Pacification
The Pacification Program was initiated by General Abrams when he succeeded General Westmoreland as MACV commander on June 10, 1968. “Clear and hold” tactic replaced “search and destroy” tactic. Major General Hieu , ARVN 5th Infantry Division Commander, clarified the “clear and hold” tactic, saying that it won’t work unless it was assumed entirely by the territory (Regional/Popular) forces instead of the regular forces performing the “clear” and the territorial forces the “hold” component. He focused his attention in improving the combat effectiveness of RF/PF and in making sure they got direct and genuine support from the military commanders.
On September 1, 1969, only two weeks after he assumed the command of the ARVN 5th Infantry Division on August 14, 1965, he discussed how he would tackle the pacification program in a conversation with Brigadier General D.P. McAuliffe, US 1st Infantry Division Deputy Commander.
5. General Hieu then spoke about pacification. He commented that military operations are relatively straightforward and easy for a military man to comprehend. Pacification, on the other hand, is complex. Citing General Tri's recent guidance, he said that the 5th Division should move away from the pacified areas, leaving these to RF/PF forces to secure. He drew an analogy of thrusting one's fist into a fish bowl; the fish move away, and stay away as long as the arm is in the fish bowl; however, as soon as the fist is withdrawn, the fish return to that spot. He said that the same thing can happen with regard to VC in populated areas, i.e., when ARVN and US forces move away, the VC tend to return. He has spoken to all of the district chiefs in his AO, as well as to many village chiefs, and many are uneasy at the prospect of ARVN and US forces moving away from the populated areas. In his view, Binh Duong Province has sufficient RF/PF forces, but these forces require further improvement in combat effectiveness, and need the reassurance of support from nearby US and ARVN forces in order to keep out the VC and maintain security for the populace. Therefore, he indicated that he feels an obligation to over watch these territorial forces and to assist and support them as much as possible. I assured him that we shared this view. However, he considers this a most difficult problem, particularly in light of General Tri's guidance.
6. (…)
7. General Hieu then talked about how to improve the coordination of both the military and political effort against the enemy. He commented that the regimental/brigade commanders are the ones who have sufficiently broad focus and the resources to plan, coordinate, and carry out major operations. Similarly, he regards the previous chiefs and sector commanders as having sufficiently broad responsibilities to view the situation beyond narrow district limits. Therefore, he announced that he is instructing his regimental commanders to meet daily with the provincial sector commanders in their area, as well as with the US brigade commanders for the purpose of planning and supervising the execution of military operations against the enemy, as well as those in support of pacification. In addition, he intends to suggest to the Bind Duong Province Chief that he conduct weekly coordination conferences aimed at the problems of military support for pacification. He envisions that his regimental commanders and the US brigade commanders who operate in Binh Duong Province, as well as the appropriate district chiefs and battalion commanders, would participate in the weekly provincial meetings. He hopes that such conferences would stress (among other things) the support and assistance required for RF/PF forces.
A week later, on September 6, 1965, in the Planning Conference with the US 1st Infantry Division, MG Hieu issued specific guidance pertaining to the pacification program:
d. Binh Duong Province Chief will coordinate with military commanders for operations in direct support of pacification.
e. (…)
f. Wherever possible, military and political boundaries will coincide so as to avoid having a district chief coordinate with two or more battalion commanders in matters pertaining to direct support of pacification.
g. Area A is the direct responsibility of the Binh Duong Province Chief utilizing only RF/PF forces.
A year later, on October 7, 1970, in the Meeting with Commanding Staff, MG Hieu instructed:
The Sectors should focus attention on populated areas, to push forward Pacification and Development Program of hamlets and villages. Specifically they must root up the VC infrastructure and its cadres who operate near the hamlets or in the heart of the hamlets.
b) Cut off enemy supply: Currently, rubber plantations have been allowed to operate again, lumbers are permitted to be cut, but the enemy can also sneak in to buy rice and collect taxes. All Sectors must particularly focus in preventing the enemy from having means to survive and to grow.
c) Each RF and PF units will be assigned an objective and must make efforts days and nights to destroy that objective. If we all apply this concept, we will be able to annihilate all enemy forces within a short time.
I was lucky in discovering the Operation order TT.09/B/5 which was conducted with the specific order to “eradicate VC infrastructure and VC cadres” in Binh Long, Loc Ninh and An Loc:
Number: 08/21/BTL/SD5BB
Lai Khe XT.765.385Reference: Operation order TT.09/B/5
(…)
In addition, other information as following:
21.- 368th Mobile Battalion: img src="locninh_binhlong_anloc.jpg " align=right>
Commander : Major Huynh Phuc Khang Deputy Commander : Captain To Minh Diep Political Cadre : Captain Huynh Van Bang Effective : 100 Location : TBD.XU.875045 22. VC Province Chief of Binh Long, code name C55:
Chief : Nam Thanh Deputy Chief : Tu Binh Executive Officer : Ba Hung Effective : 20 Location : TBD.XU.8224 *- Company protection of VC Province Chief, code name CK4:
Commander : Nguyen Van Nhan Deputy Commander : Nguyen Van Ngon Political Cadre : Tran Van Phuc Effective : 20 Operational Area : Protection of Province Chief Location : TBD.XU.815227 23.- VC District Chief of Loc Ninh, code name C65:
Chief : Nam Beo Deputy Chief : Ut Nho Political Cadre : Tu Hoai : Muoi Cao Effective : 18 Location : TBD.XU.6517 *- Combat Platoon 02/Loc Ninh:
Leader : Thanh Deputy Leader : Nghia Effective : 18 Location : TBD.XU.780195 *- Combat Platoon 03/Loc Ninh:
Leader : Dong Deputy Leader : Son Effective : 15 Location : TBD.XU.660095 *- Combat Platoon 05/Loc Ninh:
Leader Unidentified Deputy Leader : Thanh Effective : 12 Location : TBD.XU.8208 24.- VC District Chief of An Loc, code name C55:
Chief : Ba Mao Deputy Chief : Nam Sao Political Cadre : Ba Ba : Muoi Soi Effective : 10 Location : TBD.XU.8903 *- Combat Platoon K1/An Loc:
Leader : Nam Trieu Deputy Leader : Sau Phan Effective : 12 Location : TBD.XU.830946 *- Combat Platoon K2/An Loc:
Leader : Ba Dung Deputy Leader : Nam An Effective : 15 Location : TBD.XT.9191 III.- Intelligence Elements and Needs:
31- Look for location and tunnel and destroy 32- Eradicate elements mentioned in paragraph II
In brief, MG Hieu’s guidance pertaining to the pacification program included the following components: close coordination between Sector Commanders and Military Commanders; province chiefs assume coordination role in combined (territorial-regular forces) operations; weekly meeting between Sector Commanders and Military Commanders; whenever possible, Province Chiefs assume direct responsibility of sectors pacification utilizing only RF/PF; sectors’ two main focuses: root up VC infrastructure and cadres at hamlet level and prevent the enemy from having means to survive and to grow.
Vietnamization
In implementing the Vietnamization program the ARVN 5th Infantry Division encountered various problems in two main areas: replacing redeployed US Forces and taking-over of the Lai Khe US 1st Infantry Division headquarters.
There were three US divisions in the TAOR of the ARVN 5th Infantry Division: US 1st Infantry Division, US 11th Armored Cavalry and US 1st Cavalry Division HQ. With the withdrawal of these US divisions, the ARVN 5th Infantry Division had to spread it forces, resulting in three ARVN regiments – 7th, 8th and 9th doing the job of three US divisions.
General Tran Van Don visited the headquarters of the 5th Division to try to understand the Vietnamization of the war and discussed the question with MG Hieu. “He asked him, 'What do you think of Vietnamization?' He said to me, 'It's impossible to be implemented.' 'Why?' He said, 'The 5th Division covers an area where there were two other divisions, Americans, and now with the departure of the two American divisions I have only my division to cover the whole area. I have three regiments for this area and must use one regiment to replace one division. How can I face the enemy like this? I have become weaker.' He looked very disappointed. I was surprised; he was a quiet man, a polite man, and he tried to do his best. But he said to me that this was impossible. 'How can I cover a bigger area with fewer units?' (Stephen T. Hosmer, Konrad Kellen and Brian M. Jenkins (1980), Fall of South Vietnam: Statements by Vietnamese Military and Civilian Leaders.)
The ARVN 5th Infantry Division became weaker because the US forces, in their withdrawal took away along with them all US helicopter support, US Medevac helicopter support, US tactical air support, US air reconnaissance support (aerial photography, red haze, sniffer and V.R.), equipment to support the fuel facilities e.g. 500 gallon POL tankers and pumping units, artillery support . LTC George G. Layman, ARVN 5ID Deputy Senior Advisor, made mention of these lacks in a memorandum:
28 December 1970
Subject: Redeployment of US Forces
1. (U) References:
a. Phoncon from Major Van Gorder, USAAG III Corps & MR3 on 27 Dec 1970. b. Messages from DSA III Corps & MR3, Subject as above, DTG 270913Z Dec 70. 2. (U) The following report discusses the various problem areas encountered by the 5th Division as a result of redeployment of US Forces.
3. (C) The recent enlarged area of operations (AO) assumed by the 5th Division increased the area of territorial responsibility which has hampered the operational efficiency of the Division. The 5th Division is required to spread their forces over an area formerly occupied by two US Divisions and a US Armored Cavalry Regiment. This problem is compounded due to the fact that an ARVN Division is considerably smaller and has less combat power than an equivalent US Infantry Division.
4. (C) The turnover of large US Base Camp to ARVN taxes the capability of the ARVN units to operate them. The size of most of these US bases dictates an inordinate number of ARVN forces to be committed for static security thereby limiting the number of personnel available for field operations. ARVN units are gradually reducing the size of the defensive perimeters of these bases so they can effectively be defended by a minimum number of personnel.
5. (C) The turnover of US communication facilities to the ARVN will not cause them undue problems as long as the required equipment is provided for them. It is causing some inconvenience for the US Advisors however, and will continue to do so until the Advisors become familiar with the ARVN system.
6. (C) Helicopter support is being seriously limited as US units continue their withdrawal. The ARVN units are having to cut down on the number of airmobile operations, thus limiting their ability to constantly maneuver throughout their assigned TAOR. The gradual reduction of US Medevac helicopter support is becoming a serious problem as more requirements are being placed on limited VNAF Medevac resources. Due to an abundance of US air support in the past the ARVN Division became deficient in their planning techniques for the effective and efficient utilization of available air assets. The Division is now being forced to more effectively plan for the use of allocated aircraft.
7. (C) Tactical air support is being limited because of the withdrawal of US Forces and higher mission priorities for airstrikes outside of South Vietnam. Although VNAF TAC air support is very good, it is limited for the most part to immediate and secondary targets. There are very few preplanned missions being flown in the 5th Division TAOR at the present time.
8. (C) Withdrawal of US air support is having an adverse effect on the reconnaissance effort needed to seek out the enemy. The majority of aerial photography, red haze, sniffer, and V.R. is flown by US aircraft. The withdrawal of locally deployed C-1 army aircraft will reduce results dramatically. The VNAF cannot assume all the FAC and aerial reconnaissance support being given by the US units at the present time.
9. (C) The initial withdrawal of US support caused a reduction in printed Psyop material because the majority of printing supplies had been provided by the US. At the present time however, Vietnamese channels have become more responsive and are supporting the Psyop effort adequately. Civic action projects are supported almost entirely through US sources and will be very seriously affected by the continued US withdrawal. Psyop helicopter missions have been significantly reduced by the cutback in US support.
10. (C) Engineer requirements for general support and routine maintenance within the Division's area of operation have increased. Reduction in air support assets is forcing a greater dependence on land lines of communication for resupply. Current engineer assets have not been sufficient to meet requirements, especially in maintenance of main and secondary LOC's serving fire support bases and unit command posts.
a. The wider dispersion of engineer elements to encompass a greater area of operations has significantly increased command and control problems for the ARVN engineer battalion. b. The reduction in air assets has degraded the engineer reconnaissance capability. It is now less responsive to immediate requirements. A re-evaluation of coordination methods and planning procedures is required to overcome this deficit. 11. (C) The withdrawal of US air support is also placing an increased strain on the 5th Division's already inadequate ground resupply capability. The withdrawal of US units has slowed the supply of repair parts for common type vehicles and weapons. Another problem is the lack of ARVN equipment to support the fuel facilities turned over to them by departing US units e.g. 500 gallon POL tankers and pumping units.
In the particular case of the 8th Regiment,
BG Haig visited the 8th Regiment CP at Ben Cat at 1315 hours this date (24 January 70). He was briefed by Colonel Vy on current intelligence, to include NVA, main force and VC activities throughout the 8th Regiment area. General Haig asked, Does the Regiment have sufficient direct support artillery subsequent to withdrawal of US 1st Infantry Division? Colonel Vy stated emphatically, no! Colonel Vy said he needs at least one artillery battalion in support of his Regiment if his battalions are to have proper fire support when they assume the responsibility of a much larger area of operations. General Haig asked how much artillery is presently in support of the 8th Regiment, and Colonel Vy replied two batteries of 105mm and two 155mm at Chanh Luu, two tubes 105mm at Thoi Hoa, and two tubes 105mm with two tubes 155mm at Ben Cat. He explained that this disposition points out another requirement the RF/PF need artillery to support their operations because the ARVN artillery is presently tasked to furnish artillery support ARVN and RF/PF units throughout the AO. Colonel Vy pointed out that this problem will be much more accentuated when the battalions all move out, away from the populated areas. Until more tubes are made available, either ARVN or RF/PF will not have proper artillery support. (LTC Maurice H. Price, Senior Advisor, 8th Regiment)
In November 1969, the US 1st Infantry headquarters moved to Di An. The ARVN 5th Infantry Division had to move its headquarters from Phu Cuong to Lai Khe . The ARVN 5th Infantry Division had to overcome various problems in this take-over.
Because the base-camp of Lai Khe was built to the size of an American division, it did not fit a Vietnamese division. In a memorandum dated 12/28/1970, Lieutenant Colonel George Layman, ARVN 5th Division Deputy Advisor wrote to the ARVN III Corps American Advisor:
The turnover of large US Base Camp to ARVN taxes the capability of the ARVN units to operate them. The size of most of these US bases dictates an inordinate number of ARVN forces to be committed for static security thereby limiting the number of personnel available for field operations. ARVN units are gradually reducing the size of the defensive perimeters of these bases so they can effectively be defended by a minimum number of personnel.
In the letter dated 1/23/1970 addressed to General Cao Van Vien, General Do Cao Tri, III Corps Commander noted:
The defensive system consists of 11,750 meters of fences of the perimeter, 11,000 meters of fences among units, 112 bunkers and watchtowers. Barracks maintenance: 5,000 bags of cement (to make floors, blocks for walls); 50 cubic meters of lumber of all sizes (for doors, replacement of purlins and house columns); 800 kilograms of nails (assorted). Maintenance of defensive system: 23,632 M16 mines, 860 Claymore mines, 1,720 trip flares, 738 cubic meters of lumber, 1,456 bolts. 12x150, 22,800 kilograms of nails, 6-10-15cm, 672 bags of cement, 183 cubic meters of sand.
General Conroy MACV/J4 , after inspecting Lai Khe base camp, foresaw that the 5th Division would encounter a lot of difficulties in the maintenance of such a huge camp due the limited budget of the Vietnamese Armed Forces:
Funds for base maintenance -- He said that the GVN normally provides very little funds to maintain base camps, often only about one-tenth of what has been requested, and that it is generally not possible to obtain additional funds for this purpose. He commented that ARVN units occupying former US base camps will have to learn to live under this austere funding; alternatively, they should not accept these bases for occupancy. He noted that many of the buildings at Lai Khe are in need of repair and that, if building materials cannot be obtained through normal channels, it should be possible for some buildings to be torn down in order to provide materials to patch others.
Other problems included: (1) Maintenance and parts supply for the high-voltage system; (2) Provision of water trailers and pumps; 3) Light bulbs.
Despite all the problems the take-over ceremony which was scheduled to be on 3/15/1970 was held ahead of time on 2/27/1970.
Cross-border Operations
Within a short time of less than one year, from 8/69-4/70, the ARVN 5th Infantry Division succeeded in pacifying the populated areas and securing its entire areas of operation. These accomplishments resulted in freeing the 5th Infantry Division’s hands to conduct cross-border operations.
From May to July 1970, the ARVN 9th Regiment joined force with the US 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment in Toàn Thắng 46 Operation to attack the enemy in the Fish Hook area north of Loc Ninh. This operation was the ARVN 5th Infantry Division’s participation in the Cambodian Campaign involving units of III Corps, IV Corps and the US II Field Forces.
In October 1970, the ARVN 5th Infantry Division launched ̀n Thắng 8/B/5 with three task forces (TF1, TF9 and TF333) into the Snoul areas. It was a recon assault with the intention to insert recon units and to implant sensors around Snoul.
On March 23, 1971, a forward command post was established at Loc Ninh to conduct Snoul Operation which last until June 1, 1971. During this period, the 8th Regiment occupied Snoul City and its units operated the Snoul areas.
Sidebar
The fact that MG Hieu used to drive around with light security escort when he visited various outposts was an indication that the Pacification and Vietnamization programs did work.
- LTC Robert P. Lott, Deputy Senior Advisor
During temporary absences of the Senior Advisor it was my duty to accompany and assist General Hieu as he required. On a number of instances General Hieu walked into my office and asked me to go with him. We would mount his 1/4 ton vehicle - he would drive - and travel over portions of the division's tactical area. One or two other vehicles carrying a security squad would go with us.
On these drives General Hieu initiated conversations covering wide-ranging subject matter: history of the area, political events in the U.S. with regard to the Vietnamese war, training and motivation of his young men, and possible futures of South Vietnam.
- Colonel Ta Thanh Long, 18th Infantry Division Deputy Commander
After the transfer of the 5th Division command to Colonel Le Van Hung ceremony, in June 1971, I approached General Hieu and invited him to go partying with a group of Colonels and Generals, which included General Lam Quang Tho, the Commanding General of the 18th Division, General Hieu excused himself with the pretext he had to attend to some personal affairs. After the party, I went home. When I reached Ben Cat, I saw General Hieu's car parked on the side of the road. I approached the car and saw General Hieu and his driver, each one eating a loaf of bread with a ripe banana in one hand!
Nguyen Van Tin
March 26, 2019