The dominant role of II Corps Command in Pleime battle's first phase of relieving Pleime camp is without contest: II Corps command made decision in sending two ARVN Airborne Rangers teams and an American Delta Special Forces team to reinforced the camp defense, in organizing a relief column, in requesting the US Armed Force to provide an infantry battalion to defend Pleiku city and an artillery battalion to support the relief Column.

However, very few people knew about the dominant role played by II Corps Command in the decision of pursuing the enemy's withdrawing troops in phase 2 and phase 3 of the Pleime battle. Let's quote:

On 26 October 1965, while the relief column and the garrison of Pleime were conducting a sweep around the Camp, a conference was held at II Corps TOC with the presence of US advisors and unit commanders.

[. . . ]

The decision made by II Corps Command to exploit the results of the first phase and to pursue the enemy was fully concurred by the US military authorities, and an agreement was reached to establish a close cooperation in operational activities. The 1st US Air Cavalry Division made the main effort with the Long Reach Operations, and the ARVN Airborne Brigade acted as reserve, ready to participate in Corps order.

General Westmoreland acknowledged the major role played by II Corps Command when he wrote in the Preface:

From the standpoint of employment of joint forces, the Plei Me battle was a classic. The signal successes of the latter phases could, perhaps, never have been realized had it not been for the judgment and foresight of Vietnamese leadership. The initial preparatory effort on the ground, paving the way for the introduction of the 1st Air Cavalry Division, was accomplished by Vietnamese forces. Similarly, the very successful final phase exploitation was accomplished largely by the Vietnamese Airborne Brigade. The effectiveness of this highly organized, closely integrated, cooperative effort has not often been emulated in modern warfare.

American and North Vietnamese Communist documents intentionally created "a fog of war" around Pleime battle by only focusing and only emphasizing the "Ia Drang Valley" battle. The truth of the matter is that Pleime battle comprised three phases with three operations: Dân Thắng 21 (ARVN) at Pleime, Long Reach (US) at Chu Pong massif and̀ Thần Phong 7 (ARVN) at Ia Drang valley.

The attitude of American and North Vietnamese Communist authors and historians sank to oblivion Long Reach operation conducted by US 1st Air Cavalry and Thần Phong 7 operation conducted by ARVN 3rd Airborne Brigade; and they wrongfully attributed the name of "Ia Drang Valley" battle to the battle that occurred at the foot of Chu Pong massif instead of "Chu Pong Massif" battle, because the "Ia Drang Valley" battle launched by US 1/7 Air Cavalry Battalion led by Battalion Commander Harold Moore ought to be reserved for the battle performed by ARVN Airborne Brigade lead by Brigade Commander Ngo Quang Truong in the Thần Phong 7 operation, since this battle took place at Ia Drang valley.

Contrary to widespread opinion, when US 1st Air Cavalry pursued the enemy in the Chu Pong-Ia Drang complex area, it did not operate alone but was rather supported by ARVN Airborne Rangers teams. This detail was wrapped in secrecy by ARVN and US military establishments because it concerned the activities of a "secret" unit. However, this secret was unveiled in an after-action report drawn up by Tay Nguyen Front Command. This report dealing with the characteristics of US 1st Air Cavalry appeared as an addendum in Why Pleime. Let us quote:

2nd Phase: use small detachments and coordinate with Vietnamese Special forces Ranges to conduct raids into our rear (28 Oct to 11 Nov 1965).

Vertical landing by "frog leaps" into our rear by helicopters (28 Oct. to 10 Nov. 1965). Forces used: from one battalion to one company of US troops or two companies of US troops coordinated with Vietnamese SF Rangers.

Before landing. Reconnaissance of landing zones by repeated air reconnaissance or by small Vietnamese SF Rangers teams.

Vietnamese SF Rangers or US reconnaissance elements always land first to secure the LZ for the landing of riflemen, fire support elements and CP.

After landing. The Vietnamese SF Rangers usually push far in patrols.

The initial Task Force Relief Column established on October 20 comprising:

Not until October 23 was the Task Force reinforced with 1/42 Battalion. This unit was helilifted from Kontum to Pleiku. The reason II Corps Command had to wait until the fourth day after camp Pleime was attacked was that all available helicopter aircrafts were dedicated to troop transport to reinforce Quang Duc province in the ongoing Thần Phong 6 operation.

And 22nd Rangers Battalion, the last unit to remain in Pleiku was relieved by Ingram Task Force of US 1st Air Cavalry in the defense mission of Pleiku city, and " was heliborne into a landing zone on the Western side of Provincial route #5, 10 km North of Pleime, with the mission to sweep eastward and canalize the enemy toward Provincial route #5 and block and destroy any enemy caught between the battalion and the TF".

Many people explained the fact the Task Force relief column, after its exit of Pleiku in the afternoon of October 20, lingered at Phu My for three days before resuming its march toward camp Pleime as a timorous and overcautious attitude of LTC Luat, the Task Force Commander.

The truth is that LTC Luat was specifically ordered by II Corps Command to feign in only launching sweep operations around Phu My areas for two reasons: one was to gain time in obtaining helicopter transport means as above-mentioned; two was to counter the enemy's mobile ambush tactic, because II Corps Command knew the Viet Cong, contrary to the practice of using fixed ambush tactic, resorted this time around to employ mobility element for the ambush units to avoid being decimated by air and artillery pre-strikes. II Corps Command only issued an order to LTC Luat to rush to camp Pleime once it was able to lure NVA 32nd Regiment to leave its staging area near Chu Pong massif and march toward the pre-planned ambush area located at the 4 kilometer stretch on Inter-provincial Route 5 between Hill 538 and Hill 601.

Why Pleime contains a significant detail unknown or unaware by many people. That is the Tay Nguyen Front Command, after retreating its troops to Chu Pong massif due to failing to overrun camp Pleime in the first phase with the two Regiments, 32nd and 33rd, made plan to return and attack camp Pleime a second time with three Regiments, 32nd, 33rd, and 66th. D-Day was set for November 16, 1965. Let us quote:

Convinced that friendly forces had lost tracks of its units, VC Field Front quickly decidedto regain its advantage with an attack. The target again was Pleime and the date of attack set on 16 November. The plan was known within the VC ranks as the second phase of the attack of Pleime. All the three regiments would be committed this time as well as a battalion of 120mm mortars and a battalion of 14.5mm twin-barrel anti-aircraft guns which were both en route down the infiltration trail and scheduled to arrive in time for the attack. According to the declaration of a surrendered political officer, the scheme of the new attack would have as a primary objective the destruction of the camp.

However, this intention would never be carried out because two days later, on November 14, US 1/7 Air Cavalry Battalion suddenly landed and attacked the enemy right at its rear camp located at the foot of Chu Pong massif.

Afterward, the Viet Cong hide this fact to flip to coin from defeat to victory and to claim that the plan for attacking was to lure and destroy the American troops at Pleime. Some Viet Cong writers and general officers, such as Chu Huy Man and Nguyen Nam Khanh, even went as far asserting that the plan for attacking Pleime was to lure and destroy the American troops in Ia Drang valley.

A unique trait of Why Pleime is that the bulk of its reference consists of intelligence information on the VC conditions collected right on the battlefields. Besides the three VC documents, namely - (a) Combat Order for an Ambush by the NVA 32d Regiment, (b) Characteristics of the 1st US Air Cavalry Division, (c) Diary of a VC Cadre -, among the 32 references listed in the book, the remaining 23 references are intelligence reports obtained from interrogation and debriefing sessions of VC prisoners and ralliers.

A significant point worthwhile mentioning is that the reason II Corps Command was able to take the right reaction decisions leading to the defeat of the enemy at Pleime both at the camp and the ambush location, at Chu Pong, and at Ia Drang was that these decisions were based on analysis and evaluation of accurate intelligence gathered by G3 intelligence section.