Although he had never been commissioned into the Armor Unit nor had he ever attended an Armor Training School either at Thu Duc (Vietnam), at Saumur (France) or at Fort Knox (United States), General Hieu had demonstrated an excellent ability in the use of the Tandem Infantry Armor Formula in all of the combats that he had conducted. Before providing proof of such talent, let's examine why it was difficult to solve and to apply this Tandem Formula, in other words, why it was not easy to employ tanks and armored vehicle in the Vietnam battlegrounds.
A Hard To Solve Tandem Formula
General Westmoreland had emphatically stated: "Except for a few coastal areas in the Center regions, one cannot use tanks in Vietnam." It was only in 1968 that he changed his thinking after he had seen ARVN Armor units use with efficiency combined infantry and tanks/armored vehicle forces and then ordered his American troops to mirror their lilliputian allies.
Not only did U.S. Armed Forces find it challenging to use tanks in the Vietnam battlefields, but the other participants, Armed Forces (Korean, Australian, New Zealander, and Thai, including North Vietnamese), did also. The Viet Cong introduced its T-54 tanks at Kontum-Tan Canh's siege, at Quang Tri's battlefront and An Loc's siege in the Summer of 1972. In the beginning, ARVN soldiers reacted awkwardly when they came face to face with those tanks for the first time in their life. But then, because Viet Cong tanks were rarely accompanied by infantrymen and thus always advanced unprotected, they became easy targets for South Vietnamese foot soldiers armed with individual anti-tank M-72 rifles. It seemed that NVA soldiers and officers were sent to Russia to learn how to drive and maintain tanks, but were not taught the art of tanks tactics.
Three major factors make it difficult to use tanks/armored vehicles effectively. The first factor is the terrain. Tanks are most fitted on flat, wide- open, firm, and unobstructed terrain. In this respect, Vietnam was divided into four distinctive terrain areas: the Delta (rice-paddy areas surrounding Saigon, My Tho, Can Tho), the Mountains (areas along the Annamite Mountains), the Coastal Plains (sandy areas surrounding Qui Nhon, Phan Thiet, Tuy Hoa, Danang, Hue), and the Central Plateau (areas surrounding Kontum, Pleiku, Ban Me Thuot). Amazingly, ARVN Armor units had shown that their light-weighted M41 tanks and modified M113 armored vehicles could be effectively used on all terrains but the Mountains, which constituted NVA troops inaccessible refuge.
The second factor is the massive factor of tanks. To effectively use them, one has to ascertain a precise knowledge of the terrain and then master the logistical complexities of providing fuel and ammunition to tanks, as well as their maintenance. A comparison between the maneuvering of a tanks squadron and the maneuvering of a horde consisting of 30 to 40 elephants would give an immediate understanding to its difficulty: instead of being a formidable weapon, it would constitute a cumbersome burden in one's hands.
The third factor is the tankers' attitude. In any Armed Forces, the black beret tankers are always a breed of proud warriors. They always look down on infantrymen, partly due to the mere fact of the vantage point of their high seating positions (looking down the foot soldiers walking pitifully below them) and partly due to their required qualification of sophisticated technical knowledge. As a result, tanks Commanders don't easily take orders from Infantry Commanders. That explained why ARVN tanks Commanders felt unhappy when Armor Regiment was renamed to Armor Squadron, which put them one level below the Commander of an Infantry Regiment. Nonetheless, tankers do realize that without the help of accompanying infantrymen, a tank would be like a blind-folded horse, easily knocked down by individual anti-tank rifles.
It is because of all the above-mentioned factors that a Commander has to be exceptionally competent and well respected to handle with efficiency the Tandem Infantry Armor Formula. That explains why General Nguyen Van Minh, a weak military leader, had to disband the 3rd Corps Armor Brigade and the 3rd Corps Assault Task Force at the end of 1971, rather than to make use of these two formidable and yet cumbersome big units.
General Hieu had an in-depth knowledge of the elements of terrain, of intelligence vis-a-vis enemy forces, and commanded respect and confidence of both his infantrymen and tankers. The effective use of the Tandem Infantry Armor Formula had become General Hieu's distinctive and unique combat style.
He was able to do so due to his natural ability to learn by proxy. General Hieu learned the tactical maneuvering of tanks and armored vehicles by just listening to tankers whenever he got the opportunities to converse with them, i.e. Major George E. Kimball (his sponsor officer when Major Hieu was attending the US Army College of High Command and General Staff, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1963), Captain Tran Quang Khoi (Head of G3, when Colonel Hieu was 2nd Corps Chief of Staff under Commanding General Tri in 1964), General Harry Kinnard (1st US Cavalry Division when he was still 2nd Corps Chief of Staff under Commanding General Vinh Loc, in 1965, and when he was Brigadier Commanding General of 22nd Division in 1966), Colonel John Hayes (Senior Advisor, ARVN 5th Division, in 1969-1970), Major Shouse (G3 Advisor, ARVN 5th Division in 1970). Colonel Le Khac Ly, 22nd Division Chief of Staff, recounted that when General Hieu took over the command of the 22nd Division, he confided in him: "I was not meant to be a tactical commander, but rather a strategist in an international general staff command." Colonel Ly added: "General Hieu was just modest in saying so: he learned and caught up very quickly, and in no time he became an accomplished Commander of a tactical division."
General Hieu's Military Exploits using the Tandem Formula
It appeared that General Hieu applied the Tandem Infantry Armor Formula whenever he launched an attack with his troops. The following typical examples have been mentioned in other parts of this homepage:
In most cases, infantry protection is required to ensure the security of armored columns. The battle of Pleime, on the contrary, was a typical case in which the infantry elements considerably restricted the mobility and capabilities of the armored turrets. For this reason, Armor company commanders should not in the future cling to boo-principles and had better expose themselves daringly instead of limiting their mobility with close infantry protection. This would provide not only liberty of action but also the arguments to defend oneself in case of being surprised.