days later, on 14 November, the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, reinforced by elements of the 2nd Battalion, air assaulted into the Ia Drang Valley near the Chu Prong Massif. Landing Zone (LZ) X-Ray was "hot" from the start. At LZ X-Ray, the Division's first Medal of Honor in the Vietnam War was awarded to 2nd Lt. Walter J. Marm of the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry.
On 16 November, the remainder of the 2nd Battalion relieved the 1st Battalion at LZ X-Ray, who moved on to set up blocking positions at LZ Albany. The fighting, the most intensive combat in the history of the division, from bayonets, used in hand-to-hand combat, to artillery and tactical air support, including B-52 bombing attacks in the areas of the Chu Pong Mountains, dragged on for three days. With the help of reinforcements and overwhelming firepower, the 1st and 2nd Battalions forced the North Vietnamese to withdraw into Cambodia.
When the Pleiku Campaign ended on 25 November, troopers of the First Team had paid a heavy price for its success, having lost some 300 troopers killed in action, half of them in the disastrous ambush of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, at LZ Albany. The troopers destroyed two of three regiments of a North Vietnamese Division, earning the first Presidential Unit Citation given to a division in Vietnam. The enemy had been given their first major defeat and their carefully laid plans for conquest had been torn apart.
The 1st Cavalry Division returned to its original base of operations at An Khe on Highway 19.

Do you see any ARVN troops mentioned at all, from beginning to end of the campaign?

Note that the 1st Air Cav website is describing the entire Pleime Campaign, including phase I and phase III.

Phieu

#994 15 Aug 12, 13:15

Phieu : On 16 November, the remainder of the 2nd Battalion relieved the 1st Battalion at LZ X-Ray, who moved on to set up blocking positions at LZ Albany.

1-7 Cav never moved to LZ ALBANY, it was extracted from LZ XRAY by helicopter to LZ FALCON and from there back to Camp Holloway near Pleiku on November 16. It was 2-7 Cav (plus A/1-5 Cav attached) who moved to ALBANY the next day and got ambushed by d8/e66.

#995 15 Aug 12, 13:24

altus : Oh, Phieu, I see you're at your usual level of civility.

That's all you can say in defense of your two heroes?

Your Northerner compatriots say that, not me!

Are you that prudish, being a clinician as you claim to be in examining me?

I pop in here daily just to make sure this incessant source of subject data for my clinical research is assured.

Daily?! I didn't know that, I always got the impression only from time to time!

I don't know you are a clinical psychiatrist or something of that sort. I only know you as a "spy" or "double agent" or something of that sort!

So do not by all means feel flattered.

Boonierat told me the same thing that he had to pop in here daily because of his moderator's duty, so I should not feel flattered. But yet since he delegated that duty to Miss Saigon, he still makes his presence known. I wonder what excuse he has under his sleeve now?

Anyway, for whatever reason people pop in here, - genuinely interested or just to find fault and harass - I am always flatterred!

Phieu

#996 15 Aug 12, 13:31

Boonierat: 1-7 Cav never moved to LZ ALBANY, it was extracted from LZ XRAY by helicopter to LZ FALCON and from there back to Camp Holloway near Pleiku on November 16. It was 2-7 Cav (plus A/1-5 Cav attached) who moved to ALBANY the next day and got ambushed by d8/e66.

I did not say that, 1st Air Cav website said it! I quoted it on 27 July 2001!

I just check back the site and found it was revised since.

On the morning of 17 November, with the close out action at LZ X-Ray, the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, with “A” Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry attached, walked out of LZ X-Ray and headed for a location, identified as LZ Albany, to set up blocking positions to reinforce the exhausted skytroopers and prepare for extraction from the battle area and get out of the area targeted for an impending B-52 strike.

(www.first-team.us/tableaux/chapt_08/)

PS. Grammatical error!

2nd Battalion relieved the 1st Battalion at LZ X-Ray, who moved on to set up blocking positions at LZ Albany.

It means, the 2nd Bn relieved the 1st Bn at LZ X-Ray then moved on to set up blocking positions at LZ Albany.

The above newer version than my quote clarifies further by specifying 2/5th Bn and 1/7th Bn.

There is no mistake here, just unclear expression. Don't you agree?

Phieu

#997 15 Aug 12, 13:35

Phieu : I did not say that, 1st Air Cav website said it! I just quote!

Never said you did, but since you consider this thread your "class" professor I'm sure you'll agree its preferable to feed you students with accurate information.

Boonierat

#998 15 Aug 12, 13:45

My intention here is to show what the US perspective is as sample by 1st Air Cav website, not to point out or endorse the mistakes. In due time and space...

I do welcome your correcting my errors and mistakes any time as in the past before you accused me of "loggorhea".

Btw, do you still?

PS. In view of my previous PS post, would you also consider this thread my "class" professor? and that you should attend my class in order to learn a lot of things that you still don't know about Iadrang battle?

Phieu

#999 15 Aug 12, 14:06

Phieu :My intention here is to show what the US perspective is, not to point out the mistakes.

Did you type that with a straight face?

don744

#1000 15 Aug 12, 14:11

altus : Well, if "two wrongs will make a right" is your choice, so be it. After all, I'm not the most qualified one to defend the honor of the ARVN, which Phieu has been doing a great disservice to on this board.

He has as much right to be here as you do. It isn't a popularity contest, nor was anyone ever banned for having incorrect information. People are free to judge his content as they see fit.

Miss Saigon

#1001 15 Aug 12, 14:17

Well I was not challenging that right. I was commenting on your "liking to have him here." That's all the difference there is.

altus

#1002 15 Aug 12, 14:30

Yes, I like having his different perspective here, simply because it is different from yours, mine, and the others here.

If that bothers you, then welcome to my world. Because I get assailed all the time for my positions, and most of the time you are not even involved. Much to your satisfaction I imagine.

Miss Saigon

#1003 15 Aug 12, 14:55

don744 : Did you type that with a straight face?

Please, refer back to my revised post and ask the question again.

Phieu

#1004 15 Aug 12, 15:05

I think we are good now.

don744

#1005 15 Aug 12, 16:55

38,013 views ... Vow !

Phieu

#1006 15 Aug 12, 17:37

I probably account for 35,000 of those. My new personal record!

Don744

#1007 15 Aug 12, 17:45

Would you please back off? 30,000 are mine, all mine!

altus

#1008 15 Aug 12, 17:53

See, spoken like a true commie. Always got to try to one up the running-dog capitalist swine. Ain't gonna work here Mr. Altus.

don744

#1009 15 Aug 12, 18:08

altus: Would you please back off? 30,000 are mine, all mine!

I thought you said you check on me daily.

Let's see: I joined this forum in November 2011; it's now September 2012 which makes it less than 365 days.

You inflate your view number by 100 times!

Don't tell me that you check on me 100 times a day!

You treat Don as he is a 3rd grader!

Coming from Don, I can take it as a joke. But coming from you? What can I say?

You are lucky Don did not point you to his quote:“You just can't find that level of stupid in nature. It kills itself off... -T.A. Gardner”

Phieu

#1010 15 Aug 12, 19:22

I can see this thread is starting to turn. Let's not get into peeing contest. There is nothing wrong with points from a S. Vietnam view and a N. Vietnam view. Just because I despise the 'communist style government' and I get irate at their view that only they did good things and did no evil, that only we did, I still am trying to understand why they did what they did.

DeltaOne

#1011 15 Aug 12, 19:25

Hey Phieu, was a BDA undertaken for those ARC LIGHT strikes that Col Hieu ordered?

thejester

#1012 15 Aug 12, 19:31

Shouldn't we let the hackers vent their frustration a little bit?

I don't want to tell them to shut up and be accused of infringement of freedom of speech from where I stand.

You can though ... Yes, why don't you do that.

I was about to just ignore them and carry on with my presentation.

With my next post? I hope ...

Phieu

#1013 15 Aug 12, 19:35

Carry on through the jungle Phieu. When I see something I didn't know, I like to look it up along with your expressed point. Combining the two helps me get a clearer picture. As I have said, I am enjoying your points.

DeltaOne

#1014 15 Aug 12, 19:46

Phieu: The master plan was laid out as following:

- phase I: ARVN Armored TF with Dân Thắng 21;

- phase II:US Air Cav with Trường Chinh

- phase III: ARVN Airborne Brigade.

You cannot just make sudden unnessesary adjustments on the whim like that unless it is not so well thought out master plan!

So you are saying that this master plan of 3 phases was laid out by ARVN II Corps sometime after 19 Oct 1965 and before 23 Oct 1965?

samtn99

#1015 15 Aug 12, 19:51

Phieu I am pretty sure - let me say again - assume (to please Sam) that he did ask 1st Air Cav for help because the "modus operandi" stipulates, Joint intelligence and support activities.

I am pleased.

I believe it to be at best a caveated assumption. It is possible II Corps asked .....and it is possible it did not ask. I make the assumption that it would be logical for II Corps to rely on it's own direct support assets (52D Avn Bn).

samtn99

#1016 15 Aug 12, 23:34

samtn99 : So you are saying that this master plan of 3 phases was laid out by ARVN II Corps sometime after 19 Oct 1965 and before 23 Oct 1965?

I am not quite sure exactly when. I can only "assume" the idea of that master plan popped up in Colonel Hieu's head when he realized that he had the three required elements in hand to effectively annihilate the "thieves":

1. The B-52's that he saw used a month ago in August 1965 at the Duc Co relief operation;

2. The US 1st Air Cavalry attached to IFFV and settled in the Highlands at An Khe in September 1965;

3. The "special agents" embedded in the NVA B3 Field Front at regimental and division headquarters feeding him intelligence about the enemy situation, by the days, hours, and minutes.

The key factor that rendered the planning and execution of that master plan possible was #3. When did the "special agents" started feeding intel to him? Only Colonel Hieu knew. It could be earlier than October 19, while NVA B3 Field Force was planning for the 1965 Spring-Winter Campaign.

For sure, he kept that - I assume - a well kept secret from everybody except his immediate boss, General Vinh Loc, including his general staff personnel - G3 and G2 as well, like he did during the planning of Than Phong 1

Maintain maximum secrecy about the operation, even within the staff.
(...)
The first goal was realized by two-phase planning in which only authorized personnel participated. These secret meetings took place as regular staff meetings, and precautions were well kept.

(Major General Vinh Loc - Military Review, April 1966)

Don't tell me that Duc Co battle and Than Phong 1 have nothing to do with Pleime Campaign: they reveal a "behavioral pattern". Ergo, my assumptions are not unfounded!

Phieu

#1017 15 Aug 12, 23:51

samtn99 : I am pleased.

Well II Corps did not rely on I Field Force Vietnam Artillery during the whole Pleime Campaign, did she? Instead she relied heavily on Air Cav Artillery throughout, no?

During Pleime Campaign, both 52D Avn Bn and 1st Air Cav Aviation were direct support assets. In either of these two cases, he had to request artillery support through IFFV. I "assume" Colonel Hieu was astute enough to seek help for the best of the two assets. Don't you agree?

Phieu

#1018 15 Aug 12, 23:52

DeltaOne : Carry on through the jungle Phieu. When I see something I didn't know, I like to look it up along with your expressed point. Combining the two helps me get a clearer picture. As I have said, I am enjoying your points.

Thanks for your words of support and encouragement.

That's really comforting.

Phieu

#1019 15 Aug 12, 23:58

thejester : Hey Phieu, was a BDA undertaken for those ARC LIGHT strikes that Col Hieu ordered?

You sound like a hacker ... but what the heck ... let me respond to you anyway ...

Yes, mainly (officially) by 9th Air Cav Squadron. I posted this info on such BDA at least three times recently on this thread. Do you mind go back and look it up yourself?

Besides that, Why Pleime (chapter VI) states:

The intelligence estimate on enemy capabilities, made on 17 November indicated that nearly 2/3 of their strength had been wiped off through the engagements in Phases I and II.
II Corps Command thought it was time to throw in the reserve in order to put an end to the battle which had lasted for about one month.

Note:

- Arc Light strikes accounted for 1/2 of that 2/3 enemy losses; - Colonel Hieu relied more on his "special agents"'s BDA reports - which were more accurate - than 9th

Air Cav's.

Phieu

#1020 16 Aug 12, 01:32

I could only find the G3/IIFFV report, which confirmed the B-52 pilots thought they bombed accurately. As for 'special agents' - that was usually a euphemism for SIGINT in Phuoc Tuy, was that the case here?

Thejester

#1021 16 Aug 12, 10:26

Phieu : During Pleime Campaign, both 52D Avn Bn and 1st Air Cav Aviation were direct support assets.

We disagree here. I have seen no indications that 1 Cav (US) was in direct support to II Corps. 52D Av Bn in its own reporting states it was in Direct Support, no such indications have been shown that it was also the case for 1 Cav (US).

samtn99

#1022 16 Aug 12, 10:30

Phieu : Don't tell me that Duc Co battle and Than Phong 1 have nothing to do with Pleime Campaign: they reveal a "behavioral pattern". Ergo, my assumptions are not unfounded!

No issue from me with your assumptions here, Duc Co in August and Than Phong I in Sept very likely influenced the thinking for Plei Me in October

(although it does make me wonder why II Corps followed almost the same exact plans to relieve Plei Me as it did Duc Co...if you believe the captured 32 PAVN regt combat order to be legitimate, it made it very easy for the PAVN to predict II Corps actions)

samtn99

#1023 16 Aug 12, 10:43

The Vietnamization of History.

My two cents worth.Both Phieu,my friend on this board,just as he was my friend during the war.And altus,my enemy,just as he was my enemy and will always be my enemy, post agendas here,nothing more,nothing less.

It is their common goal,tho opposites,to slant the information here at ACG in a more favorable light for their side than what I seen of both of them during the actual fighting of "Their War".

What motives them here?I would guess it's the international membership of ACG and for altus,it pays the bills.For Phieu,it strokes his lost pride.

Yes, both of you Phieu and altus put up one hell of a fight,BUT in my 20 months in"YourFight"I never seen a South Vietnam troop anywhere,when the bullets started to fly.I stand corrected!Once I was ambushed by ARVIN in the middle of Quangtri City,they wanted to kill me but failed,just like your boys altus.

As for the"Victorious nva"who would post a"big ass flag"just north of the country they were"liberating"but dared not carry that flag into South Vietnam as long as they opposed American forces,or even admit where they came from.A fighting force that had to count on enemy of the U.S. to supply them with every thing from AK47 to Sam,except for some poorly crafted hand grenades.

A fighting force(nva)killers who would use noncombatants as human shields as a military tactic.

A fighting force that had to hold on and fight the fight only long enough for the protesters back in the states to accomplish the mission they,nva,could not.(Removal of American forces)

Ending this for now,I'll let you two get back to your chattering and squabbling

hankwill

#1024 16 Aug 12, 11:06

samtn99: We disagree here. I have seen no indications that 1 Cav (US) was in direct support to II Corps. 52D Av Bn in its own reporting states it was in Direct Support, no such indications have been shown that it was also the case for 1 Cav (US).

The "modus operandi" for Long Reach joint operation which encompassed All the Way operation, Silver Bayonet I and Than Phong 7/Silver Bayonet II stipulates: "joint intelligence and support activities". If that does not imply direct support, then I give up.

Let me back pedal to artillery support in phase I of Pleime campaign. I was wrong in stating that II Corps did not request IFFV Artillery. She did, and Larsen sent IFFV Task Force Ingram comprising one infantry battalion and one artillery battalion (2/12 Arty).

But then Kinnard forced Larsen to let him come in with his full 1st Air Cav Brigade and evinced 2/12 Arty in the role of artillery support to the ARVN relief column:

Pleiku Campaign's Task Organization in terms of artilley for:

- Oct 23: B 2/17 Arty (IFFV) and 2/19 Arty (-) and A 2/20 Arty (1st Air Cav Brigade)
- Oct 24: 2/19 Arty (-), B 2/17 Arty and A 2/20 Arty (1st Air Cav Brigade)

(Pleiku Campaign, pp 19 and 23)

Note: B 2/17 Arty was incorporated into 1st Air Cav Brigade.

So, I assume that Kinnard refused to lend II Corps his "prime" helicopters to transport ARVN Airborne troops, because he wanted to pursue the enemy all the way to the Cambodian border with his 2nd Air Cav Brigade and was denied of his wish and was forced to have his 2nd Air Cav Brigade play the support role to ARVN Airborne Brigade.

You know the attitude of, you give me this I give that; you denied me this I refuse you that...

Phieu

#1025 16 Aug 12, 11:14

samtn99 : (although it does make me wonder why II Corps followed almost the same exact plans to relieve Plei Me as it did Duc Co...if you believe the captured 32 PAVN regt combat order to be legitimate, it made it very easy for the PAVN to predict II Corps actions)

I "assume" - based on my brother's behavioral pattern - that II Corps plays dumb, in letting the enemy think she has only one way of acting, and remains an easy prey, then surprise them with a strike on the head with Arc Light ...

Phieu

#1026 16 Aug 12, 11:18

hankwill ,

No comments, just to say that I am sorry you came back with bad personal combat experiences. My brother died in that war, you know. At least you came back alive.

One friendly advice: don't read my thread, unless you find it therapeutic...

Phieu

#1027 16 Aug 12, 11:26

thejester: I could only find the G3/IIFFV report, which confirmed the B-52 pilots thought they bombed accurately. As for 'special agents' - that was usually a euphemism for SIGINT in Phuoc Tuy, was that the case here?

No, not G3/Two FFV report and SIGINT in Phuoc Tuy which were both in III Corps. But G3/First FFV and special agents in Pleime which were both in II Corps. You ask for BDA report on Arc Ligh strikes ordered by Colonel Hieu, right?

Please go back again to previous posts of THIS thread and look for what you want.

By the way, if you are playing dumb with the devious intention to somehow entrap me, then I prefer that you go straight to your point.

Phieu

#1028 16 Aug 12, 11:46

Phieu: I "assume" - based on my brother's behavioral pattern - that II Corps plays dumb, in letting the enemy think she has only one way of acting, and remains an easy prey, then surprise them with a strike on the head with Arc Light ...

Play dumb on the Plei Me relief effort between 19-23 Oct, to set them up for a surprise B-52 strike 3 weeks later?

samtn99

#1029 16 Aug 12, 11:56

Why not? You have to do that to catch a "thief".

A hunter, be it animal or human, play dumb to keep his victime off guard all the time in order to catch his prize...

And yes, why not 3 weeks later, if that's is what it takes ...

Phieu

#1030 16 Aug 12, 12:24

Phieu : No comments, just to say that I am sorry you came back with bad personal combat experiences. My brother died in that war, you know. At least you came back alive.

One friendly advice: don't read my thread, unless you find it therapeutic...

Phieu - I think it is fair to say that we (vets from the Vietnam War) know the story of what the war was really like. Some had terrible experiences that haunt them to this day. Others were able to deal with it better. We all respect (vets or not) the fact that your brother made the ultimate sacrifice in defense of freedom. However, I don't think it is really fair to say to someone - you came home - and infer that because we came home alive, we don't understand what truly took place. Maybe I am wrong in reading your post. I hope so and if that is the case, I humbly ask that you correct me on this issue.

DeltaOne

#1031 16 Aug 12, 12:47

I just meant to say you are still luckier than my brother and did not infer that you don't understand what truly took place .

In a sense, I am aware that sometime it would be better to die in the war than to come back wounded physically or mentally.

My brother wrote in Why Pleime (Forewords):

These pages are written with the purpose of honoring the exploits of the heroes from the Armor, Ranger, Infantry, Airborne, Air Force, Special Forces and SF Ranger units and especially of those who survive but still suffer of their wounds.

Phieu

#1032 16 Aug 12, 13:08

I respect your brother greatly. I respect that he fought for what he believed was right and he honored those who did not make it home and those who did but live with a lifetime of reminders of that war with the wounds they came home with.

Keep up the good work.

DeltaOne

#1033 16 Aug 12, 14:07

samtn99: Play dumb on the Plei Me relief effort between 19-23 Oct, to set them up for a surprise B-52 strike 3 weeks later?

The relief effort was a "Movement to Relieve". Not to be confused with the later "Movement to Fake East, Attack West". Luckily the "Movement to B-52 Strike" occurred on schedule, depleting 2/3 of the enemy strength. This was confirmed by a "Movement to BDA". Creating doctrinal terms is...fun!

Sorry, Phieu, I am just poking a little fun. So, what was Moore doing when he sent those platoons out towards the mountain after the initial lift landed? Was he:

A. Conducting a "Movement to Chu Pong"

B. Conducting a "Movement to Decieve"

C. Conducting a "Movement to Contact"

Extra Credit:

The primary principle of a "Movement to Contact" is:

A. Run haphazard into the unknown.

B. Obtain and maintain contact with the enemy using the smallest element possible, while keeping the main force from being decisively engaged, so the commander can maneuver his forces onto the enemy.

C. Death before dismount.

don744

#1034 16 Aug 12, 14:38

thejester :As for 'special agents' - that was usually a euphemism for SIGINT

Not really. "Special intelligence (SI)" or "usually reliable sources" are the American euphemisms I am familiar with (in addition to "radio research", of course ).

RadioResearcher

#1035 16 Aug 12, 14:54

don744 :

So, what was Moore doing when he sent those platoons out towards the mountain after the initial lift landed? Was he:

A. Conducting a "Movement to Chu Pong"

B. Conducting a "Movement to Decieve"

C. Conducting a "Movement to Contact"

D. None of the above.

D. Staying Put and Consolidating Defensive Perimeters.

Phieu

#1039 16 Aug 12, 15:06

RadioResearcher: Not really. "Special intelligence (SI)" or "usually reliable sources" are the American euphemisms I am familiar with (in addition to "radio research", of course ).

RR, Care to fill in the blank?

'Special agents' at Pleime are Col. Hieu's euphemisms for _______.

Phieu

#1037 16 Aug 12, 15:33

They could have been many things, including Human intelligence. After all, he was VN and had avenues of intelligence open to him that the Americans did not have.

Miss Saigon

#1038 16 Aug 12, 16:11

Nice try, Miss, but can you just use a single or double word or make up an acronym to fill in the blank ?!

Phieu

#1039 16 Aug 12, 16:16

!!!Sarcasm Alert!!!

Oh come on, guys, did you not study??????

CHINESE ADVISORS

(Edited to specifically state this was sarcasm on my part)

Samtn99

#1040 16 Aug 12, 17:21

Speaking in the clear on low-level voice and picked up by ARVN radio relay? Oh, yeah, that was in lesson #52! Whew! I almost got caned on the head by the old sensei!

RadioResearcher

#1041 16 Aug 12, 20:11

Phieu : No, not G3/Two FFV report and SIGINT in Phuoc Tuy which were both in III Corps. But G3/First FFV and special agents in Pleime which were both in II Corps. You ask for BDA report on Arc Ligh strikes ordered by Colonel Hieu, right?

Please go back again to previous posts of THIS thread and look for what you want.

By the way, if you are playing dumb with the devious intention to somehow entrap me, then I prefer that you go straight to your point.

No trap, I'm just interested. There was at least one occasion where Australian units had their PLAF counterparts on the ropes and then were forced to pull back for a B-52 strike, with disappointing results. The difference here is that there was a 24-48 hour lag between the pull back order and the ARC LIGHT mission for the Australians; the timing seems to have been better in the Ia Drang.

That said, I still can't find an actual BDA. The G3/IFFV journal on your website records Aircav investigation briefly:

- 14:10H: 1st Cav Maj Sandburn – Arc light complete at 1212 hrs. All A/C bombed within 3 designated areas. BDA being conducted by Cav elements. Will notify TOC as soon as info is available. No immediate exploitation planned, CG will conduct a conference at 1500 to plan exploitation.
- 17:35H: 1st Cav Lt Brown – Debrief for Arclite post analysis. TOT – 1330. 2000 ft altitude. Post strike analysis. Tgt 1 – 100%, coverage, large craters and tree blowdown, no bodies observed. Tgt 2 -100%, coverage. Tgt 3 – 75% due to irregular terrain, pilot remarks A/C rec’d AW fire vic YA 9101, YA 8995, helicopter no hit.

And Why Pleime? talks about overall KIA by phase and bodycount. So I'm assuming there's no actual BDA document as such?

RadioResearcher : Not really. "Special intelligence (SI)" or "usually reliable sources" are the American euphemisms I am familiar with (in addition to "radio research", of course ).

This is after the information had been processed. So the daily MACV intel bulletin or 1ATF INTSUM will refer to 'special agents' or 'agent reports'.

thejester

#1042 16 Aug 12, 20:12

samtn99 : Oh come on, guys, did you not study??????

CHINESE ADVISORS

I confess that I have not. Until now I have not read more than a snippet here and there from this thread because it deals with military matters and that is not my focus. However, since I am now Mod I do check in on all the threads just to make sure everyone is still playing nicely with each other. So I am now reading this thread, but it is only a recent development.

One day if I have enough time I will try to go back through and do some catching up.

Miss Saigon #1043 16 Aug 12, 21:48

thejester : No trap,

Sorry for being a little bit paranoid! (Altus will tell you that he has been trying to treat me in his clinic for that!)

>That said, I still can't find an actual BDA.

I'm assuming there's no actual BDA document as such?

You are right, you won't find it in this thread. Just a record by G3 Journal/IFFV that the Cav was investigating.

Phieu

#1044 17 Aug 12, 04:08

RadioResearcher : Speaking in the clear on low-level voice and picked up by ARVN radio relay? Oh, yeah, that was in lesson #52! Whew! I almost got caned on the head by the old sensei!

You have been sitting in the wrong class with a Japanese teacher!

You need to go to a class with a Mandarin speaking Vietnamese teacher!

Another thing: clear, yes; low-level voice, no; rather, aloud! You forget that they did not have good communication equipment yet!

Phieu

#1045 17 Aug 12, 04:19

samtn99 : !!!Sarcasm Alert!!!

Oh come on, guys, did you not study??????

CHINESE ADVISORS

(Edited to specifically state this was sarcasm on my part)

You nailed it! Sarcastic or genuine is of no importance. A

t least there is one thing you have learned in this class that you did not know before. Agree? For me, it's mission accomplie. I am here to inform, not to convert. S

ee the difference in knowlegde between you and Miss Saigon since you attend my class?

But watch out, she is determined and will catch up with you in no time.

And she will zoom pass you, because her mind is not pre-conditioned.

No, Sam, I don't "assume" here. It's proven already!

She beat you to the ready-to-answer button!

Anyway, you are better off than the 1st Air Cav folks who did not really know the meaning of 'special agents'.

You will never fully understand what's really going at Iadrang until the day you include that key piece into your equation.

Phieu

#1046 17 Aug 12, 10:00

Phieu: Another thing: clear, yes; low-level voice, no; rather, aloud! You forget that they did not have good communication equipement yet!

Not that I would presume to correct the honorable, Mandarin-speaking, Vietnamese teacher, but, by "low-level voice", I meant "tactical, short-range voice communications". I was just using the SIGINT dialect. Please, I do not need another lump on the head, o learned one.

RadioResearcher

#1047 17 Aug 12, 10:12

You did anyway. But I appreciate that coming from a SIGINT expert student .

Btw do you object to me considering you a student of mine? Or you rather prefer that I view you as a SIGINT expert sitting in my class with other intentions than to learn? That makes me .

One more thing, it would be the first lump from your Mandarin speaking Vietnamese teacher; a second one, after the first one administered by your Japanese teacher.

But don't worry, I have adapted to the American culture that prohibites to use physical force in the classroom...

Phieu

#1048 17 Aug 12, 10:15

Miss Saigon: I confess that I have not. Until now I have not read more than a snippet here and there from this thread because it deals with military matters and that is not my focus. However, since I am now Mod I do check in on all the threads just to make sure everyone is still playing nicely with each other. So I am now reading this thread, but it is only a recent development.

One day if I have enough time I will try to go back through and do some catching up.

It is about time, Miss Saigon. You don't know how much you have missed! ...

I am glad your Mod duty lead you to realize that. I wonder why Boonie did not ...

Phieu

#1049 17 Aug 12, 10:52

Phieu: I wonder why Boonie did not ...

Hagiographies have never been my preferred type of reading

Boonierat

#1050 17 Aug 12, 12:50

What's your excuse for still lingering in here this time around? Just looking for pécadilles, like just recently !?

I have learned by now: once you don't get it, you never get it!

Still remember your prophesy: "I bet no one's reading your posts anymore" ? I should have asked you how much you are willing to bet! I could be a billionaire by now! At least 38,897.00 dollars!

I bet you, the majority of those who continue to read me don't think it is hagiography, especially "hagiographical logorrhea" (wow, what a savant word; I still have difficulty spelling it correctly!).

That said, let me pick up from where I was distracted away by a bombardement of questions: the battle at LZ Albany.

Phieu

#1051 17 Aug 12, 13:18

Don't fool yourself Phieu, half of these 38k hits are probably yours and the rest internet bots.

As for lingering here, I'm around this forum for like ten years now, having participated in its creation, so you might expect to see me some more .

Boonierat

#1052 17 Aug 12, 13:27

General Kinnard’s View on LZ Albany Battle

General Kinnard discussed LZ Albany Battle with Cochran when he was interviewed in 1988.

Cochran: On the next day, one of your reinforcing battalions, the 2nd Battalian of the 7th Cav, was ordered to move overland several miles from LZ Xray to LZ Albany. There, they ran headlong into a reinforced NVA battalion already prepared for the attack. The battle that ensued was particularly bitter, as several U.S. positions were overrun; there were reports of NVA soldiers executing wounded U.S. troops, and air strikes and artillery fell on isolated U.S. troops. Enemy losses were set at 403 by count and estimated 100 more, while the U.S. battalion suffered 151 killed and 121 wounded.
Kinnard: This was a tough day. Unfortunately, it happened so quickly and became such a melee that it took a long time before we could employ our firepower and make it count. The enemy there was particularly bright and did a particularly good job in their close-embrace technique. Being fair about it, that battalion had been slogging through the woods long enough that they were tired and probably didn’t have their tails up quite as much as they should have. My personal guess was that the enemy had between 15 to 30 minutes’ notice on where we were going. So it was a tactical ambush, in that sense, because he had a chance to make some quick adjustments. But, in the sense that he lured us into an ambush, no way.
Cochran: Would it be fairer to characterize it as a meeting engagement? What about the several NVA prisoners captured immediately before the attack? Shouldn’t that have indicated something?
Kinnard: Yes, it was a meeting engagement in which he had the advantage of prior notice. In hindsight, when we captured the prisoners, that was the time that we should have moved in a different direction and formation. That’s why they must have been a little tired, perhaps a little overconfident. This is all intuitive on my part. I’m just trying to put myself in the position of that unit and what happened.

Phieu

#1053 17 Aug 12, 13:48

Boonierat : Don't fool yourself Phieu,

If you want to dispute the number, then you should be certain, not "probably" ...

half of these 38k hits are probably yours and the rest internet bots.

Anyway, let's see:

- 38,000/2= 19,000 hits

Still impressionant, non? in comparison to other threads.

Not that I care the number of hits.

Don & Altus: you better revise your claim of 35K and 30K personal hits, in light of Boonie's clarivoyance, if you don't want to fool yourself!

Only half of these 35k/30K hits are probably yours and the rest internet bots.

Boonie, do you care to explain - in lay language - how the rest are internet bots?

As for lingering here, I'm around this forum for like ten years now, having participated in its creation, so you might expect to see me some more .

You don't have to give me any explanation.

Just stay and have fun. Be confident that Miss Saigon is capable to do well her mod duty on your behalf ...

Phieu

#1054 17 Aug 12, 15:35

Phieu : Just stay and have fun. Be confident that Miss Saigon is capable to do well her mod duty on your behalf ...

Well, it is not going to be good if I have to break up a fight between you two

#1055 17 Aug 12, 15:42

Don't worry, our friendly exchanges won't escalate to a fight. I hope you will intervene before it comes to that stage and won't have to break up a fight. I trust, in the rarissme possibility that it happens, you will be fair and won't take side ... even one side happens to be your boss ...

Phieu

#1056 17 Aug 12, 17:24

Miss Saigon : Well, it is not going to be good if I have to break up a fight between you two

Maybe you could arrange a sit-down with some bottles of White House beer!

RadioResearcher

#1057 17 Aug 12, 17:36

A bottle of Moët & Chandon Champagne d'Élysée would be more à propos for the occasion, and the language would be Français !

Miss Saigon, I know you know Italian. How about French?

Phieu

#1058 17 Aug 12, 18:08

Le voila! (Actually, I was trying to suggest diplomatic neutrality when it came to beverage.) . . . donc, chacun a son gout, M. Phieu! Mademoiselle, un plat d'escargots aussi, s'il vous plait!

RadioResearcher

#1059 17 Aug 12, 18:36

Impressionant!

I don't know you know French!

You should learn to use a French virtual keyboard to type in the French accents, though! To sound more native ...

Le voilà! . . . donc, chacun a son goût, M. Phieu! Mademoiselle, un plat d'escargots aussi, s'il vous plaît!
-- Rechercheur de Radio (ou quelque chose comme ça)

During this heated presidential campaign season, the White House is far from a symbol of diplomatic neutrality ...

Phieu

#1060 18 Aug 12, 08:26

General Nguyen Huu An on LZ Albany battle

It is interesting to know General Nguyen Huu An’s account of the LZ Albany battle.

By noon of November 17, 8th Battalion, 66th Regiment who had received the order to return back to the previous position, while pausing for lunch along Ia Drang river, was alerted by the recon scouts that "the American troops are approaching". Le Xuan Phoi, the battalion commander, calmly set his troops into an ambush formation which would entrap the enemy troops between two hands of a plier. After using the mortar fire to put pressure against the enemy formation, our troops valiantly gave assaults to cut through the enemy lines and initiated a hand to hand combat with the enemy. This time, the two sides intertwined to the point only small firearms, bayonets and grenades could be used in combat.
(. . .)
At my order, 33rd Regiment dispatched one battalion back toward the direction of Chu Pong. While on its way back, 1st Battalion, 33rd Regiment heard gun shots in front of it, and knew for sure our troops were attacking the enemy, and hurried up to reach the conflict location. Upon approaching the enemy, one company of 1st Battalion encountered enemy combatants retreating toward Chu Pong. And so, two units combined their force to attack the American battalion from behind. The coordinated maneuvering of the two battalions threw the American troops into disarray and were destroyed rapidly by our troops.
The fighting lasted from 2:00 p.m November 17 through 8:00 p.m. November 18.

(Chien Truong Moi - Memoir - Quan Doi Nhan Dan Publishing House - Hanoi 2002 )

Phieu

#1061 19 Aug 12, 09:38

Pleiku Campaign's Report on LZ Battle

(Pleiku Campaign page 93)

Phieu

#1062 19 Aug 12, 12:16

Phieu: A bottle of Moët & Chandon Champagne d'Élysée would be more à propos for the occasion, and the language would be Français !

Miss Saigon, I know you know Italian. How about French?

I speak a Italian and a little Polish, although from lack of use I am getting rusty.

Prosecco with Lemon Sorbet

Miss Saigon

#1063 19 Aug 12, 12:22

Excellent! Altus could sit in to give support to Boonie, if he so desires!

Phieu

#1064 20 Aug 12, 11:33

Pleiku Campaign Report on LZ Albany Battle –Intelligence Summary

(Pleiku Campaign page 94)

Phieu

#1065 21 Aug 12, 09:23

During the recent Q&A session, the following hot points have been raised:

1. The move by foot to LZ Albany turned into a disaster.

2. II Corps had intelligence by the days, the hours, and the minutes not minute-to-minute.

3. Moore knew the possible of enemy positions prior to landing at X-Ray.

4. Moore’s mission was not to search and destroy but to distract the enemy into remaining immobile.

5. The prior knowledge of enemy lack of anti-aircraft guns and mortars at Chupong hillsides.

6. Colonel Hieu was probably a competent officer, far from being a military genius.

7. Lay terms used: stalking, herding, luring, fixing, aiming, destroying, finish’em off.

8. 1/7 Air Cav used as sacrificial lamb?

9. B-52 tool used as surgical strike?

10. B-52 strikes as the most efficient way to destroy en masse three NVA regiments.

11. II Corps withheld intel info from Moore.

12. Data on error probabilities of B-52.

13. Airmobility versus Air Assault.

14. Issues pertaining 1st Air Cav being “attached”, OPCON to II Coprs.

15. Implications in the modus operandi of joint intelligence/operational concept and separate TAOR/command.

16. Air Assault Digest versus Airmobility Doctrine.

17. Problems with unfounded assumptions.

18. Behavioral pattern as based for formulating founded assumption.

19. Trees versus forest.

20. Single versus multiple landing zones.

21. Squad/company versus Battalion air assault of first waves landing.

22. Air Assault tactics.

23. Intention of 2/5 Bn moving by foot to LZ Albany.

24. NVA “thieves” tactics.

25. In conducting guerilla warfare, NVA had the initiatives.

26. II Corps controlled the Pleime Campaign.

27. Significance in the renaming of Pleime to Pleiku Campaign.

28. Master plan: when was it conceived? Even before Oct 19.

29. Hackers showing up.

30. Bias presentation of the role played by Arvin at Pleime Campaign.

31. BDA reports on Arc Light strikes as ordered by Colonel Hieu.

32. Artillery and Air Support provided by 52D Avn Bn or by Air Cav to II Corps.

33. Hunter’s play dumb tactic in Pleime campaign.

Phieu

#1066 21 Aug 12, 12:39

Keep on going Phieu - I'm enjoying your posts. They motivate me to look deeper into that action.

DeltaOne

#1067 22 Aug 12, 09:58

Since you want “to look deeper into that action”, allow me to offer you some tips. You need to know

- that Ia Drang battle in particular and Pleime Campaign in general, was conceived by Colonel Hieu and executed by 1st Air Cav;

- that Colonel Hieu bridled 1st Cavalry into not applying its air assault tactic of find (with squad/company)-fix-pile in-and destroy and instead used them to herd the enemy back to Chupong, to entice them into an attack mode and in so doing to regroup close together in staging areas, to distract them into immobility and have them destroyed by B-52 strikes;

- that 1st Air Cav played a supportive role to B-52 air strike, not the other way around;

- that all the troop maneuvers in All the Way by 1st Air Cav Brigade, in Bayonet I by 3rd Air Cav Brigade and in Bayonet II by 2nd Air Cav Brigade, were in function of supporting B-52 strike.

Unless you take all that into consideration, you will never be able to make sense out of Pleiku Campaign after action report and understand what really happened at Chupong-IaDrang.

Phieu

#1068 22 Aug 12, 11:47

Okay - I will run with this for a while. Continue on please.

DeltaOne

#1069 23 Aug 12, 12:29

don744: … why not select multiple LZs? Albany, X-ray, Yankee, etc...

First, let me remind you that in inserting a battalion at LZ X-Ray, 3rd Air Cav Brigade was not executing an air assault tactic; otherwise, it would send in only one squad or one company, instead of a battalion. By going in first and by setting up a battalion forward command post, Moore – unknowingly – was signalizing to the enemy to expect the involvement of a force the size of a battalion.

The intention was to create a distraction to the three regiments assembling at staging areas about to execute a movement to attack camp Pleime into remaining immobile there longer with the looming menace of an attack of an Air Cav battalion pending the decision of B3 Field Front Command:. A squad or a company would not be sizable enough to draw attention; and the three regiments would just ignore the landing of small unit and carry on depleting the staging areas in a couple of hours for the attack on camp Pleime. The result would be empty targets for B-52s when they arrive as the next day, November 15 as scheduled.

As a result, B3 Field Front Forward CP gave order to postpone the attack on camp Pleime and ordered 66th Regiment to send to two battalions to give assault on 1/7 Air Cav Battalion.

What would have happened if there were multiple insertions in The immediate AO? Easy to hind-site it. If the 33rd had to deal with 3 simultaneous landings, how could that have impacted the battle. Maybe the enemy would have had to spread its forces rather than concentrate the entire effort on one location

No, they would not consider the dispersed troops landing on multiple zones to be a sufficient menacing specter; they would ignore them and carry on their movement to attack camp Pleime and the staging areas would be empty in no time. The distraction maneuver would have failed and the B-52’s would have no targets to strike.

One additional observation: why drop 1/7 Air Cav next to the location of 66th Regiment and not to 33rd and 32nd? Because 66th Regiment was the freshest of the three and had been designated to be the main attacking forces in the second attack on camp Pleime.

Phieu

#1070 23 Aug 12, 13:21

Phieu :

Wrong. Moore selected XRAY himself on the morning of 14 Nov after performing an helicopter reconnaissance of the area not because it was closest to the 66th, but because it was the most suitable to land a large number of hueys.

Boonierat

#1071 23 Aug 12, 13:50

Colonel Brown indicated to Moore the general location he should air assault, on the east side of Anta Village and let Moore selected a suitable landing zone with a caution to keep his troops tight together as long as the selected landing zone remain withing that general location. He did not tell Moore to go further to the west side of Anta Village for example... And by "tight together" he prevented Moore from choosing multiple landing zones: the enemy must perceive a big enough threat coming - the size of a battalion at least.

You have to understand that all troop maneuvers were dictated in function of a master plan and not at random. Do you think Colonel Hieu was such a bad chief of staff launching an operation without a meticulous planning to the minute details and a solid intelligence about the enemy situation?

You need to have a grasp of the whole picture in order to understand and interpret correctly the details. Please refer back to post #1067 about tips to understand Long Reach operation.

Phieu

#1072 23 Aug 12, 14:14

I've never said Nguyen Van Hieu was a bad chief of staff, but post #1067 is just your interpretation of the events. According to you, he had planned all three phases of the operation beforehand, but I beg to differ. BAYONET I and BAYONET II were pursuit operations planned following the developments of ALL THE WAY and executed "on the fly".

Boonierat

#1073 23 Aug 12, 14:19

Phieu : First, let me remind you that in inserting a battalion at LZ X-Ray, 3rd Air Cav Brigade was not executing an air assault tactic; otherwise, it would send in only one squad or one company, instead of a battalion.

And from what doctrine do you draw that conclusion?

don744

#1074 23 Aug 12, 17:52

Boonierat : I've never said Nguyen Van Hieu was a bad chief of staff,

By saying BayonetI and Bayonet II were executed “on the fly”, no master plan, you imply Colonel Hieu was a bad chief of staff.

but post #1067 is just your interpretation of the events.

No it contains premises without which you won’t be able to make the sense out of Pleiku Campaign report. The authors of that report, Knowles/Coleman/Kinnard, executed that master plan without a clear and full knowledge of it. How do you expect to say thing right based on their writings?

According to you, he had planned all three phases of the operation beforehand, but I beg to differ. BAYONET I and BAYONET II were pursuit operations planned following the developments of ALL THE WAY and executed "on the fly".

Let’s clarify first what you mean by three phases.

Three phases, yes, but not of Long Reach operation with phase I: All the Way; phase II: Bayonet I; and phase III: Bayonet II.

But three phases of Pleime campaign: phase I: Dan Thang 21; phase II: Truong Chinh (Long Reach); and phase III: Than Phong 7.

Please refer back to post # 1016 in which I responded to Sam when the master plan was conceived.

Let me add one more thing. Pleime campaign was a response to Plâyme campaign (otherwise called 1965 Winter-Spring campaign) through which the North intended to cut the Highlands in two from Pleiku to Quinhon along Highway 19. That plan was in study at NVA JGS in Hanoi since March 1965. The M-month would be either December 1965 or January 1966. The preparation took that long to train troops of 32nd Regiment (already in country), of 33rd Regiment and of 304th Division comprising 66th Regiment to combat ready level. Furthermore it took the two last units more than two months to march down Ho Chi Minh trail to reach Chupong-Iadrang. And since Colonel Hieu got intelligence reports from his ‘special agents’, that was how far back Colonel started studying how to destroy those “thieves”.

Forget about pursuit with Air Cav. The enemy just breaks down into small bits and pieces further ... and vanishes into the jungle.

You need to strike them at once, en masse. That's the only way.

He found the solution and the means when he got hold of B-52s (August 1965) and the Air Cav (October 1965). That was when it was possible for him to start formulating his master plan. Hardly ‘on the fly'!

Don’t dissociate but take Pleime campaign in a whole. Then you might understand it. Otherwise, you will remain in the dark.

Boonie, let me tell you up front in all modesty: I know whatever you know about Pleime-Chupong-Iadrang and a lot of stuffs I know, you don’t know.

So, don’t tell me I am wrong when it does not jibe with what you know from your sources – that I already knew. Be wise and wonder is he saying that because he knows something that I do not yet know?

Colonel Hieu was not only a competent chief of staff. He was a genius chief of staff. To take an analogy from chess, he is a great master (14 moves) more than a grand master (9 moves).

If you want to understand Pleime-Chupong-Iadrang, then think like Colonel Hieu. Don't think like Kinnard, or Knowles, or Coleman, or Moore, or just anybody else. There are plenty of inexplicable holes in their accounts... until you listen to Colonel Hieu who was the architect of that epic operation from top to end ...

Phieu

#1075 23 Aug 12, 17:59

don744 : And from what doctrine do you draw that conclusion?

Please refer back to post #972. I call it Air Assault Digest versus your Airmobility Doctrine that you keep on referring back to to interpret what was happening at Chupong-Iadrang, causing the two of us traveling on two parallel highways!

Kinnard: Right after the Plei Me siege was broken, I felt that it was up to me to find these guys who had been around the camp. So we came up with a search “modus operandi” in which the Cav Squadron was going to range widely over a very large area and I was going to use one infantry brigade to plop down an infantry battalion and look at an area here and there. I felt that we had to break down into relatively small groups so we could cover more area and also the enemy would think he could fake us. You couldn’t put down a whole battalion out there and go clomping around. You had to break down into company and platoon-sized units. You had to rely upon the fact that with the helicopter you could respond faster than anyone in history. I then learned, totally new to me, that every unit that was not in contact was, in fact, a reserve that could be picked up and used. This is my strategy. Start from somewhere, break down into small groups, depending upon the terrain, and work that area while the Cav Squadron roamed all over. The name of the game was contact. You were looking for any form of contact – a helicopter being shot at, finding a campfire, finding a pack, beaten-down grass. You couldn’t put down a whole battalion out there and go clomping around. You had to break down into company and platoon-sized units.

Phieu

#1076 23 Aug 12, 18:39

That is not air assault doctrine. It was the means Kinnard used to initiate contact.A platoon or company level Recon. You will not be able to respond in a knowledgeable manner until you read up on the principles of movement to contact.

And you keep referring back to the ramblings of a

General...and not FMs, which codify doctrine.

don744

#1077 23 Aug 12, 19:04

I am sorry Don, that was how Kinnard trained his Air Cav to air assault at Chupong-Iadrang. Don't call it Doctrine then: just Kinnard's air assault tactic:

1. find with a squad/company,

2. fix,

3. pile in more troops (battalion, brigade, division),

4. destroy.

That sequence of maneuvers just did not happen at LZ X-Ray.

Brown started with

2. fix,

3. pile in with 2 battalions,

3a. maintain troops at 2 battalions,

3b. move out ground troops,

4. destroy with B-52 strike.

Don't you see that even air-assault tactic was not applied at LZ X-Ray?

The tactic at that stage of LZ X-Ray was just simply

1. distract

2. fix

3. move out

4. air-strike.

That's the simplicity and ease of a military genius.

Phieu

#1078 23 Aug 12, 20:07

Phieu : let me tell you up front in all modesty

I think this is my favorite line out of all your 35,000,000.314 posts!

samtn99

#1079 23 Aug 12, 21:25

Aren't you going to frame it?!

That's a pre-emptive move, don't you know that?!

If you do, I would prefer that you frame the whole thing, without cuts, and with a tiny bit of change:

Sam, let me tell you up front in all modesty: I know whatever you know about Pleime-Chupong-Iadrang and a lot of stuffs I know, you don’t know. So, don’t tell me I am assuming when it does not jibe with what you know from your sources – that I already knew. Be wise and wonder is he saying that because he knows something that I do not yet know?

Phieu

#1080 24 Aug 12, 09:00

Phieu:

I am sorry Don, that was how Kinnard trained his Air Cav to air assault at Chupong-Iadrang. Don't call it Doctrine then: just Kinnard's air assault tactic:

1. find with a squad/company,

2. fix,

3. pile in more troops (battalion, brigade, division),

4. destroy.

That sequence of maneuvers just did not happen at LZ X-Ray.

Brown started with

2. fix,

3. pile in with 2 battalions,

3a. maintain troops at 2 battalions,

3b. move out ground troops,

4. destroy with B-52 strike.

Don't you see that even air-assault tactic was not applied at LZ X-Ray?

The tactic at that stage of LZ X-Ray was just simply

1. distract

2. fix

3. move out

4. air-strike.

That's the simplicity and ease of a military genius.

You are very good at deflecting and redirecting the argument. I also notice how you have liked to "glom onto" certain words I use. Take "piling" for example. Can you explain how piling relates to movement to contact? Is there a relationship? Or do you find the question obtuse? I was speaking with a brigade commander the other day about MTC, and to him the question was not obtuse. Perhaps because he graduated the Army War College, which is one level higher than CGSC. But then again, they teach MTC at the lowest levels of enlisted schooling. Surely if a lowly Sergeant can understand this concept, anyone

Else can too, no?

Don744

#1081 24 Aug 12, 10:49

Phieu :Aren't you going to frame it?!

That's a pre-emptive move, don't you know that?!

If you do, I would prefer that you frame the whole thing, without cut, and with a tiny bit change:

Lol, and you talk about Kinnard's ego.....

samtn99

#1082 24 Aug 12, 12:32

Do I ever object that Kinnard showed off his ego? No, I made only an observation. He had all the right to show off his ego, since he was really the most knowledgeable in air assault tactic - he conceived it no?

The difference, though, between him and me, is I did it in all modesty, he didn't.

Another difference is that General Kinnard did not have a clue about Pleime-Chupong-Iadrang (I already shown that, and will show it again soon), meanwhile, with the guidance of Colonel Hieu, I knew it more than anybody else ...

So far, I have proven that, in holding this thread with high colors, despite attacks from all directions.

If you are indisputably very good, you can afford to show off ... a little bit ... your ego ... in modesty ... !

One last point, my intended target was only Boonie who is kind of high nose toward me, I would not need to say it to someone who says this to me, I think most know how impregnable the literary force can be when the "Phieugasse" goes off! ... That's a compliment Phieu ...

Phieu

#1083 24 Aug 12, 18:31

I dont want to get into a Phieud-fight...so I will patiently sit and watch the events unfold.

don744

#1084 24 Aug 12, 19:57

Don't worry, from now on I will ignore Boonie and Sam and other hackers, and carry on ...

Phieu

#1085 25 Aug 12, 00:10

since he was really the most knowledgeable in air assault tactic - he conceived it no?

No, he did not conceive it. The USMC ran the first helicopter tactical operation in Korea, and the French perfected the use of helicopters in Algeria. Kinnard and several other U.S. Army aviation pioneers studied those operations, and began championing their adoption and further development by the U.S. Army in the early '60s. Ergo, Kinnard championed the development of air assault tactics and formations, and pioneered them within the U.S. Army.

And by the way, he had a little help from a former French Foreign Legion officer named Sava Steppanovich, who was commissioned into the U.S. Army as a Captain and subsequently served in Vietnam as an advisor to the ARVN Airborne Brigade and Division. Steppanovich, who was at Dien Bien Phu as a Lieutenant with the 13th DBLE, retired as a U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel in the early 1990s. I met him at Baden Baden, Germany, where he was the U.S. Army liaison officer to the First French Army. How's that for irony.

lirelou

#1086 25 Aug 12, 10:57

Phieu: Don't worry, from now on I will ignore Boonie and Sam and other hackers, and carry on ...

You call me a hacker?

samtn99

#1087 25 Aug 12, 11:19

You became one with the last two posts.

Before that, you like Don have been legitimate questioners.

I hope you think you can still learn something regarding Chupong-Iadrang from me. Otherwise, I will have to consider you as a hacker and ignore your hostile - or - sarcastic - comments.

Phieu

#1088 25 Aug 12, 11:20

don744: You are very good at deflecting and redirecting the argument.

I also notice how you have liked to "glom onto" certain words I use. Take "piling" for example. Can you explain how piling relates to movement to contact? Is there a relationship? Or do you find the question obtuse?

Seems like you are bogged down with the term “movement to contact”. As I have said, I don’t mind learning more about this concept, but since Kinnard did not used it at LZ X-Ray – only movement to distract, and movement to fix, then movement to withdraw, I don’t feel the need do learn about it.

“Glom onto your word piling? I have being using it long before I joined this forum. Even the NVA used it : “dồn đống”. May be they took it from your source?

By the way, other pet words the NVA coined at Chupong-Iadrang were:

Nắm thắt lưng định mà đánh/Grab the enemy by the belts while attacking.

Nhảy cóc/leaped frog.

But anyway, General Kinnard meant just that, piling, when he said,

You had to break down into company and platoon-sized units. You had to rely upon the fact that with the helicopter you could respond faster than anyone in history.

That’s fixing and piling!

I was speaking with a brigade commander the other day about MTC, and to him the question was not obtuse.

Not to him but to me because you insist on jamming “movement to contact” at LZ X-Ray when there were none.

Perhaps because he graduated the Army War College, which is one level higher than CGSC. But then again, they teach MTC at the lowest levels of enlisted schooling. Surely if a lowly Sergeant can understand this concept, anyone

Else can too, no?

Again, if applied to LZ X-Ray it is obtuse.

So just don’t complicate things. Look with the eyes of a innocent child. And you will get it. Even a third grader of nowadays can understand this concept from a military genius mind: it’s so simple!.

Phieu

#1089 25 Aug 12, 11:53

don744: You are very good at deflecting and redirecting the argument. I also notice how you have liked to "glom onto" certain words I use. Take "piling" for example. Can you explain how piling relates to movement to contact? Is there a relationship?

You seem to be bogged down with the concept of "mouvement to contact".

As I have said, I don’t mind learning more about this concept, but since Kinnard did not used it at LZ X-Ray – only movement to distract, and movement to fix, then movement to withdraw, I don’t feel the need do learn about it.

“Glom onto your word piling? I have being using it long before I joined this forum. Even the NVA used it : “dồn đống”. May be they took it from your source?

By the way, other pet words the NVA coined at Chupong-Iadrang were:

Nắm thắt lưng địch mà đánh/Grab the enemy by the belts while attacking.

Nhảy cóc/leaped frog.

But anyway, General Kinnard meant just that, piling, when he said,

You had to break down into company and platoon-sized units. You had to rely upon the fact that with the helicopter you could respond faster than anyone in history.

That’s fixing and piling!

Or do you find the question obtuse? I was speaking with a brigade commander the other day about MTC, and to him the question was not obtuse. Perhaps because he graduated the Army War College, which is one level higher than CGSC. But then again, they teach MTC at the lowest levels of enlisted schooling. Surely if a lowly Sergeant can understand this concept, anyone

Else can too, no?:

Not to him but to me because you insist on jamming “movement to contact” at LZ X-Ray when there were none. You have to come to the realization that the facts at LZ X-Ray do not fit your theory.

Again, if applied to LZ X-Ray it is obtuse.

As I said, my brother graduated from CGSC, but he was not bogged down by concepts taught in there. He is very creative and does things his way. And since he has a mind of military genius, his concept is very simple and its execution very easy and smooth. So just don’t complicate things. Look with the eyes of a innocent child. And you will get it. Even a third grader of nowadays can understand this concept from a military genius mind: it’s so simple!.

It's the normal act when you go hunting: distract, fixe and shoot...

A child can learn and do that.

Things just get complicate when you go hunting three regiments!

Phieu

#1090 25 Aug 12, 12:24

Phieu, there is no such thing as a movement to distract. That is an entirely made up term. Now, Moore did not have the opportunity to conduct a full out movement to contact because he didn't have time to organize before he was fully engaged in a hasty defense. I am only stuck on MTC, because I see that you haven't a clue. You can make up terms all you want in order to make history fit your scenario. I am grabbing your belt and not letting you slink away like thieves.

don744

#1091 25 Aug 12, 14:57

Moore did not have time to continue his operation with the movement to contact, as you said. So why bother with it?

Meanwhile, Brown had the time to execute consecutively

- a movement to distract,

- a movement to fix,

- then a movement to withdraw.

Grant you don't have an official term for "movement to distract", neither "movement to fix", and "movement to fix", etc... but that was what happened at LZ X-Ray.

For sure you don't find those term in American doctrinal terminologie. The operational concept at LZ X-Ray was conceived by a Vietnamese military genius's mind!

Why do you keep on jamming a creative mind into a rigid American doctrinal box?

By the way, you are grabing the belt of a ghost, not me!

Phieu

#1092 25 Aug 12, 15:10

Sometimes I have a hard time with your terminology

(Phieu) but that is because we are both trying to translate and I get the feeling it doesn't always work out too well. I tend to over complicate at times though. But that's what learning is about.

What I have learned about Ia Drang though, any plans that Moore had were changed quite swiftly to survival while holding a patch field. I've watched those interviews with Giap about the battle and I think he was as surprised as anyone was. This was their (nva) first full scale exposure to the US military might, wouldn't that be fair to say?

I find irony in the months of what I may not have known about a battle of 3 days. Yet, I find I have retained a bit more than I would have expected.

Leonardo63

#1093 25 Aug 12, 15:10

lirelou: No, he did not conceive it. The USMC ran the first helicopter tactical operation in Korea, and the French perfected the use of helicopters in Algeria. Kinnard and several other U.S. Army aviation pioneers studied those operations, and began championing their adoption and further development by the U.S. Army in the early '60s. Ergo, Kinnard championed the development of air assault tactics and formations, and pioneered them within the U.S. Army.

Kinnard would take ombrage and "quarrel" with you for failing to make the distinction between airmobilty and air assault. Please refer back to post # 972.

Phieu

#1094 25 Aug 12, 15:36

Leonardo63: Sometimes I have a hard time with your terminology

(Phieu) but that is because we are both trying to translate and I get the feeling it doesn't always work out too well. I tend to over complicate at times though. But that's what learning is about.

I find irony in the months of what I may not have known about a battle of 3 days. Yet, I find I have retained a bit more than I would have expected.

Leo,

In a nutshell, the plan was a search and destroy, meaning once Moore got all his boys on the ground and organized, he would have executed a MTC. This is where he would seek to establish contact with the enemy. In a MTC, the commander attempts to make and maintain contact with the smallest element possible. That way, he has freedom to freely maneuver the main body. In this case he hit the LZ and was unable organize his forces before becoming decisively engaged. He then had to switch from an offensive to a hasty defensive posture. I would need to go back and re-read the account, but he did send two platoons forward. Was this the initiation of a MTC? Or was he simply expanding LZ security? I'm pretty sure they got the prisoner before the

Platoons were launched. That piece of info supports a MTC, since he knew there was enemy on the mountain.

don744

#1095 25 Aug 12, 15:53

Leonardo63: What I have learned about Ia Drang though, any plans that Moore had were changed quite swiftly to survival while holding a patch field.

As a well trained Air Cav, he should not bother to hold on that patch field and should have lunged straight to the enemy.

Kinnard: They didn't understand how our unit fought. With an air assault unit, we don't give much of a damn about terrain. You can go anywhere. The focus is upon the enemy.

(Cochran)

For Moore yes, but for Colonel Hieu, no.

When he requested one Air Cav battalion to be put next to the NVA staging areas for distraction purpose, he was ready for two possible developments from the NVA side:

- they stay put while waiting for new decision from B3 Field Front Command - that would be the ideal and enough time spent in hesitation from their part to remain a target for B-52 strike with TOT set for the next day at 16:00H;

Cav battalion, while the remaining troops of the three regiments still stay put and be struck by air.

Again, Colonel Hieu anticipated and planned for all eventualities. He would not let the enemy overun 1/7 Air Cav Bn.

I've watched those interviews with Giap about the battle and I think he was as surprised as anyone was. This was their (nva) first full scale exposure to the US military might, wouldn't that be fair to say?

You are quite right. The one thing Giap did not know, though, is he was playing chess against Colonel Hieu!

I find irony in the months of what I may not have known about a battle of 3 days. Yet, I find I have retained a bit more than I would have expected.

Glad to be at your service ...

Phieu

#1096 25 Aug 12, 23:23

You say it so much better Don!

I believe yes, Moore did MTC, wasn't that the point of the lost platoon moving up on the right flank? To determine more of the size and location, and width of the enemy? To find a flank that could be exploited? That's kind of what I've taken away from that particular action....but I'm still a freshman! DKS

Leonardo63

#1097 26 Aug 12, 03:27 Isn't MTC an offensive posture? And isn't it initiated when the position of the enemy is ascertained?. And should it not followed immediately by piling in more troops and outnumbered the enemy? None of these moves happened. Pleiku Campaign reports

At 1050 hours the first company, Bravo, had landed at LZ S-Ray (YA935010) and by 1210 hours, the bulk of the battalion had closed. With C company securing the L-Z, B company was moved north and west toward a finger extendind down from the Chu Pong hill mass. At 1245 hours the company became moderately engaged and by 1330 hours was being attacked by at least two companies of NVA infantry. The westerly platoon of B company was cut off in the violence of the first enemy assault and remained an isolated island of resistance until it was retreived the following day.

(Pleiku Campaign)

Hardly a MTC description... The NVA had the initiative, they were speedier than the Air Cav and yet they were the one caught by surprise ...

Some of Field Front’s assault elements had gotten under way before dawn on the 14th, bound for Plei Me. At noon, when Cavalry helicopters disgorged troopers at the foot of the Chu Pong, absolute surprise had been achieved. Instead of launching a divisional attack on Plei Me and possibly regaining tactical initiative, the NVA division found itself engaged in a struggle to defend its own base.

The Air Cav did not seem to want to exploit the element of surprise they had achieved... They took time and wait for the enemy to attack first!

By the way, the 1/7 Air Cav succeeded in diverting the NVA's attention from Pleime toward her. That's what I call a movememt to distract for the lack of a doctrinal term!

Phieu

#1098 26 Aug 12, 05:36

Phieu: Isn't MTC an offensive posture?

Absolutely.

And isn't it initiated when the position of the enemy is ascertained?

No. It is to establish or regain contact. Sometimes you the exact location, sometimes you dont.

And should it not followed immediately by piling in more troops and outnumbered the enemy? None of these moves happened.

Pleiku Campaign reports

an operation where there was not a "clear" intelligence picture of the enemy forces in the area. Remember, all we knew was there were some radio intercepts from the American team outside Pleime that provided a bearing to a radio transmitter. The map showed a possible battalion in the vicinity Chu pong.

Hardly a MTC description... The NVA had the initiative, they were speedier than the Air Cav and yet they were the one caught by surprise ...

The Air Cav did not seem to want to exploit the element of surprise they had achieved... They took time and wait for the enemy to attack first!

As far as MTC, you should wait until you have studied it a bit more before you try to make observations like this. You have only been reading up on it a day or two. Ive had formal schooling and 20 years of practical application.

As far as the element of surprise, You only know it was surprise in hindsight. Until they captured the prisoner, they didn't even know if anyone was at home in Chu Pong, or if there was, where they were located.

By the way, the 1/7 Air Cav succeeded in diverting the NVA's attention from Pleime toward her. That's what I call a movememt to distract for the lack of a doctrinal term!

That makes me smile! . When you don't have the technical or tactical knowledge of combat operations...just make it up! I think it's easy to find an appropriate doctrinal term for that operation. Even for the unlikely scenario you suggest. But that means you have to set down the history books, and crack open a few FMs. Just sayin...

don744

#1099 26 Aug 12, 06:45

Phieu : I am not quite sure exactly when. I can only "assume" the idea of that master plan popped up in Colonel Hieu's head when he realized that he had the three required elements in hand to effectively annihilate the "thieves":

And that's the crux of the matter at hand. What you refer to as "seeing the trees, and not the forest", I call assumption. The devil is in the details.

Phieu :

By saying BayonetI and Bayonet II were executed “on the fly”, no master plan, you imply Colonel Hieu was a bad chief of staff.

but post #1067 is just your interpretation of the events.

Let’s clarify first what you mean by three phases.

Three phases, yes, but not of Long Reach operation with phase I: All the Way; phase II: Bayonet I; and phase III: Bayonet II.

But three phases of Pleime campaign: phase I: Dan Thang 21; phase II: Truong Chinh (Long Reach); and phase III: Than Phong 7.

Please refer back to post # 1016 in which I responded to Sam when the master plan was conceived.

Forget about pursuit with Air Cav. The enemy just breaks down into small bits and pieces further ... and vanishes into the jungle.

You need to strike them at once, en masse. That's the only way.

Don’t dissociate but take Pleime campaign in a whole. Then you might understand it. Otherwise, you will remain in the dark.

Boonie, let me tell you up front in all modesty: I know whatever you know about Pleime-Chupong-Iadrang and a lot of stuffs I know, you don’t know.

Colonel Hieu was not only a competent chief of staff. He was a genius chief of staff. To take an analogy from chess, he is a great master (14 moves) more than a grand master (9 moves).

It was most certainly conducted "on the fly", and I fail to see how that's a denouncement of a chief of staff's skill. Is thinking on one's feet considered a defect? What plan survives first contact? In fact, it was conducted "on the fly" figuratively and literally. Again, I'll highlight the logistic limitations in II CTZ, late 1965.

The 2nd Air Division of the USAF acknowledged receipt of their first request for assistance in regards to the fuel state 27 October. So, this illustrates that the first Cavalry Division was not expecting the scope of operations to expand in scale to greater than that of their previous coastal operations to date. The Koreans also held Highway 19 only as far as An Khe. The Air Cav when committed had neither the infantry battalions available nor the organic vehicles to open a permanent supply route along the Highway 19 corridor that would satisfy demand of both fuel and ammunition. Supply by air was the only option, and even then the organic units in II Corps were insufficient to keep up with demand. [1]

This necessitated assistance from the logistics department at Nha Trang and then MACV proper in Saigon. So if you maintain that:

Colonel Hieu who was the architect of that epic operation from top to end ... ,

and had in mind the scope of operations that the Air Cav would embark upon from the moment they arrived, questions arise. Did he entirely neglect the planning for supply, or did he simply assume that somehow the problem would resolve itself? Did he somehow wield influence over resources well outside of II Corps, up to and above MACV headquarters? And all without a single individual being even remotely aware that they were somehow being masterfully moved across this chessboard? It seems to me that if Colonel Hieu really was "the architect of that epic operation from top to end", he seems to have been moving pieces on a chessboard without any realistic grasp of the necessities required to move those pieces in the real world. One of the pesky details. I guess I am he.

Notes

1. Bowers, Ray L. Tactical Airlift. Dept. of the Air Force, 2003. pp. 213-216.

Lucky 6

#1100 26 Aug 12, 06:50

don744 : Seems to me this was a Battalion operation.

Send a battalion to attack three regiments?!

Why would an ADC(M) commit an entire Brigade (or two) to an operation where there was not a "clear" intelligence picture of the enemy forces in the area. Remember, all we knew was there were some radio intercepts from the American team outside Pleime that provided a bearing to a radio transmitter. The map showed a possible battalion in the vicinity Chu pong.

You are talking about the intelligence at battalion level, not at FDCP/II Corps!

No need too, Don, it just wasn't applied at LZ X-Ray.

You forgot Colonel Hieu got "real time" intelligence about the enemy situation from his 'special agents'? p>That makes me smile! . When you don't have the technical or tactical knowledge of combat operations...just make it up! I think it's easy to find an appropriate doctrinal term for that operation. Even for the unlikely scenario you suggest. But that means you have to set down the history books, and crack open a few FMs. Just sayin...

Again, the difference between you and I is that you try to fit a theory into facts, while I fit the facts into a theory!

That makes me …

Phieu

#1101 26 Aug 12, 06:54

Lucky 6 : And that's the crux of the matter at hand. What you refer to as "seeing the trees, and not the forest", I call assumption. The devil is in the details.

The 2nd Air Division of the USAF acknowledged receipt of their first request for assistance in regards to the fuel state 27 October. So, this illustrates that the first Cavalry Division was not expecting the scope of operations to expand in scale to greater than that of their previous coastal operations to date. The Koreans also only held Highway 19 ony as far as An Khe. The Air Cav when committed had neither the infantry battalions available nor the organic vehicles to open a permanent supply route along the Highway 19 corridor that would satisfy demand of both fuel and ammunition. Supply by air was the only option, and even then the organic units in II Corps were insufficient to keep up with demand. [1]

This necessitated assistance from the logsistcs department at Nha Trang and then MACV proper in Saigon. So if you maintain that:, and had in mind the scope of operations that the Air Cav would embark upon from the moment they arrived, questions arise. Did he entirely neglect the planning for supply, or did he simply assume that somehow the problem would resolve itself? Did he somehow wield influence over resources well outside of II Corps, up to and above MACV headquarters? And all without a single individual being even remotely aware that they were somehow being masterfully moved across this chessboard? It seems to me that if Colonel Hieu really was "the architect of that epic operation from top to end", he seems to have been moving pieces on a chessboard without any realistic grasp of the necessities required to move those pieces in the real world. One of the pesky details. I guess I am he.

Notes

1. Bowers, Ray L. Tactical Airlift. Dept. of the Air Force, 2003. pp. 213-216.

I will address to your comments in due time, so not to interrupt the continuation in my dialogue with Don.

You are going back to my old post #1016 and 1074.

We are at the moment at post #1101!

Phieu

#1102 26 Aug 12, 07:01

Phieu : Send a battalion to attack three regiments?!

You are talking about the intelligence at battalion level, not at FDCP/II Corps!

No need to, Don, it just wasn't applied at LZ X-Ray.

You forgot Colonel Hieu got "real time" intelligence about the enemy situation from his 'special agents?

Again, the difference between you and I is that you try to fit a theory into facts, while I fit the facts into a theory!

That makes me…

LOL...no, Anh Phieu...I try to fit doctrinal concepts into the historical recounting of the battle. It's not so hard to do...or see...if you have a grasp of the subject matter. Historically you have brought some good info to the table. Tactically, the concepts you push are...amateurish at best.

don744

#1103 26 Aug 12, 07:04

That's the best I can offer you, Don ...

Phieu

#1104 26 Aug 12, 07:10

...and I have been left wanting.

Perhaps a poll would be in order to see where the class stands regarding the differing accounts? I think that would be interesting. Maybe I can throw a little something together.

don744

#1105 26 Aug 12, 09:52

Better suggestion: you start a new class about your MTC at LZ X-Ray and let's see how many students will show up and for how long ...

Phieu

#1106 26 Aug 12, 10:04

Let me carry on ...

The Arc Light strike was set up for November 15 at 16:00H on November 13, when Colonel Hieu learned from his 'special agents' that the three NVA regiments had received the order to move in to staging areas in Chupong massif for movement to attack Pleime camp set for November 16.

Why send in Air Cav troops in there on Nov 14 at the risk to be hit by B-52 strike ?

Phieu

#1107 26 Aug 12, 10:13

That's where you contradict yourself Phieu, Kinnard would have never risked a battalion inside the ARCLIGHT safety zone if indeed a strike had been planned for Nov 15.

Boonierat

#1108 26 Aug 12, 10:18

My question was to entice the right answer from you! and you missed it. I already have ready the answer:

Not really, he needed to put one - only one - battalion to distract the enemy into immobility long enough at targeted location for the air strike, but at 3km safety distance and had provision to pull them out of LZ X-Ray on time for the strike on the landing zone itself.

Don't forget the operational concept consisted in using Arclite strike with the support of Air Cav ground troops.

I would beg you to go over my entire presentation and you won't have to ask me question. I trust your intelligence ...

Phieu

#1109 26 Aug 12, 10:24

So, let me get this straight: according to you, Moore's mission was to air-assault into X-Ray on Nov 14 to fix the NVA regiments on the Chu Pong, then vacate the LZ the following morning for the ARCLIGHT strike to take place?

Boonierat

#1110 26 Aug 12, 10:38

You got the scenario wrong:

Moore was placed on Nov 14 next to the staging areas to draw the enemy attention but at a 3km safety distance from the prescheduled locations at the staging areas to be hit on Nov 15, while Moore remained at the safety landing zone. And since two NVA battalions had left their staging areas and moved toward LZ X-Ray, he pulled the 2/7 and 2/5 out and struck the LZ X-Ray on Nov 17.

Again, please, please go over my entire presentation before asking me questions again. Your seemingly "silly" questions stem from your not listening attentively while sitting in my class...

If you continue playing dumb, I will have to consider you as a hacker, and ignore you ...

I don't want Miss Saigon to have to intervene ...

Phieu

#1111 26 Aug 12, 10:45

What a load of crap...Your whole thread is nothing more than amateurish revisionist history and proves how damaging a single individual can be at spinning historical facts to suit his own agenda.

Boonierat

#1112 26 Aug 12, 10:49

You flash out your true self, Boonie!

You make the fool of yourself in front of everybody ...

Bye!

Phieu

#1113 26 Aug 12, 10:49

Phieu: My question was to entice right answer from you! and you missed it. I only have ready the answer:

Don't forget the operational concept consisted in using Arclite strike with the support of Air Cav ground troops.

I would beg you to go over my entire presentation and you won't have to ask me question. I trust your intelligence ...

You keep suggestion only one battalion was used at X-Ray because it was just enough to do what the CoS wanted in his plan that you say was conceived no later than 26 Oct 1965 (but you suggest maybe August...)

"Piling"? "One - only- battalion"? 1-7 Cav was the original unit in X-Ray. Later B/2-7 Cav went in. Then 2-5 Cav was sent to LZ Victor prior to moving towards X-Ray. Then A/2-7 went in. Then elements of 1-5 Cav went to Columbus and Falcon and X-Ray. 1-7 eventually withdrew from X-Ray, but at that time there was more combat power in X-Ray than on 14 Nov 65.

Why do you consider this thread a "presentation"? You obviously have a very scripted order to what you do, but treating this like a presentation rather than a discussion is a big part of the problem on this thread.

I'd ask you to stop requesting or begging or asking that anyone who doesn't agree with you reread all your old threads; your story changes too much for that, and it only causes more confusion.

samtn99

#1114 26 Aug 12, 11:00

samtn99 : "Piling"? "One - only- battalion"? 1-7 Cav was the original unit in X-Ray. Later B/2-7 Cav went in. Then 2-5 Cav was sent to LZ Victor prior to moving towards X-Ray. Then A/2-7 went in. Then elements of 1-5 Cav went to Columbus and Falcon and X-Ray. 1-7 eventually withdrew from X-Ray, but at that time there was more combat power in X-Ray than on 14 Nov 65.

I will come to that point next: did I not specify - maintain the level of troops at 2 battalions?

And why 2/5 march to LZ X-Ray instead of helilifted like 2/7?

Why do you consider this thread a "presentation"?

Because it is, I present what you may still not know about Iadrang, it just so happen that end up monologuing because nobody think he or she can contribute his/her knowledge to the class.

a discussion is a big part of the problem on this thread.

Did I not make room for ample Q&A sessions and entertain all the legitimate questions, including yours until you started acting like a hacker?

I'd ask you to stop requesting or begging or asking that anyone who doesn't agree with you reread all your old threads;

I only said that to those who did not bother to read me first before asking "silly" questions ...

your story changes too much for that, and it only causes more confusion.

No, the story remains the same, just that the details are fed in slowly.

My presentation uses a spiral approach (the outer circle is the expansion of the inner circle the understanding of which is a prerequisite to undrstand the outer one), not a linear approach. Maybe that's why it is confusing to you.

Well, you have to bear with my teaching style, if you think it is worth your time learning from me.

Phieu

#1115 26 Aug 12, 13:00

Phieu : My presentation uses a spiral approach, not a linear approach.

It's looking more like an auto-rotation. gravity is the enemy

Leonardo63

#1116 26 Aug 12, 13:07

You think so? It works for you!

Phieu

#1117 26 Aug 12, 14:59

Leonardo63 : It's looking more like an auto-rotation. gravity is the enemy

No, Leo, spiral is the correct term. As in..this scenario of a master plan has spiraled into the abyss. I like to think of it as a movement to spiral. That term makes about as much sense as the plan.

don744

#1118 26 Aug 12, 15:04

One is for quick learner, the other one is for slow learner ...

I should not have said that: it's becoming personal ... Huh

Bye, Don!

Phieu

#1119 26 Aug 12, 15:25

Phieu : Did I not make room for Q&A and entertain all the legitimate questions, including yours until you started acting like a hacker?

Why do you persist in calling me a hacker? I assume it's meant in a derogatory way?

samtn99

#1120 26 Aug 12, 15:28

Bye Anh Phieu...only I'm not going anywhere. You just figure out about the blocked list function? LOL...I knew applying the "grab your belt" technique would prompt some type of response. When you don't have the answers to the hard questions and observations, just block dissenting viewpoints. Oh well...you will be the one missing out.

don744

#1121 26 Aug 12, 15:35

samtn99: Why do you persist in calling me a hacker? I assume it's meant in a derogatory way?

I take it as such. I think "hacker" equates to "Infidel". If you are not a true believer in the awesome genius of Phieu's story, you are a hacker.

don744

#1122 26 Aug 12, 15:39

That's the way I took it. Maybe he means "hijacker"?

samtn99

#1123 26 Aug 12, 16:37

re-Don

MTS- Dam these acronyms....I can see I'm going to summer school... @##$^!!!!

Leonardo63

#1124 26 Aug 12, 17:23

don744: Bye Anh Phieu...only I'm not going anywhere. You just figure out about the blocked list function? LOL...I knew applying the "grab your belt" technique would prompt some type of response. When you don't have the answers to the hard questions and observations, just block dissenting viewpoints. Oh well...you will be the one missing out.

I don't need to do anything, just …zip

Phieu

#1125 26 Aug 12, 17:28

samtn99: Why do you persist in calling me a hacker? I assume it's meant in a derogatory way?

If you ask question to have me clarify my idea, then you are a legitimate questioner. I am not looking to convince you, just make sure we understand each other thoroughly. Then we can depart with a we agree to disagree.

Besides that case, then I would consider you a hacker. Deragotary or not, is in your feelings, not mine.

Phieu

#1126 26 Aug 12, 17:30

samtn99 : That's the way I took it. Maybe he means "hijacker"?

See post #1125.

Phieu

#1127 26 Aug 12, 17:31

don744: I take it as such. I think "hacker" equates to "Infidel". If you are not a true believer in the awesome genius of Phieu's story, you are a hacker.

See post #1125.

Phieu

#1128 26 Aug 12, 17:33

Leonardo63: re-Don

MTS- Dam these acronyms....I can see I'm going to summer school... @##$^!!!!

No, Leo, you don't need to go to summer, just to buy a new pair of glasses...

It's MTC not MTS!

Do you intend to quit my class and go to Don's Summer class?

Phieu

#1129 26 Aug 12, 18:22

Phieu - As you know, I have read this entire thread from the beginning. I do question however, the theory of placing a battalion of air cav troops that have just gone through and established this new 'heli air assault' way of bringing battle to the enemy for the purpose of drawing the enemy into an 'arclite zone'. It doesn't sit well with me that these troops were simply pawns in a greater game. From reading accounts of this whole action, nowhere have I read where Lt. Col. Moore states this. Also, what was the guarantee that they could be pulled out quickly if necessary? And at this point in the war, why would they risk the possibility of a loss of such a great scale?

DeltaOne

#1130 26 Aug 12, 18:54

Phieu : One is for quick learner, the other one is for slow learner ...

I should not have said that: it's becoming personal ... Huh

Bye, Don!

Wow...you go back and edit this post to totally change the meaning...5 hours later. I see this as SOP for you at times. Don't edit, just make another post to clarify your thoughts. That way folks don't miss your statements. Or you can always throw in "ETA" which means edited to add...That way it doesn't appear as if you are trying to hide a mistake.

don744

#1131 26 Aug 12, 19:16

Phieu : No, Leo, you don't need to go to summer, just to buy a new pair of glasses...

It's MTC not MTS!

Do you intend to quit my class and go to Don's Summer class?

Ummm...I think he was commenting on the Movement To Spiral (MTS). Could be wrong, but maybe I need summer school too.

don744

#1132 26 Aug 12, 19:33

Just be careful, guys. You want to make sure at all times that your movements are directed to avoid MFB (Movement From Bowels).

. . .

Sorry, couldn't resist.

RadioResearcher

#1133 26 Aug 12, 19:45

don744: Wow...you go back and edit this post to totally change the meaning...5 hours later. I see this as SOP for you at times. Don't edit, just make another post to clarify your thoughts. That way folks don't miss your statements. Or you can always throw in "ETA" which means edited to add...That way it doesn't appear as if you are trying to hide a mistake.

…

Phieu

#1134 26 Aug 12, 19:46

don744 : Ummm...I think he was commenting on the Movement To Spiral (MTS). Could be wrong, but maybe I need summer school too.

Correct Don- I see Phieu didn't catch that new one. Of course, we know the enevitable location of this movement, on the other hand, RR's MFB, totally unpredictable where that's going to land. Some times, it's all over the place.....

Sorry Phieu- I'm getting punch drunk on this one buddy...Pass the test out already!

Leonardo63

#1135 26 Aug 12, 19:46

RadioResearcher : Just be careful, guys. You want to make sure at all times that your movements are directed to avoid MFB (Movement From Bowels).

. . .

Sorry, couldn't resist.

That does not work RR, it has to be movement to not from ...

Phieu

#1136 26 Aug 12, 19:49

Leonardo63 : Pass the test out already!

Who said I give you the passing score in my class?

I forgive you guys for making fun of spiral methodolpgy versus linear methodology since you are not in the teaching profession and thus ignorant about these two big educational concepts. Yes, I forgive because, like someone had said, Pardon them, they do not know what they are saying.

But I have to put a stop to this nonsence jokes, if you don't mind guys. Let me concentrate in answering Delta One legitimate comments and questions in my next post.

Phieu

#1137 27 Aug 12, 03:04

DeltaOne : Phieu - As you know, I have read this entire thread from the beginning. I do question however, the theory of placing a battalion of air cav troops that have just gone through and established this new 'heli air assault' way of bringing battle to the enemy for the purpose of drawing the enemy into an 'arclite zone'.

First of all, the purpose of using 1/7 Air Cav Battalion was not to draw the enemy into an ‘arclite zone’. That was achieved by various units of 3rd Brigade on November 9, when General Larsen ordered Knowles to switch the operational direction from west to east and in so doing entice the enemy to move in staging areas on November 13 for the movement to attack Pleime camp set for November 16.

It doesn't sit well with me that these troops were simply pawns in a greater game.

All necessary provisions had been taken for the maximum possible safety of 1/7 Air Cav: no anti-aircraft guns and mortars on hill tops, sufficient reinforcement when attacked by two NVA battalions with 2/7 and 2/5.

Can you go to war without risking lives? The main point is the commander’s humane attitude and his value of the lives of his men and even - for that matter of fact - the lives of his enemy .

From reading accounts of this whole action, nowhere have I read where Lt. Col. Moore states this.

First, when you don’t see something said in Moore’s or any official after-action, it does not mean there is no such thing. You might find it somewhere else.

Second, Moore is a too low echelon to have purview to the master plan, which has to be known by the American military authority, at least at IFFV and MACV. If you don’t hear from them, then it might be a top secret matter.

By the way, I have told you that I had contacted General Moore by email a few years ago asking him if he had ever encountered Colonel Hieu at Pleime, his response was, I don't know that individual ...

Also, what was the guarantee that they could be pulled out quickly if necessary?

To answer to your question, following are excerpts from G3/IFFV

Nov 15
- 10:30H: MAVC J3 (Gen DePuy) Gen DePuy called Col Barrow and asked if Arc Light had been cleared with CG II Corps. Col Barrow replied yes, CG II Corps has approved Arc Light. Also Gen DePuy wanted to know if the elem of 1st Cav had received the 151600H restriction on not going west of YA grid line. Col Barrow informed Gen De Puy that the 1st Cav had acknowledged receipt of the restriction and would comply. Gen DePuy personally changed target configuration. Gen DePuy stated that this is the fastest a strike of this nature had ever been laid-on.
- 11:45H: To: 1st Cav (Capt Coller) 1st Cav inquired on whether 1st Cav has any objections on new target area as changed by J-2 MACV. Ref: Secret Message AVCGT 1511651XF DT 6417052Z. 1st Cav stated they are quite satisfied particularly with the reaction time.
Nov 16
- 11:35H: 1st Cav Maj Turner – (Encoded) – Present plan extract 1/7 and B/2/7 today, then pull back 2000 meters to defensive position. After ARC tomorrow will follow plan TURNER gave you last night.
- 12:35H: FFV TOC Maj Murray to 3d Bde Adv 1st Cav – Ref your last msg. 3000 meter withdrawal. My 6 called you 6 who said no such plans, plans to remain and also to go into yesterday’s strike area. If the situation has changed and withdrawal necessary suggest you contact your 6 as “He is on the spot” notify this HQ ASAP of decision.
- 12:57H: 1st Cav Maj Turner – The last info (3000 meter w/d) was correct it is a long range plan. We have so much on the ground, that it will take a little time but they plan to move up on high ground to the east (from the bottom of the saucer to the eastern rim) but, whatever our 6 said we will do. I have not talked to 6 yet, perhaps he is unaware of these plans. The Bde also plans to send an element to MACON. Maybe I should not pass any more info to you. I am in the way here and tie up commo. But these are the plans as of now, will let you know outcome.
- 14:00H: Fm G3 TOC SP Howell to 1st Cav Capt Cook – (Encoded) Ref MAC msg – Pull back 3000 meters. General Larsen spoke to Gen Kinnard. Kinnard said no plans to pull back. Elements are going to investigate arclite area bombed yesterday. Suggest you touch base with Kinnard for verification of plans. Notify this HQ ASAP of plans.
- 20:25H: G-3 1st Air Cav (Capt Parham) Ref Arc Light MACV advises 3 KM minimum separation target area and frdy troops. Request info this HQ ASAP if 3KM separation can be guaranteed and minimum lead time necessary to provide separation. Fr TOC Lt Bol Benton.
- 20:40H: 1st Air Cav (Capt Parham) CO 3d Bde 1st Cav can meet 3KM separation necessary Arc light and frdy troops by time specified in Msg.
- 22:45H: 1st Air Cav (Capt Parham) Call to say that B-52 Targets Number 34, 35, 36 are OK and Troops will meet 3km safety limits -1st Arc Cav will notify this HQ Units move not safety limit.
- 23:10H: II Corps (Maj Sanabria) Maj Sanabria call to pass concurrence of CG ARVN II Corps on B-52 targets 34, 35, and 36 for 17 Nov.

General Kinnard was the one who seemed careless about preserving his troops’ valuable lives when he insisted on taking over Dan Thang 21 operation with his 1st Brigade,

The initial concept for this operation was to deploy by air to the vicinity of Camp Holloway a reinforced infantry battalion to provide security for US units and installations in the Pleiku area and to provide a reserve/reaction force for the Pleiku area.
Within a matter of hours the estimate of the situation at Pleime was revised and the divisional commitment expanded to a brigade task force.

(Pleiku Campaign page 16)

and over Than Phong 7 operation with his 2nd Brigade.

I recommended to Swede and up through the chain that I be allowed to pursue them into Cambodia. This is not well known, but my request was approved up through channels to include Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge but disapproved in Washington ... I wanted to destroy the enemy. This would have been my next step, this is what I wanted the 2nd Brigade to do...

(Cochran)

Colonel Hieu had to put a stop on his zeal in both accounts. Imagine how many 1st Air Cav troops would perish while landing around Pleime camp and while entering the lion's den o f Iadrang Valley instead of the crack ARVN Airborne troops.

All necessary precautions were taken, as you can see, by the Arclite planners.

There were potential risks of casualties caused by friendly fires but due to human and/or mechanical errors, but not due to the planners' carelessness:

Nov 15

- 18:55H: 1st Cav (Lt Temple) Arc light bombing strike 1602H-1632H, area YA 8607, 9007, 8600, 9000; all aircraft on target except one whose load dropped in general area, YA 8015, 8215, 8212, 8412, results being investigated.

- 19:00H: 1st Cav (L/C Buchan) Target completely covered; best coverage he had seen; one rack of bombs out of target area vic YA 820122-808142, cords not accurate.

And so yes, there is no 100 percent guarantee in anything you do. Does that make you paralyzed into inaction? If yes, then you can not be a leader of other people in war time and conditions.

Phieu

#1138 27 Aug 12, 09:53

Sidebar: Colonel Moore and Colonel Hieu

At the ceremony celebrating the victor of Pleime both Colonel Moore and Colonel Hieu were present.

Knowing my brother's character, it is certain Colonel Hieu was the first one to come up to Colonel Moore to shake hands and to congratulate him in an impeccable English accent for a job well done. Colonel Moore might not have noticing him in the midst of one, two, three, four star generals, unaware that he was facing the person who had made his task bearable and who was watching over his shoulder while he was carrying on with his assigned task.

Phieu

#1139 27 Aug 12, 10:13

Phieu: First of all, the purpose of using 1/7 Air Cav Battalion was not to draw the enemy into an ‘arclite zone’. That was achieved by various units of 3rd Brigade on November 9, when General Larsen ordered Knowles to switch the operational direction from west to east and in so doing entice the enemy to move in staging areas on November 13 for the movement to attack Pleime camp set for November 16.

You suggest this move enticed the enemy to move into staging areas on November 13.

What was the enemy doing and where were they on November 12?

samtn99

#1140 27 Aug 12, 10:19

In assembly areas for re-equippement, training and rehearsals.

I spare you from asking you to go over my previous posts this time.

When faking loosing the enemy traces by going east, 3rd Air Cav Brigade enticed the enemy into an attack mode which compelled the enemy to go through two phases: 1. training in assembling areas; 2. movement to attack in staging areas.

Colonel Hieu knew in real time through his 'special agents' exactly when troops were ordered into assembly areas and in staging areas respectively and scheduled for Arclite strike accordingly, set for Nov 15 with TOT at 16:00 hours. He needed though to retain the enemy troops immobile on targets for the arrival of B-52 planes. He achieved that with the distractive move by inserting an Air Cav battalion next to the staging areas.

I should have explained why not attack the enemy when he is in a defensive mode and entice him to switch to an offensive mode at which time he becomes stronger. Now you might understand why: the attack comes from air strike, not from ground assaults ...

Again, all the moves executed during Long Reach/Truong Chinh operation were in support, in function of Arclite strike.

Phieu

#1141 27 Aug 12, 10:20

Phieu,

I appreciate your response to my questions. I recognize that in a war you can't be sure of no casualties. That was not what I was trying to say. My point was, did the planners really want to take a chance of a repeat of a possible 'Dien Bien Phu' at this early part of the war? This could have been a disaster at this point in the war.

I know of companies being part of a lure to bring the enemy out of his hiding places and then a piling on of troops to reinforce but to use use an entire battalion of men, especially when there was a shortage of helicopters to bring them all in together (and to get them all out), well...

But I thank you for your respectful response to my questions. I am not here to poke holes in your theory or to make fun of your thoughts, but am just trying to figure out the thinking process for this action. Continue on despite some the comments of others. At the same time, please answer all the legit questions from us all.

DeltaOne

#1142 27 Aug 12, 11:04

DeltaOne “ Phieu,

I appreciate your response to my questions.

Don't mention it.

I recognize that in a war you can't be sure of no casualties. That was not what I was trying to say. My point was, did the planners really want to take a chance of a repeat of a possible 'Dien Bien Phu' at this early part of the war? This could have been a disaster at this point in the war.

The enemy wanted to replicate Dien Bien Phu at Pleime. But II Corps with the help of 1st Air Cavalry won't allow that to happen again. Colonel Hieu said in his Why Pleime, Forwords:

The Dien Bien Phu Battle which ended the Indochina war (1947-1954) lasted for two months but was merely an encirclement of a stronghold in the Dien Bien Phu Bowl.
The Pleime Battle, quite different with many tactical aspects:
- Envelopment
- Counter-ambushes
- Relief
- Pursuit
- Ambushes
- Exploitation
- Attack and destroy
is no doubt the biggest battle from the last years

I think Colonel Hieu would "quarrel" with you on this point. He foot-noted in Why Pleime:

(1) After the testing period which started in 1963, the Division was officially activated in June 1965 and came to Viet Nam in September 1965. In comparison with the other US Divisions, the 1st Air Cavalry has less troops (15787 instead of 15900) and vehicles (1600 instead of 3200) but more aircraft (435 instead of 101). The displacement of 3000 troops over a distance of 160 km takes only 59 minutes (US Army Information Digest, August 65, page 36)

I hope the bunch of recent roudy students had learned their lesson of how to properly behave in the classroom.

At the same time, please answer all the legit questions from us all.

Sure do.

Phieu

#1143 27 Aug 12, 11:04

Phieu : In assembly areas for re-equippement, training and rehearsals.

I spare you from asking you to go over my previous posts this time.

Colonel Hieu knew in real time through his 'special agents' exactly when troops were ordered into assembling areas and in staging areas respectively and scheduled for Arclite strike accordingly, set for Nov 15 with TOT at 16:00 hours. He needed though to retain the enemy troops immobile on targets for the arrival of B-52 planes. He achieved that with the distractive move by inserting an Air Cav battalion next to the staging areas.

Again, all the moves executed during Long Reach/Truong Chinh operation were in support, in function of Arclite strike.

So...if i'm not mistaken, you are saying the enemy was training in assembly areas before 13 Nov, then went into staging areas? And they were stronger in staging areas and not in assembly areas?

Can you describe the difference as you see it, because I do not understand what you are trying to say

samtn99

#1144 27 Aug 12, 11:17

No, no, no. Not, they were stronger in staging areas and not in assembly areas.

Rather, the enemy becomes stronger in attack mode than in defensive mode.

That would be foolish of II Corps to entice them into an attack mode if the purpose was to then attack with ground troops. The aim was to force them into regrouping close enough to become a target for Arclite strike, which is in staging areas for movement to attack.

I know it is difficult to grasp that notion if you are not able to raise up to the level of a chief of staff's knowledge, who is the planner of an operation.

By the way that is one of the reason I could not have pulled out of my imagination the operational concept of Long Reach/Truong Chinh operation. I learned it by listening very attentively to my brother for 20+ years!

Phieu

#1145 27 Aug 12, 11:22

I recognize that as a whole, they had a lot of hueys. But when it came to the landing at LZ Xray, they did not have enough hueys to get all the men in at once. It took several trips to get all of LT. Col. Moore's men in. Obviously, the planning had a 'hiccup' here. One would think if the planning was done earlier, they would have had enough huey's to get them men, even if not all at once, at least a larger group than what happened on that day.

DeltaOne

#1146 27 Aug 12, 11:33

You consider 1 hour and 20 minutes, from 1050 hours to 1210 hours, long?

And that was due to the constraint of the size of the landing zone, not to the shortage of hueys!

Phieu

#1147 27 Aug 12, 11:50

Phieu : I know it is difficult to grasp that notion if you are not able to raise up to the level of a chief of staff's knowledge, who is the planner of an operation.

Wrong answer....try again. A Chief of Staff is many things, but planner is not one of them. I asked the following about 4 months ago, and you deflected the question as is typical of hard questions. What is the doctrinal role of a Chief of Staff?

don744

#1148 27 Aug 12, 11:52

So it 'only' took 8 hours to get the entire force in?

DeltaOne

#1149 27 Aug 12, 11:54

Phieu : No, no, no. Not, they were stronger in staging areas and not in assembly areas.

Rather, the enemy becomes stronger in attack mode than in defensive mode.

Ok, explain then how they would be stronger in attack mode than defensive mode. What is a "mode" anyway.

I believe that you have no idea what a staging area or assembly area is. Once again, you're grasping at little pieces of information that fit into your mindsets. Those trees really make it hard to see sometimes...

samtn99

#1150 27 Aug 12, 11:55

DeltaOne: I know of companies being part of a lure to bring the enemy out of his hiding places and then a piling on of troops to reinforce but to use use an entire battalion of men, especially when there was a shortage of helicopters to bring them all in together (and to get them all out), well...

I got the feeling you are resentful that a company or battalion be used as bait by war planners at the risk of big human losses.

I am also aware that there were bad commanders who did not hesitate to waste the lives of their men.

But, be assured that was not the case of Colonel Hieu at Pleime. He had proven that he was a compassionate commander who not only value the lives of his troops but also of the enemy troops.

I hope that put your concern to rest.

Phieu #1151 27 Aug 12, 11:57

Phieu: You consider 1 hour and 20 minutes, from 1050 hours to 1210 hours, long?

And that was due to the constraint of the size of the landing zone, not to the shortage of hueys!

What does the attached document do to bolster your assertion that they had plenty of Hueys? Moore noted they had several lifts and there was a 30 minute round trip time. That doesnt sound like they had enough Hueys if they had to repeatedly return to pick up another lift. You can fit 8-10 bubbas into a huey depending on configuration and weight. One lift equals approximately a company, with 30 minutes between lifts, it all fits. They only had enough birds for 1 company at a time.

don744

#1152 27 Aug 12, 12:01

Phieu: I got the feeling you are resentful that a company or battalion be used as bait by war planners at the risk of big humane losses.

I am also aware that there were bad commanders who did not hesitate to waste the lives of their men.

But, be assured that was not the case of Colonel Hieu at Pleime. He had proven that he was a compassionate commander who not only value the lives of his troops but also of the enemy troops.

I hope that put to rest your concern.

Well, I never met your brother but I will take your word for it. I hate the practice of throwing men into a meat grinder but I also understand the need of finding and engaging the enemy, even if its strength is undetermined.

DeltaOne

#1153 27 Aug 12, 12:08

samtn99: Ok, explain then how they would be stronger in attack mode than defensive mode. What is a "mode" anyway.

Another word for "mode" is "posture".

At Chupong, while being pursued by Air Cav, the enemy troops were scattered in defensive posture and thus weak as a fighting force. When they regroup in offensive posture to attack, they became stronger. Loose formation versus tight formation. If that is not obvious to you, then I give up explaining it to you.

I believe that you have no idea what a staging area or assembly area is.

Sorry, this time I am forced to send you back to my previous posts where I had told you multiple times what constitues an assembling area and what constitues a staging area.

Once again, you're grasping at little pieces of information that fit into your mindsets. Those trees really make it hard to see sometimes...

You are assuming here !!!

If you think so, why do you continue to read me? Stop listening to my nonsense!

I have learned, if you don't get it once, you are never going to get it.

Should we depart with "we agree to disagree", instead of reading into each other's mindset, at this point?

Can I say bye now without being rude?

Phieu

#1154 27 Aug 12, 12:09

don744 : Wrong answer....try again. A Chief of Staff is many things, but planner is not one of them. I asked the following about 4 months ago, and you deflected the question as is typical of hard questions. What is the doctrinal role of a Chief of Staff?

…

Phieu

#1155 27 Aug 12, 12:20

don744: What does the attached document do to bolster your assertion that they had plenty of Hueys? Moore noted they had several lifts and there was a 30 minute round trip time. That doesnt sound like they had enough Hueys if they had to repeatedly return to pick up another lift. You can fit 8-10 bubbas into a huey depending on configuration and weight. One lift equals approximately a company, with 30 minutes between lifts, it all fits. They only had enough birds for 1 company at a time.

!!!

Phieu

#1056 27 Aug 12, 12:27

Phieu,

Why did you say your brother cared for the lives of the enemy too? Was not his plan to wipe out large numbers of them with the Arc Lite bombing run?

The whole problem I had with the Vietnam War was that we needed the ability to destroy the enemy and too many times, that was taken away from us. I hope you understand this point because it is a major factor in so many vets mind - if we were going to fight, untie our hands from behind our backs and let us get it done.

DeltaOne

#1157 27 Aug 12, 12:58

DeltaOne : So it 'only' took 8 hours to get the entire force in?

The battalion was disgorged in LZ X-Ray in 1 hour and 20 minutes:

At 1050 hours the first company, Bravo, had landed at LZ X-Ray (YA 935010) and by 1210 hours, the bulk of the battalion had closed.

Phieu

#1158 27 Aug 12, 13:04

That's why I asked when the entire battalion was in place. I believe it was 5 hours before the entire battalion was in place. Sorry, my error when I asked if it was 8 hours.

DeltaOne

#1159 27 Aug 12, 13:05

DeltaOne : Phieu,

Why did you say your brother cared for the lives of the enemy too? Was not his plan to wipe out large numbers of them with the Arc Lite bombing run?

The North Vietnamese Communist combatants and the South Vietnamese VC combatants were his compatriotes also ...

He had to kill because it's the war.

By inflicting big losses right at the outset of the war, you might entice the enemy to end it earlier, realizing they cannot conquer the South by military force and agree to sit down to resolve the difference politically.

Phieu

#1160 27 Aug 12, 13:09

DeltaOne: That's why I asked when the entire battalion was in place. I believe it was 5 hours before the entire battalion was in place. Sorry, my error when I asked if it was 8 hours.

1210 hours -1050hours = 1 hours and 20 minutes.

How do you come up with 5 hours?

The bulk of the battalion means the majority, almost all the battalion force, no?

Phieu

#1161 27 Aug 12, 13:11

Phieu : The North Vietnamese Communist combatants and the South Vietnamese VC combatants were his compatriotes also ...

He had to kill because it's the war.

I would imagine that it was hard for many of the S. Vietnamese officers and soldiers too to be fighting each other (N. Vietnamese).

I think the N. Vietnamese soldiers however, didn't share this feeling. This is seen in how they brutally killed mass citizens and raped, murdered, stole and terrorized southern villages.

In war, it is hard to feel for your enemy when you need to kill them. Easiest way was to dehumanize them. I believe the north did a better job and thus the results of the war.

DeltaOne

#1162 27 Aug 12, 13:13

Phieu : 1210 hours -1050hours = 1 hours and 20 minutes.

How do you come up with 5 hours?

The first troops landed at 1050 hours and the last came in at 1500 hours plus. These were the remainder of 1/7 and the recon platoon if I am correct in reading the after action report.

DeltaOne

#1163 27 Aug 12, 13:18

See post #1160.

Phieu

#1164 27 Aug 12, 13:24

Alright. Have to go now for a bit. I will check on it when I am home later today. Until then, have a good one.

DeltaOne

#1165 27 Aug 12, 13:33

Phieu : You consider 1 hour and 20 minutes, from 1050 hours to 1210 hours, long?

And that was due to the constraint of the size of the landing zone, not to the shortage of hueys! ]

You seem to be unaware of the severe shortages in fuel and helicopter spare parts the 1st Cav Div faced during the campaign. Is 1h20 to helilift an entire battalion a long time? damn right it is, only Company A, 229th Assault Helicopter Battalion was available that day to carry 1-7 Cav, and even not at full strength with only 16 choppers.

Boonierat

#1166 27 Aug 12, 13:51

don744 : What does the attached document do to bolster your assertion that they had plenty of Hueys? Moore noted they had several lifts and there was a 30 minute round trip time. That doesnt sound like they had enough Hueys if they had to repeatedly return to pick up another lift. You can fit 8-10 bubbas into a huey depending on configuration and weight. One lift equals approximately a company, with 30 minutes between lifts, it all fits. They only had enough birds for 1 company at a time.

Phieu : The battalion was disgorged in LZ X-Ray in 1 hour and 20 minutes:

Phieu : 1210 hours -1050hours = 1 hours and 20 minutes.

How do you come up with 5 hours?

The bulk of the battalion means the majority, almost all the battalion force, no?

Had to break out the books.

LTC Moore
But my main concern focused on the fact that we would have only sixteen Huey slicks to ferry the battalion into the assault area, an average fifteen-mile one-way flight from the various pickup points. What that meant was that fewer than eighty men—not even one full company— would hit the landing zone in the first wave, and would be the only troops on the ground until the helicopters returned to Plei Me, loaded another eighty, and returned. Later lifts would carry more men—ninety to one hundred— as they burned off fuel and grew lighter in weight.
was a thirty-minute round trip and at the expected rate it would take more than four hours to get all of my men on the ground. The Hueys would also have to divert refuel during this process, costing even more time; and if the landing zone was hot and any of the sixteen helicopters were shot up and dropped out, that, too, would immediately impact on the timetable. [1]

Coleman
At XRAY, at about 11:20 A.M., B Company's First Platoon, under Second Lieutenant Alan E. Deveny, probing west from the LZ into the trees, flushed out a Vietnamese. [2]

Coleman
By 4:00 P.M. Moore had his full battalion on the ground. [3]

AFAIK, the AAR says as much; but I don't have the time at the moment. Anyone feel free to compare. Where are the time tag and coordinates from that you quoted Phieu?

Notes

1. Moore, Harold G., and Joseph L. Galloway. We Were Soldiers Once...And Young: Ia Drang--The Battle That Changed The War In Vietnam. 1st ed. Random House, 1992. pp. 39-40.

2. Coleman, J. D. Pleiku: The Dawn of Helicopter Warfare in Vietnam. 1st ed. St Martins Pr, 1988. p.193.

3. Ibid. p. 202.

Lucky 6

#1167 27 Aug 12, 15:03

I think the point has to be made too in that Moore and his commanding officers knew they were facing a much larger force. To go up against an enemy that is far superior in number while you wait 1 hour 20 minutes could be the decisive factor between success and being wiped out. Add to this that he still had men not coming in until 15:00 - ...???

Factor this with medevac pilots not wanting to come in to pick up the wounded, the need for constant resupply, the shortage of hueys in general - I question whether this was well planned or was it rushed into without factoring everything possible. If it can turn to shite, it usually will to to shite.

DeltaOne

#1168 27 Aug 12, 15:25

D1, my best guess is that Knowles, Brown, and Moore did not expect to encounter anything larger than a Battalion. Maybe they got complacent after all the "dry holes" out east? One thing that bothered me is that when intel showed a possible battalion, the CAV did not seem to apply the attack to defend ratio when selecting the size of the assault force. Things that make you go hmmmm.

don744

#1169 27 Aug 12, 16:18

Phieu: 1210 hours -1050hours = 1 hours and 20 minutes.

How do you come up with 5 hours?

he bulk of the battalion means the majority, almost all the battalion force, no?

Not exactly...it could mean 51%.

don744

#1170 27 Aug 12, 16:26

Lucky 6 : Had to break out the books.

AFAIK, the AAR says as much; but I don't have the time at the moment. Anyone feel free to compare. Where are the time tag and coordinates from that you quoted Phieu?

Notes

1. Moore, Harold G., and Joseph L. Galloway. We Were Soldiers Once...And Young: Ia Drang--The Battle That Changed The War In Vietnam. 1st ed. Random House, 1992. pp. 39-40.

2. Coleman, J. D. Pleiku: The Dawn of Helicopter Warfare in Vietnam. 1st ed. St Martins Pr, 1988. p.193.

3. Ibid. p. 202.

Dude...I would rep you if I could. 16 slicks, huh? And someone posted the AVN unit only had a 30-40% O/R rate. And you brought up the fuel/logistical issues. Methinks that overall, it was a poorly and hastily thrown together plan. That doesn't take one thing away from those valorous Troopers that executed it.

don744

#1171 27 Aug 12, 17:03

Booniera: You seem to be unaware of the severe shortages in fuel and helicopter spare parts the 1st Cav Div faced during the campaign. Is 1h20 to helilift an entire battalion a long time? damn right it is, only Company A, 229th Assault Helicopter Battalion was available that day to carry 1-7 Cav, and even not at full strength with only 16 choppers.

…

Phieu

#1172 27 Aug 12, 17:05

don744 : Not exactly...it could mean 51%.

…

Phieu

#1173 27 Aug 12, 17:37

DeltaOne: Alright. Have to go now for a bit. I will check on it when I am home later today. Until then, have a good one.

From Pleiku Campaign, November 14.

- At 1210H, the bulk of 1/7 Bn had landed on X-Ray: Company B, Company C, Company D, and the bulk of Company A

- At 1500H, the remainder of Company A and the recon team.

Pleiku Campaign indicates further that "B co., 2/7" was alerted to get ready by Brown when the situation got hot and closed in X-Ray at 1800H.

Coleman, the reporter of Pleiku Campaign, did not do a good job, it seems. He thinks everybody is intelligent like him and can figure out what he presents in a relatively obtuse way!

Phieu

#1174 27 Aug 12, 17:39

Lucky 6: Where are the time tag and coordinates from that you quoted Phieu?

From Pleiku Campaign. See previous post.

Coleman, the author of Pleiku did not fare better: its still leaves you wondering.

Phieu

#1175 27 Aug 12, 17:44

don744 : Dude...I would rep you if I could. 16 slicks, huh? And someone posted the AVN unit only had a 30-40% O/R rate. And you brought up the fuel/logistical issues. Methinks that overall, it was a poorly and hastily thrown together plan. That doesn't take one thing away from those valorous Troopers that executed it.

Absolutely true. Those young men fought like seasoned warriors. Their action should make any US soldier, past or present, VERY proud.

DeltaOne

#1176 27 Aug 12, 17:50

DeltaOne: Absolutely true. Those young men fought like seasoned warriors. Their action should make any US soldier, past or present, VERY proud.

Your comment is for

That doesn't take one thing away from those valorous Troopers that executed it.

Not for,

Methinks that overall, it was a poorly and hastily thrown together plan.

I hope!

Phieu

#1177 27 Aug 12, 18:03

DeltaOne: I think the point has to be made too in that Moore and his commanding officers knew they were facing a much larger force. To go up against an enemy that is far superior in number while you wait 1 hour 20 minutes could be the decisive factor between success and being wiped out. Add to this that he still had men not coming in until 15:00 - ...???

Did I not tell you already that the planner of the master plan sent Moore in not to attack the enemy? God forbid, they would scatter right away and vanish into the jungle. Woult B-52 still have a target?

Moore's mission, unknown to him, was just to distract. The three regiments were about to move out to attack Pleime. No risk having all three regiments got engaged into attacking one battalion. In fact, only two battalions rushed toward LZ X-Ray, the bulk of enemy forces still remained immobile at staging areas where B-52's would strike.

Again, Delta One, you have to heed my emphasis that all maneuvers were in function of Arclite strike!

I have given you the advice in post #1067:

Since you want “to look deeper into that action”, allow me to offer you some tips. You need to know
- that Ia Drang battle in particular and Pleime Campaign in general, was conceived by Colonel Hieu and executed by 1st Air Cav;
- that Colonel Hieu bridled 1st Cavalry into not applying its air assault tactic of find (with squad/company)-fix-pile in-and destroy and instead used them to herd the enemy back to Chupong, to entice them into an attack mode and in so doing to regroup close together in staging areas, to distract them into immobility and have them destroyed by B-52 strikes;
- that 1st Air Cav played a supportive role to B-52 air strike, not the other way around;
- that all the troop maneuvers in All the Way by 1st Air Cav Brigade, in Bayonet I by 3rd Air Cav Brigade and in Bayonet II by 2nd Air Cav Brigade, were in function of supporting B-52 strike.
Unless you take all that into consideration, you will never be able to make sense out of Pleiku Campaign after action report and understand what really happened at Chupong-IaDrang.

You seem to take it lightly.

Maybe you guys should hold your thoughts for a while and let me have a chance to present the whole picture and then we can have a well informed discussion rather than just a cacophony. How about that?

Phieu

#1178 27 Aug 12, 18:21

Phieu :

Your comment is for

Not for,

I hope!

Those Soldiers valor had little to do with how crappy the plan was. A Battalion against a regiment plus...you can only make criticisms in hindsight. What if there was only a battalion in the vicinity of X-ray. There would be no "what you still might not know..." thread. It would have been a minor footnote in history, except for the Soldiers that were there.

don744

#1179 27 Aug 12, 18:32

!!!

Phieu

#1180 27 Aug 12, 18:46

Phieu :

Again, Delta One, you have to heed my emphasis that all maneuvers were in function of Arclite strike!

I have given you the advice in post #1067:

You seem to take it lightly.

Maybe you guys should hold your thoughts for a while and let me present the whole picture and then we can have a well informed discussion rather than just a cacophony. How about that?

Phieu - I am not in any way taking this lightly. It should be alright to consider different points otherwise, how do we learn from past engagements. I think you are taking this personal, as an insult to your brother perhaps. I have already stated that I have great respect for him. Because I am trying to wrap my head around what took place and have questions does not take away from his service in behalf of South Vietnam. You perhaps have forgot that we are vets who served there. This all has great importance to us.

To use the button is really over reacting. You should be happy that we have an interest in this action and are not just writing of the thread as 'Phieu's Views'.

If you have ever come under fire, even 1 hour 20 mins. feel like lifetimes. Moore seemed quite convinced that he would be facing a force of superior strength. Even if it was to distract the enemy, without knowing exactly where the enemy was and what size it was, it potentially put a battalion of men in a dangerous spot and we know how it all played out. A lot of young men paid the ultimate price, a lot of US blood was shed. It is too bad Aloha Ronnie hasn't posted here as he was there.

Anyways, AGAIN, , don't take this personally. The more the comments, the more the questions, the more you make people think, the more you make sure no one forgets what happened there, the more pleased you should be.

- Cheers

I'm popping smoke and getting out of here!

DeltaOne

#1181 27 Aug 12, 19:17

Phieu :

Maybe you guys should hold your thoughts for a while and let me have a chance to present the whole picture and then we can have a well informed discussion rather than just a cacophony. How about that?

Let's see... 10 months, 79 pages, and 1180 posts (maybe 1181 or 1182 depending on how quick some others are on the trigger)...and you need more time to outline this. Heck, when you got here you didn't even know how to read grid coordinates! You have over the past 10 months, 79 pages and 1180-82 posts to slap down every dissenting viewpoint...even though you have professional Soldiers with actual combat experience posting here. This isn't personal..it's professional...and us professionals have a word for this, it's called "amateur". Phieu, I have tried valiently to be respectful...but in my world respect is earned, and goes both ways. Just as there is Anh Phieu, there is Anh Moore, Ahn Crandall, Anh Marm, and Anh Freeman. There is a difference.

don744

#1182 27 Aug 12, 19:53

I think you also need to include the model of Huey used for the insertion of the battalion. The UH-1B models could not carry the hoped for number of troops due to being under-powered and working in high temp/high density altitude conditions. This would have contributed to longer times in getting boots on the ground.

Cham

#1183 27 Aug 12, 20:02

Welcome to the discussion Cham!

don744

#1184 27 Aug 12, 21:16

Appreciated......I doubt I can contribute much to the actual "what you still may not know....", but I am enjoying the read.

Cham

#1185 27 Aug 12, 23:02

don744: Let's see... 10 months, 79 pages, and 1180 posts (maybe 1181 or 1182 depending on how quick some others are on the trigger)...and you need more time to outline this. Heck, when you got here you didn't even know how to read grid coordinates! You have over the past 10 months, 79 pages and 1180-82 posts to slap down every dissenting viewpoint...even though you have professional Soldiers with actual combat experience posting here. This isn't personal..it's professional...and us professionals have a word for this, it's called "amateur". Phieu, I have tried valiently to be respectful...but in my world respect is earned, and goes both ways. Just as there is Anh Phieu, there is Anh Moore, Ahn Crandall, Anh Marm, and Anh Freeman. There is a difference.

!!!

Phieu

#1186 27 Aug 12, 23:15

DeltaOne:

To use the button is really over reacting. You should be happy that we have an interest in this action and are not just writing of the thread as 'Phieu's Views'.

- Cheers

I'm popping smoke and getting out of here!

I only meant to be a humor, an affectionate gesture; just like you "scold" a close friend "thick head" while gently tapping his head. Sorry that you took it other way.

Sure I like comments, but can I expect the comments on my thoughts to be clear on my thoughts first. Otherwise it is just a shouting match.

When I see the crux of the misunderstanding is most people don't realize all the maneuvers were planned in function of the Arclite strike and keep on objecting the landing at LZ X-Ray was poorly planned, that there was shortage of hueys, that Moor's men were carelessly put in harmways, that the closing in time took too long, etc I just respectfully request to hold your thoughts for a while to give me a chance the present the whole picture hoping everythins would fall in place and once you have a clear picture then we can have a well informed discussion afterwards.

Just don't get me wrong.

That said. OK let's compromise. You guys keep on commenting about my thoughts with each other. And I will carry on with the presentation of Long Reach/Truong Chinh operation in general and of LZ X-Ray operation in particular. In the meantime I will read your comments and questions and respond them in due time.

Is that satisfactory to you? (I am tempted to push a button here, but am afraid it gives out a false message!)

Phieu

#1187 28 Aug 12, 01:29

Cham : I think you also need to include the model of Huey used for the insertion of the battalion. The UH-1B models could not carry the hoped for number of troops due to being under-powered and working in high temp/high density altitude conditions. This would have contributed to longer times in getting boots on the ground.

1-7 Cav was ferried in UH-1Ds, the only UH-1Bs the 1st Cav had were gunships of 2-20 Art.

Boonierat

#1188 28 Aug 12, 03:09

Phieu:

I only meant to be a humor, an affectionate gesture; just like you "scold" a close friend "thick head" while gently tapping his head. Sorry that you took it other way.

Sure I like comments, but can I expect the comments on my thoughts to be clear on my thoughts first. Otherwise it is just a shouting match.

Just don't get me wrong.

Is that satisfactory to you? (I am tempted to push a button here, but am afraid it gives out a false message!)

Okay, will let you make your posts but also hope to ask solid questions that pop up from time to time. I am trying not to bother you, bully or anything like this. I am sorry I didn't recognize your humor before. I will continue to be patient and I hope you will answer further questions and consider some of mine and other's points.

DeltaOne

#1189 28 Aug 12, 03:52

Cham : Appreciated......I doubt I can contribute much to the actual "what you still may not know....", but I am enjoying the read.

Cham, sorry not to be the first one to greet you, as it should be. Don beat me to that!

I think he would be happy to recruit you onto his side in the discussion on course in attacking me ...

His zeal in greeting you is much similar to Kinnard's when he aggressively wanted to take command of Dan Thang 21 and Than Phong 7 - he got it in Truong Chinh/Long Reach operation!

Anyway, please accept my belated WELCOME.

I am happy to hear from you, I am enjoying the read.

Phieu

#1190 28 Aug 12, 04:08

DeltaOne: Okay, will let you make your posts but also hope to ask solid questions that pop up from time to time. I am trying not bother you, bully or anything like this. I am sorry I didn't recognize your humor before. I will continue to be patient and I hope you will further more answer some of my and others points.

Alleluia! (to be safe, no button this time!)

I did not know your skin is that thin ... not as thick as mine ... (to be safe, no button this time!)

By the way, any comments on my read pertaining to the closing time of 1/7 Bn at LZ X-Ray? (post #1173) (to be safe, no button this time!)

PS - D1, do you mind, in your response to this post, select on my behalf the three buttons you think most appropriate for my three punch lines and place them in the quote?

Phieu

#1191 28 Aug 12, 04:59

Phieu : From Pleiku Campaign. See previous post.

Coleman, the author of Pleiku did not fare better: its still leaves you

Phieu: Alleluia! (to be safe, no button this time!)

I did not know your skin is that thin ... not as thick as mine though ... (to be safe, no button this time!)

By the way, any comments on my read pertaining to the closing time of 1/7 Bn at LZ X-Ray? (post #1173) (to be safe, no button this time!)

PS - D1, do you mind, in your response to this post, select on my behalf the three buttons you think most appropriate for my three punch lines and place them in the quote?

Not confused. I have some comments about the "closing time" of 1/7. In fact, four paragraphs down on the very same page you quoted from, we read:

The remainder of the 1/7 battalion, including the Recon Platoon, landed by 1500 hours and were fed into positions on the eastern-fringe of the landing zone. [emphasis mine]

Moore also corroborates this precisely in his AAR:

At this time, approximately 1500 hours, I decided that it was necessary to continue to land the remainder of the tactical elements of the battalion consisting of the recon platoon, 3 UH1D loads of C Company men, and the XO and 1st Sergeant of D Company.

I made images so everyone can read them instead of having to page through the ORLL and AAR a thousand times.

Click Thumbnails to view:

Now, I'm not trying to deconstruct this just for the hell of it Phieu; but why is it critical that you establish that the battalion was amassed on the LZ quickly? It seems strange to me that you're contesting this point.

Lucky 6

#1192 28 Aug 12, 06:19

Boonierat : 1-7 Cav was ferried in UH-1Ds, the only UH-1Bs the 1st Cav had were gunships of 2-20 Art.

My apologies .... I was going with old memories of helicopter war stories when I was a young pilot.

Although the A- and B-model Huey engine often lacked enough power to work in the heat and high altitudes of South Vietnam, it was much stronger than earlier Army helicopter engines. Unfortunately, the high density altitudes encountered in II Corps Zone in Vietnam meant that the UH-1A and UH-1B with a full crew-pilot, aircraft commander, crew chief, and medical corpsman-often could carry no more than one or two patients at a time.

The UH-1D was redesigned to carry up to 12 troops, with a crew of two. The UH-1D had a range of 293 miles (467km) and a speed of 127 mph (110 knots). The longer rotor blade on the UH-1D gave it more lifting power, but high density altitudes in the northern II Corps AO, where US troops did most of their fighting, still prevented "Dust Off" MEDEVAC pilots from making full use of the aircraft's carrying capacity.

Here: http://www.globalsecurity.org/milita...-1-history.htm

Cham

#1193 28 Aug 12, 06:23

A very good read that might bring a whole new dimension to the discussion.

http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchr...ct/stoner.html

I did not realize it, but the Ia Drang battle was also a watershed moment for development of Airforce TACP. These were the FACs (both Airborne and ground) and the C2 elements at Division and corps. Early on in the war there were huge issues with coordinating close air support. Main problem was communication systems. Here's a bit of trivia....With the nomenclature for radio systems, (ie A/N PRC-77 or A/N PRC-25) what do the letters AN stand for? I'll save y'all some google search time...it is Army/Navy. Noticeably absent is Air Force. Ground units did not have compatible radio systems with the Air Force, causing huge delays while info was passed thru command channels. They were working thru the bugs early in the war. Specifics of the CAS at Chu Pong is found toward the end of the article, but the whole thing is a good read regardless. Here is an excerpt that I thought appropriate for this thread:

"In addition to tactical air support rendered, the Ia Drang Valley was the occasion of the first B-52 strikes truly integrated into the scheme of maneuver and responsive to the needs of a U.S. Army division commander. Once the ground elements became disengaged, it was suspected that the enemy had withdrawn into Chu Pong Mountain. The Commander, 1st Cavalry Division, did not want another attack from a flank position while continuing to search and clear the Ia Drang Valley. B-52s were requested, to neutralize the high ground overlooking combat elements bf the Division. For six days B-52 aircraft bombed in very close proximity to the left flank of the ground combat elements. This was possible because the axis of attack and the time over targets were an integral part of the joint battle plan."

don744

#1194 28 Aug 12, 06:31

Phieu : Cham, sorry not to be the first one to greet you, as it should be. Don beat me to that!

I think he would be happy to recruit you onto his side in the discussion on course in attacking me ...

Is zeal in greeting you is much similar to Kinnard's when he aggressively wanted to take command of Dan Thang 21 and Than Phong 7 - he got it in Truong Chinh/Long Reach opeartion!

Anyway, please accept my belated WELCOME.

I am happy to hear from you, I am enjoying the read.

Xin cam on ong Phieu

I had occasion to be the escort officer for LTG Kinnard (Ret), in 1990 at Ft. Rucker, AL. He told some interesting stories which included both the Bulge in WWII, and the Ia Drang in VN. From that brief contact, I'm pretty sure your descriptive of him as "aggressive" is appropriate.

Cham

#1195 28 Aug 12, 06:32

Cham : My apologies .... I was going with old memories of helicopter war stories when I was a young pilot.

No apologies necessary. Any little nugget of information is welcome here. There are a ton of different aspects that played a part in how thing happened. Shortage of helicopters, shortage of fuel, lack of intel, etc... It's amazing how many things were screwed up logistically, operationally, administratively, and with the intelligence available.

don744

#1196 28 Aug 12, 10:08

Cham : Xin cam on ong Phieu

Dạ, không có chi.

The General hasn't changed, has he? It would be interesting that you tell us here his interesting stories on Ia Drang.

Phieu

#1197 28 Aug 12, 10:38

Lucky 6 : why is it critical that you establish that the battalion was amassed on the LZ quickly? It seems strange to me that you're contesting this point.

I will tell you why the timing of the battalion was amassed at the LZ is critical but not just quickly, but also slowly - with the bulk quickly and the remainder slowly and a pause in between - after I hear from D1. Meanwhile I let you ponder the question: why did the recon team land last in the formation.. Shouldn't it be the first in search of the enemy?

Phieu

#1198 28 Aug 12, 11:15

You assume they were originally scheduled to be the last group in. After contact was made, would you rather have a heavy weapons company on the ground, or a lightly armed recon platoon? After the shooting started Moore didnt exactly need a recon element, did he? Also, why land a recon element first anyway? To secure the LZ? Wouldnt be prudent to launch out a lightly armed element until you have sufficient forces to provide support if they made contact.

don744

#1199 28 Aug 12, 11:37

It's actually an interesting point for discussion, we should crowdsource this a bit:

Was the Recon Platoon tied up elsewhere? Although I only made a cursory look at Moore's AAR, I didn't see a reference as to what the recon platoon was doing on 12-13 Nov (Moore mentions the battalion was doing saturation patrolling and a civic action program).

What was Moore's general attitude towards the Recon Platoon? Or as an alternative, how did Moore typically use his Recon Platoon?

I myself for the most part agree with holding the recon platoon for a later lift into X-Ray. First priority for an air assault is LZ security, not the best use for recon for a battalion assault; as Don said they would not be the best choice. Also, I would understand Moore wanting coherent units being put into the LZ to maximize security, so my priority would go to the line companies.

HAD Moore selected LZ Victor though, the recon platoon might have made more sense.

Thoughts anyone?

Phieu, if I'm not mistaken, I think you are trying to imply something nefarious about the recon not being put in first. You've said all along that Moore had no idea what his "real" mission was, so this contention doesn't make sense.

samtn99

#1200 28 Aug 12, 11:45

don744 : You assume they were originally scheduled to be the last group in. After contact was made, would you rather have a heavy weapons company on the ground, or a lightly armed recon platoon? After the shooting started Moore didnt exactly need a recon element, did he? Also, why land a recon element first anyway? To secure the LZ? Wouldnt be prudent to launch out a lightly armed element until you have sufficient forces to provide support if they made contact.

!!!

Phieu

Section I: post #1 – post #300
Section II: post #301 – post #600
Section III : post #601 – post #900
Section IV : post #901 – post #1200
Section V : post #1201 – post #1459

generalhieu