Iadrang Battle Presented at Armchair General Forum III

What you still may not know about the Ia Drang Valley battle
(A transcript from Armchair General Forum )

Section III : from #601 to #900
(http://www.armchairgeneral.com/forums/showthread.php?t=116167&page=41)

#601 30 Dec 11, 18:24

samtn99: Whole post

Totally concur with your assessment. I have drawn the same conclusions by documents I have read from both ARVN and US sides.

don744

#602 30 Dec 11, 20:23 The Ia Drang Campaign

don744 : Sometimes things are quite simple. I do not see in his argument where Lucky6 said there was a lack of planning, strategic planning, or general staff planning in regards to the US operation. Neither did I see in your reply any retort to his argument.

Can you tell me on what date the series of operation(s) became known as a campaign? I think that answer is significant. From what I have read, I do not see yet that the whole series of operations in the Pleime-Ia Drang-Chu Pong AO was a deliberate campaign by RVN or US military planners, but, rather began as a series of reactions to a deliberate campaign by the PAVN.

That may sound overly simplistic, but I am just a novice. Thoughts?

Hello Thread

I am finding this whole exchange interesting, tho' in and out in sporadic bursts. I am sad to continue to read a whole lot of bullshit carping about who said what and when, who is slandering others, etc. That gets in the way of the whole discussion. So, let's put our egos on hold or on the shelf, and simply contribute thoughtful comments so that we all can learn.

For the record, and to dispute Joe Galloway and any reports that ARVN had never been into the area, the 3rd Bn 41st ARVN Infantry Regt of the 22nd ARVN division conducted Operation Binh Tri in March-April 1964 (18 months prior to the famous engagement in Oct-Nov 1965) into the area in a 35 day, 4 phase operation. I was the MAAG advisor from Team 22.

We started at Pleime SF camp and worked west in Phase I. Phase II was to the east. Phase III and IV were to the northwest of the Pleime camp. Overlooking the whole area, almost brooding, if you will, was Chu Pong Massif.

RedDagger18

#603 31 Dec 11, 03:33

samtn99: According to the 1 Cavalry Division interim report on operations, the division began operations in response to the attack on Plei Me under the following orders:

By 28 Oct 1965, the mission changes (source again is the 1 CD report):

At this point a significant decision was made. General William C. Westmoreland visited the 1st Bde Forward CP at HOMECOMING, the LZ 5 kilometres northeast of the Plei Me CIDG Camp, and authorized the 1st Cav Div (AM) to pursue, seek out, and destroy the enemy. These orders were confirmed on 28 Oct by message from CG IFF-V: "Elements 1st Cav Div (AM) currently deployed Vic Pleiku will coordinate with and establish an area of operations VIC Plei Me CIDG Camp and undertake operations to find, fix, and destroy VC forces which endanger that general area."

Some questions should come up here. Did General Westmoreland talk to or visit II Corps before he arrived at the 1st Bde Forward CP at Homecoming? General Westmoreland might have visited II Corps HQ before his arrival at 1st Bde, and discussed the situation. However, I find it unlikely II Corps would not be forthcoming with him and give him the full plan if there was something more than find and kill the enemy wherever he could be found.

Following is the chronology of the events that took place pertaining to Westmoreland ordering Knowles to �give Kinnard his head�, based on Why Pleime, Coleman 1988, Pleiku, and G3 Journal/IFFV

- On 26 October 1965, while the relief column and the garrison of Pleime were conducting a sweep around the Camp, a conference was held at II Corps TOC with the presence of US advisors and unit commanders.

The decision made by II Corps Command to exploit the results of the first phase and to pursue the enemy was fully concurred by the US military authorities and agreement was reached to establish a close cooperation in operational activities. The 1st US Air Cavalry Division made the main effort with the Long Reach Operations and the ARVN Airborne Brigade acted as reserve, ready to participate on Corps order. (Pleime, chapter V)

- [B]On the afternoon of the 26th[/B], Generals Westmoreland, Larsen, Kinnard, and Knowles met for a conference at the 1st Brigade�s command post, at LZ Homecoming. [�] In the conference between Westmoreland and the division officers, Kinnard hammered on the theme that U.S. forces must now do more than merely contain the enemy or simply reinforce the ARVN. The NVA, he felt, must be sought out aggressively and destroyed. Of course, as far as Westy was concerned, Kinnard was singing to the choir; Westmoreland long had yearned for the opportunity to go on the offensive. Kinnard and Knowles also spent considerable time at the conference explaining to Westmoreland and Larsen exactly what the division could do and how well it could do it. Westmoreland eventually turned to Larsen and said: �Give Kinnard his head.� (Coleman, page 99)

- On the 26th, General William C. Westmoreland, Commanding General, US Forces, Vietnam, visited the Brigade Forward command post at Homecoming� In the conference between General Westmoreland and division officers the theme was expounded that US Forces must now do more that merely contain the enemy; he must be sought out aggressively and destroyed.

So the divisions�s scope of operations changed from one of reinforcement and reaction to that of unilimied offense. It was released from a small zone of operations and provided a tactical area of operations that covered nearly 2,500 squre kilometers. It was given the mission of searching out, fixing and destroying enemy forces that provided a threat to Plei Me, Pleiku and the entire central highlands. (Pleiku, page 28)

- On October 27, commanders at various headquarters of II Corps, First Force VN, 1st Air Cavalry Division, MACV and Joint General Staff, conferred frantically around the idea of having 1st Air Cavalry Division pursuing the enemy

- 12:30H: Fm Capt Reich, II Corps (w/Gen Larsen): Gen's Larsen, Kinnard and Knowles, and Col Mataxis are now meeting with Gen Vinh Loc to work out extension or modification of present 1st Air Cav Div TAOR vic Plei Me to comply with MACV oral instructions to develop a big TAOR centered around Plei Me to find, fix and destroy the VC in that area. Gen Larsen called Gen Collins requesting MACV touch base with JGS so similar VN instructions can be passed to Gen Vinh Loc. Gen Larsen told Gen Kinnard to stop the Tuy Hoa opn for evaluation ref COMUSMACV's order. (G3/IFFV , 10271230H)

- By midnight of October 29, the expanded tactical area of operational responsibility of 1st Air Cavalry Division was finalized between Colonel Hieu (II Corps) and Colonel Williams (IFFV) and passed along to various unit commands

- 00:50H: II Corps (Major Black) - Ref Plei Me: Camp rec'd a few mortar rds, some trip flares were set off and some SA fire. Nothing serious. 7 cas, med evac requested. At 292350 Col Williams called Col Hieu, CofS II Corps. II Corps requested that 1st Cav TAOR be extended to include the Plei Me area except the camp itself. From present line on NS grid line ZA14 east to NS grid line AR77, on EW grid line ZA/AR15, south on AR77 to EW grid line 00, then west to NW grid line ZA14. Col Buchan, Gen Knowes, Col Williams and Col Mataxis agree.

- 00:12H: II Corps Col Williams - Request extension of TAOR (as outlined in telecon fm Maj Black at 0005) be approved by FFV. Col Barrow notified; Request approved 0025; II Corps notified 0030; 1st Cav notified 0040. (G3/IFFV, 10300050H)

However, there�s no indication General Westmoreland had more knowledge than was shown in the mission statements.

Westmoreland did not have more knowledge on Oct 26, but was surely later on briefed about Colonel Hieu's master plan, if not in detail but at least in general outlines. Colonel Hieu would be totally foolish, if he did not make sure he got approval from General Wesmoreland the use of B52 airstrikes which was the crux of his operational concept.

The decision made by II Corps Command to exploit the results of the first phase and to pursue the enemy was fully concured by the US military authorities. (Pleime, chapter V)

General Larsen maintained constant communication with US MACV (Gen Collins) and ARVN JGS to coordinate 1st Air Cav and II Corps activities:

- 12:30H: Fm Capt Reich, II Corps (w/Gen Larsen): Gen's Larsen, Kinnard and Knowles, and Col Mataxis are now meeting with Gen Vinh Loc to work out extension or modification of present 1st Air Cav Div TAOR vic Plei Me to comply with MACV oral instructions to develop a big TAOR centered around Plei Me to find, fix and destroy the VC in that area. Gen Larsen called Gen Collins requesting MACV touch base with JGS so similar VN instructions can be passed to Gen Vinh Loc. (G3/IFFV , 10271230H) p>Also, II Corps would have been totally reliant on FF-V to coordinate anything to do with B-52s.

The original plan to employ strategic bombers in support of the division was presented by the Assistant Division Commander (ADC-A) through Field Force Vietnam Commanding General to the J-3 of US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Pleiku, page 9)

Now if you go through the mission change, there is a line that states �will coordinate with��. Who the division is to coordinate with is not clear to me. IF it means II Corps, coordinate with does not mean subordination to II Corps; in fact I believe it to mean almost the opposite.

(Pleime, chapter VIII):

In phase III, the operations had been conducted through a close cooperation between ARVN and US Forces: that was the latest procedure ever put into application since the second World War. It is characterized by:
- Joint intelligence and support activities.
- Commonly-shared concept of operations and results.
- Separate TAOR.
- Separate command.
- Separate deployment of forces.
- Separate conduct of activities.
- Separate reserve.
The above procedure has brought many good results, especially in a country such as ours where the psychology of the people is charged with complexities and subtleties. I also find in that procedure a real competitive spirit between the two armed forces and between units.

Westmoreland knew about this modus operandi

The effectiveness of this highly organized, closely integrated, cooperative effort has not often been emulated in modern warfare. (Pleime, preface)

However, I take the line to mean to coordinate with Plei Me Camp, which was under US control (ie 5th Group). Note the lack of any mention of II Corps in the order from FF-V.

Unlike the relationship with 1s Air Cav where orders were given through Larsen, II Corps Command seemed to be able to give order directly to 5th SF Group Commander:

Colonel Mckean was the authority that provided the American Delta Team and the Vietnamese Special Forces company that were dispatched to Pleime camp by II Corps Command. Colonel Hieu had this combined Vietnamese American Special Forces team inserted at 5 kilometers northeast of the camp with a dual mission: first was to study the enemy troop distribution around the camp to determine the enemy intention that could be either to overrun the camp or to lure and ambush the rescue force; second was to reinforce the camp (Pleime, chapter IV):

In their progression toward the Camp after landing, the 91st Battalion engaged with the enemy at 1030 hours, killed and wounded an unknown number of VC and captured one 82m/m mortar, two 50 cal M.G., many Chicom submachine-guns and Russian rifles. This contact proved that around the Camp, the enemy had dispersed their troops to prevent being targets for friendly airstrikes and also to ambush our relief forces when they were heliborne in the vicinity.

As more intelligence was acquired about the enemy intentions and disposition, the VC themselves were also gradually aware of the friendly stratagem.

However, Colonel Mckean, through LTC Bennett, Special Forces advisor at II Corps Headquarters, wanted the American Delta team to go into the camp immediately to help the camp commander to contain a potential rebellion by the Montagnard soldiers (G3 Journal/IFFV, 10/20):

- 18:25H: II Corps Capt Ushijima - Possibility of placing an Abn Ranger Co vic Plei My tonight. Col Bennett was told by SA II Corps, that the a/c would not be available until after 1900 and airlift impossible tonight. Col Bennett then requested 10 Americans be introduced into Camp to assist control of CIDG. Col Mataxis (SA II Corps) replied that due to tactical situation this could not be done.

Colonel Hieu denied that request (G3 Journal/IFFV, 10/20):

- 20:00H: Fm D/SA II Corps to Lt Col Patch. SA II Corps had just returned fm flight over Plei My Camp. Camp still holding out. Flare ships and fighters still supporting. A/1 Avn Co returned to Pleiku, because of weather. Request of Lt Col Bennett, 5th SFG, to move 10 US into camp denied.

In the background section (II) of LTC Moore�s after action report, he states that �On the 12th, the Assistant Division Commander-A, during a visit to the battalion, indicated to the Brigade Commander that he had no objection to the latter sending a battalion into the IA DRANG Valley.� The terminology is important here I think. The ADC-A stating he �has no objection to the latter (brigade commander) sending a battalion into the IA DRANG Valley is nowhere near the same as giving an order to a subordinate, nor does it imply Larson gave specific orders to Knowles to do so. On 13 November, COL Brown gave LTC Moore an order to conduct an assault into the Ia Drang Valley at the base of the Chu Pong. The AO assigned to Moore was AO LIME (you can see the AO in Moore�s AAR). If Phieu�s contention that the insertion of a battalion into X-Ray were part of some II Corps master plan of strategery, then the so called pinning operation into X-Ray was based on very flimsy guidance, and it was not much more than luck that it occurred at all.

General Larsen surely didn�t not act erratically and on the whim when he dropped in General Knowles� Forward CP from time to time to issue order. He must knew about Colonel Hieu�s master plan in issuing that was dictated by the enemy�s movements.

- On 11/8, General Larsen ordered General Knowles to go east.

- On 11/11, Intelligence report indicated that the three NVA regiments became targetable for B52 strikes with 66th center of mass (vicinity 9401), 32nd (YA820072 ) and 33rd (YA940011 )

- On 11/11, Intelligence report indicated that Field Force B3 decided a second attack on Pleime camp scheduled for 11/16.

- On 11/12, Field Front units continued preparations and rehearsals for the scheduled attack on Pleime.

- On 11/13, Field Front forces began staging in the Chu Pong-Ia Drang area in preparation for movement to Pleime and the projected 16 November attack. Some recon parties and transportation units already had moved out.

On 11/13, General Larsen ordered General Knowles to go west.

On 11/14, Moore was ordered (by Brown-Knowles-Larsen) to distract B3 Front in maintaining troops at staging areas longer for B52 strikes scheduled for 11/15. Second reason for the choice of date of insertion to avoid antiaircraft and mortar firepower.

IF COL Heiu gave GEN Knowles guidance (unlikely) to put a battalion into an LZ at the base of the Chu Pong, GEN Knowles is unlikely to have couched his subsequent guidance to the brigade commander in those terms (ie, �no objection�). Additionally, I have doubts that General Knowles would have been too receptive to instructions given by a Staff Colonel from SVN. II Corps commander, maybe (I�m sure that will come across as harsh to some). General Knowles does strike me as a guy itching to get in the fight and do it his way (tried to find a biography on him, no luck. Can anyone point me in a direction here?). What if COL Brown didn�t want to send a battalion there? Apparently it was his decision to make based on what he was told by General Knowles.

Colonel Hieu did not give order directly to General Knowles or Colonel Brown, but always through General Larsen.

My view is that II Corps and the 1 Cavalry Division Forward CP (under General Knowles) liaised with each other, and I believe that they had a common understanding as to the operation.

There are no documents, including the two first hand sources Why Pleime and Pleiku Campaign that touch upon the relationship on a personal basis between General Knowles and Colonel Hieu; however, there is mention regarding the close working relationship between the 1st Air Cavalry Division Forward Command and II Corps Command. The various documents show clearly that II Corps Command shared with 1st Air Cavalry Division Forward Command daily and real time intelligence reports as well as operation concepts: herding enemy troops, direction switching of operations as diversionary move, scheduling assault into LZ X-Ray to establish a blocking position, and using B52 carpet bombings to destroy the enemy.

It is kind of hard to comprehend why General Knowles chose not to report with transparency to General Kinnard that all of his actions were based on Colonel Hieu�s ideas and suggestions. For instance, around 3 p.m. on November 14, when 1/7th Air Cavalry Battalion began to engage with two Viet Cong battalions at LZ X-Ray, General Kinnard was surprised why General Knowles chose to insert troops at that location (Coleman, page 219):

When he arrived, Knowles showed him the situation map he had propped up against a palm tree. Kinnard took one look and said, �What the hell are you doing in that area?� Obviously, someone hadn�t kept the boss informed about Larsen�s guidance to get after the enemy even if it meant walking away from the dry holes in the east. Knowles told Kinnard, �The object of the exercise is to find the enemy, and we sure as hell have!� Knowles remembers an awkward pause before Kinnard said quietly, �Okay, it looks great. Let me know what you need.�

In paragraph 1) above, General Kinnard was quoted talking to Cochran, �The choice to go into the Chu Pong, a longtime enemy sanctuary [near the Cambodian border]) into which ARVN had never gone, was not mine. It was either that of General Knowles or the brigade commander.� Why did General Knowles remain silent instead of revealing to General Kinnard that was Colonel Hieu�s idea!

In a nutshell, Colonel Hieu knew damn well how to maneuver through the military system maze, how to walk through human resistance, how to bridle the mustang, in order to get the approval, the tool, the means, the cooperation, etc... everything to the minute details that were required to realize his master plan, everthing that you would think of that would jeopardize the effective use of B52 airstrikes to annihilate the three NVA regiments clustered together at staging areas in the Chupong-Iadrang complex.

It ought to be like that! He was the only one who had succeeded in conceiving and executing such an "out of this world" operational concept!

Phieu

#604 31 Dec 11, 04:08

His Checkmate Operational Concept

In the Chess Game Pleime, entering the counteroffensive phase (10/26), Colonel Hieu immediately foresaw the possibility to use B52 airstrikes to annihilate the three NVA regiments.

He achieved it in four (4) moves:

- herding move (10/27), operation All the Way with 1st Air Cav Brigade;

- enticement move (11/8), operation Bayonet I with 3rd Air Cav Brigade;

- distractive move (11/14), operation LZ X-Ray with 1/7 Air Cav Battalion;

- B-52 airstrikes (11/15-20)

- additional "coup de gr�ce" move (11/20,24), operation Thần Phong 7/Bayonet II with Airborne Brigade supported by 2nd Air Cav Brigade.

That was, in a nutshell, Colonel Hieu�s master plan which was translated into tactical maneuvers executed by General Knowles under the order of General Larsen.

This is a snippet. In order to understand it, one must review all the posts (#382, 396, 401, 402, 427, 438) pertaining to The Uniqueness of Pleime Offensive Operational Concept.

Simplicity is one among the nine principles in the conduct of war: MOSSMOUSE:

M=Mass

O=Objective

S=Security

S=Surprise

M=Maneuver

O=Offensive

U=Unit of effort

S=Simplicity

E=Economy of force

Phieu

#605 31 Dec 11, 09:07

A few last comments

The issue I have had to date revolve around sources and definitive statements. Kinda like a court case, you have direct evidence...and circumstantial evidence. There are some things I see:

Westmoreland did not have more knowledge on Oct 26, but was surely later on briefed about Colonel Hieu's master plan, if not in detail but at least in general outlines. Colonel Hieu would be totally foolish, if he did not make sure he got approval from General Westmoreland the use of B52 airstrikes which was the crux of his operational concept.

Any source to corroborate this? When it is said he was �surely briefed later�, sounds very opinionated. Also, the general outlines you referred to, do you think that would be kinda like a �concept of the operation�? Did a written concept of the operation exist? How about a written plan? I think this is the actual crux of the matter. No sources have been shown that directly state there was a grand battle plan. I can see how person that is not professionally learned in military operations may be able to, on some level, come to the conclusion there was a big plan. However, if one were to have made a career of the military (I am a 26 year veteran�and there are many others here with significantly longer periods of service, and level of responsibility than I) one would be educated in military institutions, schooled in doctrine, and actually perform duties on staff where one woul gain firsthand knowledge of how the Army works. To a Soldier, much of this does not make sense.

In support�not as the end all be all of the operation. A tool to be used as the situation permitted. This quote shows it as Knowles idea.

Unlike the relationship with 1s Air Cav where orders were given through Larsen, II Corps Command seemed to be able to give order directly to 5th SF Group Commander.

Source, please. This sounds like opinion. The only relationship between II Corps and IFFV that has been exhibited was one of �coordination�. Although it was for a time period just prior to the Ia Drang battle, if it changed, surely there would be a new order of battle created to show the new command relationships.

Colonel Hieu had this combined Vietnamese American Special Forces team inserted at 5 kilometers northeast of the camp with a dual mission: first was to study the enemy troop distribution around the camp to determine the enemy intention that could be either to overrun the camp or to lure and ambush the rescue force; second was to reinforce the camp (Pleime, chapter IV)

The cited source does not say that�exactly. The source is below. There is no mention of COL Hieu�s involvement in ordering this insertion. That would be an assumption then, would it not? This is my point with many things that have been said. Take, for example, the no prisoners order. I cited a source that showed the VC took two prisoners at Albany.

�In the morning 21 October, the Lu�̣t Task Force moved on, along the Phu My-Pleime axis but to simply conduct aggressive patrols within a 10 km radius! The order had been expressly given by II Corps Command to the T.F. Commander, Lt Col. Luat, to simulate the imminent approach of a relief column to the Pleime camp while in reality, he had to wait for more adequate and sufficient attachments which would be moved by air from Kontum and Binh Dinh to Pleiku, as soon as the weather conditions allowed the air movements.

In the same morning, at 0930, two companies of the 91st ARVN Special Forces Rangers were heliborne to about 5 km North-East of the Camp. It appeared as if a link-up between the Task Force and these two companies were to take place in the very afternoon! But it was rather an action to meet an emergency situation: the garrison had fought for 36 hours to withstand a five-time-stronger enemy force.�

The highlighted text is an assumption, not a fact. Please provide just one source that there was a grand plan in place prior to 14 NOV. Even just a �concept of the operation�. If the plan was this big, and this good, it would be a case study that would be taught in military academies.

On 11/13, General Larsen ordered General Knowles to go west.

Source? This is a definitive statement. In order for it to be accepted at face value it must be corroborated by a direct source. What I have seen is �circumstantial� evidence presented that this happened, but no direct corroboration.

Colonel Hieu did not give order directly to General Knowles or Colonel Brown, but always through General Larsen.

Source? Can you show just one direct example of where this happened?

There are no documents, including the two first hand sources Why Pleime and Pleiku Campaign that touch upon the relationship on a personal basis between General Knowles and Colonel Hieu; I think that about says it all. But I contend it goes even farther. There are no documents that show there was a grand plan. Even Why Pleime does not state definitively that there was a grand plan. That would have been right up front, in CH I, an outline of the master plan to destroy three regiments. Surely, if there was only once source in existence that would have stated it, would that not be the one?

however, there is mention regarding the close working relationship between the 1st Air Cavalry Division Forward Command and II Corps Command. The various documents show clearly that II Corps Command shared with 1st Air Cavalry Division Forward Command daily and real time intelligence reports as well as operation concepts: herding enemy troops, direction switching of operations as diversionary move, scheduling assault into LZ X-Ray to establish a blocking position, and using B52 carpet bombings to destroy the enemy.

Source? I have already stated that there is no concept of the operation presented that directly laid out, in terms of a grand plan, to conduct a phased operation. When did II corps see the opportunity to develop a grand plan? When did the planning start? How long did it take to complete? Was there a joint effort in planning? In my humble opinion, if one were planning on using assets that don�t belong to you �there is some coordination in advance. Any direct source? One would have to brief the master plan to gain approval from the US for use of their assets.

Sources are important. If I had turned research papers to my professors that did not cite sources, I don�t think I would have ever graduated college. Sources are not optional if you wish to revise what is known of history.

don744

#606 31 Dec 11, 10:37

Don

Good luck.

If you entirely rely upon the 'psychic pen' method of historic research, there can be need for such botherments such as: sources, other corroboration or any other external confirmation of blind assertions or bald assumptions.

I do encourage you and others, following this thread to google �psychic pen� to see where this is all coming from.

Logic, reasoned argument and a liberal application of the clue bat will get you nowhere.

Nonsense, all of it, and an utter waste of bandwidth besides.

Max Alcibiades

#607 31 Dec 11, 11:17

RedDagger18 :Hello Thread

Hi RedDagger,

Lot's of questions here...

Can you discuss the rates of movement during phase I?

How far west did phase I go?

Did the ARVN move mostly by compass, maps, dead reckoning, handrailing streams or rivers etc? I assume a combination of all these.

The "almost brooding" statement probably answers it, but when moving west from Plei Me, did it feel as it Chu Pong dominated the entire area up to Plei Me?

Would you consider Plei Me key terrain in the region? And so, why? If there were no SF Camp there, would the Plei Me area still be key terrain?

Can you speak on the subject of how the advisor system worked in Vietnam? What echelon did you advise? What was your reporting chain? how did that chain interact at II Corps level?

samtn99

#608 31 Dec 11, 11:23

My Very First Presentation of Pleime Campaign

It was done on Saturday April 21, 2001 at 1:15 pm

At Vietnam Center, Texas Tech University

2001 Annual Conference

�The Advisory Effort and the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam

20-21 April 2001

(http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/events/20...a_04-06-01.pdf)

When I walked up to the podium to present the Pleime Campaign, I saw at the corner of my eyes General Vinh Loc and Brigadier General Mataxis sitting right there in the middle of the first row. The view, to be honest, startled me a little bit and I panicked thinking I would make a fool of myself talking about Pleime campaign in front of those two individuals: the commanding general and the chief advisor of that campaign!

I inaugured my presentation with a note of caution: �Ladies and Gentlemen, we have here among the audience the distinguished presence of General Vinh Loc and Brigadier General Mataxis. They would surely fill up the gaps of my amateur account of the Pleime campaign, and would be glad to entertain your questions at the Q&A session after my presentation.

By the end of my presentation, I noticed that General Vinh Loc quietly sneaked out of the auditorium. As of Brigadier General Mataxis, he referred back to me all the questions raised by the listerners. When the session ended, he walked up to me and said, �Mon G�n�ral, well done!� I responded, �I am only General Hieu�s brother�. �I know. How come you know so well about the campaign. Were you within the inner circle of II Corps general staff team? I did not see you there �" "No, I was never there. I was a civilian at that time."

suddenly and ahead of time. His answer was, "You would handle the questions better than me. Your brother was really a good chief of staff."

Phieu

#609 31 Dec 11, 11:26

samtn99 : Would you consider Plei Me key terrain in the region? And so, why? If there were no SF Camp there, would the Plei Me area still be key terrain?

The camp at Duc Co was probably the most important feature in the area. Plei Me controlled the infiltration route going from the Chu Pong area to the Dak Payou Valley (aka VC Valley or Base Area 202 in MACV parlance) located on the Pleiku/Binh Dinh/Phu Bon border intersection. Remove the camp at Plei Me and there's nothing left of value there.

Boonierat

#610 31 Dec 11, 11:50

Why Pleime ?

Why the VC Chose Pleime Camp for their Winter Spring 1965-66 Campaign

The "point" this time would be the CIDG Camp of Pleime, 40 km South West of Pleiku. With a strength of 4 Companies of GIDG troops - most of them Highlanders - and two Vietnamese and US Special Forces A Teams, the Camp in fact did not differ from others which, unlike Pleime, had sustained many VC attacks. But in regard to the surrounding environment, the location of the Camp of Pleime is, on the contrary, a particular one.
It does not only serve as a check-point to impede to a certain extent the VC infiltration from their base in the Chu-Pong massif (40 km West of Pleime) and their sanctuary in Cambodian territory, but also act as an outpost to ensure an early warning for Pleiku City and the District town of Phu Nhon (20 km East).
Any pressure exerted by the VC upon the Camp thus compels II Corps Command at Pleiku to necessarily conduct relief operations. But therein lay the risks and the difficulties, because the only ground avenue of approach(2) to Pleime is Provincial route #5 which no longer deserves its name and has become as hazardous as a trail in the jungle for friendly displacement. It's perhaps enough to assume that since the terrain is disadvantageous for the rescuers then assuredly it favors the attackers and explains why the VC have selected Pleime and are convinced that it would be a success.

(www.generalhieu.com/why_pleime_chIII-2.htm)

Psychological Importance of a Defeat at Pleime Camp

Objectively speaking, Pleime does not present any strategic value. But it has been selected as a main objective because the enemy always tries to marry up tactics and propaganda, to adjust combat activities with psychological warfare. They intended to surprise us because they were convinced that the operations in An Lao and Kim Son, North of Binh Dinh had bound 6 battalions of the ARVN General Reserve, 4 battalions of the 22nd ARVN Infantry Division and three US helicopter companies to the coast. But our prompt maneuvers had shifted them into being surprised and losing the initiative.

(www.generalhieu.com/why_pleime_chVIII-2.htm)

Strategic Importance of Central Highlands for the French

The tenacity of the Viet Minh in carrying out their plan and their uninterrupted activities have shown the degree of importance they have conferred to the Highlands. Faced with failure, General Delange meditatively put down the following conclusion, before leaving Viet Nam:
" Whatever the future may be, due to their strategic position, their rough terrain and the scarcity of their population, the Highlands still provide the best natural infiltration routes for the enemy, as long as they do not give up their dream of aggression of South Viet Nam. Through these "corridors", all liaisons between the two regions would be carried out harmoniously and with the utmost secrecy".
It is therefore a big mistake to consider the Viet Minh increased tempo of activities in the Highlands in 1954 merely as a coordination within a vast campaign or as a counter-thrust to the French expansion. Because we should always keep in mind that in both the French and Viet Minh views, the battlefield of the Highlands is considered as a part of the war on the whole Indochinese peninsula, including not only Viet Nam but also Laos and Cambodia.
In a Viet Minh document entitled "Success in Lower Laos" (page 3), the enemy has explicitly stated:
"For the French, Lower Laos, Eastern Cambodia and the Western Highlands form a strategic triangle from where Southern Vietnam, Lower Central Vietnam, Cambodia as well as Middle and Lower Laos could be conquered".
On the other side, French Major General Delange, then Commander of the 4th Military Region (Hqs at Banmethuot), also wrote in "Campaign of Interzone V from 1 January to 31 July 1954" (pages 9-10) the following:
"In the concept of the Viet Minh High Command, the area stretching East-West from Quang Ngai to the Plateaus of Bolovens and North-South from Quang Nam to Pleiku is a "strategic compass" which could be used as a spring-board for expansion in almost all directions:
- Southward to the southern Plateaus and to Southern Viet Nam,
- Eastward to the coast,
-Westward to Lower Laos and Cambodia.
"Furthermore, with Middle Laos (to be liberated by Interzone IV), that area will constitute a large base in the very middle of the Indochinese peninsula. The control of that territory by the enemy will enable them to better coordinate their activities and regulate their forces between North and South and thus prepare for a "general counter-offensive". The positions and the terrain in this area formed by "the Northern Plateaus and the Bolovens" are considered well-fitting with the Viet Minh intentions and must be liberated in accordance with their plans".

(www.generalhieu.com/why_pleime_chI-2.htm)

In this regard General John C.F. Tillson commented:

3 December 1966
�It was indeed a pleasure to read your very fine book Why Pleime. I would like to add my congratulations to you for writing this important document and also for the very important part that you and your Vietnamese troops played in this important military victory.
Your book portrays very clearly the importance for the highlands to Viet Nam and also the significance and importance that the North Vietnamese Command places on the control of this strategic area. As I mentioned to you the other day, your book made me realize for the first time how important this area was in the 1954 Campaign�
Major General John C.F. Tillson, III
Operations, MACV and USFFV

(www.generalhieu.com/why_pleime_acknowl-2.htm)

Phieu

#611 31 Dec 11, 12:28

Max Alcibiades : If you entirely rely upon the 'psychic pen' method of historic research, there can be need for such botherments such as: sources, other corroboration or any other external confirmation of blind assertions or bald assumptions.

I do encourage you and others, following this thread to google �psychic pen� to see where this is all coming from.

Logic, reasoned argument and a liberal application of the clue bat will get you nowhere.

Nonsense, all of it, and an utter waste of bandwidth besides.

I see now. Had not made it that far into the other reading on the site. I have focused on the AARs, ORLLs, and Why Pleime. Until this minute, I was unaware this was largely a supernaturally guided recounting. Things are now much clearer.

don744

#612 31 Dec 11, 12:38

That�s the difference between an average planning and a master planning.

That�s also why it is more difficult to execute a troop withdrawal operation than an attack operation.

More reading � Art of Troop Withdrawal (www.generalhieu.com/retreat-2.htm)

Have you done this independent study or have you not?

I already handed out this assignment a while ago and gave a brief quiz: how many elements are there for a successful a big unit troop withdrawal? Did you take it? If yes, then how many correct elements did you get? Unless you got all 8 elements correct, I won�t be surprised if you have hard time grasping and accepting Colonel Hieu�s operational concept in the Pleime offensive into Chupong-Iadrang complex: to destroy the three NVA regiments -32d, 33rd and 66th- with B52 airstrikes. In particular, you won�t believe the possibility of its execution in three moves: herding � enticement � distractive. How could he possibly plan an operation like that! And you would come to this conclusion:

Phieu has been hallucinating! He is painting a hagiographic picture of his brother!

You know what: I won�t mind take credit of being the architect that had drawn up such a flawless and extremely professional master plan! I would certainly be considered a military genius, if not a real one but at least a virtual one� an armchair general � a genius nonetheless, am I not?!

But, with all honestly and modesty, I have to decline the honor. I know me. It is impossible that I could have conceived such an exceptional military operational plan along with its execution. No way, Jose�!

I, personally, have to give full credit to my brother, Colonel Hieu, II Corps Chief of Staff. You are free to concur or oppose.

Phieu

#613 31 Dec 11, 12:45

Max Alcibiades: Don

Good luck.

I do encourage you and others, following this thread to google �psychic pen� to see where this is all coming from.

Logic, reasoned argument and a liberal application of the clue bat will get you nowhere.

Nonsense, all of it, and an utter waste of bandwidth besides.

I still see potential value in the discussion, though this thread does seem to take more effort than others. All sources have to be taken with caution. I have no issue at all with people posting opinions or scientific wild ass guesses, it does help however when it is identified as such.

samtn99

#614 31 Dec 11, 12:52

Phieu : That�s the difference between an average planning and a master planning.

That�s also why it is more difficult to execute a troop withdrawal operation than an attack operation.

More reading � Art of Troop Withdrawal (www.generalhieu.com/retreat-2.htm)

Have you done this independent study or have you not?

Phieu has been hallucinating! He is painting a hagiographic picture of his brother!

But, with all honestly and modesty, I have to decline the honor. I know me. It is impossible that I could have conceived such a exceptional military operational plan along with its execution. No way, Jose�!

I, personally, have to give full credit to my brother, Colonel Hieu, II Corps Chief of Staff. You are free to concur or oppose.

Phieu, I've been trying to stay away from this issue as I can understand your family ties to the entire thing. You do however keep giving genius and master status to II Corps planning.

Was II Corps in charge of Dan Thang 21? That operation was very predictable (the PAVN seem to have had it down to almost every last detail) and lacking in any genius. Let's not even get into the fact it took days for an armored column to move less than 25 miles. Or that it was almost the exact same plan that was used every time Duc Co got attacked.

I would also like to see some discussion on the timing of the ARVN units at the end of the fighting when the PAVN slipped across the border. I suggest that it was done too late.

your thoughts?

samtn99

#615 31 Dec 11, 12:53

Some Vietnamese Military Tactical Move Jargons

Đi�̣u h�̉ ly sơn = Luring the tiger down from the mountain

Đại bàng xà xu�́ng = Eagle lunges

Lùa cá vào rọ = rounding up fish into the basket

Lùa ch�̀n vào b�̃y = herding foxes into a trap

Dương đ�ng kích t�y = Fake east attack west � Make noise east and attack west

Ti�̀n pháo h�̣u xa = artillery barrage ahead of tanks advance

Th�́ ch�n vạc = triangular formation

Nắm lưng qu�̀n mà đánh = grab the belts in fighting

Đánh đi�̉m di�̣t vi�̣n = attack an outpost to lure in and destroy the relief force

C�ng đ�̀n đả vi�̣n = lure and ambush

Đánh di�̣n di�̣t đi�̉m = Exert pressure against a secondary point and destroy the main point.

Phieu

#616 31 Dec 11, 13:55

Max Alcibiades: 'psychic pen'

Loved this...ROFLOL

Hey I'll provide these little "tid-bits"...

I only started to be aware of my brother expressing himself through me when I was writing the article Cover-Up of General Hieu's Death . I suddenly made the following statement without any hesitation: "Although this is an imaginative development, I think it follows closely with what really happened that day, because I am convinced it has been sketched under the spiritual guidance of my brother's spirit." That was on 25 August 1998.

myself happy for enjoying an intimate experience with my brother, whom I barely knew when he was alive (after his marriage, from August 1954 to March 1975, I only met him again 10 times), but now has become my closest friend!

Nguyen Van Tin

23 November 1998

https://nguyentin.tripod.com/cobut-2.htm .

heeheehee "Spooky Dude" on the loose.

KEN JENSEN

#617 31 Dec 11, 14:09

samtn99 : Phieu, I've been trying to stay away from this issue as I can understand your family ties to the entire thing.

Just one word of caution about what I mean by "psychic pen phenomenon".

Psychic pen is not something that is related to fictional, rather to factual. It produces evidence and proofs and it offers the right interpretations of facts. It connects the dots of seemingly unrelated facts and/or events.

That said, here are the two links to the psychic pen phenomenon:

In the Preface I wrote: "I am only an instrument of my brother. This Homepage is a self-expression of General Hieu." I am going to elaborate this affirmation.
I only started to be aware of my brother expressing himself through me when I was writing the article Cover-Up of General Hieu's Death . I suddenly made the following statement without any hesitation: "Although this is an imaginative development, I think it follows closely with what really happened that day, because I am convinced it has been sketched under the spiritual guidance of my brother's spirit." That was on 25 August 1998.
Prior to that day, in the beginning of July 1998, when I started writing my first article My Brother, General Hieu , I only felt a gentle nudge of inspiration to write. In it, I stated "My brother and I were not very close to each other" - right in the introduction - and "Without doubt, other people knew my brother better than me" in the conclusion. I was satisfied when this article was published in the 541st issue of Van Nghe Tien Phong magazine in the end of July 1998, and was hoping that article would trigger other people to take over the task of writing about General Hieu, because as far as I was concerned, I felt that I had already mustered everything I knew about my brother from my memory and mind. I was totally exhausted and caput.
But my brother did not desist! In the middle of July, he pushed me to send a letter to the Pentagon inquiring if they possessed any evaluation reports on General Hieu, written by American military advisors. The Pentagon responded that all significant documents pertaining to the Vietnam war era had been delivered in bulk to the National Archives three years ago. When I contacted the National Archives,
I was told that the following week, that was the third week of August, right when I had two weeks of vacation, all documents of the Vietnam war era would be released 100 percent to the general public to peruse. In hindsight, my brother turned on the green light at the right time. Were I to contact the Pentagon or the National Archives earlier, I would certainly receive from either of these two agencies a "Sorry, there was nothing on him" note, after having a clerk research superficially one or two boxes among the huge stacks of documents kept on a floor the size of a football field.
Besides the pile of documents that my brother selectively guided me in retrieving (him, consciously; me, unconsciously) from the National Archives (it was like searching for a needle in a hay stack), he also directed my nephew Dung, his eldest son, to suddenly fetch and give me a manila envelop containing pictures, three letters and the death certificate of my brother. During all those years, from 1975 to August 1998, we had ample opportunities to meet each other, at least once or twice every year, and even so, Dung had never mentioned this treasure of documents, even his other brothers and sisters did not know that he had in his possession all this memorabilia!
Back to New York, after I wrote the article Cover-Up , I had no difficulty posting up to the Internet the following articles: General Kills Self In Saigon Dispute, Evaluation of ARVN 22nd Division, American Advisors' Evaluation on General Hieu, A Discussion Session between General Hieu and General McAuliffe, Tuong Hieu Hop Voi Bo Chi Huy (Staff Meeting), Dieu Hanh Binh Doan (Orders of Operation), Hanh Quan Toan Thang 46 (Operation Total Victory 46), Hanh Quan Toan Thang 8/B/5 (Operation Total Victory 8/B/5), Hanh Quan Dat May Do Tham (Sensor Operation), and Co Van My Luong Gia Si Quan Su Doan 5 (Evaluation of 5 Division's Officers), I had only to type verbatim the existing documents written either in English or in Vietnamese or to make minor arrangements. These articles were like ready-made dishes that I needed only to warm up a little bit before serving.
At this stage, I thought I had completed my task. But no ... my brother did not think it was enough: starting from the middle of September, every morning at 3:00 a.m., I was awakened by him, turned on the computer, began typing without outline, without anticipating in advance how to begin and how to end, without having to make any correction on syntax, kept on typing, sentences came out with ease like water from a stream, straight to 5, 6 o'clock. I then went on preparing to get ready for work, all day long I did not feel tired or somnolent. Some female colleagues even teased me for having an enhanced good-looking appearance!

more reading... www.generalhieu.com/cobut-2.htm

I wrote in the Preface: "I am only the instrument of my brother. General Hieu's homepage is a self-expression." And in the Epilogue: Psychic Pen Phenomenon (1), I have briefly touched upon the psychic pen phenomenon that I have been experiencing while designing and constructing this homepage . At this present time, I would like to go further into detail about a few typical instances concerning this amazing psychic pen phenomenon (automatic writing is a more familiar term).
The Front Page Photo.
I obtained this photo not long prior to the time I started establishing General Hieu's homepage. It fell into my hands under the following circumstances: Following the days Saigon fell into Communists' hands in May 1975, one of my cousins passed by my brother's house in the Chi Hoa Officers Housing Complex and saw the house was turned upside down with papers and photos littered all over the rooms. She took home a few photos. In the end of 1989, she escaped by boat and brought along with her this photo with the purpose of showing it to the immigration authority as proof that she was related to a Vietnamese officer and thus would be admitted into the United States. Once in the United States, she gave it to my father. In the beginning of July 1998, when I needed a photo to illustrate my article My Brother, General Hieu on the Internet, my father gave to me the only photo as a general of my brother in our family's possession at that time. This photo is quite appropriate to this homepage in that it includes all elements expressed in this homepage: military, intelligentsia, virtue, religion, American advisors, etc... I realized that my brother had chosen this photo to be inserted into his homepage. If it is indeed so, he has laid the foundation for this homepage since 1975!
The Legend of Di Linh Leprosarium
When my cousin learned that I was writing about my brother, she told me that when she was still in Vietnam she had seen a photo of my brother taken with Monsignor Jean Cassaigne, the founder of the Di Linh leprosarium who was dying of leprosy at the Di Linh leprosarium. That photo was published in a book she had found in the library of a Benedictine Order in Thu Duc. I urged her to provide me with a copy of that book or at least a copy of that photo so that I could have proof that my brother used to spend time at a leprosarium. Otherwise, who would believe an army General's presence at such a place. Nonetheless, prior to obtaining any proof, when I wrote the article entitled Virtuous and Religious Traits in General Hieu, I wrote, or rather my brother made me write, that General Hieu used to visit Monsignor Jean Cassaigne at the Di Linh leprosarium.
Then one Saturday, I went to the Public Library on 42nd street to search for pictures of tanks. While I was scrolling down titles of books under the "Vietnam" section on a computer monitor, my eyes suddenly caught the title of a book in French: La Vie de Monseigneur Jean Cassaigne (Biography of Monsignor Jean Cassaigne). I immediately submitted a request for that book to be retrieved with the hope of finding that intriguing photo. To my great disappointment, it was nowhere to be found. Instead, I read the following sentence (in French): At 9:30 a.m. on April 12, 1972, Major General Nguyen Van Hieu entered the bedroom of Monsignor Jean Cassaigne and bestowed him with the 4th Degree of National Honor Medal." So, at least I got proof of General Hieu's appearance at Di Linh leprosarium.
Then, what happened next was incredible. My cousin went back to Vietnam to visit her family. She seized this opportunity to go back to the Benedictine Order's library in Thu Duc to seek out the book in which she had seen the photo in question, but the book was nowhere to be seen. That night, my brother appeared in her dream and ordered her to go up to Di Linh where she would find photos of him. The next morning, with apprehension, she made the trip to the remote area of Di Linh. And low and behold, when she was introduced into the visitors' room, she saw quite a few photos of General Hieu hanging on the walls! She was permitted to make copies of these photos and once back into the United States mailed them to me. And I put up two of these photos (1) and (2) on my web site. And so, my brother had urged me not to hesitate to write something, because he would provide me with the proof later on!
General Hieu, Deputy Commander of Corps 1.
When my brother was fired from the command post of the 5th Division after the battle of Snoul, I recalled vaguely he was transferred to Danang, Center of Vietnam, as Deputy Commander of Corps 1, under Commanding General Hoang Xuan Lam. But then when I tried to verify this fact among several officers - Captains, Majors, Colonels, and Generals - nobody seemed to recall my brother ever held that position in Danang. One day, Colonel Ta Thanh Long told me by phone that he was about to meet General Lam at a wedding ceremony and would ask him directly and in person that question. The following week I received a letter from him stating that General Lam's response was negative: "No, General Hieu had never been his Deputy Commander." General Hieu, seeing that everybody seemed to have a short memory immediately sent me - through the intermediary of my cousin - those photos taken at the Di Linh leprosarium in April 1972. One of these photos showed General Hieu wearing the insignia of Corp 1 ! Afterwards, I received a letter from General Lam apologizing for wrongly stating to Colonel Long that General Hieu had never been his Deputy Commanding General; he did so briefly!
Harvesting Documents At The National Archives.
When I was nudged by my brother into approaching the National Archives at the end of August 1998, my sole purpose was to find evaluation reports of American Advisors regarding General Hieu, because I thought those were the only types of documents that the American Advisors would have brought back from Vietnam.
Regulations and rules established at the National Archives were very strict: no pens are allowed in the building, pencils will be provided; no hats or handbags are permitted; all types of transcripts and photocopies must be reviewed and stamped at the exit; all documents are allowed to be copied but each time prior approval must be granted; all researchers are closely monitored, with archival staff showing up to ask questions at any infraction or suspected move; any request slip of documents must be accurately filled out and must be reviewed and countersigned by an archival staff prior to submission; the maximum of each request is 22 boxes loaded on a cart; the waiting time of each request is one hour and a half.
Because of all those strict regulations and rules, one must proceed with careful planning and decisive decision-making in the selection of documents to be copied. Initially, I was looking for pages in which General Hieu's name appeared and photocopied them. But at a very early stage, I commenced to function on an automatic pilot mode: choosing this page, discarding that page without knowing why or why not. I thus operated like a zombie, from 9:00 a.m. until 5:00 p.m., with one hour lunch break at noon time; starting on Monday and finishing on Friday of that week. I carried home a pack of approximately 400 pages of photocopied documents, not knowing how I would exploit and make use of these documents, because among them I only got 4 pages regarding evaluations of General Hieu.
But as one can see, the outcome was that, from these inordinate documents, my brother has produced more than 200 8"x11" pages discoursing about General Hieu. One should know that those articles were generated without any pre-planning from my part. Usually a sudden title sparked in my brain, then at 3:00 a.m. I went to my desk, turned on the computer, started to type without any outline, beginning the introduction paragraph without having any idea what the main body and what the conclusion would look like! Each time a backup document was needed, my hand just reached out and pulled out the right documents without any painful search. The writing process was extremely smooth and easy: I was working under my brother's guidance. In other words, my brother was using a psychic pen in me.
Someone suggested that I was able to write because I had the documents in hands. Let me offer you the following metaphor: You and I, we go to the supermarket and carry back home vegetables, meat, chicken, fish, etc... Once in the kitchen, you ask me to cook a 9-course meal, to which I vehemently protest because I have never learned how to cook. But then since you insist, I roll up my sleeves and attack my task of coming up with 9 dishes. You taste and like each one of them and scold me for having lied to you in saying I did not now how to cook! Dear reader, you should know I have produced more than 30 articles dealing with military subjects while I have no military background whatsoever! Was that not psychic pen phenomenon?

more reading ... www.generalhieu.com/giangbut-2.htm

I wrote this in the preface of my website:

But all of a sudden, in the end of May 1998, an unknown force within me directed me to go to my desk, turn on my computer and start typing the first words "Anh Toi, Tuong Hieu" (My Brother, General Hieu). Then, I kept on typing without an outline, without thinking clearly, without knowing all the details of a fact, without knowing the date of an event narrated, just typing in general. And thus, within two days, eight hours in total with interruptions, I wrapped up the article and sent it to be published in Van Nghe Tien Phong magazine. When my article appeared in the 541 issue at the end of July 1998, I devoured the article: I was surprised that the editor did not make any correction - since when am I such a good writer?
In a tandem with the article sent to VNTP, I also posted it into the Internet under the name of General Hieu's Homepage, black and white, just the naked article, without any pictures or illustrations.
I then received a few phone calls from friends who offered some details and suggested some corrections. From these inputs, I revised the article which increased from six to 16 pages!
Then I received phone calls and e-mails from strangers reacting favorably to my article, which enticed me into wanting to know more about my brother. I went into a frenzy process of researching, inquiring and was able to come up with "General Hieu's Military Career", based on information related to Generals whom I knew my brother was associated with.
Then I heard of and obtained the article " Major General Nguyen Van Hieu - Profile of a Competent and Virtuous General" authored by Colonel Trinh Tieu. I also found a chapter entitled "The Fate of a Patriot" about my brother in the "Fallen Leaves" authored by Nguyen Thi Thu Lam, a book forgotten among my father's piles of books.
I thought that was it. But something pushed me to contact the Pentagon, although I did not succeed with the CIA in the past: perhaps they might possess a dossier on my brother. The Pentagon advised me that after 20 years, which was 1995, all documents related to the Vietnam War had been declassified and sent in bulk to the National Archives. The National Archives told me I contacted them at the right moment because next week, the last week of August 1998, all documents related to the Vietnam War would be released 100 percent to the general public. Without saying, I hurried up to go down to Maryland and started hunting and fishing: not only did I find evaluation reports on my brother written by American Advisors, which was my initial intent, I also discovered other important documents I did not know exist, especially documents related to military operations and operation orders of General Hieu.
Furthermore, while in Maryland, unexpectedly one of my nephews without me asking, told me:"Do you want pictures of my dad?", resulting in me having all types of pictures of my brother, dating from the days prior to his entering the Military Academy in 1950 to 1975, even the three letters my brother wrote to his wife from the front-line, letters that none of my nephews and nieces knew were lying undetected among the piles of pictures all these years.
It seemed that my brother guided me to these pictures, to these letters, to the military documents so that they could be made known to the public about him, about his life, about his military exploits, about his abilities, and even about his unjust death. I got the impression that my brother's spirit engulfed me, manipulated my heart and my mind and dictated to me the articles signed Nguyen Van Tin in this Homepage.
I am only an instrument of my brother:
General Hieu's Homepage is a SELF-EXPRESSION.
Nguyen Van Tin
(25 September 1998)

(www.generalhieu.com/Loitua-2.htm)

Phieu

#618 31 Dec 11, 16:28

samtn99 : Phieu,

You do however keep giving genius and master status to II Corps planning.

Could I force it down your throat that II Corps planning is a stroke of genius and has a master status?

Not mentioning that Colonel Tung prepared his plan since the beginning of 1965 while Colonel Hieu had to improvise his counter-attack on the spot.

II Corps Commander decided to play the enemy's game.

(www.generalhieu.com/why_pleime_chIV-2.htm)

Was II Corps in charge of Dan Thang 21?

Sure it was.

Why Pleime - Chapter IV - Phase I - The "D�n Thắng 21" Operations - From 20 to 26 October 1965 - Lifting the Siege at Pleime

(www.generalhieu.com/why_pleime_chIV-2.htm)

Its order of battle: [chart]

That operation was very predictable (the PAVN seem to have had it down to almost every last detail)

It was to the credit of another chess master Colonel Tung who was known to be very meticulous in his preparation of an attack.

Through various battles prior to Pleime Battle, Colonel Hieu concurred with Colonel Mataxis, II Corps Senior Advisor, that Colonel Tung always calculated meticulously the respective strength of both sides in preparation of any attack, as is the case of Duc Co Battle:

The VC are well known for their meticulous gathering of intelligence prior to an operation. They carefully gather data not only on enemy strength to include number of troops, weapons and fortifications, but also the reinforcing capability of the headquarters controlling the zone in which they are in operation. When laying the groundwork for the attack at Duc Co the VC undoubtedly carefully calculated the number of troops garrisoning Duc Co and also estimated the troops available to the Special Zone and II Corps for a relief force.

and lacking in any genius.

Not lacking at all: It thwarted the ambush scheme, did it not? With a lesser number of troops (1000 versus 2000) and with the surprise of being able to bringing in artillery firepower to Phu My, which Colonel Tung did not expect at all.

Let's not even get into the fact it took days for an armored column to move less than 25 miles.

The delay and slow motion of the armored column was a counter-measure of the mobile ambush tactic used by the NVA ambush force:

In the morning 21 October, the Lu�̣t Task Force moved on, along the Phu My-Pleime axis but to simply conduct aggressive patrols within a 10 km radius! The order had been expressly given by II Corps Command to the T.F. Commander, Lt Col. Luat, to simulate the imminent approach of a relief column to the Pleime camp while in reality, he had to wait for more adequate and sufficient attachments which would be moved by air from Kontum and Binh Dinh to Pleiku, as soon as the weather conditions allowed the air movements.
�
Convinced that the first part of their plan - to ambush the relief column - was about to take place, the VC Field Front ordered the 32nd Regiment to leave its assembly area1.
It would be interesting to mention that large-scale ambushes by the VC have been in recent past conducted within the frame of the tactics of the war of movement. They no longer exist as static waylays.

Or that it was almost the exact same plan that was used every time Duc Co got attacked.

The NVA used the exact same plan � fake an attack on an outpost to lure in and destroy the relief force � with a difference: instead of a static waylay, it was a mobile ambush tactic.

I would also like to see some discussion on the timing of the ARVN units at the end of the fighting when the PAVN slipped across the border. I suggest that it was done too late.

The timing at the end of the fighting was perfect. The last two remnant enemy battalions were cornered at the narrow escape corridor in the Ia Drang valley by the five airborne battalions:

The intelligence estimate on enemy capabilities, made on 17 November indicated that nearly 2/3 of their strength had been wiped off through the engagements in Phases I and II.
II Corps Command thought it was time to throw in the reserve in order to put an end to the battle which had lasted for about one month. Besides suffering heavy losses, the enemy was compelled to fall into the trap set by friendly forces and canalized into the routes of withdrawal which we had foreseen.
This time the main effort was conducted by the ARVN Airborne Brigade whose mission consisted of destroying the fleeing VC units and all their installations around the Ia Drang valley. The 1st Air Cavalry Division which had thus far borne the burden of the attack would continue to exert a pressure from East to West and to provide artillery support for the Airborne Brigade. The operation - dubbed "Th�̀n Phong 7" - began in the afternoon, 18 November when the brigade was helilifted to the area of operations, immediately upon arrival in Pleiku.
...
On 24 November, as no more contacts were made with the enemy, the Airborne Brigade withdrew from the area of operations, terminating the third phase of the Battle of Pleime with 265 VC killed (BC), 10 others and 58 weapons captured.

(www.generalhieu.com/why_pleime_chVI-2.htm)

Phieu

#619 31 Dec 11, 18:07 RedDagger18 : Hello Thread

Do you allude specifically to Altus, Max and Ken?

Phieu

#620 01 Jan 12, 02:03

The Chess Grand Master Colonel Hieu.

Reading the Enemy�s Mind

The Viet Cong Field Front B3 made meticulous preparations for its Playm� campaign. This campaign was embedded in the Winter- Spring 1965-1966 campaign which the North Communist General Command started the planning since the beginning of 1965 aiming of taking control of the Central Highlands and at cutting South Vietnam in two along Highway 19 from Pleiku down to Qui Nhon.

Colonel Hieu was able to read the enemy�s mind.

Firstly, he recognized Field Front B3 was duplicating the tactics the Viet Minh was using in the Highlands in 1954 with some modifications consisting in a series of probing attacks -Thuan Man (6/29-7/1), Highway 19 (7/16-25), Duc Co (8/3-18), Highway 21 (8/19-9/2), Phu Cu, Bong Son, Phu Ly (9/23-10/2).

Then when the Viet Cong attacked Bong Son and Pleime simultaneously, he understood immediately an intent of dispersing II Corps forces, in compelling II Corps to commit at Bong Son front all of its reserve forces � Airborne Task Force 1 with four battalions and Marine Task Force Alpha with two battalions, together with 4 battalions from 22nd Division and three American troop transport helicopter companies (Why Pleime, chapter VIII):

They intended to surprise us because they were convinced that the operations in An Lao and Kim Son, North of Binh Dinh had bound 6 battalions of the ARVN General Reserve, 4 battalions of the 22nd ARVN Infantry Division and three US helicopter companies to the coast.

Furthermore, Colonel Hieu also knew that the Viet Cong used the tactic of �one main attack and two diversionary attacks �, with Bong Son as the secondary diversionary attack, Pleime the primary diversionary attack, and Pleiku the main attack, which means that to fake an attack at Bong Son to take over Pleime in a transitional phase leading to the conquest of Pleiku, the ultimate objective of the entire campaign.

When the Viet Cong attacked Pleime camp, based on the enemy troop distribution, 33rd Regiment at the camp and 32nd Regiment at the ambush site, Colonel Hieu deducted that the Viet Cong did not intend to overrun the camp and used the tactic of �lure and ambush� with the camp as the diversionary attack (the 33rd Regiment was a weaker combat force that the 32nd) and the ambush site as the main attack (the 32nd Regiment had more tactical experience than the 33rd).

Besides, Colonel Hieu knew that, not like in the past, the Viet Cong this time use the mobile ambush tactic, instead of the static waylay, due to the fact its regiment was equipped with adequate transmission devices for easy communications between the regiment headquarters and its ambush units (Why Pleime, chapter IV):

would be interesting to mention that large-scale ambushes by the VC have been in recent past conducted within the frame of the tactics of the war of movement. They no longer exist as static waylays. Such a change in the enemy maneuver of forces is dictated by the following reasons: 2) The VC could avoid losses inflicted by friendly prestrikes on the ambush sites.
3) Flexibility to respond to any contingency
4) They are able to apply such tactics because adequate means of communications are now at their disposal.

When the Viet Cong was compelled to withdraw after failing to �lure and ambush�, Colonel Hieu knew that Field Front B3 would wait for the arrival of 66th Regiment at Chu Pong in order to attempt a second time to conquer Pleime camp.

That insight into Field Front B3�s intention lead Colonel Hieu to conceive his checkmate operational concept of destroying the three NVA regiments with B-52 airstrikes as seen in previous posts.

Phieu

#621 01 Jan 12, 05:55

The Unfolding of Strategic and Tactical Moves ...

... leading toward the assault attack against the Pleime camp.

Based on the analysis of documents from the three participants in the Pleime battle - the South Vietnamese, the North Vietnamese Communist and the American - I draw up a strategic and tactical development that lead to the Pleime battle as following:

- In January 1959, with decree 15, the North Vietnamese Communist Politburo decided to take over South Vietnam by military force and ordered the construction of Ho Chi Minh trail.

- The South Vietnamese strategists anticipated that the North Vietnamese Communists could invade South Vietnam either in a frontal attack by crossing Ben Hai river, or in a lateral attack along the Ho Chi Minh trail, entering in the 1st Military Region (B1 Front or Region 5) or lower in the 2nd Military Region (B3 Field Front or Western Highlands). They built many strategic roads, such as National Route 14 connecting Ban Me Thuot, Pleiku, Kontum to Thua Thien, set up many outposts from the 17th Parallel along the Laotian border to Kontum. I Corps and II Corps conducted joint military exercices to counter potential North Vietnamese Army's either frontal or lateral invasion attacks.

- In 1962, 1963 and 1964, the ARVN repeatedly launched foray operations in Do Xa stronghold, a NVA troop's infiltration gate at the junction of Quang Ngai, Quang Tin and Kontum provinces.

- In August 1964, NVA 320th Regiment was dispatched to South Vietnam and arrived in Central Highlands in the beginning of 1965

- Beginning 1965, NVA 325th Division Command appeared in Central Highlands and took the command of all enemy efforts in the area. A switch to positional war and mobile warfare commenced. The North Vietnamese Communists planned to increase the combat strength to divisional level.

- From January to May, the first campaigns aimed at paralizing National Route QL 19 and controlling the northern part of Binh Dinh, in order to isolate the northern part of Central Highlands (Kontum and Pleiku) from the coastal area.

- In February, they challenged the Americans by having a team of VC sappers attacking Camp Holloway in Pleiku.

- In March, the Americans retaliated with Rolling Thunder air campaign by bombing North Vietnam, and the first American combat unit, 9th Marine Regiment, landed on Danang airbase on March 8 to protect the airplanes that flew air missions in the Rolling Thunder campaign out of that base.

- Immediately, the North Vietnamese Communist Joint General Staff decided to scare off the American troops and ordered 304th Division to ready to enter South Vietnam to attack this first American combat unit.

- In Region 5, that included Danang, General Chu Huy Man drew up a plan using 304th Division to inflict a damaging attack on this US Marine unit.

- From March to June, the American troops invaded in great number the coastal areas from Dong Ha up to the north to Chu Lai down to the south with more than two marine divisions, discouraging the North Vietnamese Communists from attacking the American unit garrisoned at Danang airbase.

- In July, the US 1st Air Cavalry was created and on July 28, President Johnson gave order to this unit to get ready to go to South Vietnam.

- Beginning July, National Route QL 21 and National Route QL 19 Bis were cut off, isolating the three northern provinces of Central Highlands - Pleiku, Kontum and Phu Bon.

- II Corps counter-attacked with Dan Tien 107 to relieve Thuan Man District (Phu Bon), with Than Phong 1 and 3 to clear QL 19 and 21 and reestablish resupply routes to Central Highlands.

- Also in the month of July, General Chu Huy Man was transferred to Western Highlands and B3 Field Front was created to launch the Winter Spring campaign aiming at slicing South Vietnam in two along National Route 19, from Pleiku to Quinhon, before the American troops swarmed into Western Highlands.

- Meanwhile, NVA 320th Regiment had been encircling camp Duc Co for a month; and by end of July, NVA 33rd Regiment was ordered to leave its base at Quang Ninh on a two month march to Western Highlands.

- Beginning August, units of US 1st Air Cavalry boarded a ship on a two-month voyage by sea to Quinhon. Meanwhile, an advance group composing 1.100 officers flew to Quinhon to make preparation to set up a camp at An Khe in the Western Highlands.

- Also around that time, the North Vietnamese Communist Joint General Staff received the attack plan of Pleime-Pleiku drafted by B3 Field Front and gave order to 304th Division Highlands to make preparation to get ready to enter Western Highlands to reinforce 320th Regiment and 33rd Regiment. Since the order given to 304th Division to be ready within 2 months, and the march down to the South required at least 2 months, one can assume that the plan had chosen December 1965 or January 1966 to be month M to start the Pleime-Pleiku campaign.

- In learning the American troops would be present in Western Highlands by end of September, on August 18, while the on-going training program was not yet completed, the JNVA Joint General Staff ordered the forward group of 304th Division to depart, and a week afterward came the turn of the entire 66th Regiment, as the battlefield situation demanded, without waiting for the two remaining regiments of the division, the 24th and the 9th, to be ready. The consequence was that instead of a complete division, only a division minus was dispatched. The plan of the campaign was to encircle camp Pleime with 320th Regiment, to destroy the ARVN relief task force with 33rd Regiment, to invade camp Pleime with 320th Regiment and 33rd Regiment. The belated 66th Regiment would participate in phase 3 of the campaign, and would joint force with 320th Regiment and 33rd Regiment to conquer Pleiku.

- By mid September, the ship Rose disembarked the first units of US 1st Air Cavalry at Quinhon. They prepared to be transported to An Khe beginning Octobre.

- Early October, B3 Field Front Command received the approval from the Joint General Staff of the Pleime campaign's plan.

- On October 19, B3 Field Front Command decided to start the Pleime campaign ahead of time as planned by ordering the attack on Pleime camp, while the American troops of US 1st Air Cavalry newly arrived at camp An Khe were not ready for combat, although the main force of 66th Regiment would not be present at the battlefield until November 1.

Phieu

#622 01 Jan 12, 07:12

Seven Days of Zap

Time Magazine
Friday, Nov. 05, 1965

Between the flat, metallic blasts of occasional mortar shells, the only sound in the camp was the rustle of rats shuffling over sleeping men. In the rifle pits behind the sandbagged perimeter of Plei Me, weary defenders sniffed the sour stench of cordite and unwashed clothes and grumbled about the duty. "Shut up," said a grizzled major. "This is what we're getting paid for." An enlisted man chuckled in the darkness. "Yeah, anybody who don't like the cooking can go right out the gate."

As eloquently as the gunfire or casualty lists, the G.I. gallows humor vented at the low point of Plei Me's siege last week, expressed the professionalism and grim resolve of the U.S. fighting man in Viet Nam. In the beleaguered camp, American soldiers weathered 178 hours of constant mortar and recoilless rifle barrage, fanatical assaults by wave on wave of mustard-uniformed North Vietnamese regulars, the endless thrum and thunder of close air support ("The Skyraiders looked like they were wired nose to tail," marveled one survivor), night after night in which land flares and blazing napalm turned the landscape into a Bosch-like rendering of the pit. By the end of the siege, only three of Plei Me's dozen Special Forces men were unwounded and on their feet. But the Americans were all ready to fight some more. "Are you a tiger, Swanson?" a doctor asked a gut-shot trooper at the hospital in nearby Danang. The man grinned weakly: "Yes, sir."

The Meat Grinder. The siege of Plei Me began two unsuspected days before the first shot was fired. Up to the triangle-shaped fort 20 miles from the Cambodian border crept sappers from two recently infiltrated North Vietnamese regiments. Working in darkness just 40 yards from the camp's wire-strung perimeter (see aerial photo), the cautious bo doi (infantrymen) cut trenches and L-shaped firing pits, hauled the dirt away in baskets and camouflaged their labors with brush. Though the camp's 400 montagnard defenders were patrolling assiduously up to ten miles away, no one thought to poke around his own front yard. Into each Communist pit went tidy stacks of ammo, a Chinese automatic rifle at one end, an ugly, snub-snouted 12.5-mm. antiaircraft machine gun at the other. Every emplacement was manned by a single gunner and designed so that he could scuttle quickly between his submachine-gun, trained on the camp, and the antiaircraft gun whenever fighter-bombers appeared.

With the siegeworks complete, fully 6,000 fresh Communist troops waited silently in the jungles around Plei Me. They had carefully set up another Dong Xoai-style battle, hoping to draw relief force after relief force into a merciless meat grinder. At 7:30 p.m. on Tuesday, Oct. 19, the Reds turned the handle.

full article .... www.generalhieu.com/pleime-time-2.htm

Phieu

#623 01 Jan 12, 16:57

don744 : Any source to corroborate this? When it is said he was �surely briefed later�, sounds very opinionated. Also, the general outlines you referred to, do you think that would be kinda like a �concept of the operation�? Did a written concept of the operation exist? How about a written plan? I think this is the actual crux of the matter. No sources have been shown that directly state there was a grand battle plan. I can see how person that is not professionally learned in military operations may be able to, on some level, come to the conclusion there was a big plan. However, if one were to have made a career of the military (I am a 26 year veteran�and there are many others here with significantly longer periods of service, and level of responsibility than I) one would be educated in military institutions, schooled in doctrine, and actually perform duties on staff where one woul gain firsthand knowledge of how the Army works. To a Soldier, much of this does not make sense.

This operational concept of Colonel Hieu was the type that General Schwarzkopf would marvel:

Never heard such thing at West Point, or General Staff and Command College, or War College.

Why would you need to see it in writing? You see its execution before your eyes!

When you follow a master chess game, you know there has to be a master plan, right? Do you need to see that master plan in writing in order to enjoy the master chess game?

"The original plan to employ strategic bombers in support of the division was presented by the Assistant Division Commander (ADC-A) through Field Force Vietnam Commanding General to the J-3 of US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam" (Pleiku, page 9)

In support�not as the end all be all of the operation. A tool to be used as the situation permitted. This quote shows it as Knowles idea.

Knowles just executed Colonel Hieu�s operational concept in the use of B52 airstrikes.

The B52 airstrikes had been scheduled to enter in action for 11/15. The 1/7 Air Cav Battalion was inserted at the footstep of Chu Pong to force the B3 Field Front to maintain its troops concentrated at the staging areas longer. Intelligence source indicated that these attacking troops were about to move out to attack starting 11/14. Who was supporting whom? B52s air force or 1st Air Cav ground force?

"Unlike the relationship with 1s Air Cav where orders were given through Larsen, II Corps Command seemed to be able to give order directly to 5th SF Group Commander."

Source, please. This sounds like opinion.

(G3 Journal/IFFV, 10/20):

The only relationship between II Corps and IFFV that has been exhibited was one of �coordination�.

IFFV did not have ground combat units under its command. Coordination existed only between II Corps and 1st Air Cav.

"Colonel Hieu had this combined Vietnamese American Special Forces team inserted at 5 kilometers northeast of the camp with a dual mission: first was to study the enemy troop distribution around the camp to determine the enemy intention that could be either to overrun the camp or to lure and ambush the rescue force; second was to reinforce the camp" (Pleime, chapter IV)

The cited source does not say that�exactly. The source is below. There is no mention of COL Hieu�s involvement in ordering this insertion. That would be an assumption then, would it not?

All the coordinated maneuvers of the armored relief task force, the 91st Ranger Battalion (-) and US Delta team, the 22nd Ranger Battalion, were executed under the direct command of II Corps/Colonel Hieu.

"General Larsen surely didn�t not act erratically and on the whim when he dropped in General Knowles� Forward CP from time to time to issue order. He must knew about Colonel Hieu�s master plan in issuing that was dictated by the enemy�s movements."

The highlighted text is an assumption, not a fact. Please provide just one source that there was a grand plan in place prior to 14 NOV.

If General Larsen did not act according to a master plan, then he acted erratically and on the whim. If not, then he had to have a master plan, which could not be his, because he was not positioned at the operational headquarters established for the conduct of the Long Reach operation: II Corps/Colonel Hieu � 1st Air Cav FCP/General Knowles. Conclusion?

Even just a �concept of the operation�. If the plan was this big, and this good, it would be a case study that would be taught in military academies. I

t should be by now!

"On 11/13, General Larsen ordered General Knowles to go west".

Coleman, page 196: "That day [Nov 13], General Larsen was visiting the division�s forward command post at the II Corps compound. He asked Knowles how things were going. Knowles briefed him on the attack on Catecka the night before and then told him the brigade was drilling a dry hole out east of Plei Me. Larsen said, �Why are you conducting operations there if it�s dry?� Knowles�s response was, �With all due respect, sir, that�s what your order in writing directed us to do.� Larsen responded that the cavalry�s primary mission was to �find the enemy and go after him.� Shortly after, Knowles visited Brown at the 3rd Brigade command post and told him to come up with a plan for an air assault operation near the foot of the Chu Pongs."

"Colonel Hieu did not give order directly to General Knowles or Colonel Brown, but always through General Larsen."

Source? Can you show just one direct example of where this happened?

Each time General Larsen gave ordered to General Knowles, did he do it on his own initiatives?

"There are no documents, including the two first hand sources Why Pleime and Pleiku Campaign that touch upon the relationship on a personal basis between General Knowles and Colonel Hieu;"

I think that about says it all.

You left out the following however, there is mention regarding the close working relationship between the 1st Air Cavalry Division Forward Command and II Corps Command. The various documents show clearly that II Corps Command shared with 1st Air Cavalry Division Forward Command daily and real time intelligence reports as well as operation concepts.

But I contend it goes even farther. There are no documents that show there was a grand plan. Even Why Pleime does not state definitively that there was a grand plan. That would have been right up front, in CH I, an outline of the master plan to destroy three regiments. Surely, if there was only once source in existence that would have stated it, would that not be the one?

Pleime,cu�̣c chi�́n lịch sử, page 94, the Vietnamese version of Why Pleime alluded to this grand plan at the end of phase 1 and beginning of phase 2 (I already quoted this paragraph):

The battle from phases 2 and 3 also introduced an aspect never seen up to now because for almost 20 years, during the Franco-Vietnamese war, seldom pursuit operation was considered after each time the enemy made appearance and when it was conducted, no significant results had been achieved. Therefore this time around, the determination not to allow the enemy to escape, coupled with the solid intelligence on the enemy situation had permitted the battle to develop to maximum degree and scale and at the same token lead to the biggest victory ever achieved by the ARVN and its Allied.

"however, there is mention regarding the close working relationship between the 1st Air Cavalry Division Forward Command and II Corps Command. The various documents show clearly that II Corps Command shared with 1st Air Cavalry Division Forward Command daily and real time intelligence reports as well as operation concepts: herding enemy troops, direction switching of operations as diversionary move, scheduling assault into LZ X-Ray to establish a blocking position, and using B52 carpet bombings to destroy the enemy."

Source?

I have already stated that there is no concept of the operation presented that directly laid out, in terms of a grand plan, to conduct a phased operation. When did II corps see the opportunity to develop a grand plan?

When did the planning start?

On October 26

How long did it take to complete?

Not long. Only its execution took long: 10/27, 11/8, 11/11, 11/13, 11/14 and 11/15-20.

Was there a joint effort in planning? In my humble opinion, if one were planning on using assets that don�t belong to you �there is some coordination in advance.

Obviously yes, since B52 airstrikes had to be coordinated between 1st Air Cav FCP, IFFV and MACV.

Any direct source? One would have to brief the master plan to gain approval from the US for use of their assets.

The fact B52 airstrikes had not been used as a tactical move but a strategic move, it had to be a master plan for that, and thus yes it should have been approved by General Westmoreland, and yes somebody ought to have briefed him about that master plan.

You witness the fact. Do you need to see the source before believing what your eyes see?

Maybe one day, somebody might be able to dig out that direct source!

Phieu

#624 01 Jan 12, 19:12

Phieu : Why would you need to see it in writing? You see its execution before your eyes!

Here is the crux of the matter, you want me to prove a negative. I can also make a claim I know that the truth is that Gen William Rosson (GEN Westmoreland's Chief of Staff) secretly passed the whole grand plan to COL Hieu on Westmoreland's insistence, in order to instill confidence and bolster cooperation between forces. He had received a master's degree in international relations from Oxford University, so he was well versed in cooperative effort and understood the importance of a strong relationship between allied forces. He worked in secrecy, because he knew that had the secret liaison with COL Hieu been known, it would totally destroy confidence in II Corps. So sensitive was the issue, the whole plan must be executed with the highest degree of secrecy to ensure there was absolutely no tie between Westmorelands' or Larsen's staff. Nothing was written, it was entirely verbal, but so masterfully conceived one did not need to commit it to paper.

Do you see my point yet? Prove me wrong. Before I can even think about accepting some of the more radical views expressed, I must become more educated in facts. The discussion we have had has made me think, and read on a subject I would not likely have taken the time to research had you not began posting here. Thanks for that.

don744

#625 01 Jan 12, 22:23

The thing is that the pre-requisite of the feasibility of such a plan is the solid intelligence of the enemy situation by the minutes, the hours, and the days and know if and when the three NVA regiments would have concentrated to the point of becoming targetable by B-52 airstrikes. Did Westmoreland and Rosson have that?

Phieu

#626 02 Jan 12, 01:51

What if there was no master plan for Bayonet I operation?

Then, on 11/8, after replacing the 1st Air Cav Brigade, General Knowles would lunge his 3rd Air Cav Brigade forces into Chu Prong in a search and destroy mission.

And the operation would ended up similar to be just a �walk in the park�, just like the 1st Air Cav Brigade in the All the Way operation (Coleman, page 186):

After the 1st Brigade battalions generally lost contact with the remnants of the 33rd Regiment on November 7, Kinnard said, in Army Magazine, that, �I had been planning to replace the gallant, but spent, First Brigade with the Third Brigade, commanded by Colonel Thomas W. Brown, and this seemed a logical time to do so.� The general might have been indulging in a bit of hyperbole. The units of the 1st Brigade unquestionalby were gallant, but spent? The 2/12 Cav had spent the longest period in the field, eighteen days total � but its days in contact numbered about five. The 2/8 had fourteen days in the valley and only two days of hard contact. The 1/8 Cav�s one company had one day of contact, while the others had none. And the 1/12 Cav had only its reconnaissance platoon truly get shot at in anger. Compared to times in the field by units later in the war, this was a walk in the park.

Furthermore, there would be no opportunity whatsoever to make use of B-52 airstrikes, since the three NVA regiment forces would never regroup to the point of becoming targetable for B-52 airstrikes!

Then, after a few weeks with sporadic engagements more or less significant, General Kinnard would say, "I had been planning to replace the gallant, but spent, Third Brigade with the Second Brigade, and this seemed a logical time to do so."

Then, again after a few weeks with sporadic engagements more or less significant, General Kinnard would say, "I had been planning to replace the gallant, but spent, Second Brigade with the First Brigade, and this seemed a logical time to do so."

So on and on, into an exercise of utmost futility of an endless circular troop unit rotation maneuverings...

Phieu

#627 02 Jan 12, 03:42

Phieu : the solid intelligence of the enemy situation by the minutes, the hours,

Oh yeah? So why not just call those BUFFs in on these "solidly established" positions instead of playing Go?

altus

#628 02 Jan 12, 03:46

Phieu : When you follow a master chess game, you know there has to be a master plan, right?

Nope. Even in Chess, like War, a Plan gets modified as soon as the Battle starts. Your use of Chess almost tells me you haven't studied many "master" chess games.

I have played well over 10,000 chess games. I have studied hundreds of "Master Chess Games". I've also read hundreds of different analysis of the same game by different Chess Masters. Many of them don't agree on what the original plan was.

Each Master Chess player knows the basics related to "solid play"...

Control the Center
Develop your "pieces"
Castle early
When dealing with "minor" pieces, such as Knights and Bishops, they are more powerful when working as a team of "like" pieces.
"Doubled Pawns" are a weakness
etc. etc.

I can go on for a while and teach you the more "finer" aspects of the game of Chess. I highly doubt your Brother or "his" enemy were "Master" level Chess players.

Do you need to see that master plan in writing in order to enjoy the master chess game?

Yep! In reality that is why the players (or connoisseurs of the game) note each and every move. That is also the reason for After Action Reports, and Lessons Learned Reports; and the "study" of Battles and/or Operations.

Chess and War are two different things. In War you can function with "pieces" and territory that may be "unseen" and/or "unknown", and there are NO Rules. Where in Chess all is known and seen, and always follow certain "rules".

I doubt your Brother knew all the "pieces" he or his enemy had available.

KEN JENSEN

#629 02 Jan 12, 05:41

KEN JENSEN : Nope. Even in Chess, like War, a Plan gets modified as soon as the Battle starts. Your use of Chess almost tells me you haven't studied many "master" chess games.

A Plan that needs to be modified as soon as the battle starts is not a Master Plan.

A Master Plan is a Plan that needs minor adjustments due to unexpected moves from the opponent.

A Great Master Plan is a Plan that does not need any adjustment at all; it forsees and dictates all the opponent's moves.

(A note: Kasparov accused IBM of cheating in order to beat him by making adjustment/modification: "After the loss, Kasparov said that he sometimes saw deep intelligence and creativity in the machine's moves, suggesting that during the second game, human chess players had intervened on behalf of the machine, which would be a violation of the rules. IBM denied that it cheated, saying the only human intervention occurred between games.")

It is believed that a genius operational concept once passed on to the hands of the field commander for execution, its author can go to sleep...

I have played well over 10,000 chess games.

Good for you.

First of all, the crux in differences between genius and experience is in number. If you are a genius, you don't need experiences and are capable to produce a masterpiece at first strike. And if you are not, even with well over 10,000 chess games you still do not become a master chess player, and apparently, you might still not be sharp enough to read a master plan unfolding in front of your eyes.

I've also read hundreds of different analysis of the same game by different Chess Masters. Many of them don't agree on what the original plan was.

That does not preclude there is such an original master plan, especially in the case of a great master plan...

I can go on for awhile and teach you the more "finer" aspects of the game of Chess. I highly doubt your Brother or "his" enemy were "Master" level Chess players.

I know. I am not a chess player. My brother was a very good chess player, though. Richard Peters, the American Consul General in Bien Hoa, told me:

I had no family with me at that time, and General Hieu's family was in Saigon. I often invited him for dinner, because I had a very good Vietnamese cook who liked to prepare for us delicious dishes. We played western chess. He taught me Chinese chess. Sometimes we played the two types of chess one after the other. He always won!

(www.generalhieu.com/peters-2.htm)

I might venture to say a chess master at the same level as his competence in mahjong:

General Hieu excelled in many different areas, even in mahjong. One night, personnel of the General Staff relaxed in a tent, after a hard-working day during an out-of-field operation. A Lieutenant Colonel friend of mine taught me how to play mahjong. General Hieu was passing by and saw us played. However, he did not say a word and proceeded to the open sky shower quarters to take his bath. On his way out, he approached our table, made himself comfortable, and proceeded to show us several astute moves of this complex game. He then stood up and said: "It is good to know how to play mahjong, but be aware of becoming addicted to it: it could ruin one's life."

(www.generalhieu.com/SD22-2.htm)

Yep! In reality that is why the players (or connoisseurs of the game) note each and every move.

And yet, you seem not to note Colonel Hieu's each and every move, and are not even be able to appreciate when somebody else points each and every such move to you!

That is also the reason for After Action Reports, and Lessons Learned Reports; and the "study" of Battles and/or Operations.

Yes, but provided that you are at the level to comprehend them.

Not much difference. But yes a good chess player is not necessary a good strategist and tactician.

You are a perfect illustration for this...

I doubt your Brother knew all the "pieces" he or his enemy had available.

Just enough to defeat his opponent.

Phieu

#630 02 Jan 12, 05:43

altus: Oh yeah? So why not just call those BUFFs in on these "solidly established" positions instead of playing Go?

Hey, Altus, you bother to argue with a lunatic?

I think RedDagger 18 is alluding to you, Altus in the following: �I am finding this whole exchange interesting, tho' in and out in sporadic bursts. I am sad to continue to read a whole lot of bullshit carping about who said what and when, who is slandering others, etc. That gets in the way of the whole discussion. So, let's put our egos on hold or on the shelf, and simply contribute thoughtful comments so that we all can learn. RedDagger18�

Phieu

#631 02 Jan 12, 06:14

altus : Oh yeah? So why not just call those BUFFs in on these "solidly established" positions instead of playing Go?

From post #530

don744 : If we had pinpoint minute to the minute intel, we would have just called in the B-52s from the start and not have messed around with inserting troops.

Just a question...I had asked earlier, but never got your thoughts.

Phieu: A Plan that needs to be modified as soon as the battle starts is not a Master Plan.

The BEST plan does not survive first contact. That is a universal truth for Soldiers. I believe had you actually served in the military you would never have made that statement. I dont say that to be harsh, it is just an observation. I have had this thought concerning several tidbits of information that have been posted.

don744

#632 02 Jan 12, 06:23

Phieu : Hey, Altus, you bother to argue with a lunatic

Not really. Consider this a compassionate wake-up call before your imminent free fall.

altus

#633 02 Jan 12, 06:29

Phieu: A Plan that needs to be modified as soon as the battle starts is not a Master Plan.

A Master Plan is a Plan that needs minor adjustments due to unexpected moves from the opponent.

A Great Master Plan is a Plan that does need any adjustment at all.

heeheehee, only in your "mind".

From what little I've read so far, your brother was not the "Master Planner" for the operations surrounding the Ia Drang Valley "Tactical" operations for the period in question.

It is believed that a genius operational concept once passed on to the hands of the field commander for execution, its author can go to sleep...

"Sleep", yeah right. If your brother had to make calls based on minute-by-minute Intel and Battle situations, he sure wasn't getting much sleep. Again, you make somewhat "dream like" statements attempting to keep your "Great Master Plan" from falling to the wayside.

As I stated previously, multiple Master Chess Players study the same great match and come up with differing conclusions as to the "why" a move or sequence of moves was performed. You write your opinion based on other's material and make a single conclusion that you expect everyone to agree with you. Sorry, Phieu, I was expecting to learn a lot from you based on ARVN points of view. You have disappointed me.

KEN JENSEN

#634 02 Jan 12, 06:46

What is the difference between these two quotes?

1. It is believed that after a [sic] commanding general conceived a master plan, he can go to sleep after releasing it to the field commander. Post 536

2.It is believed that a genius operational concept once passed on to the hands of the field commander for execution, its author can go to sleep... Post 629

The first thing that jumps out at me is that #1 applies to the �commanding general�, and #2 allows for application to a lesser entity. Modified possibly in a way to make it better fit the scenario. Do you have any idea of the actual role of a Chief of Staff? I mean a doctrinal definition of the position? That may help you understand more the difficulties with acceptance of your message.

don744

#635 02 Jan 12, 06:49

don744 : From post #530

"If we had pinpoint minute to the minute intel, we would have just called in the B-52s from the start and not have messed around with inserting troops."

Just a question...I had asked earlier, but never got your thoughts..

B-52 airstrikes were scheduled to enter in action Nov 15.

NVA troops got orders to move out of the staging areas on Nov 13.

1/7 Air Cav was inserted on Nov 14 to force B3 Field Front to retain its troops clustered at staging areas longer. That morning some recon teams and transportation units began to move out the staging areas.

Without this distractive move, the NVA troops would have dispersed long before the arrival of B-52s that would strike an empty target!

(Note: this is heavy military knowledge stuff! I can understand it went over your head ... I should not have assumed that you knew it already and mistakenly just made mention of the notion of "staging area" without explaining what it entailed.)

"The BEST plan does not survive first contact." That is a universal truth for Soldiers. I believe had you actually served in the military you would never have made that statement. I dont say that to be harsh, it is just an observation. I have had this thought concerning several tidbits of information that have been posted.

Where do you think all those "professional military stuffs" that I have acquired come from then ?

A lot of times, no knowledge at all is better than a little bit of knowledge. It keeps your mind more receptive, devoid of prejudices and preconceptions.

Phieu

#636 02 Jan 12, 06:56

altus: Not really. Consider this a compassionate wake-up call before your imminent free fall.

Thanks for your compassionate feeling Mr. the Wolf disguised as a sheep.I can picture you circling around waiting for the kill!

Phieu

#637 02 Jan 12, 06:58

don744 : What is the difference between these two quotes?

1. Post 536

2. Post 629

It 's just happen in this particular case that the author and the executor of that operational concept are the same person!

This response addresses to Ken too.

Phieu

#638 02 Jan 12, 07:23

Phieu : It 's just happen in this particular case that the author and the executor of that operational concept is the same person!

This response addresses to Ken too.

What about the role of a chief of staff? Can you provide the answer to that question. You kind of sidestepped that one.

Don: I believe had you actually served in the military you would never have made that statement.

Phieu: Where do you think all those "professional military stuffs" that I have acquired come from then ?

From you. I dont necesarily believe everything you have presented is "professional military stuffs". I think it is your best effort to explain something that you didn't have the full ability to explain. At some point you are going to "hit the wall" so to speak, as you lack real life practical application of the concepts you throw out there as fact. If you took the time to consider the point of view of people that were actually educated, worked, and lived in the military, you may temper your viewpoint a bit and come to a better understanding of what happened.

In regards to your thread...what is the end state here? 100 pages of "yes he did...brilliant, genius, master plan" and "no way...impossible, AAR, sources". Since you and I have been in dialogue, I have not one time seen, "I see what you mean" or "you make a valid point". I see some big holes in the scenario you present, which have directly led me to understand that you lack institutional understanding. You have people here that can fill-in-the-blanks for your lack of understanding of the military, and better help you understand your brothers role, if you wish to do that.

don744

#639 02 Jan 12, 07:23

Phieu : Without this distractive move, the NVA troops would have dispersed long before the arrival of B-52s that would strike an empty target!

Not good...still walking asleep...ok, one more wake-up call:

Since you have accurate to-the-minute intel on the enemy's location, what prevents you from calling the BUFFs say half an hour prior to TOT so they can update the grids? Or from masterful timing the BUFF's TOT so that the enemy were bombed while asleep?

Since your "master" could not do that, we can project that the whole to-the-minute intel thingy was just another Ship High in Transit.

altus

#640 02 Jan 12, 07:28

Phieu : Then, on 11/8, after replacing the 1st Air Cav Brigade, General Knowles would lunge his 3rd Air Cav Brigade forces into Chu Prong in a search and destroy mission.

And the operation would ended up similar to be just a �walk in the park�, just like the 1st Air Cav Brigade in the All the Way operation (Coleman, page 186):

Furthermore, there would be no opportunity whatsoever to make use of B-52 airstrikes, since the three NVA regiment forces would never regroup to the point of becoming targetable for B-52 airstrikes!

Then, after a few weeks with sporadic engagements more or less significant, General Kinnard would said, "I had been planning to replace the gallant, but spent, Third Brigade with the Second Brigade, and this seemed a logical time to do so."

Then, again after a few weeks with sporadic engagements more or less significant, General Kinnard would said, "I had been planning to replace the gallant, but spent, Second Brigade with the First Brigade, and this seemed a logical time to do so."

So on and on, into an exercise of utmost futility of an endless circular troop unit rotation maneuverings ...

Ken, Don, etc.

I have shown you what would have happened if there was no master plan.

No need to go into further tiny bit arguments. You don't have to accept my take of the master plan of Colonel Hieu, if it is over your comprehension. I think I have presented it clear enough, that does not warrant any further clarification.

Let's move on...

Phieu

#641 02 Jan 12, 07:31

altus : Not good...still walking asleep...ok, one more wake-up call:

Since your "master" could not do that, we can project that the whole to-the-minute intel thingy was just another Ship High in Transit.

Do you know how long it took B-52s to fly from Guam to Central Highlands? Not half an hour for sure.

It's eight hours, for Chirst's sake!

Some wake-up call you threw at me, Altus! You owe one to yourself.

Phieu

#642 02 Jan 12, 07:33

Yes. You on the other hand seem to have no idea what TOT is and what SAC/USAF are capable of.

altus

#643 02 Jan 12, 07:42

My post #640 applies to you too, Altus.

If you are my student, I would classify you student category e.

e. He was a repeater category d. student,
- I would just flatly tell him to shut up;

category d. being

d. He just wanted to show off in front of the class,
- I would demonstrate to him how swallowed and limited his knowledge still is (that would certainly humiliate him in front of the class and shut him up) and would move on with the lesson;

Phieu

#644 02 Jan 12, 07:53

Phieu: Let's move on...

Move on to what? So far you have 100% of the class in disagreement with your lesson. How can you move on at this point? If you are not capable of considering other points of view, or responding to direct questions, this thread is at an end as far as I am concerned.

don744

#645 02 Jan 12, 08:15

Phieu : Ken, Don, etc.

I have shown you what would have happened if there was no master plan.

No need to go into further detail arguments. You don't have to accept my take of the master plan of Colonel Hieu, if it is over your comprehension. I think I have presented it clear enough, that does not warrant any further clarification.

Let's move on...

heeheehee, I don't just want to move on.

And I'm sure our U.S. Generals didn't put to much "salt" into your Brother's Genius of a Plan.

I know U.S. Generals do take their subordinates advice from time-to-time (good ones anyway). I do believe that your Brother could not plan for, call or initiate any B52 strikes, or any other U.S. assets, unless some U.S. Officer authorized to do such, did it for your Brother. Your Brother's Master Plan was "wishful thinking".

In summary, so far, it seems your Brother's genius of a Master Plan relied on assets not at his disposal. And you, and possibly even your Brother, felt the American Leadership was "lacking" and your Brother should have been in Command.

Our U.S. Generals, in Vietnam, didn't take any orders from any Vietnam Officer and/or even the President of S. Vietnam. Do you get the picture now?

KEN JENSEN

#646 02 Jan 12, 10:18

Sorry, Ken,

Your military knowledge remains at the level of a platoon leader, who has the audacity to despise a II Corps chief of staff's knowledge and skills, instead of remaining humble and willing to learn.

I have to classify you as student category f and g

f. He was not at the level of the class,
- I would request that he be put down to a lower level grade;

g. He was just too obtuse,
- I won�t bother to explain further to him and just moved on for the entire class and hoped and prayed the best for him.

Phieu

#647 02 Jan 12, 10:23

don744: Move on to what?

I still have things to present you know. The 14976 views are staring at you; they pretty sure want to move on...

So far you have 100% of the class in disagreement with your lesson.

Whole class?

Sorry, Don, I have to classify you as student category b, since your questions show you have not reviewed the previous lessons thoroughly.

b. He did not review previous lessons, and so did not understand this lesson,
- I would tell him to review his lessons first;

and you can continue to hang on to the class.

How can you move on at this point? If you are not capable of considering other points of view, or responding to direct questions,

I am very capable of that. Look back and see how many direct questions I have entertained, from other serious "questionneurs" and from you.

Otherwise I have to classify you as student category g.

g. He was just too obtuse,
- I won�t bother to explain further to him and just moved on for the entire class and hoped and prayed the best for him.

this thread is at an end as far as I am concerned

You can leave this class as you so choose, I just hope and pray the best for you. And thanks for your valuable participation to this thread.

Phieu

#648 02 Jan 12, 11:43

Side bar: Master Plan of Pleime Offensive �

� was known at the highest American military authorities level � MACV (Coleman, page 193):

Despite this plethora of intelligence to the contrary at the field commanding level, Kinnard, acting on the orders from Task Force Alph (the American command�s euphemism for a corps headquarters), told Brown to begin his search south and east of Plei Me. For some reason, Swede Larsen and his staff, and probably the operations and intelligence people up the line at MACV as well, were convinced that some of the North country about fifteen kilometers from the Plei Me camp, and they were adamant that the Cav should start turning over rocks in that area.

Coleman was accurate in terms of the level of decision-making but not quite on the reason given for the switch in operational direction from west to east: enticement diversionary move. The B3 Field Front Command bit the 3rd Air Cavalry Brigade�s enticement diversionary move and made plan for a second attack set for November 16 (Pleiku, page 76):

Convinced that friendly forces had lost tracks of its units, VC Field Front quickly made a decision to regain its advantage with an attack. The target again was Pleime and the date of attack set at 16 November.

Phieu

#649 02 Jan 12, 13:30

Phieu,

Leave off the attack stuff and stick to the historic facts. I enjoy your historic points in this thread.

DeltaOne

#650 02 Jan 12, 13:49

Astonishingly, I have been able to juggle the two attack stuff and historic facts at the same time! I think.

However, I gladly oblige, just tell those distractors to shup up, please.

Never mind, I won't respond to them anymore, just ignore their clamors instead.

I am extremely glad in knowing you enjoy my historic points in this thread.. Tha't my sole intention anyway.

Phieu

#651 02 Jan 12, 16:47

Phieu : I still have things to present you know. The 14976 views are staring at you; they pretty sure want to move on...

WOW, 14976 views; I'm so thrilled it creates "goose bumps on my legs". ROFLOL.

I wonder how many of those views were done by myself, Altus, Boonie etc. etc. and/or other forum members?

Boonie has 46 post.

I have 44 posts (45 now).

Altus has 74 posts.

Don744 has 47 posts.

One could easily multiple each of the above by a factor of 20 or more views before even deciding to make a post. heeheehee, except Boonie of course, his job seems to be to view every post.

What a strange "spooky dude" you are Phieu. Hey, you have stated you get your thoughts from the "spirit world"; and you are a "fictional" Author who mixes "gleaned" facts and other "Authors" writings with your pretend world.

Your problem is trying to sell this "history" forum your "dreams".

How's the "Thread Rating" average impress you? I've never seen such a LOW rating on a thread that has had as many views as this one. ROFLOL!

KEN JENSEN

#652 02 Jan 12, 17:39

It's 15589 now!

15589-14926= 1463 in 24 hours! Woah!

The low rating and its contrast with the number of views is revealing, isn'it? How subjective one can scoop down to when one is dissastified because one's ego has been bleeding!

You named Ken, Altus, Boonie, Don ... anybody else? ...

Hey I have promised to DeltaOne I would ignore the attack stuff and stick to the history facts.

Phieu

#653 02 Jan 12, 20:11

Phieu: Sorry, Ken,

Your military knowledge remains at the level of a platoon leader, who has the audacity to despise a II Corps chief of staff's knowledge and skills, instead of remaining humble and willing to learn.

I have to classify you as student category f and g

Phieu,

What is your military experience?

samtn99

#654 02 Jan 12, 20:46

Zilch!

What little and limited military knowledge I have been able to acquire, I did it under the tutelage of my brother. He is a great teacher of mine ... Even some general officer colleagues of his now dreaded to discuss military issues with me !... Like when I challenged them how many elements are there in a successful big unit troop withdrawal ...

I have told you at the outset of this thread. I am only an expert in what pertains to my brother's military career, and indirectly to the ARVN in general.

Do you know that www.generalhieu.com is becoming the most consulted reference source in ARVN, even the most authoritative? For instance, it has the most exhaustive list of ARVN general officers, complete with their pictures. Everybody else copies that list, without naming the source though ...

As someone has said, "I do not see how anyone studying the Vietnam War on the ARVN side can neglect your book at all." (James Miguez).

I know, you won't find anywhere else a better and more accurate account of the Iadrang battle and the Pleiku campaign, and the Pl�yme campaign, and the Pleime campaign... I said this in all modesty ..

Phieu

#655 03 Jan 12, 00:38

�

Max Alcibiades

#656 03 Jan 12, 01:17

Ken,

You forgot to name Max, as another dissastified distractor ... it seems.

I have promised DeltaOne to ignore the attack stuff and stick to history facts...

Therefore ; zip!

Phieu

#657 03 Jan 12, 01:32

Some additional precision on various diversionary moves employed in Pleime offensive

- Herding diversionary move � Its intention was to roundup the enemy troops toward a common location.

Colonel Hieu knew the 1st Air Cav Brigade won�t be able to find and destroy the scattered three NVA regimental troops in the vast area that stretched from Pleime to Chupong with its newly developed air assault tactics.

- Enticement diversionary move � Its intention was to entice B3 Field Front to switch to an attack posture in order to have them gather its three regimental troops first in assembling areas for re-equipment, training and rehearsal purposes and secondly in staging areas in preparation for the imminent attack.

The order to execute the switch in operational direction from west to east was issued on 11/8 with a vague suggestion:

By this time Field Force Vietnam had asked the division to consider moving this operations eat of Pleime if it appeared that was no further contact imminent in the west�

(Kinnard, page 67)

The purpose of the enticement move was made known to General Knowles on 11/10 (Kinnard , page 73):

The movement and shift in emphasis from west to east was to further stimulate a forthcoming decision from the NVA division headquarters.

Its intention became clearer to General Knowles on Nov 11 (Kinnard, page 76):

With American units seemingly withdrawing to the east of Pleime, the decision was to attempt to regain its early advantage with an attack. The target once again was the Pleime CIDG Camp. The division headquarters set the date for attack at 16 November, and issued orders to its three regiments.

The B3 Field Front thus fell for Colonel Hieu�s scheme in regrouping its troops in two stages: assembly areas for training and rehearsals, and staging areas for movement to attack.

The ideal target for B-52 airstrikes was the staging area where troop concentration would be the most dense.

The window margin would be narrow: 11/13-14 or 11/12-14, (it turned out Colonel Hieu only had the 11/13-14 one) depending on the allotment time given for rehearsals.

And when order was issued for gathering troops in staging areas, the window margin would be in terms of 24 hours and less.

Thus the necessity to create the

- Distractive diversionary move � Its intention was to refocus B3 Field Front from the direction toward Pleime camp on to LZ X-Ray and had it retain its troops at staging areas longer to allow the B-52 to still find them there at their arrival due for Nov 15, after a long eight hour voyage from Guam to Central Highlands.

The number of Air Cav troops inserted at LZ X-Ray should be small so as not to make B3 Field Front to rushing in all of its three regimental troops.

The coordination of all these various diversionary moves with the purpose of attaining the objective set out by the operational concept � the use of B-52 airstrikes to annihilate the three NVA regiments - was made only possible with a solid intelligence of the enemy situation by the minutes, hours and days. That�s why it would be quasi impossible to duplicate this uniqueness operational concept. It�s only possible if conditions are exactly the same as Colonel Hieu�s.

Phieu

#658 03 Jan 12, 03:18

Ok Phieu, let's have another go.

Another chief dispute I have with your version of events is in relation the logistical apparatus. Previously, you commented in response to the fact that no one quite knew how to handle an Airmobile Division, that "Colonel Hieu did". Well, where in this fantastical rendezvous with destiny exactly was the provision made for supply?

I ask this because without direct intervention from the USAF, the entire Pleiku campaign would presumably have been over before it began. By 25 October, the Caribous and Chinooks that were deemed sufficient initially were already struggling to meet the demand necessary to keep barely a full brigade in action. By the following day, fuel supplies had reached 7,000 gallons against a demand of 70,000 gallons daily. Kinnard made IFFV aware of the situation and MACV was alerted to the critical status via a call from them. The 2d Air Division acknowledged receipt of the request on October 27th. [1]

C-130's carrying ten to fifteen 500 gallon fuel bladders each began to shuttle fuel from Tan Son Nhut to Pleiku and return with the empties for refilling. Nonetheless, 1st Cav reported that there were "zero gallons of JP-4" by the 29th. [2]

Eventually, the airlift caught up to demand and outpaced it. But it took 16% of the entire airlift system in country at the time, and resulted in a backlog of 50% of other requests throughout the theater. [3]

In this master chess plan, what was his plan once his bishops ran out of gas?

Notes

Ray L. Bowers, Tactical Airlift (Dept. of the Air Force, 2003). p. 213.
Ibid. p. 214.
Ibid. p. 215.

Lucky 6

#659 03 Jan 12, 06:01

Lucky 6 : Ok Phieu, let's have another go. A

nother chief dispute I have with your version of events is in relation the logistical apparatus. Previously, you commented in response to the fact that no one quite knew how to handle an Airmobile Division, that "Colonel Hieu did". Well, where in this fantastical rendezvous with destiny exactly was the provision made for supply?

Did I really comment to the fact that no one quite knew how to handle an Airmobile Division?

You should not have paraphrased my statement and quote me directly instead:

In all, it appeared that although (Cochran) It was not that sure that
I knew in a way that no one else did the real capabilities and limitations of an air assault division.
Colonel Hieu did.

(http://www.generalhieu.com/pleime_co...iqueness-2.htm)

I said, Colonel Hieu did in a way know the real capabilities and limitations of an air assault division; contrary to General Kinnard's statement that no one else did.

Is anything inaccurate with my assertion?

Left alone, General Kinnard/Knowles would roam the vast area stretching from Pleime to Chupong - like a walk in the park � for months and months in search of an evasive three NVA regimental troops, would they not?

I had shown this possible scenario in post #626 (What If ...)

Colonel Hieu had shown he knew exactly how to make use of all units - CIDG Montagnards, special forces, airborne rangers, infantry, armor, rangers, paratroopers, marine corps, air cav, artillery, air force, armed helicopters, fixed-wing fighter airplanes, jet airplanes, B-52 bombers .

Every and each one, be it a mediocre (CIDG), so-so (infantry, air cav) or excellent (paratroopers, marine corps, rangers, special forces, airborne rangers) combat unit.

In this master chess plan, what was his plan once his bishops ran out of gas?

He was a grand chess master who knew how to move all and each of the chess pieces, from the slow moving pawn to the throttling knight, even how to handle once his bishops ran out of gas...

Besides, Colonel Hieu was a very versatile commander, you know � I guess you don�t know that.

A Lieutenant Colonel of an Engineer unit told me:"You can fool other Generals with technical arcane in order to avoid obeying a difficult order, such as building a field force bridge across a river in an enemy controlled area, but you would not dare use the same tactic with General Hieu, because he mastered all details, even technical minutia, and you know damn well he only gave an order that he knew could be carried out."

(www.generalhieu.com/HieuV6-2.htm)

P.S. Btw, Lucky 6, am I such a dinky dau to you?

I am, am I not?

Are you still in my neighborhood in the Bronx? Why don't we get together and

Phieu

#660 03 Jan 12, 06:33

Phieu: Colonel Hieu had shown he knew exactly how to make use of all units - CIDG Montagnards, special forces, airborne rangers, infantry, armor, rangers, paratroopers, marine corps, air cav, artillery, air force, armed helicopters, fixed-wing fighter airplanes, jet airplanes, B-52 bombers .

Every and each one, be it a mediocre (CIDG), so-so (infantry, air cav) or excellent (paratroopers, marine corps, rangers, special forces, airborne rangers) combat unit.

He was a grand chess master who knew how to move all and each of the chess pieces, from the slow moving pawn to the throttling knight.

So you are maintaining the position that Colonel Hieu was responsible for this plan, even though the Cav literally ran out of gas? Because to me, that seems like a pretty big oversight on the part of a chief of staff who "had shown he knew exactly how to make use of all units".

Phieu: Are you still in my neighborhood in the Bronx? Why don't we get together and

I never was in the Bronx. I'm in Chicago. But If you feel you can change my opinion with a beer, my poison is Guinness, and you're buying.

#661 03 Jan 12, 06:48

Lucky 6 : So you are maintaining the position that Colonel Hieu was responsible for this plan, even though the Cav literally ran out of gas? Because to me, that seems like a pretty big oversight on the part of a chief of staff who "had shown he knew exactly how to make use of all units".

Not quite! You know what I mean... or you don't get the finesse in it? ... It won't happen under his watch, believe me ...

I never was in the Bronx. I'm in Chicago. But If you feel you can change my opinion with a beer, my poison is Guinness, and you're buying.

Who says I am buying? I expect you are buying, not me, as an appreciation gesture for me scanning the Why Pleime. pdf especiallly just for you ...

Do you think I am that dinky dau to feel I can change your opinion with a beer?

Remember I classified you once as student category b?

I should have treated you as such instead of responding to your last question!

I didn't and answered you anyway.

How should I classify you now ... a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h ...?

All the above? ... Perhaps g?

g. He was just too obtuse,
- I won�t bother to explain further to him and just moved on for the entire class and hoped and prayed the best for him.

or h?

h. He was just too ahead of his classmates,
- I would assign him independent studies

Since you told us that you were about to run out to amazon on a spending spree ... You even got my Why Pleime. pdf ...

When you get in the reading of all those books, try not to let the trees obstruct your view of the forest ... (no offense )

Phieu

#662 03 Jan 12, 07:00

Phieu : Not quite! You know what I mean... or you don't get the finesse in it? ...

No, I don't get the finesse in it.

Do you think I am that dinky dau to feel I can change your opinion with a beer?

That was an attempt at levity and lightening the mood, in these parts known as a joke...that apparently went over your head. I was actually being nice, I thought.

Remember I classified you once as student category b?

I should have treated you as such instead of responding to your last question!

I didn't and answered you anyway.

How should I classify you now ... a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h ...? Perhaps g?

I now officially request reclassification from the ministry of education. Put me down as Category "A", as in absent. I bid you adieu, good sir.

Lucky 6

#663 03 Jan 12, 07:04

GREAT! or TOO BAD!

Any way, A Dios

But don't forget you had given to yourself all those book reading assignments ...

and remember the door to the classrrom thread is always wide open... you can sneak in while the class is not in session and look at the lessons chalked up on the boards ...

Phieu

#664 03 Jan 12, 07:28

I've said it before.

I find it outrageous, that anyone who gives their own book on Amazon a five star review, could possibly have the front to lecture others about finesse.

It is akin to Karen Carpenter coaching a champion pie eating team.

I've said this before too, if you have no actual military experience or any depth of scholarship and rely completely upon your own powers of clairvoyance as some sort of authority, you cannot be taken seriously.

Look at the score board champ.

Let me do the maths for you. Out of 9 votes that could have been as high as 5, you've managed an average approval rating, from an informed audience (most of whom you once had on side) of only 1.44. garnering a total of 12.5 out of a possible 45. As a percentage that works out to 28.8%

That is a fail in anyones language.

Actually that is a gross fail.

Give it away. You embarass yourself, your family and the ARVN.

Max Alcibiades

#665 03 Jan 12, 11:06

Hey I have promised to DeltaOne I would ignore the attack stuff and stick to the history facts.

But let me make an exception and respond to you a last time.

Max Alcibiades : I've said it before.

I find it outrageous, that anyone who gives their own book on Amazon a five star review, could possibly have the front to lecture others about finesse.

I've also said it before.

I didn�t give to myself that five star. Just look at these five reviews of my book; you know who are General Weyand and Douglas Pike right?

*General Hieu was obviously a great soldier who put his country a nd his people foremost. (General Fred C. Weyand).
*Biography of a South Vietnam general officer who has been likened to Patton, Rommel, Montgomery, and LeClerc. He was much admired by Vietnamese civilians and respected by his American advisors. (Douglas Pike)
*This book sheds light on the ARVN Forces never before told. (Darry Nelson)
* I do not see how anyone studying the Vietnam War on the ARVN side can neglect your book at all. (James Miguez)

By the way, Douglas Pike sat on all of my presentations at the Vietnam Center until he passed away. He did not find my depiction of my brother at the conferences and in my book hagiographic at all. And note that he likened General Hieu to Patton, Rommel, Montgomery, and LeClerc, not your humble servant!

I've alsso said this before too:

Does it matter how I have acquired my wealth of knowledge about ARVN and military stuffs � I attributed it to my brother�s guidance and teaching � as long as it is solid and stands the onslaughts of people like you, who even dares to question General Davidson on the presence of radar controlled 37mm AA guns at Dien Bien Phu, while you are the one who is dead wrong on the matter? (see Dien Bien Phu thread)

Look at the score board champ.

That is a fail in anyones language.

Actually that is a gross fail.

Make the parallelism between this and X-Factor show: the panel of four expert judges and the general public audience. Which side�s votes weight more and are more objective, more fair, more accurate?

15589-14926= 1463 views in 24 hours! Woah! Can you beat that?

Give it away. You embarass yourself, your family and the ARVN.

Check your spellings, Max. It�s unforgiving in your particular case, since you claimed you do spelling too!

Thank you for your advice. But no thanks for your concern, the genie is out of the bottle since 1998 and it hasn't embarrassed me, my family and the ARVN.

Bien au contraire�

P.S. So next time around, if you launch another attack stuff, instead of contributing - I wouldn't say professionally because I dread your PHD (post holed digger - your very own expression)'s erudition - humbly history facts, you will get a from me.

Phieu

#666 04 Jan 12, 02:39

Arc Lite Operation Planning and Execution in Pleime Offensive

Planning

On October 26, 1965, as Pleime had just been liberated, Colonel Hieu made plan for an exploitation operation in the pursuit of the two withdrawing NVA regiments to the Chupong-Iadrang complex.

He immediately foresaw the possibility of annihilating the B3 Field Front forces with B-52 airstrikes because of a stroke of luck in intelligence gathering about the military situation of the enemy troops by the hours and by the days.

In Pleime, cuộc chiến lịch sử, page 94, Colonel Hieu stated unequivocally that the victory achieved in the Pleime counteroffensive into Chupong-Iadrang complex was due to the acquisition of a solid intelligence on the enemy situation:

The battle from phases 2 and 3 also introduced an aspect never seen up to now because for almost 20 years, during the Franco-Vietnamese war, seldom pursuit operation was considered after each time the enemy made appearance and when it was conducted, no significant results had been achieved. Therefore this time around, the determination not to allow the enemy to escape, coupled with the solid intelligence on the enemy situation had permitted the battle to develop to maximum degree and scale and at the same token lead to the biggest victory ever achieved by the ARVN and its Allied.

So with the certainty of getting a plethora of ongoing and updated by the days of solid intelligence on the enemy military situation, Colonel Hieu draw up his operational plan of using Arc Lite to destroy the enemy en mass at Chupong-Iadrang complex.

His objective was to be able to nudge B3 Field Front into an attack posture which would require the three regiment units to cluster into respective staging areas in preparation for movement to attack; at that precise brief moment of a less than 24 hour window of opportunity, they would be closed enough that the center of mass would become targetable for B52 airstrikes.

His plan would have the following element of diversionary moves:

- 1/ to herd the scattered troop units toward Chupong-Iadrang complex;

- 2/ to entice the enemy to decide to attack again in order to make him to regroup closer together at assembling areas for training and rehearsals and tighter together at staging areas for preparation in movement to attack;

- and 3/ to prolong - with a troop insertion close by the enemy staging areas - the attack posture and the retention time of troops at these staging areas where the concentration of troops would be the most dense, and to offer to Arc Lite the maximum window of opportunity to effectively strike.

Colonel Hieu then submitted his operational plan and its feasibility to MACV/General Westmoreland for approval.

Execution

The next step was to set up a coordination team comprising the II Corps, the Air Cav Forward Command Post, the First Field Force and MACV.

The execution of the plan and the determination of timing for starting of each of the three diversionary moves relied on the assessment of intelligence data of Colonel Hieu. The orders issued to the Field Commander/General Knowles were assumed by General Larsen in three occasions:

I. ONE

- on Oct 27, for the herding operation (1st Air Cav Brigade)

= on Nov 7, in the Chu Pong sanctuary the depleted 33d Regiment licked its wounds and waited for its stragglers to come in. The remainder of Field Front forces were quiet.

= only fragmented units and stragglers remained east of the Chu Pong-Ia Drang complex as the 33d Regiment began to assess its losses.

II. TWO

- on Nov 8, for the enticement operation (3rd Air Cav Brigade)

= On Nov 9, the 33d Regiment gathered in the last of its organic units and began to count noses. There were many missing. And at Field Front headquarters north of the Ia Drang, it was a day of situation analysis.

= On 11/10, Field Front headquarters, after evaluating the situation, had reached a decision. With American units seemingly withdrawing to the east of Pleime, the decision was to attempt to regain its early advantage with an attack. The target once again was the Pleime CIDG Camp. The division headquarters set the date for attack at 16 November, and issued orders to its three regiments.

= On 11/11, the 66th Regiment was at (center of mass vic YA 9104); the 32nd (YA 820072), the 33rd (YA 940011)

= On 11/12, Field Front units continued preparations and rehearsals for the scheduled attack on Pleime.

III. THREE

- on Nov 12, 1/7 Air Cav Battalion was ordered to make plan to air assault Chu Pong massif (for the distractive operation)

= On 11/13, Field Front forces began staging in the Chu Pong-Ia Drang area in preparation for movement to Pleime and the projected 16 November attack. Some recon parties and transportation units already had moved out.

- and Nov 14, for the distractive operation (1/7 Air Cav Battalion)

On Nov 15, at noon, B-52 air strikes began at B3 Field Front forces (center of mass vicinity YA8702) and continued for 5 days, until 11/19 (Why Pleime, chapter VI): For five consecutive days, from 15 to 19 November, the giant B52 bombers had flown a total of 96 sorties. One after the other, the areas of the Chu Pong massif - each of 20 square miles - underwent a systematic earthquake spreading from West to East. VC bunkers and trenches which so far had resisted the strikes by tactical aircraft and artillery began to score direct hits by the 750-pound bombs. The heavy canopy of the jungle ceased to be effective in both concealment and cover. The "back door" into Cambodia was closed and to escape, the VC remnants were reduced to utilize the narrow valley of the Ia Drang.

Enemy casualties as results of Arc Lite operation amounted to about 2,000 dead.

The "coup de gr�ce" surgical strike was finished off by the Airborne Brigade ending the Pleime Offensive on November 25, 1965.

Phieu

#667 04 Jan 12, 07:59

Max Alcibiades �

Max hung this picture at a wrong location.

I put it back at the appropriate location which is in Dien Bien Phu thread.

Phieu

#668 04 Jan 12, 08:45

Pleime Through New York Times' View

Saigon, South Vietnam, Friday October 22, 1965
By Neil Sheehan, Special to The New York Times

Embattled Camp Gets Help; Vietcong's Toll Rises

Several hundred South Vietnamese Infantrymen were flown yesterday to a United States Special Forces camp at Pleime, in the Central Highlands, where a Vietcong battalion had apparently suffered serious casualties in an unsuccessful 36-hour attack.

A military spokesman said the reinforcements had landed in American helicopters at an airstrip about half a mile from the camp and had then marched into it without meeting guerrillas.

According to the spokesman, a Vietcong battalion - numbering about 600 men - is still believed to be near the camp, on jungle-covered mountains about 215 miles north of Saigon.

The Vietcong apparently broke off the fight yesterday morning before the reinforcements arrived.

90 Bodies Are Sighted

Later reports from the camp said that the reinforcements and the original defenders - several hundred tribesmen led by United States and South Vietnamese Special Forces teams - were facing only scattered small-arms fire.

American Special Forces men in the camp radioed the pilot of an observation plane that they could see as many as 90 guerrilla bodies scattered around the camp.

Last night, the guerrillas again harassed the camp with .50-caliber machine-gun fire and 81-mm. mortar rounds.

The attack against the camp, about 25 miles south of Pleiku, began bout 7:30 P.M. Tuesday. The guerrillas pounded the camp with heavy mortars and 57-mm. recoilless rifles and then sent waves of infantrymen against it.

Reaching the outer barbed-wire barrier of the camp, the Vietcong soldiers were driven back by United States Air Force jet fighter-bombers, which roared in and lashed them with fire bombs of napalm, or jellied gasoline.

Military spokesmen said that the bombing had been extremely accurate and that most of the flaming canisters had dropped right into the barbed wire.

Throughout the next day, the guerrillas raked the camp with mortars, recoilless rifles and automatic weapons. The defenders' casualties were termed light.

A company of mountain tribesmen, led by United States Special Forces men - the Army's jungle-warfare training and leadership experts - had been caught outside the camp when the Vietcong struck. It fought its way back inside, however, with the aid of fighter-bombers.

Wednesday night, the camp was again subjected periodically to heavy fire from mortars and automatic weapons, but the Communists did not try to assault it. Transport aircraft dropped flares to guide the defenders and the assisting planes.

The planes were subjected to heavy antiaircraft fire. One observation pilot reported having sighted five machine guns dug in near an airstrip outside the camp

In another action, 15 miles south of Pleiku, four United States soldiers were killed when their military helicopter crashed and exploded on a reconnaissance mission. The mishap occurred a day after another helicopter was shot down in the area. All four of its crewmen were also killed.

Phieu

#669 05 Jan 12, 02:18

The Chess Grand Master Colonel Hieu.

The stealthy II Corps Chief of Staff

When you read Why Pleime, Pleiku Campaign, Coleman�s Pleiku and other related documents to this campaign, you won�t see Colonel Hieu, II Corps Chief of Staff mentioned in them, lest his key role in the campaign.

Even Pleime, cuộc chiến lịch sử, gave specific credits to

- Lieutenant Colonel Ng� Tấn Nghĩa, Chief G2/II Corps,
- Lieutenant Colonel Lều Thọ Cường, Chief G3/II Corps,
- Captain Dương Di�n Nghị, Chief Psychological Warfare Bureau.

No mention of Colonel Hieu, II Corps Chief of Staff.

Fortunately, G3 Journal of I First Field Force made amendments to this remiss and provided a glimpse of the key role of the II Corps Chief of Staff, Colonel Hieu in the conduct of the Pleime campaign.

20 Oct 65
- 12:35H: Fm Lt Col Broughton G3 Adm for Col Barrow. II Corps would like the two Abn Rngr Co's and helilift moved ASAP to Camp Holloway Army Airfield Pku where they will stage for airmobile opn airlanded assault vic Plei Me. Lt Col Broughton asked again about air assets offered. Told 12 passable, 14 H34 and 4 gun ships, no CH47. Lt Col Broughton was asked what troops will be committed by II Corps. Ans unk at this time, firm answer around 1315 after return of SA. But II Corps may request assistance from 1st Air Cav Div. Murray advised Broughton that CG, is not keen on committing the Cav in that area at this time. Broughton said only an alert for possible request and asked what this would do to Than Phong 6 opn. Murray reiterated previous statement about CG not keen.
21 Oct 65
- 08:20H: II Corps Capt Ushijima - Who if anyone at Pleiku can make a Cmd decision if necessary in Vinh Loc's absence? Request you stay on top of Than Phong 6, Plei My and route 21 Opns and ensure timely and accurate info forwarded this HQ. Asn: Chief of Staff is here and has contact w/CG on coast. Question: Can CofS make a decision. Ans: He will have to check w/CG before making a decision.
- 10:20H: Msg to II Corps - what is status of 3d Armored Cav and Ranger Bn. Ans: They are still in blocking position where they spent last night. Question: When will they move. Ans: Depends on outcome of lift of 2 Ranger Co's. Ref TAOR's - CG II Corps has approved TAOR, with stipulation. Letter will be hand carried to FFV today.
- 11:40H: Msg fm II Corps, Col Williams - 2 LLDB Co's are on ground. Have contact w/enemy, should close in Plei My camp in 30 minutes. Cav RF is moving and is in contact. II Corps Cmdr is considering committing 22d Ranger Bn.
- 11:45H: Fm Maj Mobley FFV Adv - About 30 minutes ago Gen Larsen in a discussion with Gen Vinh Loc, decided that they would not commit the Ranger Bn now at Pku in reaction against VC vic Plei Me at this time. Because the unit, Bn vic Plei Me is in a strong enough position to hold. The 1st Air Cav Bn will hold in position until Ranger Bn is moved out of Pleiku. No change in 1st Air Cav status at this time. Decision subj to change. Gen Larsen desires Gen Smith be advised of this decision
22 October 65
- 17:50H: CG called CofS sometime prior to 1700. Than Phong 6 will terminate tomorrow. TF Amos will be extracted tomorrow. TF Ingram is to move during early morning hrs to Pleiku.
23 October 65
(...)
24 October 1965
(...)
25 October 1965
- 24:00H: Intelligence Summary for period 250001 to 252400. At 1221 II Corps reported 3d Armored TF (ARVN) moving south fm ZA 169150 in route to Plei Me. Plei Me camp still receiving sporadic harrassing fire but report situation well in hand, 1 US WIA but no med evac needed, successful resupply at Plei Me at 0800, a/c rec'd AW fire. At 1530 rec'd report from II Corps that 3d Armd Cav TF receiving fire vic ZA 178132 as of 1450 hrs. Air strike called.
26 October 1965-12:20H: II Corps (Capt Ushijima) request II Corps give a progress or situation report every two hours on Plei Me.
- 19:00H: Capt Valley to TOC - Capt Valley informed G3 that CG had directed 1st Cav to commit as required all elems of 1st Bde in Pleiku - Plei Me area to assist in relief of Plei Me and the destruction of the VC forces in that area. DSA II Corps informed and requested to advise Gen Vinh Loc that if required additional Bn's of Cav would be positioned Pleiku for that town's security.
27 October 1965
- 12:30H: Fm Capt Reich, II Corps (w/Gen Larsen): Gen's Larsen, Kinnard and Knowles, and Col Mataxis are now meeting with Gen Vinh Loc to work out extension or modification of present 1st Air Cav Div TAOR vic Plei Me to comply with MACV oral instructions to develop a big TAOR centered around Plei Me to find, fix and destroy the VC in that area. Gen Larsen called Gen Collins requesting MACV touch base with JGS so similar VN instructions can be passed to Gen Vinh Loc. 1st Cav has elements on ground vic Plei Me that are searching around the western side of the camp moving south. Opn being supported by mortars positioned 4K's due south of camp. ARVN is operating from 360 degrees to 270 degrees around camp at a radius of 3K's. Support being provided by tanks. However, the terrain is limiting this support. Gen Larsen told Gen Kinnard to stop the Tuy Hoa opn for evaluation ref COMUSMACV's order. Gen Vinh Loc plans to extract the 2 Abn Ranger Co's from Plei Me. (Passed to G3)
28 October 1965
(...)
29 October 1965
(...)
30 October 1965
- 00:50H: II Corps (Major Black) - Ref Plei Me: Camp rec'd a few mortar rds, some trip flares were set off and some SA fire. Nothing serious. 7 cas, med evac requested. At 292350 Col Williams called Col Hieu, CofS II Corps. II Corps requested that 1st Cav TAOR be extended to include the Plei Me area except the camp itself. From present line on NS grid line ZA14 east to NS grid line AR77, on EW grid line ZA/AR15, south on AR77 to EW grid line 00, then west to NW grid line ZA14. Col Buchan, Gen Knowes, Col Williams and Col Mataxis agree.
- 00:12H: II Corps Col Williams - Request extension of TAOR (as outlined in telecon fm Maj Black at 0005) be approved by FFV. Col Barrow notified; Request approved 0025; II Corps notified 0030; 1st Cav notified 0040.
18 November 1965
- 20:00H: II Corps (Maj Boyle) PW Pvt cap vic YA 943038 fr 8th Bn 66th Regt states Bn strength at 620 when started down from DVN. 565 strength in RVN. All well equiped well prepared food last saw unit vic YA 919148 1711700H. Mission to break contact and move NW. States Air atks 17 Nov inflected 30 KIA. 50 WIA 50 deserters. Moral unchanged after air atks. Men were not allowed to pick up Psy/war leaflets. II Corps feels this is same Bn that atk on 16 Nov vic YA 937011.
19 November 1965
16:55H: 1st Cav (Rear) Capt Parham - Fwd CP states the elem's in Abn TF area was coordinated at higher levels than Fwd G3. The Abn TF knows about it. No other info available.
20 November 1965
- 1635H: MACV Maj Kirby � Request verification of loc of Abn Bn not committed (Duc Co). Request for movement has been rec�d. Called II Corps - Major Easterling (1640) Dragon has been tasked to move Red Hat 8 to vic of Red Hat 5. Abn Chief is considering moving 1st & 7th Bn�s to Duc Co area.
- 1702H: II Corps Maj Easterling � II Corps isn�t aware of this info. G3 II Corps knows nothing. (MACV called 1705 � Maj Kirby � Three way hook up) Maj Kirby II Corps DASC reported that ARVN units in Abn Bde area are receiving mortar fire (Chu Pong area). Maj Easterling (Check w/II Corps G3) II Corps ARVN knows nothing about it. Maj Kirby reports msg came thru DASC channels. We need confirmation through Army channels before we can act of request to hit target. Maj Amey II Corps check out situation and call back ASAP (1710).
21 November 1965
- 22:00H: II Corps Capt Neary and Capt Martin - (Encoded) Request time of Abn Bde atk on obj vic YA 810055. Is Abn Bde aware of Arc Lite #4 at 221210H.
- 22:50H: II Corps Capt Neary - Ref encoded msg (log item #60). This request for info is for confirmation that subject (arc lite) is well coordinated. It also pertains to II Corps sec msg, cite number 174, which affects some subj (Arlite msg, gives southern boundary of area of opns which falls within Arc lite tgt. No times are included for movement south). Confirmation of time of movement is required as well as confirmation that subj of encoded msg (Arc lite) is coordinated.

Phieu

#670 05 Jan 12, 10:38

Pleime Through New York Times' View

Saigon, South Vietnam, Friday October 22, 1965
By Charles Mohr, Special to The New York Times

Vietcong Step Up Fire At U.S. Camp

More Reinforcements Sent by South Vietnamese

Communist guerrillas besieging an American Special forces camp at Pleime "increased their pressure" last night and early today and the South Vietnamese Government responded by sending more reinforcements to the mountain outpost, military spokesmen said.

An American propeller-driven A-1E Skyraider fighter-bomber was shot down this morning while attacking the estimated total of 600 Vietcong guerrillas who have ringed Pleime with .50-caliber machine guns and 82mm. mortars. The pilot parachuted and was rescued by an armed United States helicopter.

The Vietcong attack on Pleime began Tuesday night. The guerrillas left about 90 bodies on the camp's barbed wire after an unsuccessful infantry assault and have continued to pour machine-gun, mortar and small-arms fire into the position.

Jungle Warfare Experts

Originally occupied by a small American Special Forces team - jungle-warfare training and leadership experts - and several hundred aboriginal Montagnard irregulars, the camp was reinforced yesterday morning by several hundred Vietnamese regulars who were sent by air. Today additional reinforcements reached the post.

The volume of enemy fire into Pleime camp, 25 miles south of the major town of Pleiku, was reported to have increased during the night, but quiet prevailed after daylight, the spokesmen said.

Some patrols have been able to leave and return to the camp without making contact. Air Force observers reported that a hill north of the camp was covered with the bodies of guerrillas.

The fighter-bomber was shot down south of the camp by automatic-weapons fire. Earlier in the battle of Pleime, a B-57 bomber and an armed helicopter were lost.

Air Force planes dropped 900 flares over Pleime last night, and one pilot said the guerrillas appeared to have moved to more automatic weapons to replace those destroyed in 215 bombing strikes.

Saigon, South Vietnam, Saturday October 23, 1965
By Neil Sheehan, Special to The New York Times

Vietcong Ambush A Column On Way To Aid U.S. Force

South Vietnamese Attacked 10 Miles From Besieged Outpost at Pleime

Another Plane Downed; Craft is 4th Lost at Post - American Pilot Rescued by Copter Under Fire

A South Vietnamese Army column moving to help the besieged United States Special Forces camp at Pleime was ambushed by guerrillas today, and several armored personnel carriers and trucks were destroyed, a military spokesman said.

The spokesman said the column of several hundred infantrymen, supported by armor, had moved from the town of Pleiku to a point on a dirt road about 10 miles northeast of the camp when it was attacked shortly before dark.

It was not known what casualties the column suffered. Late tonight reports indicated that the convoy had not yet reached the camp, which is set among the mountain jungles of the Central Highlands, 215 miles north of Saigon and 25 miles south of Pleiku.

Heavy Artillery Arrives

Meanwhile, a United States military spokesman said, four battalions of heavy artillery began landing in South Vietnam to protect areas around American bases, roads and lines of communications.

The Pleime camp has been under siege by guerrilla forces estimated at two battalions - more than a thousand men - since Tuesday night.

By noon today United States and South Vietnamese Air Force fighter-bombers and Navy planes from Seventh Fleet carriers had flown more than 300 sorties, dropping bombs, rockets and napalm, but they had not succeeded in driving off the guerrillas.

The camp reported tonight that the Vietcong were pounding the position with white phosphorous mortar shells.

35 Hours in Jungle

The spokesman here said a United States Air Force pilot whose A-1E propeller-driven fighter-bomber was shot down yesterday while bombing guerrillas around the camp was rescued today in good condition after 35 hours in the jungle.

The pilot, Capt. Melvin C. Elliott, 36 years old, of Glendale, Ariz. was picked up by an Air Force helicopter in a clearing of scrub brush and high grass about eight miles southeast of the camp. The rescue helicopter was under constant fire from guerrillas, as it hovered over the ground until Captain Elliott could run to it from his hiding place.

The spokesman said other Air Force fighter-bombers suppressed some of the Communist fire by searing Vietcong gun position with napalm while United States Army helicopters swooped in and strafed guerrillas with machine guns.

The pilot of the rescue helicopter, Capt. Dale L. Potter, 31, of Joseph, Ore., said that captain Elliott looked "ragged and torn" as he ran out of the jungle but that he later was found to be uninjured.

Yesterday, another pilot, Capt. Myron W. Burr, 31, of South Windsor, Conn., was rescued after his fighter-bomber was crippled by Communist ground fire. Since Tuesday a total of four aircraft has been shot down around the camp.

United States military officials believe that incessant bombing has inflicted serious casualties on the guerrillas, but the Vietcong have refused to break off the siege of the Special Forces camp, which is an outpost for jungle warfare training and leadership experts. On Wednesday and Thursday, several hundred South Vietnamese Rangers and infantrymen were flown to the camp in helicopters to reinforce the garrison of several hundred mountain tribesmen, who are led by United States and Vietnamese Special Forces teams.

There is some speculation here among United States military officials that the Vietcong may be protecting an infiltration route from Laos that is believed to run past the camp, but other military observers reject this thesis and point out that the Vietcong already control vast stretches of the Central Highlands.

The defenders have so far suffered "light casualties," according to official reports.

Phieu

#671 06 Jan 12, 02:59

Who were privy to the Arc Lite operational concept in Pleime Offensive

Since Colonel Hieu submitted his operational plan and its feasibility to MACV/General Westmoreland for approval and a coordination team, comprising the II Corps, the Air Cav Forward Command Post, the First Field Force and MACV was to set up.

-Obviously General Westmoreland and his close associates at MACV,

- General Vinh Loc at II Corps,

-General Knowles at Air Cav Forward Command Post

- and General Larsen at First Field Force.

General Kinnard semed to be excluded off that inner circle with his lay back leadership style in delegating all powers to General Knowles, and remained at Air Cav headquarters in An Khe.

The mystery lies in General Knowles not filling in his boss on the operational concept and its execution � Reasons?

- To accommodate General Kinnard�s lay back leadership style?

- To maintain maximum secrecy of the planning and the execution?

- To take full credit of its success?

It is certain that Colonel Hieu tried to limit the number of people who were privy to this operational concept to the minimum possible in order to maintain its secrecy.

Why did it have to be a secret at all?
For the simple reason to keep the planning of the battle out of the enemy knowledge, particularly during the Vietnam War, where VC spies had infiltrated all levels of the ARVN organization, from bottom to up, which caused the ARVN Commanders to limit the number of individuals who had access to the planning phase to the minimum � two or even one. Some examples:
General Nguyen Viet Thanh
General Abrams recounted that General Thanh, in order to preserve secrecy, designed in person the operational plan on a piece of paper, tucked it into his shirt pocket, only showed it to the divisional commander of the operation and warned him not to reveal it to anybody including his general staff. Then on the operation launching day, General Thanh seized the operational command of the battle: ...

(see post #283: The best kept secret at Ia Drang Valley battle)

Is there a written document of this Arc Lite operational concept in Pleime Offensive?

No, if Colonel Hieu did the briefing orally.

Yes, if he submitted his operational concept in writing.

However, it seems nobody - besides those aboved mentioned individuals -knew such an operational concept ever exist. And if it exists, then

nobody who has attempted to look for it has yet found it.

It would be nice, if all these individuals who were privy to this operational concept could be tracked down and be interviewed. Maybe one of them would care to share his understanding of that operational concept. It appears that all passed away by now.

Nevertheless, the absence of a written document does not preclude the fact that such an operational concept had been conceived and executed in the Pleime offensive into the Chupong-Iadrang complex. You only need to open a non-preconceived mindset and you can see it unfolding in front of your eyes by a thorough analysis and synthesis of what had been said in all those primary sources about the Pleime/Pleiku campaign. That's how I discovered it and interpreted it and described it complete with all the "professional military jargons" - that rendered it quasi impossible to be a product of pure imagination - in here�

You are free to accept it or reject it.

You don�t have to believe it blindly. Just see it for yourself with your own verification and analysis of those same documents.

I present it as it was � Your turn, your take � � Just don�t reject it with a brush of hand with some sort of exclamation or curse and simply walk away � It�s too easy � And see if you can come up with something better?

Phieu

#672 07 Jan 12, 02:48

The Chess Grand Master Colonel Hieu

Conceiving Tactical and Strategic Plans

After determining the intentions the Viet Cong wanted to achieve and the tactics they were about to use, Colonel Hieu deployed his tactical and strategic skills to counter all of their schemes. Countering the tactic of �one main attack and two diversionary attacks�, Colonel Hieu deployed troops appropriately to cope successfully with all the three fronts � at the camp with two Special Forces companies, at the ambush site with the Armored Relief Task Force, at Pleiku City with 2/12th Air Cavalry Battalion. The cleverness of this troop distribution had caught General Westmoreland�s appreciative eyes (Why Pleime, chapter VIII):

Our prompt maneuvers had shifted them into being surprised and losing the initiative. Extract from a memorandum signed by Col Daniel B. Williams, A/DSA II Corps MACV sent to C.G. II Corps on 25 Oct 1965: "At 1500 hours on 24 October General Westmoreland called and asked for a general rundown on the situation,... He wound up the conversation by asking that his personal congratulations be passed to General Vinh Loc on his handling of his troops to meet the various emergency situations."

Countering the tactic of �lure and ambush�, Colonel Hieu dispatched a small force of two Special Forces companies sufficient to contain the 33rd Regiment, and an Armored Task Force comprising two armored companies and about one thousand infantry and rangers troops to engage the 32nd Regiment. Furthermore, he reserved a surprise for the ambush troops in bringing heavy artillery by huge helicopters near the ambush site to lend support to the relief task force when it clashed with the ambush troops. He said that he was ready �to play the enemy's game� (Why Pleime, chapter IV):

II Corps Commander decided to play the enemy's game. Since the VC expected to successively eliminate our forces the scheme of maneuver had to make the best use of the factor TIME and to exploit the inherent weaknesses of the enemy troop disposition.

Countering the tactic of �mobile ambush�, Colonel Hieu applied the �delay� tactic to neutralize it, in forcing the enemy troops to still show up at the ambush site ahead of time and be struck by pre-arranged air and artillery strikes. He ordered LTC Nguyen Van Luat to have his Armored Task Force linger in the vicinity of Phu My (Why Pleime, chapter IV):

In the morning 21 October, the Lu�̣t Task Force moved on, along the Phu My-Pleime axis but to simply conduct aggressive patrols within a 10 km radius! The order had been expressly given by II Corps Command to the T.F. Commander, Lt Col. Luat, to simulate the imminent approach of a relief column to the Pleime camp while in reality, he had to wait for more adequate and sufficient attachments which would be moved by air from Kontum and Binh Dinh to Pleiku, as soon as the weather conditions allowed the air movements.
...
Early in the morning 23 October, as soon as report from the Camp reached II Corps Command, decision was immediately taken to push the relief column to Pleime without delay and at any costs.

Stepping into phase 2 pursuing the withdrawing enemy, Colonel Hieu demonstrated his military genius trait in conceiving an outstanding operational concept and sharing it with General Knowles who realized it in the operation Long Reach conducted by the 1st Air Cavalry Division.

After the 1st Brigade battalions generally lost contact with the remnants of the 33rd Regiment on November 7, Kinnard said, in Army Magazine, that, �I had been planning to replace the gallant, but spent, First Brigade with the Third Brigade, commanded by Colonel Thomas W. Brown, and this seemed a logical time to do so.� The general might have been indulging in a bit of hyperbole. The units of the 1st Brigade unquestionably were gallant, but spent? The 2/12 Cav had spent the longest period in the field, eighteen days total � but its days in contact numbered about five. The 2/8 had fourteen days in the valley and only two days of hard contact. The 1/8 Cav�s one company had one day of contact, while the others had none. And the 1/12 Cav had only its reconnaissance platoon truly get shot at in anger. Compared to times in the field by units later in the war, this was a walk in the park.

lso according to Coleman, after the 3rd Air Cavalry Brigade replaced the 1st Air Cavalry Brigade and conducted the operation Silver Bayonet I in searching the enemy in the east, the units of this brigade only encounter �dry holes� until they reverted back to the west and went in LZ X-Ray (Coleman, page 196):

That day - November 12 - General Larsen was visiting the division�s forward command post at the II Corps compound. He asked Knowles how things were going. Knowles briefed him on the attack on Catecka the night before and then told him the brigade was drilling a dry hole out east of Plei Me. Larsen said, �Why are you conducting operations there if it�s dry?� Knowles�s response was, �With all due respect, sir, that�s what your order in writing directed us to do.� Larsen responded that the cavalry�s primary mission was to �find the enemy and go after him.� Shortly after, Knowles visited Brown at the 3rd Brigade command post and told him to come up with a plan for an air assault operation near the foot of the Chu Pongs.

Colonel Hieu�s operational concept appeared extremely simple (Pleime Counteroffensive into Chupong-Iadrang Complex):

The search and pursuit of the two 32nd ( 334th, 635th and 966th Battalion) and 33rd Regiment (1st, 2nd and 3rd Battalion) should not be too difficult a task for 1st Air Cavalry Division with its fleet of helicopters in hands (435 in lieu of 101 for a regular infantry division). Nevertheless, to destroy an enemy force that had broken up into small units and in hiding amidst a vast area of elephant grass, bushes and trees, was a daunting task which would require months if not years to uncover and to destroy all these scattered piece meal units one at a time.
It is better to be able to attack and kill when the enemy units assemble at one location. This could have a chance to happen since Field Force B3 Command has ordered its attacking forces to return to their initial staging areas in the Chupong-Iadrang complex, while waiting for the arrival of the 66th Regiment.
However, in order to annihilate a division size force comprising three regiments, it would necessitate a force three times larger, which means three divisions, that II Corps Command could not afford.
A better alternative available was to use B-52�s carpet bombings to annihilate the concentrate enemy troops.

Therefore the operational concept for this operation comprised two phases:

Phase I: Channeling the scattered enemy units toward a common grouping area. This task was assigned to 1st Air Cavalry Brigade with operation All the Way.

Phase II: Destroying the enemy with B-52�s carpet bombings. General Knowles would coordinate this planning phase with MACV Command in Saigon for the use of this strategic weapon.

The bombings would be prepared by a diversionary tactic performed by 3rd Air Cavalry Brigade with operation Silver Bayonet I.

Consequently, Colonel Hieu was not overly concerned when the American air cavalry units did not discover many enemy units on their withdrawing routes from Pleime to Chu Pong, and rather focusing in monitoring moves and positions of various the enemy units, in big or small groups, patiently waiting for the moment they all assembled at Chu Pong and annihilating them with B52 carpet bombings (Why Pleime, chapter VI):

For five consecutive days, from 15 to 19 November, the giant B52 bombers had flown a total of 96 sorties. One after the other, the areas of the Chu Pong massif - each of 20 square miles - underwent a systematic earthquake spreading from West to East. VC bunkers and trenches which so far had resisted the strikes by tactical aircraft and artillery began to score direct hits by the 750-pound bombs. The heavy canopy of the jungle ceased to be effective in both concealment and cover. The "back door" into Cambodia was closed and to escape, the VC remnants were reduced to utilize the narrow valley of the Ia Drang.

Colonel Hieu continued to reveal his military genius trait in phase 3 of the campaign in operation Than Phong 7 conducted by Airborne Brigade. As a normal practice, the field commander makes decision on tactical moves as dictated by the situations on the battlefield. In this instance however, Colonel Hieu directly controlled the entire airborne operation and dictated all the moves made by the airborne units under the command of LTC Ngo Quang Truong (G3 Journal/IFFV , 11/19):

- 16:55H: 1st Cav (Rear) Capt Parham - Fwd CP states the elem's in Abn TF area was coordinated at higher levels than Fwd G3. The Abn TF knows about it.

Colonel Hieu made all preparations and arrangements; LTC Truong had only to execute the orders. The result was that the two surviving battalions of Field Front B3 � the 334th and the 635th � were easily cornered in the Ia Drang valley, causing Major Schwarzkopf to be utterly flabbergasted when he witnessed an extraordinary phenomenon that he attributed to LTC Truong uncanny abilities. Was he aware of what really happened he would reserve his admiration instead and do justice to Colonel Hieu.

Phieu

#673 08 Jan 12, 03:19

The Chess Grand Master Colonel Hieu

Executing Tactical Moves

In the preparation process of Pl�yme campaign, Field Front B3 calculated very meticulously II Corp�s availability in terms of troops and equipments. For instance, in the captured Combat Order for an Ambush by the 32d Regiment, showed that the regimental general staff made accurately prediction the components of the Armored Task Force, the number of American units that would be attached and how the relief task force would be deployed:

After the initial attack on Pleime the GVN will likely send a relief column. The relief column will probably be composed of one ARVN Battle Group and one Armored Battle Group from the 24th STZ. There will probably be one or two US battalions in reserve. The relief forces could come by air or by road, whichever is the most suitable. They could arrive at the battle area in one or two days. Their battle formation could operate up to one kilometer from the road. They could have the infantry and armor elements interposed with each other; as an example an Armor element leading with the infantry 500m to one kilometer behind. After the ARVN elements are ambushed they will pull back to the O-Gri area to regroup. ARVN forces behind the ambushed element will probably move to the area of Po Post (20-14), O-Gri (22-18) and Klan (26-22).

(www.generalhieu.com/rescuingducco-2.htm)

Field Front B3 was also successful in diverting II Corsp reserve force comprising five battalions of Airborne and Marine Corps as well as units of 22nd Division in Bong Son, together with the three American helicopter companies prior to the attack against Pleime camp and at the same time took the decision to launch Pl�yme campaign more than one month earlier than scheduled in order to avoid the intervention of the 1st Air Cavalry Division that was still on the resettlement process from Qui Nhon to An Khe.

But Field Force B3 was caught by many surprises because Colonel Hieu countered all their maneuvers with clever tactical moves of his own by knowing how to make use of all types of unit forces available to him, especially those that were all of the sudden put into his disposition: American and Vietnamese Special Forces, Airborne Rangers, Montagnard Eagle Flight teams, Rangers, Airborne, Marine Corps, 3rd Armored Task Force and an infantry unit of the 24th Special Military Zone, units of the 1st Air Cavalry Division. Many units were airlifted from Kontum, Ban Me Thuot, Phu Yen, Tuy Hoa, Vung Tau, Bien Hoa, Saigon, An Khe. All these units were inserted and extracted in and off the various battlefields in well executed coordination in a battlefront that lasted 38 days and 38 nights. Each unit was given a task that corresponded to its capacity; consequently each mission was achieved smoothly and without too much effort and yet the desired expectation was satisfactorily fulfilled.

In regard specifically of the use of 1st Air Cavalry Division, Colonel Hieu demonstrated that he knew how to use this tactical unit better than General Kinnard and General Knowles. General Kinnard�s tactical operation to counter the guerrillas warfare was (Cochran):

to seal off the area in which the guerrillas were fighting, to separate them from their source of reinforcement, supplies, weapons.

And the air assault tactic he had developed was:

Right after the Plei Me siege was broken, I felt that it was up to me to find these guys who had been around the camp. So we came up with a search �modus operandi� in which the Cav Squadron was going to range widely over a very large area and I was going to use one infantry brigade to plop down an infantry battalion and look at an area here and there. I felt that we had to break down into relatively small groups so we could cover more area and also the enemy would think he could fake us. You couldn�t put down a whole battalion out there and go clomping around. You had to break down into company and platoon-sized units. You had to rely upon the fact that with the helicopter you could respond faster than anyone in history. I then learned, totally new to me, that every unit that was not in contact was, in fact, a reserve that could be picked up and used. This is my strategy. Start from somewhere, break down into small groups, depending upon the terrain, and work that area while the Cav Squadron roamed all over. The name of the game was contact. You were looking for any form of contact � a helicopter being shot at, finding a campfire, finding a pack, beaten-down grass.

Firstly, Colonel Hieu knew that General Kinnard would not be able to seal off a wide expanded 40 km by 50 km area covered by jungles, even with more than 500 helicopters and 3 air cavalry brigades. Secondly, he also knew that the Viet Cong troops were very clever in avoiding contact with the American air cavalry troops. And he rationalized that in order to destroy an army of troops that scattered all over like rats hiding in cracks and holes, there was only one way, which was to stake out and wait patiently until they assembled in one spot, then to finish them off with B52 carpet bombings. That was why he did not consider phase 2 as a pursuit phase but rather a herding one (Pleime Counteroffensive into Chupong-Iadrang Complex).

Besides army troops, Colonel Hieu also demonstrated his skill in the use all types of weapons, small and big, ancient and modern: artillery, armor, wing as well of jet tactical aircrafts, armed helicopters, B52 strategic air fortresses, as dictated by various battlefield situations.

Phieu

#674 09 Jan 12, 01:41

A Doctrinal Lesson on the Use of Arc Lite in Pleime Counteroffensive

Principle:

B-52 airstrike needs a targetable objective, which means the object has to be sizable, relatively immobile and its location can be pinpointed with an accuracy of at least (XX�YY�).

Feasibility:

The annihilation of the three NVA Regiments � 32nd, 33rd and 66th � after the relief of Pleime camp by B-52 airstrike can be done, because B3 Field Front intends to regroup its entire forces in preparation for a second attack against Pleime camp; and with godsend intelligence source provided by open communications between Chinese Advisors at regimental and divisional levels, allowing to determine the locations and the times at which point those three regiments become targetable for B-52 airstrike.

Operational Concept:

To stalk (1) the enemy movements until their troop units gather together close enough; particular attention should be focused on when the enemy get closer (assembling phase) (2) and much closer together (staging phase) (3) and provision should be ascertained in prolonging the staging time (4) to provide a better margin window for Arc Lite strike; and to schedule the B-52 airstrike accordingly.

Planning:

The planning of Arc Lite strikes is assumed by a coordination team comprising II Corps (Colonel Hieu, Colonel Williams), 1st Air Cav Forward CP (General Knowles, LTC Stoner), IFFV (General Smith, Colonel Barrow), MACV (General Collins).

Execution:

- October 27: The herding operation (1') started with the 1st Air Cavalry Brigade conducting All the Way operation. Spotted enemy units were broke up further in small pieces and pushed back westward to Chupong-Iadrang complex.

- Nov 4, the 33d Regiment was ordered out of its base at Hill 732, which it had hardly reached, and onto the eastern slopes of Chu Pong in the vicinity of YA922010 with its battalions (when they closed) to take up positions from Hill 732, down through Anta Village (940010) to the north bank of the Ia Meur (980000).

- Nov 8 and 9, the 33d Regiment began to assess its losses and to count noses. There were many missing.

- Nov 8, the enticement move started with the 3rd Air Cavalry Brigade ordered to switch the operational direction from west to eastward.

- Nov 11, B3 Field Front took the enticement bait and decided a second attack on Pleime camp scheduled for 11/16.

- Nov 10, B3 Field Front B3 ordered troop units into assembling areas (2') for reorganization, training and rehearsals.

- Nov 11, the three regiments became targetable with the 66th center of mass (vic YA 9104); the 32nd (YA 820072), the 33rd (YA 940011)

- Arc Lite scheduled to strike before 11/16, either 11/14 or 11/15, depending B3 Field Front moves.

- Nov 12, while the assembling phase was on going, 1/7th Air Cavalry Battalion was ordered to get ready to be inserted into Chu Pong massif.

- Nov 13, B3 Field Front forces began staging (3') in preparation for movement to Pleime and the projected 16 November attack. Some recon parties and transportation units already had moved out.

- Nov 14, 1/7th Air Cavalry Battalion was inserted in LZ X-Ray in a distractive move (4'), forcing B3 Field Front to delay the attack against Pleime and to refocus its attention onto new threat and to maintain its troop units concentrated at staging area for Arc Lite strike scheduled for noon Nov 15.

- Nov 14 noon, B3 Field Front engaged the 1/7th Air Cavalry Battalion with two battalions. Reinforcement with 2/7th Air Cavalry Battalion was sent in.

- Nov 15 noon, Arc Lite suddenly struck at B3 Field Front forces center of mass (vicinity YA8702) and continued for the next 5 days in 96 sorties.

- Nov 17, Arc Lite�s targets included LZ X-Ray.

- Nov 18, the �coup de gr�ce" operation started with Airborne Brigade conducting Than Phong 7 operation.

- Nov 24, as no more contacts were made with the enemy, the Airborne Brigade withdrew from the area of operations, terminating the third phase of the Battle of Pleime with 265 VC killed (BC), 10 others and 58 weapons captured.

II Corps Headquarters, Pleiku City

Colonel Nguy�̃n Văn Hi�́u
Chief of Staff.

Phieu

#675 10 Jan 12, 04:27

Like Hunting a Pack of Wolves

Colonel Hieu in his hunting for the pack of B3 Field Front Force wolves,

- round them up in Chupong-Iadrang complex with 1st Air Cav;

- enticed them to regroup by faking east aiming west with 3rd Air Cav;

- distracted them into staying immobile in staging area with the insertion of 1/7 Air Cav;

- took a deep breath and hit his target bull eye with an arclite bullet;

- and "Finish 'Em" with the Airborne Brigade�s surgical �coup de gr�ce�.

Wasn't he a shrewd tracker and a great hunter of wolves?!

#676 11 Jan 12, 02:45

Arc Lite�s and Air Cav� s Know How Use

Captain Nguy�̃n Minh �̉m, a G3/II Corps said, �The American advisors greatly admired Colonel Hieu. They wondered where he had acquired all his wide knowledge and recognized he was far better than them." ̣

(With Colonel Mataxis, II Corps Senior Advisor, and his two staff members)

In regard to Arc Lite, maybe when he attended the General Staff and Command College in 1963. In regard to Air Cav, definitely not there since Air Cav only came into existence in July 1968. General Kinnard boasted to Cochran in a 1994 interview:

Within several hours after I arrived in Vietnam, General Westmoreland told me that he wanted to split the division into three separate brigades at great distances apart throughout all of Vietnam. I knew that I had to oppose this very strongly � and I did so by explaining the rudiments of the air assault organization and concept of employment. He had not knownthis because he was not in the States during the air assault testing.
He never really did fully understand the division - its capabilities and limitations, and most importantly that the aviation assets supported the entire division and that if you split it out, you took away my basic tool. I told him the Army Chief of Staff wanted us in the Highlands. He never gave me a direct answer. My guess is that he finally had some conversations with General Johnson. I was just surprised that they hadn�t talked about it before. In any event, Westy did agree to the division being based in a single location, An Khe, in the Central Highlands. You�ve got to remember that I was the only one who had ever commanded an air assault division. I had the division for over two years before Vietnam. When I left the division, I had over 39 months of division
command, the second longest in the history of the modern Army. Only General Gavin had commanded longer than I. I knew in a way that no one else did the real capabilities and limitations of an air assault division. It didn�t matter that it hadn�t been in combat, if they would let me operate as I wanted to. There were to be instances in Vietnam, such as the Ia Drang, where Gen. �Sweden� Larsen, my immediate boss, and General Westmoreland, who did not understand how we operated, did not use the best judgment about the way things were done.

(Cochran, Alexander S., "First Strike at River Drang", Military History, Oct 1984, pp 44-52, Per. Interview with H.W.O Kinnard, 1st Cavalry Division Commanding General.)

Apparently, General Kinnard did not count Colonel Hieu, when he made all that boasting in 1994.

Colonel Hieu seemed to learn the use of an Air Cavalry division on the job while working next to General Knowles and his general staff who lodged in the American Advisor Group�s compound in II Corps headquarters.

e indicated in Why Pleime he learned about the Air Cav from studying the US Army Information Digest, August 65.

1st US Air Cavalry Division stationed in An Khe, a major unit which possesses the highest degree of mobility all over the world and also the most up-to-date equipment and weaponry.(1)
After two years of maneuver in the jungle of the South Carolina State, the Division has totally succeeded in developing and promoting new tactics. In a news conference on 16 June 1965, the US Secretary of Defense McNamara said,
"The tactics, the techniques, the procedures that will be employed by this new division will result in a markedly different approach to the solution of tactical problems. The use of aircraft to bring combat personnel directly to the battlefield, to remove them from the battlefield, provides a capability which neither we nor any other army in the world possess today".
(1) After the testing period which started in 1963, the Division was officially activated in June 1965 and came to Viet Nam in September 1965. In comparison with the other US Divisions, the 1st Air Cavalry has less troops (15787 instead of 15900) and vehicles (1600 instead of 3200) but more aircraft (435 instead of 101). The displacement of 3000 troops over a distance of 160 km takes only 59 minutes.

This study document might have been passed on to him by General Knowles who settled his Forward Command next to II Corps headquarters and work closely with him from the outset of Pleime campaign, as earlier as October 21 when he came up Pleiku to lead Task Force Ingram.

Colonel Hieu was indeed a quick learner. He was the type who when taught one understands ten folds.

In the phase 2 and phase 3 of Pleime campaign, he had shown he knew how to use Air Cav better than General Kinnard and General Knowles.

And who else can replicate his extraordinary feat of annihilating an entire enemy division comprising three regiments with the use of Arc Lite?

When he became 5th Infantry Division Commander in August 1969, in his very first meeting with his commanders, he instructed:

We must make full use of technical means provided to us such as sensors, etc. And so, all units must know how to operate with proficiency and make full use of these devices.

He took every opportunity he could get to test out himself all the new weaponries the American Army introduced in the Vietnam War. Captain Paul Van Nguyen said:

I got the opportunity to meet him while he was holding the position of 5th Infantry Division Commander. In 1969, as an aide de camp accompanying Lieutenant General Nguyen Van Minh, Governor of Saigon-Giadinh and Capital Special Military Zone Commander, I witnessed General Hieu�s marksmanship in the use of various weapons, from Colt 45, M16 to machine gun M60, and hitting bull-eyes at fixed and mobile targets at the firing range. That time, Lieutenant General Do Cao Tri, III Corps Commander, invited Commanders of Capital Special Military Zone, 5th, 18th and 25th Infantry Division and some high ranking officers of other units to participate in trying out various weapons using infra-red vision devices introduced by the Americans with the intention to equip ARVN snipers.

Phieu

#677 11 Jan 12, 17:20

New York Times re: Pleime
Pleiku, South Vietnam, Tuesday October 26, 1965 (Associated Press)

Americans Pursue Guerrillas

A South Vietnamese armored column that began reaching Pleime last night consolidated its position just outside the camp and at dawn reported only sporadic fire from the Vietcong.

United States troops, in a sweep to the west and north of Pleime, engaged a retreating Vietcong platoon of 35 to 50 men. A spokesman said the guerrilla platoon apparently was part of a rearguard detachment covering the Vietcong withdrawal.

The Vietcong's week-long offensive apparently was designed to clear supply lines from Laos, and North Vietnam. A United States military informant in Pleiku said the Pleime defenders - 300 Montagnard tribesmen and a dozen United States advisers - together with air attacks, had knocked out about 750 of the 1,200-man Vietcong force.

Phieu

#678 12 Jan 12, 03:16

Sidebar: Quarterback versus Coach

Colonel Hieu has been presented under the light of a chess grand master, a rodeo cowboy bridling a mustang, a tracker and hunter of mountainous tigers, a tracker and hunter of wolves. He was also seen as a quarterback (tactician) and a football coach (strategist).

A visitor to General Hieu�s Page once commented: "The ARVN had many competent officers at the regimental level and down, but at the divisional level and up, many generals were not competent. The command of a division and a corps requires competency in strategy and general staff. Many generals only knew how to attack as a buffalo, and lacked strategy (i.e. Operation Lam Son 719, Highlands withdrawal of II Corps). I greatly admire the competence and virtue of general Hieu, who had the ability to command with strategy at the divisional level and up." (Pham Khiet, Readers� Comments #54).

General Hieu did not have any combat experience at the regimental level and down, having been appointed to his first divisional command post�s assignment straight from a long career exclusively in the general staff field . Nonetheless, despite such handicap, General Hieu was a quick learner and in no time was able to become a seasoned divisional commander at the helm of the 22nd Division Command first, and then of the 5th Division Command.

General Pham Van Phu and General Ngo Quang Truong were reputed as formidable battalion and regiment commanders. However, in light of the debacles of the II Corps in Central Highlands and of the I Corps in Da Nang in March 1975, many opinions have been voiced hinting that these two otherwise fine general officers had been assigned to a level of command positions beyond their abilities when they were elevated to the levels of division and corps commanders.

What makes an officer a good regiment commander, and what makes an officer a good division commander? Are the qualities that make a good regiment commander and the qualities that make a good division commander the same? In other words, does a good regiment commander necessarily become a good division commander?

At the risk of oversimplification, one can safely state that a good regiment commander should possess the following skills ratio: 80% tactics and 20% strategy. In the other hand, a good division commander should possess a reversed ratio: 20% tactics and 80% strategy. When a good regiment commander is promoted to a division command post and is not capable of making an adjustment by switching the above-mentioned ratio combinations, he would not be a good division commander.

To take an analogy of a football team, a regiment commander is like its quarterback and a division commander its coach. The quarterback works more directly with his teammates. He is present on the field together with them; he commands them, he sweats with them, he trains with them, he risks physical injuries as much as them. Likewise, the regiment commander is out there in the battlefield with his men; he commands them by example, he runs the risk of death as much as his men, he is out in the frontline with them. The coach, on the other hand, plays a more indirect role in the team. He handpicks and works through his deputy coaches and he stays on the sidelines. He designs strategies and calls tactical shots. Likewise, the division commander works on overall strategies, and gives tactical instructions to his regiment commander in the mist of battle.

Both the quarterback and the coach are important. However, among the two, the coach holds a more important role than the quarterback. Although a quarterback might commands more fame and higher pay than a coach, the role of the coach is a more determinant winning factor of a football team than its quarterback�s.

It is interesting to notice that in the football�s history, no good quarterback has ever become a good coach. And it is obvious that a good coach can never become a good quarterback because of lack of physical strength.

In the military arena, we encounter general officers who are either good tacticians with direct combat experiences - like General Patton - or good strategists with no combat experiences - like General Eisenhower or Collin Powell. General Nguyen Van Hieu seems to be an exception, who was a good tactician with ample combat experiences as a division commander of the 22nd Infantry Division and of the 5th Infantry Division, and at the same time was a good strategist as Chief of Staff of the I Corps and the II Corps, then Deputy Commander/Operation of the I Corps and the III Corps. To use our analogy, General Hieu was capable of being a good quarterback and/or a coach!

General Do Cao Tri, Commander of I Corps before 11/1963 and of II Corps after 11/1963 had Colonel Hieu as his Chief of Staff in both instances. He recognized in his chief strategist the potential and formidable qualities of a tactician. Consequently, he appointed him Commander of the 22nd Infantry Division, prior to relinquishing his II Corps command post to General Nguyen Huu Co in September, 1964; and later on, when he assumed the III Corps command post in 1968, he again entrusted General Hieu with the command of the 5th Infantry Division in August 1969.

General Hieu missed the chance of becoming Commander of the III Corps in February 1971 when General Tri, who had recommended him to this position, died in a helicopter accident. And he missed the chance of becoming Chairman of the Joint General Staff under the government of President Tran Van Huong, because he was assassinated on April 8, 1975. And so, because he was not politically correct under President Thieu�s regime, he was not promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General and was not given the opportunities to use his potential abilities as a tactician/strategist to the fullest.

_________________________

Note:

"General Truong, I Corps Commander, was occasionally given credit for being a "honest man" and a "good officer", but some sources stated that he lacked the schooling for a Corps Command.

General Phu, II Corps Commander, was also described by some as a good combat officer, but also as a sick man unsuited for a higher command."

(Fall Of South Vietnam: Statements by Vietnamese Military and Civilian Leaders, 1980; Stephen T. Hosmer, Konrad Kellen and Brian M. Jenkins)

Phieu

#679 12 Jan 12, 03:23

New York Times re: Pleime

Saigon, South Vietnam, Tuesday October 26, 1965
By R.W. Apple, Jr., Special to The New York Times

First Cavalry Force Backs Drive of Saigon Column

Vietcong Casualties Heavy in 7-Day Fight in Highlands

Troops of the United States First Cavalry Division (Airmobile) have been thrown into the battle at Pleime in the Central Highlands, a military spokesman said today.

[A South Vietnamese Army column backed by the United States troops broke the seven-day Vietcong siege of the Special Forces camp at Pleime early Tuesday. The Associated Press reported from Pleiku, 25 miles from the camp.]

The American units, including infantrymen, artillery and a squadron of helicopter-mounted cavalry, were committed on Saturday, the spokesman said. The news had been held up for security reasons.

Brig. Gen. Charles Knowles, assistant division commander of the First Cavalry, said at Pleiku that his troops had joined the fighting at the request of the South Vietnamese authorities.

Vietcong forces surrounding the Pleime camp had opened fire again yesterday afternoon. They pounded the camp with heavy mortar fire from 8:30 to 11:30 P.M.

Casualties among the mountain tribesmen and United States Special Forces advisors defending the camp were again described by the spokesman here as light. There was no breakdown of American casualties.

The camp was supplied on Sunday afternoon by parachute drop from United States Army Caribou light transport planes. Since the siege began more than 270.000 pounds of ammunition, food and other materiel have been dropped into the tiny triangular fortress.

According to Lieut. Col. William A. McLaughlin, commander of the 310th Air Commando Squadron, more than half of the 29 United States Air Force C-123 transports used on supply mission have been hit by ground fire.

Phieu

#680 12 Jan 12, 04:00

Phieu : [I]...or good strategists with no combat experiences - like General Eisenhower or Collin Powell

Is it possible you made a miss-statement here in regard to Collin Powell. You do know he served two tours in Vietnam and has a Purple Heart and Combat Infantryman's Badge. Seems to me he has combat experience; along with tactical and strategic experience.

#681 12 Jan 12, 06:37

What I meant is combat experience as a commanding general; in other words, at the division level.

By the way, at the very outset of my website I wrote:

If General Do Cao Tri was compared to General Patton, I venture to compare General Hieu to General Colin Powell. Both excelled in military and civilian skills. Both excelled equally in tactical and strategic skills. Both proudly worn their paratroopers insignia on their chest. Both held important position in the civilian branch of the government (Assistant to the Minister of Anti-Corruption, Assistant to the Secretary of National Security) and both were respected for their administrative skills. There are even striking physical similarities: majestic, gentle and humble at the same time. Both were promoted based on achievements, not on, or even despite partisanship.

Phieu

#682 12 Jan 12, 13:10

While I have been enjoying the history of this time and place during the Vietnam war, it seems to be that it is becoming a rah-rah thread for General Hieu. I understand that he may have had specific knowledge of the area and enemy - this is what I want to read about - not a ranking of personnel. I hope nobody takes offense at my statement. It was not intended to do such.

DeltaOne

#683 12 Jan 12, 13:33

Maybe it's about time I start a specific thread on General Hieu, the architect of the Pleime campaign, if you don't want to link the deed with its author ...

Meanwhile what have you been enjoying about this thread so far? Have you get what you want to read about in this thread so far?

Phieu

#684 12 Jan 12, 13:47

There won't be a thread about General Hieu on ACG, your book and website are enough already.

Boonierat

#685 12 Jan 12, 14:30

Phieu: What I meant is combat experience as a commanding general; in other words, at the division level.

By the way, at the very outset of my website I wrote:

I'm not too sure about how much "strategic" planning is/was done at "division level" for the "operations" involved with the Ia Drang. Possibly you could provide us at what point Ia Drang strategic planning ended and Ia Drang "tactical" planning started.

Possibly, if you can, provide who did, and was responsible, for the "strategic" planning in regard to Ia Drang.

P.S. I am more interested in what "you" conclude, write and present within this forum, rather than what is available from your "web site" and/or your, or your brother's books.

KEN JENSEN

#686 12 Jan 12, 14:47

Boonierat: There won't be a thread about General Hieu on ACG, your book and website are enough already.

Is that a specific AGS forum rule, Bonnie ?

Phieu

#687 12 Jan 12, 14:54

KEN JENSEN: I'm not too sure about how much "strategic" planning is/was done at "division level" for the "operations" involved with the Ia Drang. Possibly you could provide us at what point Ia Drang strategic planning ended and Ia Drang "tactical" planning started.

Possibly, if you can, provide who did, and was responsible, for the "strategic" planning in regard to Ia Drang.

P.S. I am more interested in what "you" conclude, write and present within this forum, rather than what is available from your "web site" and/or your, or your brother's books.

Frankly, Ken, I do not know how to respond to you on this ...

Phieu

#688 12 Jan 12, 14:56

Boonierat: There won't be a thread about General Hieu on ACG.

Me thinks we are 46 pages into one right now...

don744

#689 12 Jan 12, 15:02

Phieu:Is that a specific AGS forum rule, Bonnie ?

No, just my rule.

Boonierat

#690 12 Jan 12, 15:18

So, it is personal. What do you have against me that made you try to shut me up many times ?

Isn't it an abuse of power of the moderator?

I thought any member can start a thread as he see please, except those porno, etc ...

#691 12 Jan 12, 15:39

Like I said earlier, you already wrote a book and created a website entirely dedicated to Nguyen Van Hieu, that's more than any other ARVN general, including the great Ngo Quang Truong. People wishing to know more about your brother can easily refer to them. I won't let you hijack this forum to indulge in more hagiographic logorrhoea about him, enough is enough

Boonierat

#692 12 Jan 12, 19:58

1. How is it possible to hijack this forum? What do you exactly mean by you hijack this forum?

2. You find my contribution as hagiographic logorrhoea about my brother. That's your personal opinion. As a moderator, is it your duty to forbid it in this forum? You state it's not the AGC's rule, only yours. That's abuse of power, do you realize that?

3. Does this forum impose equal time and exposure to every ARVN general officers?

4. Is there an appeal provision to higher authority than you like in this case of abuse of power by a moderator?

Phieu

#693 12 Jan 12, 23:14

A quick search for generalhieu for all posts made my Phieu shows a total of 126 different posts that you have used your web site as your authenticity for your claims. Don't you think that is a little overboard?

I do!

I had expected you to fill in the ARVN side of the story for what Joseph L. Galloway has presented (fill in the blanks or possible corrections as to what Galloway has presented over the years)...

Synopsis:
The Plei Me Siege and Opening of the 1st CAV Pleiku Campaign

http://www.lzxray.com/Pleime_o.htm

Here is an example... What information can you provide from the ARVN point of view for the below pictured march? ** Note ** since the picture is Copyrighted I won't use it here; however the LINK is provided.

These are my questions related to this pic due to the caption remark; "Schwarzkopf marching with his RVN paratroop battalion"

Was Schwarzkopf an adviser or the Commander?

What was Schwarzkopf title during this march ; Battalion Commander?

Again, what ARVN unit?

Who was the ARVN Commander, if any?

http://www.lzxray.com/schwarz.htm

Answer the questions direct, if you can. I do not want a LINK back to any of your other "web" stuff. If you wish to authenticate your knowledge, I will accept a "quote" and a source link back to an AAR or ORLL or something equivalent that reflects on the above march and/or during the time frame of march.

P.S. I'm tired of your or other's opinions about your genius brother. Please provide what most anticipated you may fill in about the Ia Drang; I don't believe we were anticipating a "bio" on your brother.

KEN JENSEN

#694 12 Jan 12, 23:41

This photo is taken from It Doesn't Take a Hero and inserted between page 114 and 115. The legend reads: �After the siege at Duc Co, we had to walk out along Route 19 to friendly-held territory some sixty miles away. The tank in the rear is from the resuce column that relieved us. (UPI/BETTMAN) �

- He was an advisor not a commander. (An American officer never commanded an ARVN unit.)

- He was an advisor during this march.

- The ARVN unit was the First Task Force of the Vietnamese Airborne Brigade.

- The ARVN Commander was Lieutenant Colonel Kha.

I do not want a LINK back to any of your other "web" stuff.

www.generalhieu.com is made up of a compilation of related documents. If I quote one of those documents, obviously I give a link back to my other "web" stuff!

Phieu

#695 13 Jan 12, 00:07

Outstanding response Phieu; thanks

I do believe that members appreciate the info you provided here. As for me, I wasn't aware of the book "It Doesn't take a Hero" (autobiography of Schwarzkopf ). I won't buy it, but others may want to.

Also I have a name of a UPI Reporter/Photographer I can search on for other pictures and/or stories he may have written in regard to the Vietnam War.

Later, I may also search on the ARVN Commander Lt. Col. Kha and see what I can find.

I'm not, but others maybe, interested in First Task Force of the Vietnamese Airborne Brigade because of their activity in the Ia Drang.

KEN JENSEN

#696 13 Jan 12, 01:31

Phieu : 4. Is there an appeal provision to higher authority than you like in this case of abuse of power by a moderator?

What you do not realize Phieu is that the promotion you are doing of your brother is totally counter-productive. You've been antagonizing almost everyone here with your self-obsessed and pedantic attitude. I've been working hard over the years to make this forum one of the best on the internet dedicated to the Vietnam War and I won't let anyone mess around with it. You can of course appeal your case if you so wish directly to the forum administrators:

ACG Forums Commanding Officer : Admiral

ACG Director of Internet Operations : Siberian HEAT

Boonierat

#697 13 Jan 12, 03:48

KEN JENSEN: Outstanding response Phieu; thanks

You are welcome.

I do believe that members appreciate the info you provided here. As for me, I wasn't aware of the book "It Doesn't take a Hero" (autobiography of Schwarzkopf ). I won't buy it, but others may want to.

All I said in this forum are also based on documents as well. I did not invent anything. I cut and paste and archived all those documents on to my "web stuff" as much as possible so that readers can have easy access through the internet and to can be sure to find it there and not risk to encounter a defunct link as it often happens with individual websites.

I'm not, but others maybe, interested in First Task Force of the Vietnamese Airborne Brigade because of their activity in the Ia Drang.

For your further information, the composition of the Airborne First Task Force had changed from the Duc Co battle to Iadrang battle:

- Captain Schwarzkopf vs Major Schwarzkopf

- LTC Kha vs LTC Ngo Xuan Nghi (LTC Ngo Quang Truong was the Airborne Brigade Field Commander, Forward CP; Brigadier General Du Quang Dong was the Airborne Brigade Commander, Headquarters.)

- US 173rd Airborne vs US 2nd Air Cav as reserve forces.

It is beyond my comprehension when all what I said in here about my brother are so well documented and in detail can be characterized as "hagiographic logorrhoea" ... Maybe due to the analogies that I used? ...

Phieu

#698 13 Jan 12, 04:22

Boonierat: What you do not realize Phieu is that the promotion you are doing of your brother is totally counter-productive.

Totally counter-productive is your perception. I think the objective perception is demonstrated by the most fast growing thread based on the number of 17733 view hits as of today.

You've been antagonizing almost everyone here with your self-obsessed and pedantic attitude.

Who are those almost everyone? You, Ken, Altus, Max, Lucky, Don, Lirelou ... the vocal ACG members that I dare challenge and pierced through their so called ARVN expert's skin which made them feel I harbored a self-obsessed and pedantic attitude.

I thought I am the common sense janitor; Max is the Professeur Erudit or he prefers PHD (post holes digger) scholar. Aren't you a tiny bit pedantique using those esoteric vocaburaries such as logorrhoea ?

I've been working hard over the years to make this forum one of the best on the internet dedicated to the Vietnam War.

You can be rightfully proud of it.

and I won't let anyone mess around with it.

In what way I am messing around with it? by correcting other members' mistakes and presenting what I believe to be the truth?

With all due respect, Bonnie, I think you are hurt because I had the nerve to contradict you in multiple occasions ... maybe too bluntly and not as diplomatic as our friend Altus ... I have no intention of usurping your stature at this forum, if that's what you are afraid of ... You sound as this forum is your own property, while you are only a caretaker ...

You can of course appeal your case if you so wish directly to the forum administrators:

ACG Forums Commanding Officer : Admiral

ACG Director of Internet Operations : Siberian HEAT

I will certainly do that and get their ok before I venture to start that new thread about General Hieu.

I wonder why it is tolerated and acceptable when General Westmoreland, General MacArthur, General Abrahams are demonized by some ACG members and not the other way around? How did it happen that throwing dirt onto somebody is a virtue and incensing somebody even if that somebody is your brother a sin?

Meanwhile, I do appreciate the fact that we are able to dialogue on this matter in a calm and mutual respectful manner.

Phieu

#699 13 Jan 12, 06:01

My unique contribution to this forum on the Ia Drang Battle

Post #245 - Operation Bayonet I (November 8-14) - Pleiku AAR�s Account

Post #252 - Operation Bayonet I (November 8-14) � Coleman 1988�s Account

Post #254 � Operation Bayonet I (November 8-14) � Why Pleime�s Account

Post #256 � Why Pleime AAR and Pleiku Campaign AAR

Post #258 � Why Pleime AAR and Pleiku Campaign AAR (continued)

Post #275 � Why Pleime AAR and Pleiku Campaign AAR

Post #283 � The best kept secret at Ia Drang Valley battle

Post #284 � The Main Players in Pleime-Chupong-Iadrang Battlefront

Post #285 � The Main Players in Pleime-Chupong-Iadrang Battlefront � General Larsen

Post #286 - The Main Players in Pleime-Chupong-Iadrang Battlefront � General Vinh Loc

Post #287 � The Main Players in Pleime-Chupong-Iadrang Battlefront � General Kinnard.

Post #288 � The Main Players in Pleime-Chupong-Iadrang Battlefront � General Knowles

Post #299 � The Main Players in Pleime-Chupong-Iadrang Battlefront � Colonel Mataxis

Post #300 � The Main Players in Pleime-Chupong-Iadrang Battlefront � Colonel McKean.

Post #301 � The Main Players in Pleime-Chupong-Iadrang Battlefront � General Westmoreland

Post #309 � The Two Main Players of the Pleime Chess Game

Post #339 � Pleime Counteroffensive into Chupong Iadrang Complex

Post #365 - Side bar: General Swcharzkopf�s Reaction...

Post #382 - The Uniqueness of Pleime Counteroffensive operational concept

Post #396 - Herding the Enemy Troops to Chupong-Iadrang Complex.

Post #401 - The Enticement Diversionary Move.

Post #402 - The Distractive Diversionary Move.

Post #415 - Destroy the Enemy with B-52 Air Strikes

Post #416 - Side bar: Command and Control at Pleime Counteroffensive Operation

Post #417 - Side bar: Colonel Hieu and General Larsen

Post #427 - The Coup de Grace� Operation

Post #438 - The Art of How to Bridle a Mustang

Post #484 - Side Bar: 1st Air Cavalry Commanders� Cockiness P

ost #499 - Different names assigned to Pleime Campaign

Post #503 - Pleime Counteroffensive Operational Concept

Post #506 � Pre-requisiete Key Factor in Pleime Counteroffensive Planning and Execution

Post #528 - Side Bar: Why Pleime as an ORLL

Post #559 - Side Bar: Watching Chess Game Pleime

Post #569 - Chess Master Ha Vi Trung

Post #574 - The Chess Grand Master Colonel Hieu - His Checkmate Operational Concept

Post #608 - My Very First Presentation of Pleime Campaign

Post #610 - Why Pleime ?

Post #620 - Reading the Enemy�s Mind

Post #626 - What if there was no master plan for Bayonet I operation?

Post #648 - Master Plan of Pleime Offensive was known at the highest American military authorities level � MACV

Post #657 - Some addtional precision on various diversionary moves employed in Pleime offensive

Post #666 - Arc Lite Operation Planning and Execution in Pleime Offensive

Post #669 - The stealthy II Corps Chief of Staff

Post #671 - Who were privy to the Arc Lite operational concept in Pleime Offensive

Post #672 - Conceiving Tactical and Strategic Plans

Post #674 - A Doctrinal Lesson on the Use of Arc Lite in Pleime Counteroffensive

Post #675 - Like Hunting a Pack of Wolves

Post #676 - Arc Lite�s and Air Cav� s Know How Use I

s it good or bad ?

Is it positive or negative ?

Is it fictional or factual ?

Is it counter-productive or beneficial to everybody?

Can I talk about a unique action without touching upon its agent?

Should it be praised or condemned ?

Am I not telling you "What you still may not know about the Ia Drang Valley battle" ?

Phieu

#700 13 Jan 12, 06:54

Your thread carries many things that we may still not know.

It also carries many things that are very well documented.

The catch however is, most of those "things that we may still not know" are not documented, many of which are bald speculations that you can't even argue, whereas those things that are well documented are relatively well known.

That's about it.

altus

#701 13 Jan 12, 10:18

That's your and one opinion.

My posts speak for themselves.

If they contain garbage stuffs, the readers won't bother to read it. And yet 17787 view hits? How do

you explain that? Are they blind? They totally lack discernment and judgement and common sense? The fact you still read my posts says something ...

Phieu

#702 13 Jan 12, 10:35

KEN JENSEN : I had expected you to fill in the ARVN side of the story for what Joseph L. Galloway has presented (fill in the blanks or possible corrections as to what Galloway has presented over the years)...

I am wondering, who was the photographer, Galloway or Bettman?!

Aren't you too, you who are so scupulous pertaining to copyright infringement!

Furthermore, was it Duc Co or Ia Drang? Was Galloway correct in his presentation of LZ X-ray battle or Pleime campaign?

I did get in touch with Galloway and discussed about LZ X-Ray when he was still working at UPI in Washington, D.C. He was that sure about what he knew about that battle. And when I met him at the 1st Air Cav Ia Drang 40th Anniversary in Washington , D.C. in 2005, when he saw me walking toward him, he took the tangent ...

Phieu

#703 13 Jan 12, 10:39

Phieu: Are they blind? They totally lack discernment and judgement and common sense?

No, just curious to see to what would be the limit of one's absurdity. Kinda a mother asking a man to come to her house so she can introduce him to her children and say "If you won't eat and won't study, when you grow up you'll become as pitiful as this man!"

altus

#704 13 Jan 12, 10:43

Aren't you making foolist statements, Altus ?!

I really feef pity for that poor child having such kinda uneducated mother ...

Provide your arguments coherently, not just throw out cheap cursings ... please ... ... please ... ... please ...

Better, I challenge you to start a thread something like, Shooting down one by one Phieu�s absurdities in 47 some pages.

You did pretty good with your Human Wave Attacks which got to 19 pages. That's how and why you earned Boonie's respect and friendship? Why am I not as lucky as you, Altus?

I kind of envy you ... Naah ... naah ... naah ...

P.S. - One note of praise for you guys of TTVNOL forum.

While battling there, I was imposed only one restriction: don't show the South Vietnamese yellow flag. Besides that, I was free to touch upon any topics: Pleime, Dien Bien Phu, ARVN generals, General Hieu, etc.

And yet, look the restriction I am subjected to here. I thought I am living in a freedom of speech country!

And, when my Pleime thread reached 100 pages, Chiangsan hastily opened a follow up Pleime II thread ... He did not feel threaten that I might hijack this forum ... And Vo Quoc Tuan invited me over to his Dien Bien Phu thread ...

Well, I have no choice. I have to abide to the arbitrary rules of engagement set up by the moderator.

I underestimated my VC enemies back then. I salut you guys ...

Phieu

#705 13 Jan 12, 15:06

Phieu: I am wondering, who was the photographer, Galloway or Bettman?!

I can care less. I did do some googling on Bettman and I'm not to sure he was ever in Vietnam. What I have ran across is that he was a "collector" of some sort of photographs and his "collection" was sold to CORBIS.

Aren't you too, you who are so scupulous pertaining to copyright infringement!

Yes, indeed Do you wish to continue down this path?

Furthermore, was it Duc Co or Ia Drang? Was Galloway correct in his presentation of LZ X-ray battle or Pleime campaign?

I have no idea; aren't you the "expert"? I never even heard of "Galloway" until I joined this forum. First I ever heard of Ia Drang was in the movie that stared "Mel Gibson". I enjoyed the movie but hardly ever do I pay much attention to "details" in regard to movies.

KEN JENSEN

#706 13 Jan 12, 17:06

Now, you are interested ... Now, you don't care ...

Phieu

#707 13 Jan 12, 17:53

Please explain who you are pointing this comment at.

If it is me, then pray tell, what was I interested in and what I don't care about?

Shitty response like you made above is really why you are NOT wanted, by many of us, to be a member of this forum. Why don't you just pack it up an get out of here.

KEN JENSEN

#708 13 Jan 12, 19:13

Outstanding/shitty

I can search and see/I can care less

I can search on for other pictures/I hardly ever do I pay much attention to "details"

Phieu

#709 13 Jan 12, 21:58 Re: Your brother's suicide...

SAIGON (UPI) - The deputy commander of South Vietnamese troops defending the Saigon area was found shot to death Tuesday night following an argument with his superior over tactics. Military sources said he apparently committed suicide.

He probably shot himself because he was so heavily involved in the Corruption that was taking place at very High Levels within the ARVN leadership (which your brother was a part). After all, he was in a perfect spot being on the "team" of the Anti-Corruption Staff.

You have all this "stuff" trying to justify his death in a more "honorable" way than what actually took place. Why you seem it is still a mystery is beyond me. After all, your "special" dream/visits you claim to have been visiting with your brother seem a little "far-fetched" to me. Hell, on his first visit most would think how he died would be the first thing he would tell you.

hmmmm, where did your money come from that you were able to "bribe" your way out of Vietnam?

I checked out GoogleEarth for a view of your property in the Bronx; damn you have so much space compared to others. Must have been part of the "corruption" dollars.

I know, I know, I'm a chit head! ROFLOL!

KEN JENSEN

#710 13 Jan 12, 22:23

Phieu : That's your and one opinion.

make it TWO!

My posts speak for themselves.

Many are worthless.

If they contain garbage stuffs, the readers won't bother to read it. And yet 17640 view hits? How do you explain that?

Let me "un-confuse you. I probably have around 300 visits; Altus probably about the same; Boonie probably around 1000. LOL Hell, you probably have around 8,000.

You keep begging, and whinning for praise, well here you are you egotistical BS'er.

Now get out of this forum.

KEN JENSEN

#711 14 Jan 12, 01:17

???

Phieu

#712 14 Jan 12, 01:28

For the sake of this thread can we get on topic? I've learned more about Vietnam in this thread than I have in probably two years of history in high school.

Just saying this thread and its participants have an awful lot to offer, and I personally have learned a lot and wish to learn more.

Wellington95

#713 14 Jan 12, 01:30

Why Pleime had been introduced in the curriculum of various American Military Schools, such as Infantry Center (Major General Robert H. York - Brigadier General James Simmons Timothy), Armor Center (Major General A.D. Surles, Jr.), War College (Major General Eugene A. Salet), Command and General Staff (Major General Michael S. Davison) in 1966. (see post #398)

Nevertheless, it might be interesting to have the Doctrinal Lesson of the Use of Arc Lite in Pleime Counteroffensive taught at Command and General Staff College and War College as a concrete example of the use of Arc Lite strike.

Principle:
B-52 airstrike needs a targetable objective, which means the object has to be sizable, relatively immobile and its location can be pinpointed with an accuracy of at least (XX�YY�).
Feasibility:
The annihilation of the three NVA Regiments � 32nd, 33rd and 66th � after the relief of Pleime camp by B-52 airstrike can be done, because B3 Field Front intends to regroup its entire forces in preparation for a second attack against Pleime camp; and with godsend intelligence source provided by open communications between Chinese Advisors at regimental and divisional levels, allowing to determine the locations and the times at which point those three regiments become targetable for B-52 airstrike.
Operational Concept:
To stalk (1) the enemy movements until their troop units gather together close enough; particular attention should be focused on when the enemy get closer (assembling phase) (2) and much closer together (staging phase) (3) and provision should be ascertained in prolonging the staging time (4) to provide a better margin window for Arc Lite strike; and to schedule the B-52 airstrike accordingly.
Planning:
The planning of Arc Lite strikes is assumed by a coordination team comprising II Corps (Colonel Hieu, Colonel Williams), 1st Air Cav Forward CP (General Knowles, LTC Stoner), IFFV (General Smith, Colonel Barrow), MACV (General Collins).
Execution:
- October 27: The herding operation (1') started with the 1st Air Cavalry Brigade conducting All the Way operation. Spotted enemy units were broken up further in small pieces and pushed back westward to Chupong-Iadrang complex.
- End of October 27, [I]the lead elements of the 33d had closed on it forward assembly area, the village Kro (ZA080030);{/I]
- On October 28, the 32d Regiment had nearly closed its base on the north bank of the Ia Drang;
- October 28, the 32d Regiment had nearly closed its base on the north bank of the Ia Drang.
- On October 29, the 33d Regiment decided to keep the unit on the move to the west, to Anta Village ( YA940010), located at the foot of the Chu Pong Massif.
- On October 31, the constant harassment from the air and the sudden and unexpected landing of infantry troops at points throughout the area was causing consternation in the enemy ranks. Elements continued to disintegrate and fragment into small parties or, in some cases, individual stragglers. Many of these, left to fend for themselves, soon fell into the hands of Cavalry units. Contributing to the problems of the 33d was the acute shortage of food and medicines since many units could not reach their pre-stocked supply because of the sudden thrusts of the helicopter-borne troopers.
- On November 1, the 33rd regiment headquarters closed in at Anta Village.
- On November 2, the 33d Regiment now received orders to head deeper into the Chu Pong sanctuary. By 0400 on the 2d, the regimental CP had arrived at Hill 762 (YA885106). But while the head of the column had comparative safety, the body and tail, still stretching back to near Pleime, was anything but safe.
- On November 3, the 33d Regiment, meantime, was still trying to pull its bruised and battered tail into the Chu Pong sanctuary. But it became just another day of constant harassment from the air and ground marked by the loss of still more medical supplies and ammunition.
- November 4, the 33d Regiment was ordered out of its base at Hill 732, which it had hardly reached, and onto the eastern slopes of Chu Pong in the vicinity of YA922010 with its battalions (when they closed) to take up positions from Hill 732, down through Anta Village (940010) to the north bank of the Ia Meur (980000).
- Nov 8 and 9, the 33d Regiment began to assess its losses and to count noses. There were many missing.
- Nov 8, the enticement move started with the 3rd Air Cavalry Brigade ordered to switch the operational direction from west to eastward. - Nov 9, B3 Field Front took the enticement bait and decided a second attack on Pleime camp scheduled for 11/16.
- Nov 10, B3 Field Front B3 ordered troop units into assembling areas (2') for reorganization, training and rehearsals.
- Nov 11, the three regiments became targetable with the 66th center of mass (vic YA 9104); the 32nd (YA 820072), the 33rd (YA 940011)
- Arc Lite scheduled to strike before 11/16, either 11/14 or 11/15, depending B3 Field Front moves.
- Nov 12, while the assembling phase was on going, 1/7th Air Cavalry Battalion was ordered to get ready to be inserted into Chu Pong massif.
- Nov 13, B3 Field Front forces began staging (3') in preparation for movement to Pleime and the projected 16 November attack. Some recon parties and transportation units already had moved out. - Nov 14, 1/7th Air Cavalry Battalion was inserted in LZ X-Ray in a distractive move (4'), forcing B3 Field Front to delay the attack against Pleime and to refocus its attention onto new threat and to maintain its troop units concentrated at staging area for Arc Lite strike scheduled for noon Nov 15.
- Nov 14 noon, B3 Field Front engaged the 1/7th Air Cavalry Battalion with two battalions. Reinforcement with 2/7th Air Cavalry Battalion was sent in.
- Nov 15 noon, Arc Lite suddenly struck at B3 Field Front forces center of mass (vicinity YA8702) and continued for the next 5 days in 96 sorties.- Nov 17, Arc Lite�s targets included LZ X-Ray.
- Nov 18, the �coup de gr�ce" operation started with Airborne Brigade conducting Than Phong 7 operation.
- Nov 24, as no more contacts were made with the enemy, the Airborne Brigade withdrew from the area of operations, terminating the third phase of the Battle of Pleime with 265 VC killed (BC), 10 others and 58 weapons captured.
II Corps Headquarters, Pleiku City
Colonel Nguy�̃n Văn Hi�́u
Chief of Staff.

Phieu

#714 14 Jan 12, 01:36

New York Times re: Pleime

Saigon, South Vietnam, Tuesday October 26, 1965
By R.W. Apple, Jr., Special to The New York Times

Vietcong Attack At Pleime Halted

U.S. and South Vietnamese force Stops New Assault 20 Yards From Camp

Vietcong guerrillas fought their way to within 20 yards of the beleaguered Special forces camp at Pleime this afternoon before being repulsed.

Crawling to their stomachs across the red earth surrounding the outpost, the Communists launched a major assault at noon. They moved up under the cover of intensive .50-caliber machine-gun fire and sporadic heavy mortar barrages.

One guerrilla - a pair of wire cutters in his hand - was captured at the barbed-wire enclosure.

At 1:45 P.M. as the frontal attack on the triangular fortress was being thrown back, a second action developed to the southwest. There, a unit sent from the outpost trades small-arms fire with Vietcong troops for more than five and a half hours.

By 9 P.M. the perimeter around Pleime was quiet again. The 1.500 defenders of the Central Highlands fortress - mountain tribesmen, South Vietnamese troops and American advisers who are experts in jungle warfare training and leadership - suffered light casualties during the day.

United States strategists are still puzzled by the persistence of the Communist effort at Pleime. They concede that they would not have thought the Vietcong would choose to fight a prolonged battle against so small and remote an outpost.

A senior American commander suggested that the Vietcong must be using trails in the area to infiltrate men and equipment from Cambodia into South Vietnam. The camp lies only 14 miles from the wilderness of northeastern Cambodia.

The commander also said that he believed the Vietcong, who have not been conspicuously successful this fall, were badly in need of a striking victory for propaganda purposes. Perhaps, he added, they thought they could overrun the Special Forces camp quickly and without significant losses.

Whatever the Communist thinking, the struggle for Pleime has become important to the allies because it has offered them a rare opportunity to fight a continuing battle with the usually elusive enemy forces.

Today's action came as a surprise because last night a South Vietnamese armored column broke through the cordon of enemy forces and reached Pleime. It appeared that the weeklong siege had been lifted.

American advisers at Pleime who are now under the command of Maj. Charles Beckwith, estimated that the enemy force was of regimental size - about 2,000 men. Many of them wore the trim khaki uniforms of North Vietnamese regulars.

A North Vietnamese master sergeant, left behind because he was sick, was captured by a patrol today. He told interrogators he was infiltrated into South Vietnam three months ago along with the rest of his infantry battalion.

The sergeant said there were also other Hanoi units in the area, but he did not say how many.

A correspondent who accompanied the patrol said many of the Communists had been killed in their foxholes and bunkers by napalm bombs dropped by American fighter-bombers.

Hit Twice

A red-haired Army enlisted man, Specialist 4 Daniel H. Shea of Roslindale, Mass., recounted how he and two other men sallied out of the besieged camp last Wednesday to look for survivors of an American helicopter that had been shot down by Vietcong machine gunners.

With him were Capt. Harold H. Moore of Fayetteville, N.C. then the camp commander and Sgt. 1st Cl. Joseph Bailey, and Oklahoman.

When they reached the underbrush at the edge of the camp's airstrip, a Vietcong sniper, apparently equipped with an efficient telescopic sight hit he sergeant twice. He slumped to the ground.

"Just the minute before," Special Shea recalled, "he had been saying that it was dangerous to try to get out to that helicopter, but the pilots had tried to help us and this was the least we could do for them."

With the enemy bullets whizzing overhead, Specialist Shea fell to his knees and gave mouth-to-mouth artificial respiration to Sergeant Bailey for almost three quarters of an hour while Captain Moore tried to call in a smokescreen to cover a retreat into the fortress.

There was no smoke available, so Specialist Shea, who is 24 years old, tried to carry Sergeant Bailey to safety without a smokescreen.

"We didn't get him halfway up when they hit Bailey again," the young soldier said. "Second later they hit me in the arm. Bailey was dead."

They never reached the downed Army helicopter.

Phieu

#715 14 Jan 12, 02:23

KEN JENSEN :

Re: Your brother's suicide...

hmmmm, where did your money come from that you were able to "bribe" your way out of Vietnam?

I checked out GoogleEarth for a view of your property in the Bronx; damn you have so much space compared to others. Must have been part of the "corruption" dollars.

I know, I know, I'm a chit head! ROFLOL!

Under the belt cheap shots ...

Are you unleashing your bad () side ? I didn't see that side in Retired Us Army Captain Ken Jensen - Short Bio

P.S. Since you are at it ...

1/ here is the link to the Anti-Corruption Special Investigator

2/a view of your property in the Bronx

Phieu

#716 14 Jan 12, 02:30

Wellington95: For the sake of this thread can we get on topic?

Roger.

I've learned more about Vietnam in this thread than I have in probably two years of history in high school.

More likely two years of history in graduate - maybe even post graduate -college ...

It's an end result of 20+ years of research ...

Phieu

#717 14 Jan 12, 07:22

Phieu : Under the belt cheap shots ...

Learned the "cheap shots" from your fine "leadership" examples (i.e. against Boonie, Altus, Chiangshan, etc.) combined with other "snide" posts.

heeheehee, what part of "short bio" don't you understand. I am very accomplished in may other things that I haven't yet disclosed.

KEN JENSEN

#718 14 Jan 12, 07:37

Wellington95: For the sake of this thread can we get on topic? I've learned more about Vietnam in this thread than I have in probably two years of history in high school.

Just saying this thread and its participants have an awful lot to offer, and I personally have learned a lot and wish to learn more.

This "thread" is far from what is available to you within this fine forum.

May I suggest checking out the below "thread"; a world of knowledge can be found there (if you grasp what is written, you are at the Master Level of Education in regard to the Vietnam War)....

Vietnamese military terms or anything Vietnamese

http://www.armchairgeneral.com/forum...ad.php?t=62840

P.S. The above thread is where Altus earned his respect within the membership of this forum.

KEN JENSEN

#719 14 Jan 12, 07:39

KEN JENSEN: Learned the "cheap shots" from your fine "leadership" examples (i.e. against Boonie, Altus, Chiangshan, etc.) combined with other "snide" posts.

Seems you did not heed to Mama Mia Altus 's warning.

�Kinda a mother asking a man to come to her house so she can introduce him to her children and say "If you won't eat and won't study, when you grow up you'll become as pitiful as this man!"

heeheehee, what part of "short bio" don't you understand. I am very accomplished in may other things that I haven't yet disclosed.

The hidden bad side ...

Are you trying to compete with General Hieu's "long bio" ?

Keep it "short" though, otherwise it runs the risk of being banned in this forum !

Or you don't care because you enjoy preferential treatment ...

Enough fun pokings. Let's get back to the topic. Shall we?

Phieu

#720 14 Jan 12, 07:44

New York Times re: Pleime

Pleime, South Vietnam, Wednesday October 27, 1965
By Charles Mohr, Special to The New York Times

Siege at Pleime: Americans Marvel at Tough Foe

A battalion of United States troops leaped from helicopter today to a burned and scarred slope out outside the barbed wire of the Pleime Special Forces camp, which has been under attack for eight days.

The troops, members of the First Cavalry Division (Airmobile), deployed through bomb craters and foxholes containing the blackened bodies of some guerrilla dead and swept around the west side of the camp. But they made little contact with the enemy.

It appeared that the battle of Pleime might at last be ending. But it had also seemed to be over at midday yesterday as 17 American Special Forces men, bearded and dirt-caked, relaxed around their team building.

Suddenly shots rang out, and the Americans, who have been specially trained in anti-guerrilla warfare, spent the next hour under cover as perhaps as many as 2,000 rifle and machine-gun bullets ripped through the building.

Those same tired Special Forces men stood on bunkers today, watched the Airmobile troops land and then began loading the bodies of fallen South Vietnamese on helicopters.

When a reporter reached the camp Monday by helicopter, he asked a Special forces sergeant where the camp commander, Maj. Charles A. Beckwith of Atlanta, Ga., could be found.

"When you see a real big man yelling 'Press on,' that's him," the sergeant said.

The most striking first impression of Pleime was the depth of the professional respect the Americans had for their enemy, among whom were hundreds of North Vietnamese regular army troops.

Major Beckwith called the attacking troops "the finest soldiers I have ever seen in the world except Americans."

"I wish we could recruit them," he said.

"I wish I knew what they were drugging them with to make them fight like that. They are highly motivated and highly dedicated."

The battle of Pleime began the night of Oct. 19 with an assault on the triangular camp, 220 miles northeast of Saigon, and its defense force of 350 mountain tribesmen advised by nine American Special Forces men.

The camp held out and on Friday was reinforced with 14 more Special Forces soldiers and about 250 South Vietnamese airborne troops. For the next four days, the North Vietnamese regular army troops in the attack force and the defenders clashed just outside the barbed wire.

On Saturday, other troops ambushed and partly overran a huge South Vietnamese armored relief column five and a half miles up the road and stopped it for a full day.

The two concentric lines of trenches and the grounds of Pleime are carved from red earth, and the fine dust has turned the sweating men a rich copper color.

The filth of the besieged camp is appalling. Every night, scores of rats scuttle over the bodies of the sleeping men, and lice burrow into their unwashed uniforms.

Empty shell cartons and ammunition boxes and brightly colored parachutes littered the camp.

"Tell Him We're Dragging"

On Monday night, word came on the radio that President Johnson had "expressed concern" about Pleime and that the generals in Saigon wanted a new situation report to pass on to him. There were laughs.

"Tell him we're dragging, man," said one soldier.

But on Monday night, the intensity of enemy fire slackened greatly, and none of the Special Forces men paid any real attention to the five rounds of recoilless rifle fire and eight rounds of mortar shells that hit the camp.

Aside from such enemy hazards, there were many from supporting forces. For example, two persons were killed when heavy supply packages dropped by air fell on them, and one such package left a gaping hole in the mess hall roof.

Throughout the siege, United States Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps planes dropped hundreds of bombs so close to Pleime that shrapnel flew around the camp. Two defenders were wounded by American bombs.

But as the executive officer, Maj. Charles Thompson of Morristown, Tenn., said as he ducked his head during a strike: "We like it! We like it!"

"The Air Force saved this camp," became a common remark.

But there are limitations to air power. The defenders almost took a kind of pride in the fact that bombing had not silenced the heavy machine guns of their enemy.

"Old Charlie [Vietcong] just stands up in his hole and keeps shooting back at the whole Air Force," said one man.

Two helicopters were shot down by enemy antiaircraft fire, and eight Americans were killed in them. Two A-1E Skyraider fighter-bombers and an RB-66 photo-reconnaissance plane were lost.

Early in the fight. Sgt. 1st Cl. Joseph Bailey of Lebanon, Teen., borrowed a tiny, gold fringed American flag from Pfc. Eugene Tafoya of Albuquerque, N.M., and ran it up the flagpole under the saffron-and-red South Vietnamese flag.

"If we are going get zapped we might as well get zapped under our own colors," Sergeant Bailey said. An hour later, he was dead.

At 5:30 p.m. Monday the armored relief column appeared on the crest of a northern hill and rumbled down toward camp. The original mountaineer defenders and the airborne South Vietnamese troops who had come in on Friday cheered and waved their yellow scarves.

Children of the mountain tribesmen were playing in the trenches or clinging to their mothers skirts. More than a hundred wives and an underdetermined number of babies and older children were living in the entrenchments with the mountaineers.

Many of the children were armed. A camp favorite was a 12-year-old boy named John, who was dressed in a helmet and uniform and armed with grenades and a carbine.

On Monday morning, one little boy was killed in a fire in a mortar bunker. Then with the arrival of the relief column in the afternoon, the war did seem over in Pleime.

Yesterday morning, the special forces and two companies of airborne South Vietnamese troops moved confidently out onto the northern slope, which had once had six machine-gun positions. In four previous trips there, Americans had died while capturing three of the .50-caliber guns, and the survivors have been driven back into camp each time.

They had not forgotten the fight on Saturday when a single Vietcong soldier had emerged from a hole, charged two platoons of mountaineers with a hand grenade and routed them. Major Beckwith himself had fired seven bullets into the enemy's back, but he had said, "That was a real soldier."

In yesterday's sweep, the bodies of about 40 Vietcong soldiers were found. Some of them were in deep L-shaped holes dug within 60 yards of the camp's barbed wire, and no one could explain how they had been able to dig such holes without detection.

In the brush, the Pleime defenders captured an assistant platoon leader of a North Vietnamese regiment who had been left behind because he was ill. He trembled but was treated kindly and given a cigarette.

One American said: "We ought to put this guy on the north wall and throw out these Government troops. He could probably hold it alone. If we could get two more, we would have all the walls taken care of."

The operation ended suddenly when a single sniper opened fire and hit a South Vietnamese soldier.

Meanwhile, the armored column and its riflemen had also moved out confidently in a southward sweep. But a band of guerrillas began shooting up the camp, and the armored column, consisting of 16 tanks numerous personnel carriers and about 800 government riflemen, were forced back to Pleime by what seemed to be a small but well dug in Vietcong force.

Five American advisers were carried into the camp wounded, one of them dying. T

he bodies of 19 South Vietnamese soldiers and many wounded were brought in. The siege of Pleime was no longer over.

During the afternoon, snipers continued to pick off an occasional South Vietnamese.

As medical evacuation helicopters began to come in, the Special Forces doctor, Capt. Lanny Hunter of Abilene, Tex., had to struggle to keep what he called the "smiling wounded' or even unscathed South Vietnamese from scrambling aboard in place of critically wounded men.

The night was again fairly quiet with only five mortar rounds fired at the camp. Today, Specialist 7 Leo Drake, a lanky medical corpsman, emerged from the kitchens at dawn with a soup bowl of steaming coffee and shouted, "Good morning, all you lucky people in Pleime!"

While the bodies of only about 40 Vietcong soldiers have been found so far, there are believed to be many more enemy dead.

The South Vietnamese said 124 others had been counted after the ambush of the armored relief column last Saturday, and the Americans largely confirmed the figure without having seen all of them themselves.

Saigon reports of Vietcong bodies "hanging on the barbed wire" at Pleime were totally false and brought only laughs from the camp's defenders.

Government casualties were numerous but fewer than those of the Vietcong probably by a significant margin.

Phieu

#721 14 Jan 12, 07:56

Phieu : ...The hidden bad side ...

Bad, some may think so. I'm a GR8 Poker, Chess player, and "street hustler". Also shoot a fairly good game of Pool or Billiards. Don't believe your brother, or you are anywhere near my level of play.

Are you trying to compete with General Hieu's "long bio" ?

R O F L O L

KEN JENSEN

#722 14 Jan 12, 08:42

Ken,

Class is back in session. Hurry up back, you are already very late. Or you prefer to play hookie ... chess game ... poker, bowling, or street hustling, etc...

Phieu

#723 14 Jan 12, 13:09

This is not going to end well...

Don744

#724 14 Jan 12, 15:57

don744: This is not going to end well...

LOL, never know Don. Ever hear of "Perry Left", "Perry Right", and "Thrust"

Phieu : Ken,

Class is back in session. Hurry up back, you are already very late. Or you prefer to play hookey ... chess game ... poker, bowling, or street hustling, etc...

No, I believe those days are behind me now (except for Poker). Anyway I would very much like to participate in another "Class" subject though...

If I recall from your personal background, you were a School Teacher in Vietnam. If that is so, please provide some of your own "personal" experiences. What level of Teaching, and where you taught?

If not a "Teacher", then I would still like you to fill our membership in on your own experiences as a S. Vietnam resident civilian (maybe citizen???). What did you do and what were your hardships?

I actually created another thread (class room with you in mind) I wish you would provide your knowledge to all our members in regard to the subject matter. The below class room is titled and awaiting all "instructors" providing the knowledge (or opinions) they have...

Please note the below thread starts off with School children...

PROPAGANDA WITHIN VIETNAM

http://www.armchairgeneral.com/forum...d.php?t=118675

You may still get some questions but the pressure would be far less than what it is within this thread. Please participate in the mentioned "Class Room".

P.S. Please be aware that Altus (and any other N. Vietnam supporter) is/are also invited to aid in the "instruction" within this special class. heeheehee, Altus and I have already had some "debate" a couple of years ago on the subject matter.

KEN JENSEN

#725 14 Jan 12, 16:03

Thanks, but no thanks.

At least not now. Maybe later in due time.

Phieu

#726 14 Jan 12, 16:37

I have no "negative" feelings as to your above wishes. I was reaching out with an "olive branch"; I am also aware that you may still have family and/or friends still in Vietnam that you must consider.

I am also aware that there were many positive efforts made by the VC in "other than terrorists" activities that many S. Vietnam folks supported. Hopefully the "Propaganda" thread will also bring out those (I am sure they will); because of what "Altus" and "Lirelou" and other SOG members have provided in the past (again scattered all over this forum).

I'm still interested in your struggles as a civilian in Vietnam.

KEN JENSEN

#727 14 Jan 12, 17:03

Thanks for your nice gesture and consideration.

I might join in your class at a later date.

All the best for its success.

Phieu

#728 15 Jan 12, 02:46

New York Times re: Pleime

Saigon, Vietnam, Saturday October 30, 1965 (Associated Press)

Vietcong Raid Pleime Camp

The Vietcong attacked the Unitd States Special Forces camp at Pleime last night with mortar and small arms fire, an American military spokesman reported.

The enemy force, estimated at 35 to 50 men, fired 10 mortar rounds into the camp and maintained sporadic small-arms fire until after midnight.

Phieu

#729 15 Jan 12, 09:28

New York Times re: Pleime

Saigon, South Vietnam, November 16, 1965
By Charles Mohr, Special to The New York Times

3 Prisonners Tell Of Aid From China

North Vietnamese Also Say Cambodians Helped Them

Captured North Vietnamese soldiers said today that their units had received assistance from Cambodian "militiamen" during their infiltration into South Vietnam and that each infiltrated regiment had one Chinese Communist adviser.

These prisoners, picked up in the vicinity of Pleime in late October and early this month, appeared at a news conference in Saigon today.

One said that the people of North Vietnam "hate the Americans" for the daily air strikes directed against North Vietnam.

The young men, wearing cheap khaki uniforms, emphatically asserted that their regiments had passed through Cambodia to reach the Pleime area in central Vietnam. One of them, Nguyen Xuan Lien, said his regiment had received rice and other assistance from what he called "regional forces or militiamen of Cambodia."

The Cambodian government has strenuously denied that the North Vietnamese use Cambodian soil as a staging area, and particularly, that the Cambodian Government has assisted them.

Earlier Report Cited

The statement that Chinese advisers were with regular North Vietnamese Army units in South Vietnam followed a report by an American Special Forces sergeant that he saw a Chinese body near Pleime last month.

An official American spokesman commented that "we don't have positive knowledge of Chinese advisers, but it is a distinct possibility." As for the remarks on Cambodia, the spokesman said that it was known that some Vietnamese units had entered South Vietnam from that country but that he had no knowledge that they had received the assistance described.

The North Vietnamese soldiers who appeared at the news conference had rough peasant-style haircuts and looked nervous and shy as military policemen led them into the conference hall. But within minutes they became almost voluble.

In addition to Lien, they were identified as Hoang Van Chung, 27 years old, a tiny private in a medical aid detachment of the North Vietnamese 32d Regiment, and Tran Ngoc Luong, a tall, sallow, 20-year-old who was a medical corpsman in the 33d Regiment. Lien, 25, was a corporal and rifle squad leader in what he said was the Second Regiment.

Lien and Luong are both from rural villages in Quang Binh Province in North Vietnam and Chung is from the North Vietnamese town of Nam Dinh. Luong was captured by American troops west of Pleime when his field hospital was overrun by units of the First Cavalry Division (Airmobile). The two others were listed as "returnees to the national cause" rather than ordinary prisoners, because they gave themselves up.

The men said that before leaving North Vietnam this summer they were told that three-fourths of South Vietnam was already "liberated" and that they were going to oppose an American "invasion" of the South.

They said they had found that the South Vietnamese and Americans had superior material equipment and transport and that living conditions in the jungle were grim.

Phieu

#730 15 Jan 12, 12:40

Hagiographic Logorrhea

Whatever is said about Pleime campaign and its architect, Colonel Hieu, is based on the following primary sources. And yet it is rejected as hagiographic logorrhea stuffs ! I am pretty sure the person who made that statement did not bother to look closely into these sources himself.

1. J.D. Coleman, Pleiku, the Dawn of Helicopter Warfare in Vietnam, St. Martin�s Press, New York, 1988.
2. General Harold G. Moore and Joseph L. Galloway, We Were Soldiers Once� and Young, Random House, New York, 1992.
3. General Pham Huu An, Chien Truong Moi, Memoir, Quan Doi Nhan Dan Publishing House, Hanoi, 2002.
4. General Harry Kinnard, Pleiku Campaign, 1st Air Cavalry Division Headquarters, March 4, 1966.
5. G3 Journal, I Field Force Vietnam, October 1965.
6. General Norman Schwarzkopf, It Doesn't Take A Hero, Bantam, 1992. 7. General Vinh Loc, Why Pleime, Information Printing Office, Saigon, September 1966.
8. Cochran, Alexander S. "First Strike at River Drang", Military History, Oct 1984, pp 44-52, Per. Interview with H.W.O Kinnard, 1st Cavalry Division Commanding General.
9. LTC Harold G. Moore, Combat After Action Report, Ia Drang Valley Operation, 14-16 Nov 65. Headquarters 1/7 Cavalry Battalion.

Phieu

#731 15 Jan 12, 14:22

Does the name Hieu, or any direct reference to the II Corps Chief of Staff appear in any of those references? If yes, please cite the page and passage.

Don744

#732 15 Jan 12, 16:06

The stealthy II Corps Chief of Staff

Don,

Your question indicates to me you are student category b

b. He did not review previous lessons, and so did not understand this lesson,
- I would tell him to review his lessons first.

Or perhaps you played hookie with Ken while that lesson was given in classe. I should have taken attendance!

I should make you review the entire thread (49 pages!) where Colonel Hieu, II Corps Chief of Staff has been mentioned in one of those primary source document. Then

- either you are obtuse enough to painfully get back to each one of the 731 posts (!) to find them,

- or wise enough to use the search this thread function to have them line up into a list for you with a simple click of the mouse.

However, as a courtesy to your goodwill, I make it easier for you: please go to post # 669 : The stealthy II Corps Chief of Staff.

(Note that Chief of Staff, II Corps, Colonel Hieu indicate the same entity in the G3 Journal.)

Better, let me condense it further for you in a nutshell.

(G3 Journal/IFFV):

21 October 65
- 08:20H: II Corps Capt Ushijima - Who if anyone at Pleiku can make a Cmd decision if necessary in Vinh Loc's absence? Request you stay on top of Than Phong 6, Plei My and route 21 Opns and ensure timely and accurate info forwarded this HQ. Asn: Chief of Staff is here and has contact w/CG on coast. Question: Can CofS make a decision. Ans: He will have to check w/CG before making a decision.
22 October 65
- 17:50H: CG called CofS sometime prior to 1700. Than Phong 6 will terminate tomorrow. TF Amos will be extracted tomorrow. TF Ingram is to move during early morning hrs to Pleiku.
30 October 1965
- 00:50H: II Corps (Major Black) - Ref Plei Me: Camp rec'd a few mortar rds, some trip flares were set off and some SA fire. Nothing serious. 7 cas, med evac requested. At 292350 Col Williams called Col Hieu, CofS II Corps. II Corps requested that 1st Cav TAOR be extended to include the Plei Me area except the camp itself. From present line on NS grid line ZA14 east to NS grid line AR77, on EW grid line ZA/AR15, south on AR77 to EW grid line 00, then west to NW grid line ZA14. Col Buchan, Gen Knowes, Col Williams and Col Mataxis agree.
20 November 1965
- 1702H: II Corps Maj Easterling � II Corps isn�t aware of this info. G3 II Corps knows nothing. (MACV called 1705 � Maj Kirby � Three way hook up) Maj Kirby II Corps DASC reported that ARVN units in Abn Bde area are receiving mortar fire (Chu Pong area). Maj Easterling (Check w/II Corps G3) II Corps ARVN knows nothing about it. Maj Kirby reports msg came thru DASC channels. We need confirmation through Army channels before we can act of request to hit target. Maj Amey II Corps check out situation and call back ASAP (1710).

Besides, I have established lengthily and in various occasions the fact that Colonel Hieu was the author of Why Pleime and the architect of Pleime Campaign.

Furthermore, it seems that official AAR's and ORLL's protocole is not to mention the individual commander and his general staff members by name.

Phieu

#733 15 Jan 12, 16:12

It's mentioned several times in this thread.

Wellington95

#734 15 Jan 12, 16:21

Wellington95,

Thanks for your lending hand. But Don's specific request was in those references and not in the thread, which has been addressed in my precedent post to yours.

Between the two of us : isn�t it strange that those who professed no more interest toward my presentation still keep on sneaking in the classroom, not to learn though, but to attempt for the kill.

Phieu

#735 15 Jan 12, 16:35

Oh whoops, I misunderstood...carry on then.

Wellington95

#736 15 Jan 12, 17:37

It suddenly dawned on me that would I have presented the Pleime campaign without indicating that Colonel Hieu was its architect, it would be gleefully accepted by everybody and would not have suscitated all those envious feelings ... and triggered all those hateful attacks .... and generated all those under the belt innuendos �

Well, can I do otherwise? Obviously no, I want to tell the truth and the whole truth as it is, without sugar coating it to please the tongue and for easy swallowing...

I did try to hold and not mention my brother's name and role until very late into the presentation though ... until page 25 ... 26 ... in an attempt to accomodate sensibility and sensitivity ... and it turned out to be to no avail ...

Phieu

#737 15 Jan 12, 22:32

Phieu : Don,

Your question indicates to me you are student category b

This is not a class. This is more a re-run of the psychic John Edward's TV show "crossing over". I am a student of history, not this.

don744

#738 15 Jan 12, 22:36

How is it possible for you to ask question while watching a rerun of TV shows? Or you are a tech savvy possessing an interactive TV device?

Otherwise, it has to be a live history class and the specific lesson is on Ia Drang battle.

Never mind, since you went in a wrong place and did ask a question, did I answer your question to your satisfaction?

If yes, I am sorry for disappointing you. g. He was just too obtuse,
- I won�t bother to explain further to him and just moved on for the entire class and hoped and prayed the best for him.

By the way, aren't you busy enough running your Operation Hump class ... whoops, sorry ... history seminar ?

Phieu

#739 16 Jan 12, 04:54

New York Times re: Pleime

Pleime, South Vietnam, December 4, 1965
By Hanson W. Baldwin, Special to The New York Times

Scarred Stronghold at Pleime Is fortified Anew

Bomb craters around the outer wire at Pleime still soar the earth, and the jungle growth nearby is littered with white patches from sent parachute flares.

But the broken wire is replaced, the families of the soldier-tribesmen are coming back to this Special forces camp and the fort around which so many died so short a time ago is stronger than ever.

The furious combat that began late in October with the siege of Pleime may have been decisive against Communist attempts to dominate Vietnam's Central Highlands and thus cut South Vietnam in two.

At any rate, the battles were the climax of the year's campaign by the Vietcong, aided by strong units of the North Vietnamese Army, to overrun district capitals in the II Corps area, to threaten Pleiku and to dominate Highway 19, a strategic Highlands route.

Early in the monsoon season, these efforts met success. Town after town fell. Larger and larger areas in the Highlands came under Vietcong control. Only the stout defense of Special Forces camps such as the ones at Pleime and Ducco and the arrival of the First Cavalry Division (Airmobile), with its aircraft, helped the South Vietnamese to turn the tide.

The struggle for the Central Highlands is far from over. The enemy is expected to come again from secret base areas that are reported to exist in the tree-covered mountains across the Cambodian border.

Capt. Harold M. Moore, a 24-year-old Special Forces officer from Pekin, Ill., commanded the seven-man American jungle-warfare leadership team during the siege. He is still in command and cheerful.

Captain Moore and the camp commander, Capt. Tran Van Nhan, pointed proudly today to their fort's defenses and to its Montagnard fighting men. Some of the tribesmen still bore wounds; some, as young as 12 years old, showed no fear of a Vietcong attack.

Outside the barbed wire, outside the Claymore mines and the dugouts and the watchtowers are the burned remnants of a village that once housed families of some of the fighting men in the fort.

Wreckage of an A-1E Skyraider fighter-bomber, downed in the fighting, lies on a nearby hillside. Cartridge cases from the enemy's 7.62 mm. carbines and rifle ammunition litter the ground. The hills are pocked with craters and the woods seared brown and black where napalm spread its fiery carpet.

But the South Vietnamese flag - three red stripes across a yellow field - still flutters above Pleime, and the garrison is stronger than before the siege. The fort has gone underground - its living quarters and its gun positions are protected by layers of sandbags and by the red clay.

At Ducco, where half the garrison is South Vietnamese and half is Montagnard, the story is the same. The post is stronger than before, and patrols are moving into the brush.

Refugees who fled are coming back. Villages are growing again in the back country near the Cambodian border

Phieu

#740 16 Jan 12, 10:28

I think I actually said it was "small group". The thread served it's utility. Members provided exactly what I asked. You make a good point, however. Your thread, your rules, and I should not have interjected in the manner I did.

don744

#741 16 Jan 12, 10:30

�

Phieu

#742 16 Jan 12, 10:41

A Doctrinal Lesson on the Use of Arc Lite in Pleime Counteroffensive (revised)

Please allow me to re-post this as it had several typo errors.

Principle:

B-52 airstrike needs a targetable objective, which means the object has to be sizable, relatively immobile and its location can be pinpointed with an accuracy of at least (XX�YY�).

Feasibility:

Operational Concept:

Planning:

Execution:

- October 27: The herding operation (1�) started with the 1st Air Cavalry Brigade conducting All the Way operation. Spotted enemy units were broken up further in small pieces and pushed back westward to Chupong-Iadrang complex.

- End of October 27, the lead elements of the 33d had closed on it forward assembly area, the village Kro (ZA080030);

- October 28, the 32d Regiment had nearly closed its base on the north bank of the Ia Drang.

- October 29, the 33d Regiment decided to keep the unit on the move to the west, to Anta Village ( YA940010), located at the foot of the Chu Pong Massif.

- October 31, the constant harassment from the air and the sudden and unexpected landing of infantry troops at points throughout the area was causing consternation in the enemy ranks. Elements continued to disintegrate and fragment into small parties or, in some cases, individual stragglers. Many of these, left to fend for themselves, soon fell into the hands of Cavalry units. Contributing to the problems of the 33d was the acute shortage of food and medicines since many units could not reach their pre-stocked supply because of the sudden thrusts of the helicopter-borne troopers.

- November 1, the 33rd regiment headquarters closed in at Anta Village.

- November 2, the 33d Regiment now received orders to head deeper into the Chu Pong sanctuary. By 0400 on the 2d, the regimental CP had arrived at Hill 762 (YA885106). But while the head of the column had comparative safety, the body and tail, still stretching back to near Pleime, was anything but safe.

- November 3, the 33d Regiment, meantime, was still trying to pull its bruised and battered tail into the Chu Pong sanctuary. But it became just another day of constant harassment from the air and ground marked by the loss of still more medical supplies and ammunition.

- November 4, the 33d Regiment was ordered out of its base at Hill 732, which it had hardly reached, and onto the eastern slopes of Chu Pong in the vicinity of YA922010 with its battalions (when they closed) to take up positions from Hill 732, down through Anta Village (940010) to the north bank of the Ia Meur (980000).

- November 8 and 9, the 33d Regiment began to assess its losses and to count noses. There were many missing.

- November 9, the enticement move started with the 3rd Air Cavalry Brigade ordered to switch the operational direction from west to eastward.

- November 10, B3 Field Front took the enticement bait and decided a second attack on Pleime camp scheduled for 11/16.

- November 11, B3 Field Front B3 ordered troop units into assembling areas (2�) for reorganization, training and rehearsals.

- Nov 11, the three regiments became targetable with the 66th center of mass (vic YA 9104); the 32nd (YA 820072), the 33rd (YA 940011).

- Arc Lite scheduled to strike before 11/16, either 11/14 or 11/15, depending B3 Field Front moves.

- November 12, while the assembling phase was on going, 1/7th Air Cavalry Battalion was ordered to get ready to be inserted into Chu Pong massif.

- November 13, B3 Field Front forces began staging (3�) in preparation for movement to Pleime and the projected 16 November attack. Some recon parties and transportation units already had moved out.

- November 14, 1/7th Air Cavalry Battalion was inserted in LZ X-Ray in a distractive move (4�), forcing B3 Field Front to delay the attack against Pleime and to refocus its attention onto new threat and to maintain its troop units concentrated at staging area for Arc Lite strike scheduled for noon Nov 15.

- November 14 noon, B3 Field Front engaged the 1/7th Air Cavalry Battalion with two battalions. Reinforcement with 2/7th Air Cavalry Battalion was sent in.

- November 15 noon, [B]Arc Lite suddenly struck[/B] at B3 Field Front forces center of mass (vicinity YA8702) and continued for the next 5 days in 96 sorties.

- November 17, Arc Lite�s targets included LZ X-Ray.

- November 18, the �coup de gr�ce" operation started with Airborne Brigade conducting Than Phong 7 operation.

- November 24, as no more contacts were made with the enemy, the Airborne Brigade withdrew from the area of operations, terminating the third phase of the Battle of Pleime with 265 VC killed (BC), 10 others and 58 weapons captured.

II Corps Headquarters, Pleiku City

Colonel Nguy�̃n Văn Hi�́u
Chief of Staff

Voil�! It's perfect now!

Phieu

#743 17 Jan 12, 03:38

VC gunners chained to their guns.

G3 Journal/IFFV

22 Oct
- 21:00H: II Corps - Chinese officer killed. (not confirmed). Confirmed that enemy are chained to their machine guns. Ref action at Plei My.
- 24:00H: Intelligence Summary for period 220001 to 222400H Oct 65. 0135H A1E a/c shotdown over Plei My, last report pilot alive not recovered. 0400 Plei My under heavy 50 cal, and 81mm mortar fire. Plei My frd captured 1 81mm mortar, .30 cal MG, 3 Russian type wpns. 1 light MG. 1020H Plei Me 1 A1E shotdown with AW, pilot recovered. Plei My approx 1300H H-34 a/c rec'd 10 rds hit in tail. 1 USSF med fm Delta team killed. One reporter WIA. Both personnel evac to Pleiku. 1430H reporter evac to 8th field Nha Trang. Eye wound. Est 80 - 100 81mm dud mortar rds collected of US manufacture. (1) 57RR 1 or more 50 cal MG rpt used by VC. Plei My - Recovery of downed pilot cancelled until 23 Oct, due to intense ground fire. Strobe light seen. Confirmed that enemy are chained to their machine guns.

5th SFG

After the VNSF Airborne Ranger companies arrived in camp on the 22nd, the defenses were immediately re-aligned and now responsibilities designated. That afternoon at 1400 hours a three-company size force composed of Rangers and CIDG departed the camp to clear the high ground outside. One USASF Captain was killed and one wounded on this operation. There were eleven Ranger/CIDG and one LLDB Lt killed, and 26 Ranger/CIDG wounded. The operation closed back into the camp at 1840 hours. During the operation they had met fanatical resistance, and one PAVN soldier was observed chained to a .50 caliber machine gun.

Why Pleime

The sweep lasted until noon 27 October. Down south the Camp, in the vicinity of the famous hill of Chu-Ho, more enemy corpses and weapons were discovered. Some dead VC gunners were found chained to their anti-aircraft heavy machine guns.

(5th Army Combat Propaganda Team Leaflet)

Colonel Hieu was well aware that VC clever indoctrination could turn an inexperienced VC combatant into a fanatic and thus a fierce and formidable killer animal.

Among these, the 32d is the more experienced, having been in South Vietnam since January. Already to its credit were numerous battalion and regimental attacks and ambushes which it had conducted in Kontum and in Pleiku provinces, such as Plei Kleng (March 65), Le Thanh (June 65) and Duc Co (August 65). Its experience in the Lure and Ambush tactic would be used accordingly. The 33d Regiment which had arrived in the South only recently still lacked in experience but would be ready since it just went through indoctrination in North Vietnam and firmly believed in the VC propaganda.

In terms of ideology, the troops, the combatants must be informed that the scheme of the American imperialists was to conduct an war of invasion, to destroy all economic, military endeavors, even livelihood of the population in order to revert Vietnam to the stone age area. As a foundation, to point out the enemy's evil intention, to build hate and resolve to defeat the American Imperialists. The division imparted in due time to the troops, combatants information on evil acts committed by the American Imperialists in the South, rekindled patriotism, revived the image of past slavery, the starvation of the population in 1945; educated with Uncle Ho's exhortation to fight against the Americans to save the country from 1954 to 1975. Through education, ideology indoctrination aiming at elevating the moral and resolve of achieving victory over the Imperialist Americans, we obtained three levels (excellent level of determination 30-35%, good 50-55%, acceptable 8-10%), those whose performance was poor remained behind for further preparation.

(www.generalhieu.com/f304-2.htm)

Phieu

#744 18 Jan 12, 03:11

Pleime vs Dien Bien Phu

Tactics

Why Pleime observes:

The Dien Bien Phu Battle which ended the Indochina war (1947-1954) lasted for two months but was merely an encirclement of a stronghold in the Dien Bien Phu Bowl.
The Pleime Battle, quite different with many tactical aspects: envelopment, counter-ambushes, relief, pursuit, ambushes, exploitation, attack and destroy.

Casualties

In Dien Bien Phu, in term of casualties, the Viet Minh lost 8000 combatants while they pitted in four divisions - the 304th, 308th, 312th and 351st.

In Pleime the Viet Cong lost 6000 men while they committed three regiments - the 32nd, 33rd and 66th.

Modus Operandi

At Pleime, the architect of the campaign was Colonel Hieu. The �modus operandi� was: Joint intelligence and support activities and commonly-shared concept of operations and results; but separate TAOR, command, deployment of forces, separate conduct of activities, reserve.

At Dien Bien Phu, initially the architect of the campaign was thought to be General Giap, but turned out to be Chinese Communist General Ly Chenhou who directed the battle by setting his command post right in Giap headquarters, along with 14 other Chinese general staff members.

Phieu

#745 18 Jan 12, 17:28

Hello,

The bit about Ly and 14 other Chinese army staff is interesting. Have not read that before. If I may have before in Fall's book, Hell...., I have forgotten. Any other source for the info?

RedDagger18

#746 18 Jan 12, 17:59

The Pentagon Papers

Gravel Edition

Volume 1

Document 29, Telegram from Dillon to Dulles on Conversations with the French about Dien Bien Phu, 5 April 1954, p 461-62.

FROM: Paris

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 3710, April 5, 1 a.m.

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

URGENT. I was called at 11 o'clock Sunday night and asked to come immediately to Matignon where a restricted Cabinet meeting was in progress.

On arrival Bidault received me in Laniel's office and was joined in a few minutes by Laniel. They said that immediate armed intervention of US carrier aircraft at Dien Bien Phu is now necessary to save the situation.

Navarre reports situation there now in state of precarious equilibrium and that both sides are doing best to reinforce-Viet Minh are bringing up last available reinforcements which will way outnumber any reinforcing French can do by parachute drops. Renewal of assault by reinforced Viet Minh probable by middle or end of week. Without help by then fate of Dien Bien Phu will probably be sealed.

Ely brought back report from Washington that Radford gave him his personal (repeat personal) assurance that if situation at Dien Bien Phu required US naval air support he would do his best to obtain such help from US Government. Because of this information from Radford as reported by Ely, French Government now asking for US carrier aircraft support at Dien Bien Phu. Navarre feels that a relatively minor US effort could turn the tide but naturally hopes for as much help as possible.

French report Chinese intervention in Indochina already fully established as follows:

First. Fourteen technical advisers at Giap headquarters plus numerous others at division level. All under command of Chinese Communist General Ly Chenhou who is stationed at Giap headquarters.

Second. Special telephone lines installed maintained and operated by Chinese personnel.

Third. Forty 37 mm. anti-aircraft guns radar-controlled at Dien Bien Phu. These guns operated by Chinese and evidently are from Korea. These AA guns are now shooting through clouds to bring down French aircraft.

Fourth. One thousand supply trucks of which 500 have arrived since 1 March, all driven by Chinese army personnel.

Fifth. Substantial material help in guns, shells, etc., as is well known.

Bidault said that French Chief of Air Staff wished US be informed that US air intervention at Dien Bien Phu could lead to Chinese Communist air attack on delta airfields. Nevertheless, government was making request for aid.

Bidault closed by saying that for good or evil the fate of Southeast Asia now rested on Dien Bien Phu. He said that Geneva would be won or lost depending on outcome at Dien Bien Phu, this was reason for French request for this very serious action on our part.

He then emphasized necessity for speed in view of renewed attack which is expected before end of week. He thanked US for prompt action on airlift for French paratroops. He then said that he had received Dulles' proposal for Southeast Asian coalition, and that he would answer as soon as possible later in week as restricted Cabinet session not competent to make this decision.

New Subject. I passed on Norstad's concern that news of airlift (DEPTEL 3470, April 3) might leak as planes assembled, Pleven was called into room. He expressed extreme concern as any leak would lead to earlier Viet Minh attack. He said at all costs operation must be camouflaged as training exercise until troops have arrived. He is preparing them as rapidly as possible and they will be ready to leave in a week. Bidault and Laniel pressed him to hurry up departure date of troops and he said he would do his utmost.

http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon/doc29.htm

See also

http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com...sesupport.aspx

Phieu

#747 18 Jan 12, 20:50

Link to a great Panel

I discovered this link and the panel discussion about the battle with the major surviving players...

http://www.americanveteranscenter.or...ittle-raiders/

it is really great... i am sure many have seen it.. but i just sat through it all, and when a Lt. General, and many of his officers get teary eyed, I guess I can excuse myself when it happens...

you see the comraderie that exists after all these years between all of them...

hope you get a chance to take a look.

clanc13

#748 19 Jan 12, 01:34

Chinese Communists Advisors At Pleime

The North Vietnamese Communists did not want the international public to know that they were assisted by Red China in the first big battle at regimental level at Pleime, especially that the Chinese Communist advisors were present at Pleime battlefield.

According to General Moore, in his book We Were Soldiers Once � and Young, page 63, the radio relay intercept team belonging to II Corps overheard a coded message which appeared to be a report on the military situation in Mandarin, emitting from the foothill of Chu Pong Massif. This indicated the presence of Chinese Communist advisors at B3 Forward Command Post.

It was likely that Chinese Communist advisors working with B3 Forward Command Post at Chu Pong sent a military situation of the battlefield to Chinese Communist advisors present in Pnom Penh. II Corps Command through its book Why Pleime reveals:

Without Cambodian rice, without the presence of Red Chinese advisors in Pnom Penh, without the communications between Hanoi and the Khmer capital, the infiltration of VC units from North Vietnam could never take place and develop.

Besides, in the report of activities of G-5, the psywar section, Major Horace E. Jordan addressed to II Corps Senior Advisor and G-5 Advisor, made mention of the presence of Chinese Communist Advisor in Pleime area:

On 22 October, leaflets were requested by S-5, Det C-2, based on intelligence reports from Plei me stating that there were Chinese Adviors on the battlefield and that a dead VC was observed chained to his machine gun.

In a news conference on November 16, 1965 in Saigon, three Viet Cong prisoners revealed that each regiment that infiltrated South Vietnam was accompanied by a Chinese advisor.

Captured North Vietnamese soldiers said today that their units had received assistance from Cambodian "militiamen" during their infiltration into South Vietnam and that each infiltrated regiment had one Chinese Communist adviser.

Coleman 1988 said a surgeon captured at the regimental hospital appeared to be a Chinese:

There was also the captured NVA medical staff, including a larger-than-average man who Oliver still believes was a Chinese surgeon.

It was the volubility of the Chinese Advisors conversing openly in Mandarin on the radio waves that made it possible for Colonel Hieu to conceive the master plan of using the B-52 airstrikes to annihilitate en masse the three NVA Regiments - 32nd, 33rd, and 66th - in the Chupong-Iadrang complex.

Phieu

#749 20 Jan 12, 03:51

Pl�yme Campaign and Red China's Aid

Why Pleime observes:

The recent infiltration of new units from North Viet Nam such as the 88th, 24th, 66 Regiments, the 321st and 308th Divisions continue to maintain the enemy pressure upon the Highlands. But at the same time it reveals the dilemma which Giap and his clique are now facing. Their plan to use Cambodia as a sanctuary for their aggression could precipitate that country into disaster, because no one can tolerate the foolish arrogance of the capricious prince who has betrayed the Free World and turned his own country into a communist satellite.
The Bu Kheo Airfield, west of Highways 19 across the border, had an important role in the battle of Pleime. High-ranking VC cadres had landed there, on their way from North Vietnam to the Field Front. By letting the Communists use Bu Kheo, Cambodia which pretends so far to be "neutralist" has demasked herself.
The infiltration routes which French General Delange worried about would never present any dangers if Cambodia did not comply to overlook the machinations the Communists are conducting on her territory. Without Cambodian rice, without the presence of Red Chinese advisors in Pnom Penh, without the communications between Hanoi and the Khmer capital, the infiltration of VC units from North Vietnam could never take place and develop.

Phieu

#750 20 Jan 12, 03:54

Viet Cong Requested Red China's Aid

Around 1964, when Viet Cong decided to escalate the war in South Vietnam by launching battles at regimental and divisional levels, they anticipated that the Americans would respond in kind by pouring in troops to directly engage in the conflict. Following are reports of some of the meetings in Peking between Red China's leaders on one side - Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping - and Viet Cong's leaders on the other side - Ho Chi Minh, Pham Van Dong, Le Duan, Vo Nguyen Giap, Van Tien Dung. Types of aid requested by the Viet Cong were mentioned specifically in terms of the number of troops - 100 thousands, 500 thousands, � -, and the units - engineer, air force, artillery, anti-aircraft , �-. Excerpts are taken from Cold War International History Project..

Discussion between Mao Zedong and Pham Van Dong

Date: 10/05/1964

Description: Zedong advises Pham Van Dong on how to handle war in South Vietnam and protection of North Vietnam.

Mao Zedong: According to Comrade Le Duan,3 you had the plan to dispatch a division [to the South]. Probably you have not dispatched that division yet4. When should you dispatch it, the timing is important. Whether or not the United States will attack the North, it has not yet made the decision. Now, it [the U.S.] is not even in a position to resolve the problem in South Vietnam. If it attacks the North, [it may need to] fight for one hundred years, and its legs will be trapped there. Therefore, it needs to consider carefully. The Americans have made all kinds of scary statements. They claim that they will run after [you], and will chase into your country, and that they will attack our air force. In my opinion, the meaning of these words is that they do not want us to fight a big war, and that [they do not want] our air force to attack their warships. If [we] do not attack their warships, they will not run after you. Isn't this what they mean? The Americans have something to hide.

Pham Van Dong: This is also our thinking. The United States is facing many difficulties, and it is not easy for it to expand the war. Therefore, our consideration is that we should try to restrict the war in South Vietnam to the sphere of special war, and should try to defeat the enemy within the sphere of special war. We should try our best not to let the U.S. imperialists turn the war in South Vietnam into a limited war, and try our best not to let the war be expanded to North Vietnam. We must adopt a very skillful strategy, and should not provoke it [the U.S.]. Our Politburo has made a decision on this matter, and today I am reporting it to Chairman Mao. We believe that this is workable.

Mao Zedong: Yes.

Pham Van Dong: If the United States dares to start a limited war, we will fight it, and will win it.

Mao Zedong: Yes, you can win it5. The South Vietnamese [puppet regime] has several hundred thousand troops. You can fight against them, you can eliminate half of them, and you can eliminate all of them. To fulfill these tasks is more than possible. It is impossible for the United States to send many troops to South Vietnam. The Americans altogether have 18 army divisions. They have to keep half of these divisions, i.e., nine of them, at home, and can send abroad the other nine divisions. Among these divisions, half are in Europe, and half are in the Asian-Pacific region. And they have stationed more divisions in Asia [than elsewhere in the region], namely, three divisions. One [is] in South Korea, one in Hawaii, and the third one in [original not clear]. They also placed fewer than one division of marine corps in Okinawa in Japan. Now all American troops in South Vietnam belong to the navy, and they are units under the navy system. As far as the American navy is concerned, they have put more ships in the Western Pacific than in Europe. In the Mediterranean, there is the Sixth Fleet; here [in the Pacific] is the Seventh Fleet. They have deployed four aircraft carriers near you, but they have been scared away by you.

�.

Mao Zedong: If the Americans dare to take the risk to bring the war to the North, how should the invasion be dealt with? I have discussed this issue with Comrade Le Duan. [First], of course, it is necessary to construct defensive works along the coast. The best way is to construct defensive works like the ones [we had constructed] during the Korean War, so that you may prevent the enemy from entering the inner land. Second, however, if the Americans are determined to invade the inner land, you may allow them to do so. You should pay attention to your strategy. You must not engage your main force in a head-to-head confrontation with them, and must well maintain your main force. My opinion is that so long as the green mountain is there, how can you ever lack firewood?

Pham Van Dong: Comrade Le Duan has reported Chairman Mao's opinions to our Central Committee. We have conducted an overall review of the situations in the South and the North, and our opinion is the same as that of Chairman Mao's. In South Vietnam, we should actively fight [the enemy]; and in North Vietnam, we should be prepared [for the enemy to escalate the war]. But we should also be cautious.

Mao Zedong: Our opinions are identical. Some other people say that we are belligerent. As a matter of fact, we are cautious. But it is not totally without ground to say [that we are belligerent].

Phieu

#751 21 Jan 12, 03:35

Viet Cong Requested Red China's Aid (2)

Discussion between Liu Shaoqi and Le Duan

Date: 04/08/1965

Description: China offers military services to Vietnam, on the condition that Vietnam invites them first; Vietnam accepts.

Le Duan: We want some volunteer pilots, volunteers soldiers�and other volunteers, including road and bridge engineering units.

Liu Shaoqi: It is our policy that we will do our best to support you. We will offer whatever you are in need of and we are in a position to offer�If you do not invite us, we will not come; and if you invite one unit of our troops, we will send that unit to you. The initiative will be completely yours.

Le Duan: We want the Chinese volunteer pilots to play a role in four respects: (1) to restrict American bombing to areas south of the 20th or 19th parallels; (2) to defend the safety of Hanoi; (3) to defend several main transportation lines; and (4) to raise the morale of the Vietnamese people.

Phieu

#752 22 Jan 12, 01:55

Viet Cong Requested Red China's Aid (3)

Discussion between Mao Zedong and Ho Chi Minh

Date: 05/16/1965

Description: Ho Chi Minh asks Mao Zedong for help to build roads along the border to South Vietnam; Mao agrees.

President Ho: We should try to build new roads. We have had discussions with Comrade Tao Zhu1 on this issue. If China is able to help us build some roads in the North, near the border with China, we will send the forces reserved for this job to the South.

Mao Zedong: It's a good policy.

Tao Zhu: I have reported it over the phone to Comrade Zhou Enlai. He said that China could do it.

President Ho: First of all, we need China to help us build 6 roads from the border areas. These roads run south through our rear. And in the future they will be connected to the front. At present, we have 30 thousand people building these roads. If China helps us, those people will be sent to the South. At the same time we have to help Lao comrades to build roads from Samneua to Xiengkhoang and then from Xiengkhoang to Lower Laos, and to the South of Vietnam.

Mao Zedong: Because we will fight large-scale battles in the future, it will be good if we also build roads to Thailand�

President Ho: If Chairman Mao agrees that China will help us, we will send our people to the South.

Mao Zedong: We accept your order. We will do it. There is no problem.

[Notes: In Hanoi on April 13, Tao Zhu had told Ho that "our Party Central Committee and Chairman Mao have held our four border provinces responsible for being the immediate rear for Vietnam. Of course, China as a whole is the rear for Vietnam. But these four provinces represent the immediate one."]

Phieu

#753 23 Jan 12, 02:15

Viet Cong Requested Red China's Aid (4)

Discussion between Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong

Date: 10/09/1965

Description: Zhou Enlai addresses Pham Van Dong, not supporting the idea of Soviet volunteers entering Vietnam and discussing Cambodian involvement in the war.

Zhou Enlai: �During the time Khrushchev was in power, the Soviets could not divide us because Khrushchev did not help you much. The Soviets are now assisting you. But their help is not sincere. The US likes this very much. I want to tell you my opinion. It will be better without the Soviet aid. This may be an ultra leftist opinion. Yet, it is mine, not the CCP Central Committee's.

�Now, the problem of international volunteers going to Vietnam is very complicated. But as you have mentioned this problem we will discuss it and then you can make your decision.

As you have asked for my opinion, I would like to tell you the following: I do not support the idea of Soviet volunteers going to Vietnam, nor [do I support] Soviet aid to Vietnam. I think it will be better without it. It is my own opinion, not the opinion of the Party Central Committee. Comrades Peng Zhen and Luo Ruiqing2 who are present here today also agree with me.

[As to] Vietnam, we always want to help. In our mind, our thoughts, we never think of selling out Vietnam. But we are always afraid of the revisionists standing between us.3

Zhou Enlai: �The war has been expanded to North Vietnam. It is, therefore, impossible for Laos and Cambodia not to get involved. Sihanouk understands it. When we were on a sightseeing tour on the Yangtze, I asked him how he would deal with the situation and whether he needed weapons. At present, China has provided Cambodia with 28,000 pieces of weapons. Sihanouk told me that this amount was enough to equip Cambodian regular and provincial forces and that all US weapons have been replaced.

I also asked him whether he needed more weapons. Sihanouk replied that because he could not afford to increase the number of troops, the weapons were enough. He only asked for anti-aircraft artillery and anti-tank weapons.

This is what he replied to my questions about weapons. He also added that if war broke out, he would leave Phnom Penh for the countryside where he had already built up bases. Last year, President Liu [Shaoqi] told Sihanouk: "large-scale fighting in your country is not equal to the [fighting] at our border." If the US launches attacks along the Chinese border, China will draw its forces there, thus reducing the burden for Cambodia. Sihanouk now understands and prepares to leave for the countryside and to regain the urban areas whenever good conditions prevail. That is what he thinks. Yet, whether his cadres can carry out this policy is a different thing.

These changes in the situation show that Sihanouk has been prepared to act in case of an invasion by the US. At present, Sihanouk strongly supports the NLF because he knows that the more you fight the US the fewer difficulties there will be for the Cambodians. In addition, Sihanouk understands that he needs China. But at the same time, Sihanouk does not want to take sides because he is afraid of losing the support of France, losing his neutral position. At least, what he says shows that he seems to think of and understand the logic of the war: if the US expands the war to North Vietnam, it will be spread all over Indochina.

Nota bene my post #749

The recent infiltration of new units from North Viet Nam such as the 88th, 24th, 66 Regiments, the 321st and 308th Divisions continue to maintain the enemy pressure upon the Highlands. But at the same time it reveals the dilemma which Giap and his clique are now facing. Their plan to use Cambodia as a sanctuary for their aggression could precipitate that country into disaster, because no one can tolerate the foolish arrogance of the capricious prince who has betrayed the Free World and turned his own country into a communist satellite.
The Bu Kheo Airfield, west of Highways 19 across the border, had an important role in the battle of Pleime. High-ranking VC cadres had landed there, on their way from North Vietnam to the Field Front. By letting the Communists use Bu Kheo, Cambodia which pretends so far to be "neutralist" has demasked herself.
The infiltration routes which French General Delange worried about would never present any dangers if Cambodia did not comply to overlook the machinations the Communists are conducting on her territory. Without Cambodian rice, without the presence of Red Chinese advisors in Pnom Penh, without the communications between Hanoi and the Khmer capital, the infiltration of VC units from North Vietnam could never take place and develop.

(Why Pleime)

Phieu

#754 24 Jan 12, 03:16

Viet Cong Requested Red China's Aid (5)

Discussion between Zhou Enlai, Deng Xioaping, Kang Shen, Le Duan and Nguyen Duy Trinh

Date: 04/13/1966

Description: China stresses the importance of Chinese aid in Vietnam, while pointing out Vietnam�s seeming mistrust; Vietnam relies on Chinese support.

Deng Xiaoping: You have spoken about truth as well as mentioned fairness. So what are you still afraid of? Why are you afraid of displeasing the Soviets, and what about China? I want to tell you frankly what I now feel: Vietnamese comrades have some other thoughts about our methods of assistance, but you have not yet told us.

I remember Comrade Mao criticizing us�the Chinese officials attending the talk between Comrade Mao Zedong and Comrade Le Duan in Beidaihe2�of having "too much enthusiasm" in the Vietnam question. Now we see that Comrade Mao is farsighted.

Le Duan: Now, when you talk about it again, it is clear for me. At that time I didn't understand what Comrade Mao said because of poor interpretation.

Deng: We understand that Comrade Mao criticized us, that is Comrade Zhou Enlai, me and others. Of course, it doesn't mean that Comrade Mao doesn't do his best to help Vietnam. It is clear to all of you that we respond to all your requests since they are within our abilities. Now, it seems that Comrade Mao Zedong is farsighted in this matter. In recent years, we have had experiences in the relations between socialist countries. Is it true that our overenthusiasm has caused suspicion from Vietnamese comrades? Now we have 130 thousand people in your country. The military construction in the Northeast as well as the railway construction are projects that we proposed, and moreover, we have sent tens of thousands of military men to the border. We have also discussed the possibility of joint fighting whenever a war breaks out. Are you suspicious of us because we have so much enthusiasm? Do the Chinese want to take control over Vietnam? We would like to tell you frankly that we don't have any such intention. Here, we don't need any diplomatic talks. If we have made a mistake thus making you suspicious, it means that Comrade Mao is really farsighted.

Moreover, at present many hold China to be disreputable: Khrushchev is revisionist, and China is dogmatic and adventurous.

So, we hope that in this matter, if you have any problem, please tell us straightforwardly. Our attitude so far has been and from now on will be: you are on the front line and we are in the rear. We respond to all your requests within our abilities. But we shouldn't have too much enthusiasm.

The construction in the northeast islands has been completed. The two sides have discussed that the construction along the coast will be done by our military men. Recently, Comrade Van Tien Dung3 proposed that after completing the construction in the northeast, our military men help you build artillery sites in the central delta.. We haven't answered yet. Now I pose a question for you to consider: Do you need our military men to do it or not?

Zhou Enlai: [The proposal is about] the construction of 45 artillery sites close to the Soviet missile positions.

Deng: We don't know whether it is good for the relations between two parties and two countries or not when we sent 100,000 people to Vietnam. Personally, I think it's better for our military men to come back home right after they finish their work. In this matter, we don't have any ill intention, but the results are not what we both want.

�

Deng: Now, I want to talk about another aspect of the relations between the two parties and two countries. Among 100 thousand Chinese military men, who are now in your country, there may be someone who committed wrongdoing, and on your side there also may be some others who want to make use of these incidents to sow division between two parties and two countries. We should, in a straightforward manner, talk about it now as there is not only the shadow but some damages in our relations as well. It is not only the matters concerning our judgment on the Soviet aid. Are you suspicious that China helps Vietnam for our own intentions? We hope that you can tell us directly if you want us to help. The problem will easily be solved. We will withdraw our military men at once. We have a lot of things to do in China. And the military men stationed along the border will be ordered back to the mainland.4

Le Duan: I would like to express some opinions. The difficulty is that our judgments are different from each other. As the experience in our Party shows, it takes time to make different opinions come to agreement.

We don't speak publicly [about] the different opinions between us. We hold that the Soviet assistance to Vietnam is partly sincere, so neither do we ask whether the Soviets [will] sell Vietnam out nor [do we] say the Soviets slander China in the matter of transportation of Soviet aid. Because we know that if we say this, the problem will become more complicated. It is due to our circumstances. The main problem is how to judge the Soviet Union. You are saying that the Soviets are selling out Vietnam, but we don't say so. All other problems are rooted in this judgment. Concerning China's assistance to Vietnam, we are very clear and we don't have any concern about it. Now, there are more than a hundred thousand Chinese military men in Vietnam, but we think that whenever there is something serious happening, there should be more than 500,000 needed. This is assistance from a fraternal country. We think that as a fraternal socialist country, you can do that, you can help us like this. I have had an argument with Khrushchev on a similar problem. Khrushchev said the Vietnamese supported China's possession of the atomic bomb so China could attack the Soviet Union. I said it was not true, China would never attack the Soviet Union.

Today, I am saying that the judgment by a socialist country on another socialist country should be based on internationalism, especially in the context of relations between Vietnam and China. In our anti-French resistance, had the Chinese revolution not succeeded, the Vietnamese revolution could hardly have been successful. We need the assistance from all socialist countries. But we hold that Chinese assistance is the most direct and extensive.

As you have said, each nation should defend themselves but they also should rely on international assistance. So, we never think that your enthusiasm can be harmful in any way. To the contrary, the more enthusiasm you have, the more beneficial it is for us. Your enthusiastic assistance can help us to save the lives of 2 or 3 million people. This is an important matter. We highly value your enthusiasm. A small country like Vietnam badly needs international assistance. This assistance saves so much of our blood.

The relations between Vietnam and China will exist not only during the struggle against the US but also in the long future ahead. Even if China does not help us as much, we still want to maintain close relations with China, as this is a guarantee for our nation's survival.

With regard to the Soviets, we still maintain good relations with them. But we also criticize the Soviets if they are receptive to our criticism.

In the relations between our two parties, the more agreement we have the better we feel, the less agreement we have, the more we are concerned. We are concerned not only about your assistance but also about a more important matter, that is the relations between the two nations. Our Party Central Committee is always thinking of how to strengthen the friendly relationship between the two parties and two countries.

I would like to add some of my personal opinions. At present, there is a relatively strong reformist movement in the world, not only in Western Europe but also in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union. Many nationalist countries adopt either the path of reformism or that of fascism, as those countries are ruled by the bourgeoisie. So I think that there should be some revolutionary countries like China to deal with the reformist countries, criticizing them, and at the same time, cooperating with them, thus leading them to the revolutionary path. They are reformist, so on the one hand, they are counter-revolutionary, that is why we should criticize them. But on the other hand, they are anti- imperialists, that is why we can cooperate with them. In the history of the Chinese revolution, you did the same thing. Comrade Mao Zedong established the anti-Japanese United Front with Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek]. So my personal opinion is that China, while upholding the revolutionary banner, should cooperate with reformist countries to help them make revolution. It is our judgment as well as our policy line. This is not necessarily right, but it is out of our sincere commitment to revolution. Of course, this matter is very complicated. As you have said, even in one party there are three parts: rightist, centrist and leftist, so is the situation in a big [Communist] movement.

The differences in judgment bring about difficulties which need time to be solved. It is necessary to have more contacts in order to reach agreement in perception. It is not our concern that China is trying to take control over Vietnam. If China were not a socialist country then we [would be] really concerned. [We believe that] Chinese comrades came to help us out of proletarian internationalism.

Phieu

#755 25 Jan 12, 02:52

Viet Cong Requested Red China's Aid (6)

Discussion between Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong

Date: 04/07/1967

Description: Soviet proposals to increase aid to Vietnam, via China.

Pham Van Dong: [The Soviet] proposals were: (1) China increases the quota for shipments of Soviet aid to [Vietnam] via China from 10 to 30 thousand tons a month. If necessary, the Soviet Union will send some of its locomotives to China. (2) China sets aside 2 or 3 of its ports in the South for handling Soviet aid to Vietnam. If more equipment is needed in those ports, the Soviets will cover all costs.

Phieu

#756 26 Jan 12, 02:36

Viet Cong Requested Red China's Aid (7)

Discussion between Zhou Enlai, Pham Van Dong and Vo Nguyen Giap

Date: 04/07/1967

Description: Zhou Enlai reinforces his and China�s commitment to the war in Vietnam, even though he is almost seventy years old.

Pham Van Dong: Some of the strategies we are adopting on the battlefield in South Vietnam follow what you suggested to us in the past. This demonstrates that our military strategies, as well as yours, are correct, and there are also new developments.

Zhou Enlai: Not only have your strategies had new developments, but also new creations. The latecomers become the first. This is what the Chairman has said. I have written a few words for you: The latecomers become the first. ... We have not fought a war for 14 years. All three of us are old. I am almost seventy. Comrade Ye Jianying2 is seventy. Comrade Chen Yi is sixty-seven. We still want to fight, but we do not have much time left.

Ye Jianying: This is the rule of the nature.

Zhou Enlai: Although I am old, my ambition is still there. If the war in the South does not end next year, I will visit you and look around.

Ye Jianying: The old horse in the stable is still dreaming of heroic exploits; the heart of a hero in his old age is as stout as ever.

Zhou Enlai: Chairman Mao quoted these [words] from a poem by Cao Cao3 in a letter to Comrade Wang Guanlan.4 A historical figure during the feudal age still had his aspirations, how about us proletarians?

[Notes: This was the fourth meeting between the Chinese and the Vietnamese delegations. Vo Nguyen Giap started the meeting with continuing to introduce the military situation in North and South Vietnam and Vietnam's strategies.]

Phieu

#757 27 Jan 12, 02:13

Viet Cong Requested Red China's Aid (8)

Discussion between Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong

Date: 04/10/1967

Description: Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong address the issue of problematic Chinese Red Guard.

Zhou Enlai: Most of the Chinese Red Guards, who crossed the border to Vietnam, are good. They came to Vietnam because they wanted to fight the Americans. But they did not respect the rules of our two countries, thus causing some complications. We apologize to you for this.

Mao Zedong: Some Red Guards do not know what a national border means. Among the people who came to Vietnam, most of them [are] from Jiangxi, some from Yunnan. It is not necessary for you to take care of them. Just explain to them and then hand them over to us.

Phieu

#758 28 Jan 12, 01:59

Viet Cong Requested Red China's Aid (9)

Zhou Enlai's Talk with Pham Van Dong and Vo Nguyen Giap

Date: 04/10/1967

In considering the prospect of the war, we should include two or three possibilities. One possibility is that the war will continue and expand. The law of war is often not decided by the will of people, neither by our will nor by the enemy's will. War has its own law. Even if the enemy wants to stop the war, it may not be able to do so. Therefore, for the sake of the future, we must prepare for the continuation and expansion of the war. Another possibility is that the enemy will blockade your coast. If the enemy wages a total blockade, then it is very likely that it intends to expand the hostilities into a total war. If the enemy just wants to force you into compromise by blockading your coast and if you refuse to compromise, then what will the enemy do? The enemy must have a follow-up plan. A total blockade of the coast will not be a simple matter. It will involve the deployment of many fleets. It will be a major operation. It will strain the enemy's relations with other countries. A third possibility is what the two of you have just mentioned: the crucial moment will be the dry season next year. You may defeat the enemy, forcing it to admit its failure and withdraw from Vietnam. As to the likelihood that the war will neither end nor expand but simply wear on, that is inconceivable. The war will end inevitably and the question is when. It is impossible that the war will wear on forever without a result. Concerning the issue of political struggle, it is without doubt that political struggle should be carried out at any time. War is the highest form of the development of political struggle. It is impossible that war will not involve political struggle. Things like strengthening international propaganda, winning sympathy, weakening and dividing enemies, and exploiting contradictions between them all fall into the category of political struggle. You have done those things in the past and you must continue doing so in the future.

Phieu

#759 29 Jan 12, 01:51

Viet Cong Requested Red China's Aid (10)

Discussion between Mao Zedong, Pham Van Dong and Vo Nguyen Giap

Date:04/11/1967

Description: Mao Zedong encourages Pham Van Dong to continue fighting and praises the Vietnamese on the resiliency, not only in the war against the Americans, but against the French and Japanese.

Pham Van Dong: We are very glad to see you healthy, Chairman Mao.

Mao Zedong: Just normal, not very well�Among all of you here, is there anyone from the South?

Vo Nguyen Giap: Comrade Pham Van Dong is a Southerner.

Pham Van Dong: My native village is in Quang Ngai province [in central Vietnam], where people are fighting the enemy very well.

Vo Nguyen Giap: Only in one year, people in Quang Ngai shot down almost 100 helicopters. They are fighting the puppet troops, [and] American and South Korean troops very well.

Mao Zedong: As you are fighting, you have drawn experience, you have come to understand the rule. If you are not fighting you will not have experience, will not know the rule... It looks more or less similar to your resistance against the French.

Pham Van Dong: We are now better than that and the fighting now is fiercer.

Mao Zedong: So, I said you now know the rule.

Pham Van Dong: We just began to do so.

Mao Zedong: It is a matter of course that in the process, changes can occur. The most difficult years were from 1956 to 1959�In 1960 there were some good changes. From 1960 to 1961, the armed forces were still small. But in 1963 and 1964, the situation changed. And now, in 1965 and 1966, you have better understanding of the rule, based on your experiences fighting against French, Japanese, and now American troops. You also fought the Japanese, didn't you?

Vo Nguyen Giap: Yes, we did, but not much; only in a small scale guerrilla warfare. In our fighting against the Americans, we always remember your words: try to preserve and develop our forces, steadfastly advancing forward.

Mao Zedong: We have a saying: "if you preserve the mountain green, you will never have to worry about firewood." The US is afraid of your tactics. They wish that you would order your regular forces to fight, so they can destroy your main forces. But you were not deceived. Fighting a war of attrition is like having meals: [it is best] not to have too big a bite. In fighting the US troops, you can have a bite the size of a platoon, a company, or a battalion. With regard to troops of the puppet regime, you can have a regiment-size bite. It means that fighting is similar to having meals, you should have one bite after another. After all, fighting is not too difficult an undertaking. The way of conducting it is just similar to the way you eat.

�I was told that you wanted to build a new 100 km railway, do our Chinese counterparts agree to help you?

Zhou Enlai: We have had discussions on the issue. Some people will be sent [to Vietnam] to make a feasibility study.

Mao Zedong: It is not too long, shorter than the distance from Beijing to Tianjin.

Pham Van Dong: We will make the feasibility study together with Chinese comrades.

Mao Zedong: It's all right, for the sake of war. What about the matter of food supply?

Zhou Enlai: We discussed this with Comrade Li Xiannian.1 We will provide 100 thousand tons of rice, 50 thousand tons of maize.

Pham Van Dong: So, this year alone, China helped Vietnam with approximately 500 thousand tons of food. This help is very great.

Mao Zedong: We can help you. Last year we had good crops.

Pham Van Dong: Thank you, Chairman Mao.

Mao Zedong: If you want to say thanks, you should say it to our peasants�Later, when you have dinner with Comrade Zhou, you can ask Comrade Wei Guoqing how he was criticized by the Red Guards. I know comrade Wei because he often visits and reports to me when he comes back from working visits to Vietnam. Who is now the new [Vietnamese] ambassador?

Zhou Enlai: Comrade Ngo Minh Loan2.

Mao Zedong: Which [Chinese] character is [Loan]?

Zhu Qiwen: Phoenix-like.

[B]Mao Zedong: This kind of bird is very strong.

Pham Van Dong:[/B] Comrade Loan will try his best to continue the job by Comrade Tran Tu Binh3, that is, to strengthen the friendship between the two countries.

Mao Zedong: I am sorry that Comrade Tran Tu Binh passed away.

Pham Van Dong: We are also very sad about it.

Mao Zedong: What kind of illness did he have?

Pham Van Dong: The same illness he had before and after he came back home, he was too busy.

Vo Nguyen Giap: He passed away after having a serious cold. He was in the same hospital with ambassador Zhou Qiyun.

Zhu Qiwen: The Friendship Hospital. I also have a record of high blood pressure.

Pham Van Dong: Today, we would like to pay a courtesy visit to you, Chairman Mao, Vice Chairman Lin [Biao] and other comrades. Once again, thank you very much.

....

Mao Zedong: You have been bravely struggling both in the North and in the South.

Pham Van Dong: It's because we are learning Chairman Mao's military thinking.

Mao Zedong: [It is] not necessary. Without it, you still can gain victory. In the past, you were fighting the Japanese, the French. Now you are fighting the Americans.

Pham Van Dong: Thanks to the military policy of our Party and also to Mao Zedong's military thinking.

....

Vo Nguyen Giap: As I remember, at one time during our resistance war against the French, Comrade Zhou sent president Ho a telegram that read: "Now is not the right time to have a peaceful solution. You should continue fighting." [Ed. note: Giap refers to late 1949 or January 1950.]

Zhou Enlai: At that time, the French were going to recognize us. But because we recognized Vietnam they ignored us. As Lenin taught, big countries have the responsibility to encourage the world revolution. At that time revolution was victorious in Russia, so Lenin thought of China and India. Now, Lenin's desire has been half-realized: the Chinese revolution has been successful. Yet, reality has not developed the way people want it to be. Some smaller countries gained victory earlier. Victory in Korea is followed by the one in Vietnam.

Phieu

#760 30 Jan 12, 02:58

Viet Cong Requested Red China's Aid (11)

Discussion between Zhou Enlai and Ho Chi Minh

Date: 02/07/1968

Description: Zhou Enlai proposes to the Vietnamese to organize additional field army corps to carry out operational tasks far from home bases.

Zhou Enlai: Since the war in Vietnam has reached the current stage,1 is it possible for [the Vietnamese comrades] to consider organizing one, two, or three field army corps? Each of them will be composed of 30,000-40,000 soldiers, and each of their combat operations should aim at eliminating 4,000-5,000 enemy soldiers in whole units. These field army corps should be able to carry out operational tasks far away from their home bases, and should be able to engage in operations in this war zone, or in that war zone. When they are attacking isolated enemy forces, they may adopt the strategy of approaching the enemy by underground tunnels. They may also adopt the strategy of night fighting and short-distance fighting, so that the enemy's bombers and artillery fire will not be in a position to play a role. In the meantime, you may construct underground galleries, which are different from the simple underground tunnels, in three or four directions [around the enemy], and use them for troop movement and ammunition transportation. You also need to reserve some units for dealing with the enemy's reinforcements.

[Notes: This conversation was held in the context of the battle for Khe Sanh, which had started on January 21, and the Tet Offensive, which had begun on January 31.]

Phieu

#761 31 Jan 12, 02:52

Viet Cong Requested Red China's Aid

Highlights of the eleven meeting series

1. The planning of the invasion of South Vietnam was not done in Hanoi, but Beijing.

2. The planners were not Ho Chi Minh, Pham Van Dong, Le Duan, Vo Nguyen Giap and Van Tien Dung and Nguyen Duy Tring, but Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Tao Zhu, Deng Xiaoping, Liu Shaoqi, Kang Shen, Ye Jianying, Peng Zhen, Luo Ruiqing and Zhu Qiwen.

3. The escalation to division level was decided in 1964 and approved by Mao Zedong on 10/5/64 meeting.

4. Mao Zedong laid out all the possible reactions from the Americans and how it could be handle: if they commit group troops in the South, if they invade the North, if they attack China Air Force �

5. Mao Zedong dictated the conduct of the war to Pham Van Dong. In the North, to construct defensive works along the coast like the Chinese did in Korea War; not to engage main force head-to-head confrontation. In the South, to actively fight the enemy.

6. Mao Zedong admitted Red China were �belligerent�

7. Le Duan asked for pilots, soldiers, road and bridge engineering units.

8. Mao Zedong and Ho Chi Minh planned to build roads from China border to the South front, from Samneua to Lower Laos to South Vietnam, and roads to Thailand � with Chinese soldiers.

9. Zhou Enlai did not approved Soviet aid but wanted Cambodian involvement in the war.

10. In 1966, Deng Xiaoping said there were 100,00 Chinese soldiers in Vietnam. Le Duan said more than 500,000 were needed.

11. Soviet proposed to increase aid through China from 10 to 30 thousand tons a month.

12. Zhou Enlai was committed to the war in Vietnam even at 70 years old.

13. Zhou Enlai instructed to Pham Van Dong and Vo Nguyen Giap how to conduct the war with three possibilities: the war will continue and expand; 2. The enemy will blockade the coast; 3. The crucial moment of the 1968 dry season year. He also emphasis the importance of political struggle.

14. On 02/07/1968 meeting, Zhou Enlai proposed Ho Chi Minh to step up the war to field army corps level of 30,000-40,000 soldiers aiming at eliminating 4,000-5,000 enemy soldiers in whole units and used the strategy of using tunnels to approach enemy bases, the strategy of night and short distant fighting, and the construction of underground galleries for troop movement and ammunition transportation.

Conclusion

This series of meetings between Chinese Communist Politburo and North Vietnamese Politburo reveals one major point:

The Vietnam War was a confrontation between Red China and the United States in which the United States blinked the eyes first. Therefore, who is to be blamed for the loss of South Vietnam? Not the ARVN who was accused of not wanting and not capable of defending their own country after the American troops left. It was the Americans who cut off completely all aid in 1975.

Vice versa, without Red China looming tall behind, the North Vietnamese Communists would never - so called - 'defeat' the United States and the South.

If the United States continued to aid South Vietnam, it would not collapse in 1975 and no matter how little the aid, the North Vietnamese Communists would not be able to conquer the entire South Vietnam. The ARVN would be able to prolong the fight, even to revert to conducting a guerrilla warfare if needed be. The Viet Nam issue would never be able to be resolved on the battlefields, with one side able to defeat the other side militarily. And when both sides get tired, they would have to agree to seat down on a round table and resolve the issue politically.

Having faced the NVA in the battlefields, General Hieu knew it was clear that the ARVN would never defeat them, and vice versa. He was convinced, therefore, that when everybody was tired of fighting each other, a political solution would be eventually sought by everyone. When it came to that point, South Vietnam would fall into the Communists' hands if the corruption plague was not eradicated in the ARVN:

Either we correct our faults or the Communists will correct them for us.

Phieu

#762 01 Feb 12, 01:46

Sidebar: The United States blinked the eyes first...

... When, Who, Why and What �

In 1971, the North Vietnamese Communists was told by their Chinese Communists counterparts that they could go ahead attacking South Vietnam with the blessings of the Americans, because in his meeting with Prime Minister Zhou Enlai on July 9, 1971, Kissinger indicated that "the Nixon administration was determined to withdraw from Vietnam even unilaterally, and even if it led to the overthrow of the government of South Vietnam." This position of the Nixon administration had been kept secret until it was recently revealed by the release of classified documents by the National Security Archive, an independent research group and reported by the New York Times on February 27, 2002.

In a nutshell, Zhou Enlai bartered with Kissinger: you can have China's market if you agree to let my little brother win the war.

Emboldened by the American eagerness to withdraw unilaterally from Vietnam at all costs, in May of 1972, the North Vietnamese Communists launched their attacks simultaneously at three fronts: Quang Tri in the I Corps, Kontum in the II Corps, and An Loc in the III Corps. Quang Tri was lost immediately and was only retaken by the ARVN in September 1972. Kontum was able to hold through a two week siege. An Loc was able to hold through a three month siege. In all these three battlefronts, the ARVN units were able to hold-up against the enemy only with intensive American air-power, especially with the carpet bombing of B-52s. Temporary, the Vietnamization seemed to be working. Realizing that the ARVN would be still strong enough to resist their attacks with the assistance of the United States, the North Vietnamese Communists agreed to sign the Paris Agreements on January 23, 1973, just to make the Americans limit combat materials supply on a one-to-one replacement basis to the ARVN and not to provide air-power support to the ARVN, in exchange for American POWs' release. But then, right after the signing of the accord, the Ho Chi Minh trail became a 24-hour-7-day all-weather conduit of troops and materials streaming from the North to the South. Meanwhile, to the delight of the North Vietnamese Communists and to the bewilderment of the South Vietnamese, the United States reduced funding to South Vietnam 30% (from 1.6 billion to 1.26 billion) in 1973, and 60% (from 1.6 billion to 700 millions) in 1974. Furthermore, the United States reduced ground ammunitions down 30% (from 179,000 tons to 126,000 tons) and P.O.L and spare parts down 50%.

In 1974, the North Vietnamese Communists were still fearful of a private promise Nixon made to Thieu to re-enter South Vietnam militarily if the North invades the South. They decided to test that promise by attacking Phuoc Long in December 1974. When Phuoc Long fell in January without provoking any American reaction, they got bolder and attacked and vanquished Ban Me Thuot in March 1975, still without any reaction from the United States.

In March 1975, President Ford's unresponsiveness forced President Thieu to make two disastrous tactical withdrawals of troops from the I and II Corps which resulted in the annihilation of all ARVN combat units in these two Corps. When General Weyand arrived in Vietnam in April 1975 on a fact-finding mission, he found that the NVA forces had 200.000 men and 123 regiments as opposed to 54.000 men and 39 regiments of the ARVN. He recommended that President Ford should provide 750 million dollars in emergency funds to rebuild the armed forces of South Vietnam and B-52 air-strikes to contain the advance of the North Vietnamese Communists units. Both requests were denied, resulting in the total collapse of the South.

On April 6, 1975 morning, Thieu summoned General Hieu to the Presidential Palace for consultation. General Hieu did not hesitate to assess that the disorganized retreats of I Corps and II Corps had reduced the ARVN's fighting strength to a desperate point which would not enable it to counter the NVA's rapid advance. If the United States do not re-enter the Viet Nam battlefield, the ARVN will run out of ammunitions in two months, the President as the Commander-in-Chief of the ARVN has no other choice than to order the combat units to lay down their arms and to surrender, if he cared to avoid wasteful bloodshed to the combatants and the population.

Thieu did not heed to General Hieu�s warning and had him assassinated on April 8...

#763 01 Feb 12, 13:14

Opinion, not FACT!

KEN JENSEN

#764 01 Feb 12, 16:44

Not just opinion ... circumstantial evidence ... do you think a corps commander could have his deputy commander killed in his headquarters office without direct order from his immediate superior, the commander-in-chief ? ...

I would entertain your statement if you had really studied this issue in depth ... Can you take up my challenge and refute point by point my expos� on the death of General Hieu ...? I guess not ... huh ...

Anyway, here is not the place ... the topic is about the collapse of Saigon ...

Phieu

#765 02 Feb 12, 02:30

Sidebar: General Hieu and Nixon�s 1/5/1973 letter to Thieu

As III Corps Deputy Commander/Operations, General Hieu�s task was to defend Saigon against the Viet Cong�s final push in April 1975. In his military planning, he needed to have all the parameters in hand, and one of those was the assurance from Nixon �of continued assistance in the post-settlement period and that we will respond with full force should the settlement be violated by North Vietnam. So once more I conclude with an appeal to you to close ranks with us.�

Although he was very close to Vice President Tran Van Huong, he only heard of the rumor of such letter. He set out to know for sure the existence of such assurance. For that purpose, he dispatched LTC Tran Van Thuong, who was about to leave Viet Nam to attend the US Army Command and Control College, to the singer Thanh Lan�s residence, to find out the truth. Why Thanh Lan? Because she was Hoang Duc Nha�s secret lover and Nha was Thieu�s cousin and special secretary. One late night, on June 13 1974, prior to entering Thanh Lan�s house at 7:30 p.m., General Hieu�s intelligence agents wired Thuong with recording devices. However, he came out of the fishing expedition empty handed because he could not raise the question to Thanh Lan in the presence of her father who would not leave the two of them alone. Thuong continued his efforts in the finding of that letter while attending the USCGSC on General Hieu's behalf to no avail until the day he met with President Ford in Summer 1977. President Ford cautioned him not to divulgue secret correspondances between the United States and Saigon, including that letter if he had it (he still did not at that point in time) ... Thuong deemed President Ford wanted to maintain the American's credibility before the international opinion ...

(Note: This sidebar is intended as a response to those who would : 'If Hieu was that great at Pleime in 1965, why didn't he try and save Saigon in 1975 ...')

Phieu

#766 03 Feb 12, 01:35

'Pleime Tr�̣n Chi�́n Lịch Sử' and 'Why Pleime'

In the translation process from Pleime Tr�̣n Chi�́n Lịch Sử to Why Pleime, Colonel Hieu left out some paragraphs that however were crucial in the understanding of the unique operational concept underlying this campaign, in particular the following two paragraphs on page 94

The battle from phases 2 and 3 also introduced an aspect never seen up to now because for almost 20 years, during the Franco-Vietnamese war, seldom pursuit operation was considered after each time the enemy made appearance and when it was conducted, no significant results had been achieved. Therefore this time around, the determination not to allow the enemy to escape, coupled with the solid intelligence on the enemy situation had permitted the battle to develop to maximum degree and scale and at the same token lead to the biggest victory ever achieved by the ARVN and its Allied. So with the certainty of getting a plethora of ongoing and updated by the days of solid intelligence on the enemy military situation, Colonel Hieu draw up his operational plan of using Arc Lite to destroy the enemy en mass at Chupong-Iadrang complex.
Tr�̣n chi�́n từ giai đoạn hai và ba cũng mang th�m m�̣t sắc thái chưa từng có từ trước tới nay vì ngót 20 năm r�̀i, khi còn chi�́n tranh Vi�̣t Pháp, chưa m�́y khi các cu�̣c truy kích đã được đ�̀ c�̣p tới sau m�̃i l�̀n địch xu�́t hi�̣n và n�́u có thực hi�̣n được cũng kh�ng đem lại k�́t quả gì đáng k�̉. Cho n�n l�̀n này ý chí quy�́t kh�ng đ�̉ cho địch chạy thoát, c�̣ng với sự nắm vững tình hình địch đã làm cho tr�̣n chi�́n phát tri�̉n đ�́n m�̣t mức đ�̣ và quy m� t�́i đa đ�̀ng thời đem lại những chi�́n c�ng lớn nh�́t từ trước đ�́n nay của Qu�n Lực Vi�̣t Nam C�̣ng Hòa và Đ�̀ng Minh.

and page 99 respectively

Throughout the war from 1948 until now, the enemy always withdrew safely after the end of a battle at the moment it had chosen and determined, always holding the upper hand posture in offensive as well as defensive. It was not because it was awesome, which excellent tactics, but simply because of the difficulties like in the attempt to catch a thief during nighttime.
Su�́t tr�̣n chi�́n từ 1948 tới nay, bao giờ địch cũng rút lui được an toàn sau khi k�́t thúc tr�̣n chi�́n vào lúc chúng đã định và mong mu�́n, lu�n lu�n nắm được chủ đ�̣ng trong th�́ c�ng l�̃n th�́ thủ trong tay. Chẳng phải là địch gh� gớm, chi�́n thu�̣t kỳ di�̣u, mà chỉ vì n�̃i khó khăn cũng như tìm bắt kẻ tr�̣m lúc đ�m h�m.

Another significant ommissions in the translation process are the coordinates of unit positions. For instances:

- One

= Pleime Tr�̣n Chi�́n Lịch Sử

Cũng trong sáng này, lúc 00giờ30, hai Đại Đ�̣i thu�̣c Ti�̉u Đoàn 91 Bi�̣t Kích Dù rút từ hành qu�n Th�̀n Phong 6 v�̀ được trực thăng v�̣n xu�́ng ZA.175415 ở khu Đ�ng Bắc trại, làm như Chi�́ Đoàn nói tr�n sẽ thúc qu�n vào Pleime trong ngày và hai lực lượng này sẽ giao ti�́p với nhau ch�̣m lắm là vào bu�̉i chi�̀u h�m đó.
= Why Pleime

In the same morning, at 0930, two companies of the 91st ARVN Special Forces Rangers were heliborne to about [blank] 5 km North-East of the Camp. It appeared as if a link-up between the Task Force and these two companies were to take place in the very afternoon!

- Two
= Pleime Tr�̣n Chi�́n Lịch Sử

Đúng 14 giờ, Ti�̉u Đoàn 22 BĐQ được trực thăng v�̣n xu�́ng ZA.150.157 ...

= Why Pleime

At 1400 hours, the 22nd ARVN Ranger battalion was heliborne into a landing zone [blank] on the Western side of Provincial route #5, 10 km North of Pleime ...

-Three
= Pleime Tr�̣n Chi�́n Lịch Sử

Lúc 17 giờ, Chi�́n Đoàn đã di chuy�̉n được g�̀n nửa đường, tạm dừng lại khoảng ZA. 171171 trong khi kh�ng qu�n oanh kích ti�n li�̣u vào nưi nghi ngờ có Vi�̣t C�̣ng. Lúc 17 giờ 50 sau khi l�n đường ti�́p tục di chuy�̉n, Chi�́n Đoàn tới ZA. 172164 (gọi là đỉnh đ�̀i Đ�̣c L�̣p)

= Why Pleime

At 1700 hours, the Task Force stopped midway [blank] while preplanned airstrikes were conducted ahead over suspected enemy concentrations. At 1750 hours, while progressing on an ascending slope and narrow path with dense vegetations on both sides [blank] ...

- Four
= Pleime Tr�̣n Chi�́n Lịch Sử
Ngày 25-10 lúc 13 giờ 30, Chi�́n Đoàn Thi�́t Giáp ti�́p tục l�n đường ti�́n vào Pleime. Được 5 c�y s�́, khoảng ZA. 178138 chi đoàn thi�́t qu�n v�̣n đi đ�̀u lại bị địch ngăn ch�̣n nhưng hỏa lực của ta đè bẹp ngay.

= Why Pleime

At 1300 hours 25 October, the Armor-Infantry Task Force resumed advancing toward Pleime. After 5 km, [blank] the APC's moving ahead of the column encountered enemy fire which was quickly repressed by friendly artillery.

- Five

= Pleime Tr�̣n Chi�́n Lịch Sử

Cu�̣c lục soát được ti�́p tục tới sáng ngày 27-10 ở phía Bắc và T�y Bắc trại. Tại ZA. 157050 là nơi phi cơ oanh kích trong ngày h�m trước, qu�n ta ki�́m được m�̣t s�́ xác ch�́t, bắt được 1 V.C. và thu được 4 kh�̉u Đại li�n .50 pho�ng kh�ng cùng m�̣t s�́ vũ khí cá nh�n. Đặc bi�̣t là cùng với những kh�̉u súng lớn này, có những d�y xích li�̀n với ch�n của các xạ thủ đ�̉ bắt bu�̣c họ kh�ng được bỏ vị trí mà phải s�́ng ch�́t bắn ch�́ng trả cũng như chịu đựng những cu�̣c oanh kích của kh�ng qu�n ta..

= Why Pleime

The sweep lasted until noon 27 October. Down south the Camp,[blank] in the vicinity of the famous hill of Chu-Ho, more enemy corpses and weapons were discovered. Some dead VC gunners were found chained to their anti-aircraft heavy machine guns.

One might wonder why these omissions ...

- in regard to the first type ... perhaps ... modesty ...

- in regard to the second type .. perhaps ... the no-English-speaking Vietnamese readers do not have access to The Pleiku Campaign After Action Report, in which coordinates of unit positions are provided

... (I have mentioned that Colonel Hieu drafted his Pleime Campaign After Action Report as an ORLL which includes The Pleiku Campaign AAR)

Phieu

#767 04 Feb 12, 04:14

Although he was very close to Vice President Tran Van Huong, he only heard of the rumor of such letter. He set out to know for sure the existence of such assurance. For that purpose, he dispatched LTC Tran Van Thuong, who was about to leave Viet Nam to attend the US Army General Staff and Command College, to the singer Thanh Lan�s residence, to find out the truth. Why Thanh Lan? Because she was Hoang Duc Nha�s secret lover and Nha was Thieu�s cousin and special secretary. One late night, on June 13 1974, prior to entering Thanh Lan�s house at 7:30 p.m., General Hieu�s intelligence agents wired Thuong with recording devices. However, he came out of the fishing expedition empty handed because he could not raise the question to Thanh Lan in the presence of her father who would not leave the two of them alone. Thuong continued his efforts in the finding of that letter while attending the USCGSC on General Hieu's behalf to no avail until the day he met with President Ford in Summer 1977. President Ford cautioned him not to divulgue secret correspondances between the United States and Saigon, including that letter if he had it (he still did not at that point in time) ... Thuong deemed President Ford wanted to maintain the American's credibility before the international opinion ...

(Note: This sidebar is intended as a response to those who would : 'If Hieu was that great at Pleime in 1965, why didn't he try and save Saigon in 1975 ...')

Thuong only found out in reading The Palace File (1986) that in mid April 1975, President Thieu dispatched an emissary to Washinton, D.C. on an aid seeking mission and had given to Nguyen Tien Hung copies of twelve secret letters Nixon had sent to him during the Paris Accord negotiations. In two of those secret letters Nixon promised Thieu the United States would re-enter South Vietnam if Hanoi violates the Paris Accords.

- 11/14/1972 letter

You have my absolute assurance that if Hanoi fails to abide by the terms of this agreement it is my intention to take swift and severe retaliatory action.

I repeat my person assurances to you that the United States will react very strongly and rapidly to any violation of the agreement.

- 1/5/1973 letter

You have my assurance of continued assistance in the post-settlement period and that we will respond with full force should the settlement be violated by North Vietnam.

When Hung produced those letters to the Congress on April 30, President Ford denied Nixon had made such promise and refused to hand the secret letters to the Congress on the basis of executive branch priviledge and diplomatic confidentiality.

Can Thieu be blamed for believing in Nixon�s promises? Hardly. Furthermore he was unlucky to have Ford as Nixon�s successor in the White House: President Ford was not forceful enough to oppose the Congress in keeping his predecessor�s words.

Never mind the finger-pointing between the Oval Office and the Capitol, the United States� credibility as an allied was really abysmal.

Obviously, this wavering attitude did not help the ARVN soldier�s fighting motivation and performance a bit �

Ergo, stop at least blaming the ARVN and praising the NVA in the collapse of Saigon.

Bottom line, in the staring contest between Red China and the United States, the USA blinked the eyes first ... the rest is irrelevant ...

Phieu

#768 04 Feb 12, 11:57

I concur with your"Bottom Line"Phieu and have known this since 1969.

Not an agreeable man you are certainty a knowledgeable one.

hankwill

#769 04 Feb 12, 12:14

�

Phieu

#770 05 Feb 12, 01:23

What have I told you so far ...

... that you had not known before about Ia Drang battle �

1. The architect of Pleime Campaign was Colonel Hieu, II Corps Chief of Staff.
2. The Field Commander of Pleiku Campaign was General Knowles not General Kinnard.
3. The actual reporter of Pleiku Campaign After Action Report was General Knowles.
4. The scribe of Pleiku Campaign After Action Report was Captain Coleman.
5. Coleman subsequently rewrote Pleiku Campaign AAR in 1988 and published, Pleiku the Dawn of Helicopter warfare with additional inputs from General Knowles.
6. The great majority of intelligence data contained in Pleiku Campaign AAR was provided by G2/II Corps
7. There was a specific �modus operandi� in the conduct of the joint Pleime Counteroffensive operation.
8. There was a master plan for the Pleime Counteroffensive operation conceived by Colonel Hieu and executed by the 1st Air Cavalry Brigade in All the Way and by the 3rd Air Cavalry Brigade in Bayonet I.
9. The operational concept for Pleime Counteroffensive operation was the use of B-52 airstrikes with the ground force support. Not the other way around.
10. There were three diversionary moves that prepared the ground for the B-52 airstrikes: the herding move, the enticement move, and the distractive move.
11. The ideal target was achieved when the three NVA regiments were regrouped in staging areas for movement to attack.
12. The 1st Air Cavalry was better used in herding operation than in search and destroy mission.
13. The 1/7 Air Cavalry Battalion�s mission was to distract the enemy, not to search and destroy the enemy.
14. The Airborne Brigade was a better surgical tool than the 1st Air Cavalry in delivering the coup de gr�ce.
15. Major Schwarzkopf participated in the third phase of Pleime Campaign as an advisor to LTC Ngo Quang Truong in operation Than Phong 7.
16. II Corps/Colonel Hieu was in control throughout the Pleime Campaign: in the 1st phase (Dan Thang 21 operation), in the 2nd phase (Long Reach operation: All the Way, Bayonet I, Bayonet II), in the 3rd phase (Than Phong 7 operation).
17. Orders issued during the execution phase of the operational concept was given out by General Larsen, IFFV Commander, to General Knowles.
18. Why the Pl�yme Campaign started without the 66th Regiment.
19. Why the 1/7th Air Cavalry was inserted on November 14, two days before the scheduled November 16 attack (to avoid mortar and antiaircraft firepower and to distract the enemy into remaining longer at staging areas)
20. Why the piling tactic was not applied when the enemy was discovered at LZ X-Ray.
21. Why the slow march toward LZ Albany instead of rapid troop extraction by helicopters.
22. The key role of updated intelligence of the enemy situation by the hours and days that rendered possible the use of B-52 airstrikes to annihilate en mass the three NVA regiments.
23. The inadvertence of Chinese Advisors allowing the gaining of real time intelligence.
24. Lower level commanders do not necessary need to know the operational concept in its execution. What they need is that their upper level commanders will provide all the necessary tools to achieve their assigned mission.
25. ARVN commanders knew better than US commanders how to combat against and defeat the VC.
26. ARVN commanders and combatants outperformed NVA commanders and combatants.
27. The US should have left the ARVN do the fighting and be content in a supportive role.
28. It takes an in-depth analysis and synthesis of all the following primary sources to get the whole and accurate story of the Pleime Campaign

1. J.D. Coleman, Pleiku, the Dawn of Helicopter Warfare in Vietnam, St. Martin�s Press, New York, 1988.
2. General Harold G. Moore and Joseph L. Galloway, We Were Soldiers Once� and Young, Random House, New York, 1992.
3. General Pham Huu An, Chien Truong Moi, Memoir, Quan Doi Nhan Dan Publishing House, Hanoi, 2002.
4. General Harry Kinnard, Pleiku Campaign, 1st Air Cavalry Division Headquarters, March 4, 1966.
5. G3 Journal, I Field Force Vietnam, October 1965.
6. General Norman Schwarzkopf, It Doesn't Take A Hero, Bantam, 1992.
7. General Vinh Loc, Why Pleime, Information Printing Office, Saigon, September 1966.
8. Cochran, Alexander S. "First Strike at River Drang", Military History, Oct 1984, pp 44-52, Per. Interview with H.W.O Kinnard, 1st Cavalry Division Commanding General.
9. Thi�́u Tướng Vĩnh L�̣c, Pleime Tr�̣n Chi�́n Lịch Sử, Information Printing Office, Saigon, September 1966.

29. The different battles, operations, campaigns pertaining to the Pleime Campaign and their respective relationship: Pleime, Pleiku, Long Reach, All the Way, Bayonet I, Bayonet II, Dan Thang 21, Than Phong 7.
30. Red China�s direct involvement in the Pl�yme campaign.
31. Even Joe Galloway, Hal Moore, Coleman, Kinnard, Schwarzkopf, who participated in different phases of the Pleime campaign, were unable to give us a complete and truthful account of what, how and why it happened as it was. They cannot claim that for being there and done that, as evidence they hold the truth of the matter.
32. The truth of the Pleime campaign is a hard to swallow pill for the Viet Cong on one side and the Allied (American, Australian, even French!) on the other side. It has been discarded as �hagiographic logorrhea� �
32. The fact that my presentation of the Pleime campaign with in particular Colonel Hieu as its architect was once done in the presence of General Vinh Loc and Brigadier General Mataxis, both participants in that campaign as the commander and American senior advisor, at the Vietnam Center in 2001, has reinforced its credibility: both did not raise any objections after listening to it.
33. Who is really to be blamed for the collapse of Saigon? The United States who cut off all aid in March 1975, not the ARVN who has always been accused of incompetence and cowardice.
34. The PAVN combatants were not that great. They only looked awesome with Big Brother Red China looming tall behind who directed the entire invasion war executed by the PAVN troops from the outset in the 1960s to the very end in 1975.
35. �

Phieu

#771 06 Feb 12, 04:18

Highlight #1 : Pleime Counteroffensive into Chupong Iadrang Complex

Background

Viet Cong Field Front B3 Command used the tactic �faking an attack against an outpost to lure in and destroy the rescue force� in attacking the Pleime camp from October 19 to 26, 1965. However, II Corps Command defeated the enemy both at the camp and at the ambush site with the help of US Ingram Task Force comprising an artillery battalion and an infantry battalion.

Enemy Situation

After failing to annihilate the rescue column and to overrun Pleime camp, the two 32nd and 33rd Regiment NVA were ordered to retreat to their initial staging area before the attack in the Chupong-Iadrang complex.

Field Front B3 Command needed to retrieve its severely damaged units in order to preserve force while waiting for the reinforcement of 66th Regiment still wandering on the Ho Chi Minh trail. It would take this unit at least a week to close in at the Chupong-Iadrang complex.

The enemy�s losses were as following based on an account realized after 10/27/1965: 211 KIA, 115 KBA, 6 CIA, 1 57 RR, 2 pistols, 2 81mm mortar, 12 cal .50 MG, 3 cal .30 MG, 9 BAR, 37 SMG, 22 rifles, 8 carbines, 2 M79, a B40 Anti tank wpn.

Once the six battalions of the 32nd and 33 Regiment were reorganized and reequipped and with the arrival of 66th Regiment, it was certain that Field Front B3 Command would set up for a revenge, besides its resolve to achieve its goal of overtaking Pleiku as planned by the 1965-1966 Winter Spring campaign.

Friendly Situation

After October 27, 1965, friendly units� losses are: Abn Ranger, 15 KIA, 20 WIA. LLBD, 1KIA. CIDG, 21 KIA, 21 WIA, 6MIA. US, 12 KIA, 8WIA. 3rmd Cav, 7 KIA, 27 WIA, 4 MIA. 1/42, 32 KIA, 72 WIA, 2 MIA. 21st Rangers, 35 KIA, 5 WIA. 22d Rangers, 12 WIA. Arty, 4 KIA, 2 WIA, 6 MIA. Engr 1 WIA. Total: 111 KIA, 190 WIA, 18 MIA.

Normally in the past, after the relief of a besieged outpost, II Corps Command could not afford to pursue the enemy for lack of sufficient troops and means. However, this time around, seizing the opportunity of a helping hand offered by the US 1st Air Cavalry Division, II Corps Command was able to launch a coordinated operation of exploitation in the pursuit of the enemy that were retreating back to the Chupong-Iadrang complex.

Planning

The planning of this operation was assigned to Colonel Hieu, II Corps Chief of Staff, working in coordination with Brigadier General Richard Knowles, 1st Air Cavalry Division Deputy Commander.

The 1st Air Cavalry Division Forward Command Post was established in the compounds of II Corps Headquarters in Pleiku, sharing the facilities with II Corps American Advisor Group. General Knowles was shadowed by Colonel Mataxis, the Senior Advisor.

In order to obtain a well organized working relationship between the two allied commands, Colonel Hieu laid out a clear cut �modus operandi�: joint intelligence and support activities and commonly-shared concept of operations and results; but separate TAOR, command, deployment of forces, conduct of activities and reserve.

Operational Concept

The search and pursuit of the two 32nd ( 334th, 635th and 966th Battalion) and 33rd Regiment (1st, 2nd and 3rd Battalion) should not be too difficult a task for 1st Air Cavalry Division with its fleet of helicopters in hands (435 in lieu of 101 for a regular infantry division). Nevertheless, to destroy an enemy force that had broken up into small units and in hiding amidst a vast area of elephant grass, bushes and trees, was a daunting task which would require months if not years to uncover and to destroy all these scattered piece meal units one at a time.

It is better to be able to attack and kill when the enemy units assemble at one location. This could have a chance to happen since Field Force B3 Command has ordered its attacking forces to return to their initial staging areas in the Chupong-Iadrang complex, while waiting for the arrival of the 66th Regiment.

However, in order to annihilate a division size force comprising three regiments, it would necessitate a force three times larger, which means three divisions, that II Corps Command could not afford.

A better alternative available was to use B-52�s carpet bombings to annihilate the concentrate enemy troops.

Therefore the operational concept for this operation comprised two phases:

Phase I: Herding the scattered enemy units toward a common grouping area. This task was assigned to 1st Air Cavalry Brigade with operation All the Way.

Phase II: Destroying the enemy with B-52�s carpet bombings. General Knowles would coordinate this planning phase with MACV Command in Saigon for the use of this strategic weapon.

The bombings would be prepared by a diversionary tactic performed by 3rd Air Cavalry Brigade with operation Silver Bayonet I

II Corps Command would maximize the use of its intelligence apparatus and would precisely schedule accordingly the starting point of each consecutive phases based on analysis of updated intelligence data along the way. The success of this operation relies squarely on this knowlege of enemy movements.

Execution

Phase I: Herding the scattered enemy units

On 10/27, Eagle Flights from the Air Cavalry Division went into action. From dawn to darkness, they flew unwarily over the area to search for the enemy. Every suspect enemy presence is carefully checked and dealt with, either by airstrikes or by the Eagle Flights themselves, or by reaction forces. These tactics compelled the enemy to move continuously, to disintegrate and to fragment into small parties and thus they could not avoid being sighted.

By the end of the day, according to intelligence daily report, the lead elements of the 33d had closed on it forward assembly area, the village Kro (ZA080030), while its rear-guard battalion, was just beginning to break contact at the Pleime CIDG camp.

On 10/28, according to intelligence daily report, the 32d Regiment had nearly closed its base on the north bank of the Ia Drang, although the exact route it took in its withdrawal from the ambush site still remains a mystery.

On 10/29, according to intelligence daily report, the withdrawal of the 33d Regiment was rapidly becoming a nightmare. More and more armed helicopters began striking units of the regiment. So close were these attacks pressing to the advance base that by noon of the 29th the regimental cadre decided to keep the unit on the move to the west, seeking sanctuary. This time it was headed for its "home" prior to the attack on Pleime. This was Anta Village (NVA designation) at YA940010, located at the foot of the Chu Pong Massif. It was here during early October, that the 33d had conducted drills and rehearsals of its attack on the Pleime CIDG camp.

On 10/30, according to intelligence daily report, maintaining unit integrity was becoming increasingly difficult for many element of the 33d Regiment as Cavalry helicopters seemed to be everywhere, firing into carefully camouflaged positions and causing individual to either break and run or reveal positions by returning the aircraft fires. And a new element of danger had been introduced. Infantry units began air assaults in widely separated points throughout the general area through which the 33d must pass.

At time these landings were far enough from regimental units so that battle could be avoided, but in other cases, the cavalrymen found retreating elements and sharp fire fights, always costly to the NVA would result. And with each such engagement, further fragmentation of NVA units would occur.

As the small unit actions increased, the Cavalry obtained its first North Vietnamese captives and more and better intelligence concerning the enemy forces was becoming available to commanders.

On 10/31, according to intelligence daily report, the constant harassment from the air and the sudden and unexpected landing of infantry troops at points throughout the area was causing consternation in the enemy ranks. Elements continued to disintegrate and fragment into small parties or, in some cases, individual stragglers. Many of these, left to fend for themselves, soon fell into the hands of Cavalry units. Contributing to the problems of the 33d was the acute shortage of food and medicines since many units could not reach their pre-stocked supply because of the sudden thrusts of the helicopter-borne troopers.

On 11/01, at 0730 hours, about a VC platoon was sighted at 10 km South West of the Pleime Camp. A reaction force was immediately sent by the 1st Brigade of the 1st Air Cavalry Division. Only minutes after, 20 VC were killed and 19 captured. Friendly troops kept on searching and suddenly discovered a VC field hospital well equipped with medicines and surgical instruments made by Communist countries. All the communist origin supplies were still brand-new and amounted approximately to a value of 40000 US dollars.

While the evacuation of the trophy was carried out by helicopters, a battalion size enemy force stealthily moved toward friendly troops and strove to surround their positions. The first engagement between elements of the 1st US Air Cavalry Division and the VC took place. It lasted for five hours until darkness. When the enemy finally broke contact and withdrew, it had been for them a deadly blow by the "First Team": 99 VC were killed (Body count), 44 other VC regulars captured along with 40 weapons. But at least more than 200 other VC were probably killed and wounded.

The capture of the aid station was a major find for the Air Cavalry Division and besides the opportunity it provided for destruction of VC forces, it also yielded documents, including one particularly valuable map that revealed enemy supply and march routes.

According to intelligence daily report, by now the regimental headquarters had reached the base at Anta village, but the bulk of the regiment was still strung out between Pleime and Chu Pong. And these elements continued to draw aerial rocket and machine gun fire throughout the withdrawal. Also the heavy bombing and strafing attacks by USAF aircraft were directed against regimental positions with increasing accuracy as the secondary target detection system of the 1st Air Cavalry division began to click.

The precision of the strikes was so upsetting that regimental cadre held a conference in an attempt to discover what was allowing the US forces to make such repeated, accurate air strikes. It was concluded that only spies within the ranks could be furnishing the location and movement of the regiment's elements.

On 11/02, according to intelligence daily report, the 33d Regiment now received orders to head deeper into the Chu Pong sanctuary. By 0400 on the 2d, the regimental CP had arrived at Hill 762 (YA885106). But while the head of the column had comparative safety, the body and tail, still stretching back to near Pleime, was anything but safe.

Meanwhile, the NVA division headquarters (Field Front) had a bright spot in an otherwise gloomy picture. The last of its three regiments was due to arrive soon in South Vietnam and begin moving into assembly areas in the Chu Pong-Ia Drang area.

On 11/03, at 2100 hours, an audacious ambush in the very heart of the Chu Pong - Ia Drang complex inflicted to the 8th Battalion of the newly-infiltrated 66th Regiment: 112 KIA (Body count), more than 200 others estimated KIA and WIA, 30 weapons captured.

According to intelligence daily report, the 33d Regiment, meantime, was still trying to pull its bruised and battered tail into the Chu Pong sanctuary. But it became just another day of constant harassment from the air and ground marked by the loss of still more medical supplies and ammunition.

On 11/04, a large arms cache was uncovered at 5 km West of the Pleime Camp, in the vicinity of the Ia Meur river.

According to intelligence daily report, after failing to overrun US positions on the south bank of the Ia Drang, the 8th Battalion, 66th Regiment, broke off the attack and pulled its dead and wounded back from the site of the engagement. The apparent discovery by Cavalry forces of a new NVA infiltration unit would cause the Field Front to re-evaluate its tactical position and begin looking for ways to counteract the continued pressure.

An immediate action was to order the 33d Regiment out of its base at Hill 732, which it had hardly reached, and onto the eastern slopes of Chu Pong in the vicinity of YA922010 with its battalions (when they closed) to take up positions from Hill 732, down through Anta Village (940010) to the north bank of the Ia Meur (980000).

The fragmented bits and pieces of the regiment were still making their way in a generally westward direction, clinging to stream beds, utilizing all available concealment to avoid detection by the ever-present Cavalry helicopters. There still was one unit reasonably intact - the battalion that had acted as rear guard. Starting later and moving more slowly than the rest, it was still east of main Cavalry positions.

On 11/05, according to intelligence daily report, the day brought little change to the intelligence picture. The 66th Regiment continued to close into assembly areas in the Chu Pong sanctuary and the 33d Regiment waited for its shattered forces to rejoin the parent unit. The 32d Regiment and Field Front, meanwhile, remained untouched and untroubled north of the Ia Drang and adjacent to the Cambodian frontier.

On 11/06, the 6th battalion of the 33rd Regiment was almost annihilated after an engagement taking place North of the Ia Meur river: 77 KIA (BC), nearly 400 others estimated KIA and WIA.

Up to this point, the 1st Brigade of the First Air Cavalry Division in its "All the Way" (2) deployment over an area of about 2500 square kilometers had given severe blows to the withdrawing VC units but through the contacts made and related above, no traces were yet found concerning the 32nd Regiment. Although the number of VC casualties amounted to 1500, including those suffered in the first phase, one more regiment - the 66th Regiment - had been added to the enemy order of battle.

There was strong suspicion that elements of the 32nd Regiment may have slipped off to the east.

On 11/07, according to intelligence daily report, in the Chu Pong sanctuary the depleted 33d Regiment licked its wounds and waited for its stragglers to come in. The remainder of Field Front forces were quiet.

In the battle area there was diminishing activity. One NVA soldier surrendered with a safe-conduct pass.

On 11/08, according to intelligence daily report, only fragmented units and stragglers remained east of the Chu Pong-Ia Drang complex as the 33d Regiment began to assess its losses.

Friendly intelligence at this point still was not really sure that the entire 33d Regiment withdrew to the west. One prisoner taken at Pleime stated positively that after the battle his unit was to walk for two nights south and east. In addition, there was strong suspicion that elements of the 32d Regiment may have slipped off to the east after the ambush. By this time Field Force Vietnam had asked the division to consider moving its operations east of Pleime if it appeared that was no further contact imminent in the west.

On 11/09, according to intelligence daily report, the 33d Regiment gathered in the last of its organic units and began to count noses. There were many missing.

At Field Front headquarters north of the Ia Drang, it was a day of situation analysis

Phase II: Destroying the enemy

On 11/09, the movement and shift in emphasis from west to east commenced in a diversionary tactic in preparation of the attack into the enemy�s formation in the Chupong-Iadrang complex.

On 11/10, 3rd Air Cavalry Brigade replaced 1st Air Cavalry Brigade.

According to intelligence daily report, Field Front headquarters, after evaluating the situation, had reached a decision. With American units seemingly withdrawing to the east of Pleime, the decision was to attempt to regain its early advantage with an attack. The target once again was the Pleime CIDG Camp. The division headquarters set the date for attack at 16 November, and issued orders to its three regiments.

The 32d Regiment, of course, remained a cohesive fighting force, despite the casualties sustained during the ambush of the ARVN Armored Task Force on the road to Pleime.

The 33d, as has been seen, suffered tremendous losses in its attack of and subsequent withdrawal from Pleime, but it still was to be committed again. With a view toward its future commitment, the 33d's cadre began reorganization of the depleted battalions into a composite fighting unit.

The real cutting edge for the attack, however, was the newly infiltrated 66th Regiment, fresh from North Vietnam and spoiling for a fight. It would be in the van of the three regimental effort against Pleime.

On 11/11, the three battalions of the 66th Regiment were strung along the north bank of the Ia Drang river;

the 32nd Regiment was also up north in the same area;

the 33rd Regiment maintained its positions in the vicinity of the Anta Village (VC appellation), east of the Chu Pong mountains.

Convinced that friendly forces had lost tracks of its units, VC Field Front quickly made a decision to regain its advantage with an attack. The target again was Pleime and the date of attack set at 16 November. The plan was known within the VC ranks as the second phase of the attack of Pleime. All the three regiments would be committed this time as well as a battalion of 120mm mortars and a battalion of 14.5mm twin-barrel anti-aircraft guns which were both en route down the infiltration trail and scheduled to arrive in time for the attack. According to the declaration of a surrendered political officer, the scheme of the new attack would have as primary objective the destruction of the camp.

On 11/12, according to intelligence daily report, Field Front units continued preparations and rehearsals for the scheduled attack on Pleime.

On 11/13, according to intelligence daily report, Field Front forces began staging in the Chu Pong-Ia Drang area in preparation for movement to Pleime and the projected 16 November attack. Some recon parties and transportation units already had moved out.

II Corps Command determined that it was the right moment to insert air cavalry unit to set up a blocking position in Chu Pong before the arrival of the two battalions of anti-aircraft and heavy mortar to prevent the helicopters transporting troops from being shot down by guns placed on hill sides and infantrymen from been decimated by mortar shells fired prior to assaults. The D-day would be the next day 11/14.

On 11/14, at noon, helicopters disgorged troops and artillery from the 1st Air Cavalry on the very doorsteps of the Chu Pong mountains. Instead of launching an attack on Pleime, field Front fount itself engaged in a struggle to defend its own base. The landing zone called L.Z. X-ray was about 25 km from the Camp of Pleime, at the eastern foot of the Chu Pong massif. The terrain was flat and consisted of scrub trees up to 100 feet high, thick elephant grass varying in height from one foot to five feet and ant hills throughout the area up to eight feet high with thick brush and elephant grass on and around them. Along the western edge of the LZ, the trees and grass were especially thick and extended off into the jungle on the foothills of the mountain.

After a 20-minute tube artillery preparation, and 30 seconds of aerial artillery fire, the landing of the 1/7 Cavalry battalion began. The battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Harold G. Moore, himself with the assault company - Company B - landed precisely at 1048 hours on 14 November 1965.

While the helicopters were shuttling back to Pleime to lift company A, the B company commander secured the landing zone by having one platoon dispatch its squads into different areas, 50 to 100 meters off the landing zone to reconnoiter. At approximately 1120 hours a prisoner was taken. He stated that he had eaten only bananas for five days and that there were three VC battalions on the mountain.

At 1210 hours, as sufficient elements of company A had landed, the LZ security mission was given to that company and company B ordered to search the lower portion of the mountain area with emphasis on the finger leading down towards X-ray.

Around 1245 hours, lead elements of company B began to engage in a fire fight of moderate intensity. Shortly afterwards, at approximately 1330 hours, the company commander reported that he was being attacked heavily by at least two companies of enemy and that his right platoon 2B1/7 was in danger of being surrounded and cut off from the rest of the company by a numerically superior force. The fire fight became intense. Also a few rounds of 60 and 81 mm mortar fire began falling in the LZ and on company B.

Shortly after the fire fight began, the last platoon of company A and lead elements of company C landed. Company A was then ordered to move up on the left of company B, to establish physical contact with it, to protect its left flank and to send one platoon up to assist company B in getting to the platoon which was in danger. Company C was ordered to take up a blocking position off the landing zone to the south and southwest to prevent the LZ from being overrun in that direction and to give protection to A company's left flank. Airstrikes and artillery fires were called in on the lower fringe of the mountains foothills and work over the mountain and enemy approaches to the LZ from the west and south. But there were no well-defined terrain features to help and the scrubs and trees all looked alike. The air was heavy with smoke and dust. The fact that the separated 2B1/7 platoon was forward of companies A and B delayed delivery of effective fires in support of these two companies. However, using the technique of "walking" fires down the mountain from the south and west, fires were placed where they gave some help to these two companies. Despite all its efforts, company B reinforced was only able to get to within 75 meters of the cut-off platoon and could get no further.

Concurrently, company A minus also made heavy contact with a large force of at least one enemy company which was driving in and along a dry creek bed parallel to the western edge of the LZ. A very heavy firefight immediately broke out. Company A was taking light casualties and extracting a heavy toll from the enemy. One platoon was in such a position that it was able to bring close-in flanking fire on 50-70 VC as they continued moving across their front.

Just as company A firefight broke out, the last elements of company C and the lead elements D landed. The C company commander directed his elements into position alongside his other elements which had landed previously within five minutes, a force of 175-200 enemy headed for the LZ and ran headlong into company C. They were held off and numerous of them killed in the process of trying to get to the landing zone. The action continued for approximately one hour and a half until the enemy, disorganized and decimated, pulled off under heavy friendly artillery and air fires, dragging many of his dead and wounded.

At 1500 hours, as the remainder of the tactical elements of the battalion finally landed, and the enemy fire had slacked off, due to companies C and D actions, the battalion commander could quickly give necessary orders for the repositioning of his troops. Afterwards, two attacks were launched to reach the surrounded 2B1/7 platoon. But they were met by a greatly superior enemy force which from concealed positions was trying to cut off the attacking forces into parts. By 1740 hours, Colonel Moore decided to pull back companies A and B under cover of heavy supporting fires to the fringe of the landing zone and set up a tight defensive perimeter for the night. The battalion was still in good communications with the surrounded platoon and it was ringed with close in artillery defensive fire. By 1800 hours, company B of the 2/7 battalion landed to reinforce the 1/7.

On 11/15, due to the heavy losses they had received in the afternoon, the enemy made only some light probes around the perimeter at night. As for the cut-off platoon, it received three separate attacks from the enemy but thanks to the protection by continued close-in artillery fires, when daylight broke, numerous enemy dead were seen around the platoon.

But as first light came, the enemy reappeared and simultaneously attacked from three directions: from the south, south west and south east. By 0730 hours, the enemy had moved almost to the perimeter foxholes despite taking severe losses from artillery, mortar and close air support. There was considerable hand fighting. At 0755 hours, all platoon positions were ordered to throw a colored smoke grenade to define visually for the air observers the periphery of the perimeter and all fire support brought in extremely close, because the enemy fire was so heavy that movements toward or within the sector of defense resulted in more friendly casualties. Some friendly artillery fire fell inside the perimeter itself and two cans of napalm were delivered in the battalion CP area.

At approximately 0910 hours, company A, 2/7 battalion landed to reinforce. By 1000 hours, the enemy attack was finally repelled, enemy corpses, body fragments, weapons and equipment were littered in profusion around the edge and forward of the perimeter. There was massive evidence of many other enemy dead and wounded being dragged away from the area.

The relief of the cut-off platoon took place in the afternoon and was conducted by the 2/5 battalion which had been sent by the 3rd Brigade and on foot from LZ Victor, had closed into LZ X-ray at 1205 hours. Little enemy resistance was encountered and the platoon was reached at 1510 hours. It still had ammunitions left, was in good morale and suffered only 8 KIA, 12 WIA.

In the afternoon on 15 November, the B52 stratofortresses had also taken part in the battle with 18 sorties of the Chu Pong massif.

On 11/16, the night was relatively quiet until 0400 hours when a force of 250-300 enemy attacked from the south east. Flareship illumination was called for and continuous until 0545 hours. The attack was beaten off by small arms and artillery fires. At 0432 hours, another attack by 200 enemies came in from the same direction but the artillery took a heavy toll. By 0500 hours, the weight of the enemy attack had shifted more to the southwest but repulsed half an hour later. At 0627 hours, another attack came directly toward the CP. At 0641 hours, the enemy had been beaten off and was dragging off bodies under fire.

A search and clear sweep was conducted at 0810 hours by all units on the perimeter. Enemy dead were lying throughout the area and numerous weapons were collected.

The entire battle had lasted continuous for 48 hours and the enemy had suffered at X-ray almost one third of their total losses throughout all three phases:

- KIA (body count): 834

- KIA (estimated): 1215

- CIA: 6

-Weapons captured: 141

- Weapons destroyed: 100

As for the 1/7 battalion, 79 troops were killed and 125 wounded. T

he 1/7 battalion left LZ X-ray at 1040 hours on 16 November and was replaced by the 2/7th and 2/5th battalions.

During the day, the two 32nd and 33rd Regiment continued to be struck by B-52�s bombs at north west of LZ Xray in 20 sorties. One after the other, the areas of the Chu Pong massif - each of 20 square miles - underwent a systematic earthquake spreading from West to East. VC bunkers and trenches which so far had resisted the strikes by tactical aircraft and artillery began to score direct hits by the 750-pound bombs. The heavy canopy of the jungle ceased to be effective in both concealment and cover.

On 11/17, the two 2/5th and 2/7th Battalions were ordered to exit LZ Xray; 2/5th marching northwestward to LZ Columbus and 2/7th northward to LZ Albany. The displacement was also based on the estimate that the enemy had withdrawn in that direction. In the afternoon of the previous day, a friendly helicopter had been shot down over that area, the enemy movement could also aim at attacking the artillery position east of X-ray which had provided effective support to the 1/7 battalion during the last two days.

As soon as these two battalions reached the safety zone at a 3 kilometer radius, B-52s carpet bombed right at LZ Xray annihilating troops of 66th Regiment still lingering at the landing zone. Meanwhile, 2/7th Battalion fell into a VC ambush conducted by a battalion-size enemy unit, when it almost came near its objective. But once again, the VC had offered themselves as targets for air-strikes and artillery fire: KIA (body count): 403; KIA (estimated): 100; Weapons captured: 112.

Intelligence report estimated the casualties caused by B-52�s bombs during the last three days were around 2,000 killed.

Phase III: �Finish� Em�

The intelligence estimate on enemy capabilities, made on 17 November indicated that nearly 2/3 of their strength had been wiped off through the engagements in Phases I and II.

II Corps Command thought it was time to throw in the reserve in order to put an end to the battle which had lasted for about one month and decided to add a third phase to the operation. Besides suffering heavy losses, the enemy was compelled to fall into the trap set by friendly forces and canalized into the routes of withdrawal which we had foreseen.

This time the main effort was conducted by the ARVN Airborne Brigade whose mission consisted of destroying the fleeing VC units and all their installations around the Ia Drang valley. The 1st Air Cavalry Division which had thus far borne the burden of the attack would continue to exert a pressure from East to West and to provide artillery support for the Airborne Brigade.

The operation - dubbed "Th�̀n Phong 7" - began in the afternoon, 18 November when the brigade was helilifted to the area of operations, immediately upon arrival in Pleiku.

On 11/18, from 3:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m., Airborne 1st Task Force Headquarters and its three Airborne 3rd, 5th and 6th Battalions were helilifted to landing zone (YA842090) on the northern part of Ia Drang River. Airborne 3rd Battalion and Airborne 6th Battalion immediately set out to sweep for the enemy westward in two different axes. While on the move, Airborne 3rd Battalion was tipped off by Special Forces Rangers teams that a battalion sized enemy forces belonging to NVA 32nd Regiment were shadowing it.

During the day, B-52�s continued to carpet bombing Chu Pong area.

On 11/19, around 11:00 a.m., Airborne 3rd Battalion received order to veer south toward an ambush site set up at (YA801081) by Airborne 6th Battalion.

During the day, B-52�s continued to carpet bombing Chu Pong area.

On 11/20, at 2:40 p.m., the enemy troops entered the very center of the ambush and was caught within the field of fire of Airborne 6th Battalion. The enemy suffered about 200 casualties in this engagement.

The same day, at 5:45 p.m., Airborne 8th Battalion was helilifted to location (YA822077), to prepare for the insertion of Airborne 2nd Task Force Headquarters along with Airborne 7th Battalion at 11:00 a.m.

During the day, B-52�s continued to carpet bombing Chu Pong area. In total during 5 days, from 11/16, B-52�s performed 96 sorties.

On 11/22, the units already present on the battlefields - Airborne 1st Task Force Headquarters, Airborne 3th Battalion, Airborne 5th Battalion, and Airborne 6th Battalion converged toward location (YA822077); by 1:50 p.m. on November 22, all units were reunited at this staging area. From here, the entire Airborne Brigade crossed to the south side of Ia Drang River and climbed up a mountain.

On 11/23, the entire Airborne Brigade reached its peak at (YA810060) around 11:15 a.m. They settled down for the night in preparation to ambush the enemy troops at the corridor that II Corps Command had predicted the enemy would utilize to withdraw back to Cambodia the next day.

On 11/24, early morning, Airborne 3rd Battalion was dispatched to the left to intercept the enemy troops. This battalion made contact with the enemy at 8:45 a.m.; Airborne 5th Battalion was sent to the right. This battalion made contact with enemy troops at 10:50 a.m. Airborne 7th Battalion and Airborne 8th Battalion were sent down the mountain and boxed them in against the Ia Drang River.

On 11/24, as no more contacts were made with the enemy, the Airborne Brigade withdrew from the area of operations, terminating the third phase of the Battle of Pleime with 265 VC killed (BC), 10 others and 58 weapons captured. Furthermore, in their sweep, Airborne 3rd Battalion and Airborne 6th Battalion had destroyed 3 training centers, one equipment cache and 75 houses.

Phieu

#772 07 Feb 12, 04:42

Highlight #2 : Pleime Counteroffensive Operational Concept

The Pleime counter offensive - a preferable name to Long Reach - operational concept was the annihilation of the B3 Field Front forces with B-52 air strikes, not with 1st Air Cavalry ground forces, as most people are inclined to believe.

Pleime, tr�̣n chi�́n lịch sử (Why Pleime Vietnamese version) illustrates this concept well with a map (not shown as clearly in Why Pleime)

1 Destruction of VC field hospital 11-1-65 ) herding move
2 Ambush of 66th Regiment 11-3-65) herding move
3 Discovery of a weapon cache 11-4-65 ) herding move
4 Destruction of one 33rd Regiment�s battalion 11-6-65) herding move
5 LZ X-Ray 11-14-65 ) distractive move
6 LZ Albany 11-17-65 ) distractive move
7 Artillery location 11-18-65 ) coup de grace move
8 B-52 air strikes targeted areas 11/15-18/65) with B3 center of mass vicinity YA8702

Phieu

#773 08 Feb 12, 02:24

Highlight #3 : Various Diversionary Moves ...

... in Preparation for Arc Lite Strike in Pleime Counteroffensive

- Herding diversionary move � Its intention was to roundup the enemy troops toward a common location.

The order to execute the switch in operational direction from west to east was issued on 11/8 with a vague suggestion (Kinnard, page 67):

By this time Field Force Vietnam had asked the division to consider moving this operations eat of Pleime if it appeared that was no further contact imminent in the west�

The purpose of the enticement move was made known to General Knowles on 11/10 (Kinnard , page 73):

The movement and shift in emphasis from west to east was to further stimulate a forthcoming decision from the NVA division headquarters.

Its intention became clearer to General Knowles on Nov 11 (Kinnard, page 76):

With American units seemingly withdrawing to the east of Pleime, the decision was to attempt to regain its early advantage with an attack. The target once again was the Pleime CIDG Camp. The division headquarters set the date for attack at 16 November, and issued orders to its three regiments.

The B3 Field Front thus fell for Colonel Hieu�s scheme in regrouping its troops in two stages: assembly areas for training and rehearsals, and staging areas for movement to attack. The ideal target for B-52 airstrikes was the staging area where troop concentration would be the most dense.

The window margin would be narrow: 11/13-14 or 11/12-14, (it turned out Colonel Hieu only had the 11/13-14 one) depending on the allotment time given for rehearsals.

And when order was issued for gathering troops in staging areas, the window margin would be in terms of 24 hours and less.

Thus the necessity to create the

The number of Air Cav troops inserted at LZ X-Ray should be small so as not to make B3 Field Front to rushing in all of its three regimental troops.

Phieu

#774 09 Feb 12, 05:03

Highlight #4 : What if there was no master plan for Bayonet I operation?

Coleman describes what happened during the first phase of the enemy pursuit executed by the 1st Air Cavalry Brigade from October 27, 1965 to November 8:

After the 1st Brigade battalions generally lost contact with the remnants of the 33rd Regiment on November 7, Kinnard said, in Army Magazine, that, �I had been planning to replace the gallant, but spent, First Brigade with the Third Brigade, commanded by Colonel Thomas W. Brown, and this seemed a logical time to do so.� The general might have been indulging in a bit of hyperbole. The units of the 1st Brigade unquestionably were gallant, but spent? The 2/12 Cav had spent the longest period in the field, eighteen days total � but its days in contact numbered about five. The 2/8 had fourteen days in the valley and only two days of hard contact. The 1/8 Cav�s one company had one day of contact, while the others had none. And the 1/12 Cav had only its reconnaissance platoon truly get shot at in anger. Compared to times in the field by units later in the war, this was a walk in the park.

(J.D. Coleman, Pleiku, the Dawn of Helicopter Warfare in Vietnam, p. 189, St. Martin�s Press, New York, 1988.)

If there was no master plan for Bayonet I operation, then, on 11/8, after replacing the 1st Air Cav Brigade, General Knowles would lunge his 3rd Air Cav Brigade forces into Chu Prong in a search and destroy mission.

And the operation would ended up similar to be just a �walk in the park�, just like the 1st Air Cav Brigade in the All the Way operation.

Furthermore, there would be no opportunity whatsoever to make use of B-52 airstrikes, since the three NVA regiment forces would never regroup to the point of becoming targetable for B-52 airstrikes! Then, after a few weeks with sporadic engagements more or less significant, General Kinnard would say, "I had been planning to replace the gallant, but spent, Third Brigade with the Second Brigade, and this seemed a logical time to do so."

So on and on, into an exercise of utmost futility of an endless circular troop unit rotation maneuverings ...

Phieu

#775 10 Feb 12, 01:13

Highlight #5 : Arc Lite Operation Planning and Execution in Pleime Offensive

Planning

On October 26, 1965, as Pleime had just been liberated, Colonel Hieu made plan for an exploitation operation in the pursuit of the two withdrawing NVA regiments to the Chupong-Iadrang complex.

Amidst all the methods of intelligence gathering, there was the radio intercepts of open communications in Mandarin between the Chinese Advisors at regimental level and divisional level. These Chinese Advisors discussed in the open on everything: logistics, personnel, troop unit locations, movements, morale, status, losses, casualties, cadres� intentions, and planning. When the Chinese Advisors talked, Colonel Hieu listened in. When they stopped talking, he relied on other methods of intelligence gathering. In Pleime, cuộc chiến lịch sử, page 94, Colonel Hieu stated unequivocally that the victory achieved in the Pleime counteroffensive into Chupong-Iadrang complex was due to the acquisition of a solid intelligence on the enemy situation:

The battle from phases 2 and 3 also introduced an aspect never seen up to now because for almost 20 years, during the Franco-Vietnamese war, seldom pursuit operation was considered after each time the enemy made appearance and when it was conducted, no significant results had been achieved. Therefore this time around, the determination not to allow the enemy to escape, coupled with the solid intelligence on the enemy situation had permitted the battle to develop to maximum degree and scale and at the same token lead to the biggest victory ever achieved by the ARVN and its Allied. So with the certainty of getting a plethora of ongoing and updated by the days of solid intelligence on the enemy military situation, Colonel Hieu draw up his operational plan of using Arc Lite to destroy the enemy en mass at Chupong-Iadrang complex.

His plan would have the following element of diversionary moves:

- 1/ to herd the scattered troop units toward Chupong-Iadrang complex;

Colonel Hieu then submitted his operational plan and its feasibility to MACV/General Westmoreland for approval.

Execution

The next step was to set up a coordination team comprising the II Corps, the Air Cav Forward Command Post, the First Field Force and MACV.

I. ONE

- on Oct 27, for the herding operation (1st Air Cav Brigade)

= on Nov 7, in the Chu Pong sanctuary the depleted 33d Regiment licked its wounds and waited for its stragglers to come in. The remainder of Field Front forces were quiet.

= only fragmented units and stragglers remained east of the Chu Pong-Ia Drang complex as the 33d Regiment began to assess its losses.

II. TWO

- on Nov 8, for the enticement operation (3rd Air Cav Brigade)

= On Nov 10, Field Front headquarters, after evaluating the situation, had reached a decision. With American units seemingly withdrawing to the east of Pleime, the decision was to attempt to regain its early advantage with an attack. The target once again was the Pleime CIDG Camp. The division headquarters set the date for attack at 16 November, and issued orders to its three regiments.

= On Nov 11, the 66th Regiment was at (center of mass vic YA 9104); the 32nd (YA 820072), the 33rd (YA 940011)

= On Nov 12, Field Front units continued preparations and rehearsals for the scheduled attack on Pleime.

III. THREE

- on Nov 12, 1/7 Air Cav Battalion was ordered to make plan to air assault Chu Pong massif (for the distractive operation)

= On Nov 13, Field Front forces began staging in the Chu Pong-Ia Drang area in preparation for movement to Pleime and the projected 16 November attack. Some recon parties and transportation units already had moved out.

- and Nov 14, for the distractive operation (1/7 Air Cav Battalion)

- On Nov 15, at noon, B-52 air strikes began at B3 Field Front forces (center of mass vicinity YA8702) and continued for 5 days, until 11/19 (Why Pleime, chapter VI):

For five consecutive days, from 15 to 19 November, the giant B52 bombers had flown a total of 96 sorties. One after the other, the areas of the Chu Pong massif - each of 20 square miles - underwent a systematic earthquake spreading from West to East. VC bunkers and trenches which so far had resisted the strikes by tactical aircraft and artillery began to score direct hits by the 750-pound bombs. The heavy canopy of the jungle ceased to be effective in both concealment and cover. The "back door" into Cambodia was closed and to escape, the VC remnants were reduced to utilize the narrow valley of the Ia Drang.

Enemy casualties as results of Arc Lite operation amounted to about 2,000 dead.

The "coup de gr�ce" surgical strike was finished off by the Airborne Brigade ending the Pleime Offensive on November 25, 1965.

Phieu

#776 11 Feb 12, 03:29

Highlight #6 : A Doctrinal Lesson on the Use of Arc Lite in Pleime Counteroffensive

Principle:

B-52 airstrike needs a targetable objective, which means the object has to be sizable, relatively immobile and its location can be pinpointed with an accuracy of at least (XX�YY�).

Feasibility:

Operational Concept:

Planning:

Execution:

- Oct 27: The herding operation (1') started with the 1st Air Cavalry Brigade conducting All the Way operation. Spotted enemy units were broke up further in small pieces and pushed back westward to Chupong-Iadrang complex.