Reviewing "Why Pleime"

Why Pleime, a small-sized book 4.5in. x 7in., 180 pages, authored by Major General Vinh Loc, ARVN, was done by April 1966 (except the last chapter X, which was written in September of the same year) and was published in September 1966 by the Information Ministry's printing house. As of to date (*), there is no Vietnamese version of the book. Why Pleime remains unknown to the public. Even American writers who had written about the Pleime battle failed to mention it as a source for reference of their books or articles. However, a closer view of this book reveals a unique and thorough content. It is indeed a masterpiece of military accounts.

The Most Truthful Account

The overall format of this book was the after-action report of the II Corps Chief of Staff submitted to the Operation Center/Joint Chief of Staff, with sensitive military details blacked out. Furthermore, it was a product of a series of military briefings done by the II Corps Chief of Staff to high ranking officers of allied forces: the United States, Republic of Korea, and Taiwan. Right after the ending of the battle, general officers of MACV from Saigon and US II Field Force from Nhatrang came to Pleiku to obtain details about the battle and have a tour of the battlefields in order to gain a physical sense of the battle scenes at Pleime, Chu Pong and Ia Drang. Early 1966, a delegation of South Korean generals headed by General Lee Hyun Chin; in April 1966, another delegation ROK General Commanders lead by ROK Deputy Defense Minister General Chang Chang Kuk and; then a delegation composed of 11 Taiwanese Generals headed by General Lo Yu Lun, Operations came to II Corps Headquarters to study about the battle and asked for documents. As a result, the detail contained in this book ought to be accurate, because any errors would not escape the eyes of American Generals belonging to US II Field Force and US 1st Air Cavalry who had participated and monitored the battlefields closely throughout the different phases of the battle.

Details Not Found Elsewhere

1. The Dominant Role of II Corps Command

The dominant role of II Corps Command in Pleime battle's first phase of relieving Pleime camp is without contest: II Corps command made decision in sending two ARVN Airborne Rangers teams and an American Delta Special Forces team to reinforced the camp defense, in organizing a relief column, in requesting the US Armed Force to provide an infantry battalion to defend Pleiku city and an artillery battalion to support the relief Column.

However, very few people knew about the dominant role played by II Corps Command in the decision of pursuing the enemy's withdrawing troops in phase 2 and phase 3 of the Pleime battle. Let's quote:

On 26 October 1965, while the relief column and the garrison of Pleime were conducting a sweep around the Camp, a conference was held at II Corps TOC with the presence of US advisors and unit commanders.

[. . . ]

The decision made by II Corps Command to exploit the results of the first phase and to pursue the enemy was fully concurred by the US military authorities, and an agreement was reached to establish a close cooperation in operational activities. The 1st US Air Cavalry Division made the main effort with the Long Reach Operations, and the ARVN Airborne Brigade acted as reserve, ready to participate in Corps order.

General Westmoreland acknowledged the major role played by II Corps Command when he wrote in the Preface:

From the standpoint of employment of joint forces, the Plei Me battle was a classic. The signal successes of the latter phases could, perhaps, never have been realized had it not been for the judgment and foresight of Vietnamese leadership. The initial preparatory effort on the ground, paving the way for the introduction of the 1st Air Cavalry Division, was accomplished by Vietnamese forces. Similarly, the very successful final phase exploitation was accomplished largely by the Vietnamese Airborne Brigade. The effectiveness of this highly organized, closely integrated, cooperative effort has not often been emulated in modern warfare.

2. Pleime Battle Comprised Three Phases

American and North Vietnamese Communist documents intentionally created "a fog of war" around Pleime battle by only focusing and only emphasizing the "Ia Drang Valley" battle. The truth of the matter is that Pleime battle comprised three phases with three operations: Dân Thắng 21 (ARVN) at Pleime, Long Reach (US) at Chu Pong massif and̀ Thần Phong 7 (ARVN) at Ia Drang valley.

The attitude of American and North Vietnamese Communist authors and historians sank to oblivion Long Reach operation conducted by US 1st Air Cavalry and Thần Phong 7 operation conducted by ARVN 3rd Airborne Brigade; and they wrongfully attributed the name of "Ia Drang Valley" battle to the battle that occurred at the foot of Chu Pong massif instead of "Chu Pong Massif" battle, because the "Ia Drang Valley" battle launched by US 1/7 Air Cavalry Battalion led by Battalion Commander Harold Moore ought to be reserved for the battle performed by ARVN Airborne Brigade lead by Brigade Commander Ngo Quang Truong in the Thần Phong 7 operation, since this battle took place at Ia Drang valley.

3. The Role Played by ARVN Airborne Rangers

Contrary to widespread opinion, when US 1st Air Cavalry pursued the enemy in the Chu Pong-Ia Drang complex area, it did not operate alone but was rather supported by ARVN Airborne Rangers teams. This detail was wrapped in secrecy by ARVN and US military establishments because it concerned the activities of a "secret" unit. However, this secret was unveiled in an after-action report drawn up by Tay Nguyen Front Command. This report dealing with the characteristics of US 1st Air Cavalry appeared as an addendum in Why Pleime. Let us quote:

2nd Phase: use small detachments and coordinate with Vietnamese Special forces Ranges to conduct raids into our rear (28 Oct to 11 Nov 1965).

Vertical landing by "frog leaps" into our rear by helicopters (28 Oct. to 10 Nov. 1965). Forces used: from one battalion to one company of US troops or two companies of US troops coordinated with Vietnamese SF Rangers.

Before landing. Reconnaissance of landing zones by repeated air reconnaissance or by small Vietnamese SF Rangers teams.

Vietnamese SF Rangers or US reconnaissance elements always land first to secure the LZ for the landing of riflemen, fire support elements and CP.

After landing. The Vietnamese SF Rangers usually push far in patrols.

4. The Initial Relief Column Contingency and the Role of 22nd Rangers Bn

The initial Task Force Relief Column established on October 20 comprising:

- HQS, 3rd Armored Cavalry Squadron;

- One Ranger Battalion

- One APC Company (M 113)

- One M-41 Tank Company;

- One Artillery Battery

- One Engineer Platoon

Not until October 23 was the Task Force reinforced with 1/42 Battalion. This unit was helilifted from Kontum to Pleiku. The reason II Corps Command had to wait until the fourth day after camp Pleime was attacked was that all available helicopter aircrafts were dedicated to troop transport to reinforce Quang Duc province in the ongoing Thần Phong 6 operation.

And 22nd Rangers Battalion, the last unit to remain in Pleiku was relieved by Ingram Task Force of US 1st Air Cavalry in the defense mission of Pleiku city, and " was heliborne into a landing zone on the Western side of Provincial route #5, 10 km North of Pleime, with the mission to sweep eastward and canalize the enemy toward Provincial route #5 and block and destroy any enemy caught between the battalion and the TF".

5. The Undecisive Behavior of the Relief Task Force

Many people explained the fact the Task Force relief column, after its exit of Pleiku in the afternoon of October 20, lingered at Phu My for three days before resuming its march toward camp Pleime as a timorous and overcautious attitude of LTC Luat, the Task Force Commander.

The truth is that LTC Luat was specifically ordered by II Corps Command to feign in only launching sweep operations around Phu My areas for two reasons: one was to gain time in obtaining helicopter transport means as above-mentioned; two was to counter the enemy's mobile ambush tactic, because II Corps Command knew the Viet Cong, contrary to the practice of using fixed ambush tactic, resorted this time around to employ mobility element for the ambush units to avoid being decimated by air and artillery pre-strikes. II Corps Command only issued an order to LTC Luat to rush to camp Pleime once it was able to lure NVA 32nd Regiment to leave its staging area near Chu Pong massif and march toward the pre-planned ambush area located at the 4 kilometer stretch on Inter-provincial Route 5 between Hill 538 and Hill 601.

6. The Intention To Attack Camp Pleime in Phase 2

Why Pleime contains a significant detail unknown or unaware by many people. That is the Tay Nguyen Front Command, after retreating its troops to Chu Pong massif due to failing to overrun camp Pleime in the first phase with the two Regiments, 32nd and 33rd, made plan to return and attack camp Pleime a second time with three Regiments, 32nd, 33rd, and 66th. D-Day was set for November 16, 1965. Let us quote:

Convinced that friendly forces had lost tracks of its units, VC Field Front quickly decidedto regain its advantage with an attack. The target again was Pleime and the date of attack set on 16 November. The plan was known within the VC ranks as the second phase of the attack of Pleime. All the three regiments would be committed this time as well as a battalion of 120mm mortars and a battalion of 14.5mm twin-barrel anti-aircraft guns which were both en route down the infiltration trail and scheduled to arrive in time for the attack. According to the declaration of a surrendered political officer, the scheme of the new attack would have as a primary objective the destruction of the camp.

However, this intention would never be carried out because two days later, on November 14, US 1/7 Air Cavalry Battalion suddenly landed and attacked the enemy right at its rear camp located at the foot of Chu Pong massif.

Afterward, the Viet Cong hide this fact to flip to coin from defeat to victory and to claim that the plan for attacking was to lure and destroy the American troops at Pleime. Some Viet Cong writers and general officers, such as Chu Huy Man and Nguyen Nam Khanh, even went as far asserting that the plan for attacking Pleime was to lure and destroy the American troops in Ia Drang valley.

7. VC Documents

A unique trait of Why Pleime is that the bulk of its reference consists of intelligence information on the VC conditions collected right on the battlefields. Besides the three VC documents, namely - (a) Combat Order for an Ambush by the NVA 32d Regiment, (b) Characteristics of the 1st US Air Cavalry Division, (c) Diary of a VC Cadre -, among the 32 references listed in the book, the remaining 23 references are intelligence reports obtained from interrogation and debriefing sessions of VC prisoners and ralliers.

A significant point worthwhile mentioning is that the reason II Corps Command was able to take the right reaction decisions leading to the defeat of the enemy at Pleime both at the camp and the ambush location, at Chu Pong, and at Ia Drang was that these decisions were based on analysis and evaluation of accurate intelligence gathered by G3 intelligence section.

Tactics Have Been Mentioned

Besides the mobile ambush tactic, Why Pleime also touched upon other tactics used by the two sides in Pleime battle. Let us quote:

- Such a campaign conducted in accordance with the "tactics "one point and two faces" would surely confuse the ARVN analysis and estimate about the impact of the VC's main effort. The "point" would be selected in such a manner that ARVN forces could not avoid handicaps and disadvantages unless the challenge was not accepted. A literal translation of the so-called "nhất điểm lưỡng diện" tactics of the VC in the offense. The expression simply means either "one main effort and two secondary efforts" or "one main attack and two diversionary attacks".

- The Dien Bien Phu Battle which ended the Indochina war (1947-1954) lasted for two months but was merely an encirclement of a stronghold in the Dien Bien Phu Bowl. The Pleime Battle, quite different from many tactical aspects: envelopment, counter-ambushes, relief, pursuit, ambushes, exploitation, attack and destroy is no doubt the biggest battle from the last years.

- II Corps Commander decided to play the enemy's game. Since the VC expected to successively eliminate our forces the scheme of maneuver had to make the best use of the factor TIME and to exploit the inherent weaknesses of the enemy troop disposition.

- It would be interesting to mention that large-scale ambushes by the VC have been in recent past conducted within the frame of the tactics of the war of movement. They no longer exist as static waylays.

- At 1400 hours, the 22nd ARVN Ranger battalion was heliborne into a landing zone on the Western side of Provincial route #5, 10 km North of Pleime, with the mission to sweep eastward and canalize the enemy toward Provincial route #5 and block and destroy any enemy caught between the battalion and the TF.

- The decision made by II Corps Command to exploit the results of the first phase and to pursue the enemy was fully concurred by the US military authorities and agreement was reached to establish a close cooperation in operational activities.

- So far the VC always succeed in rallying and reassembling their troops after action. This time, after the lift of siege of Pleime by friendly forces, they faced a 22-day pursuit and had to disintegrate to escape.

- Objectively speaking, Pleime does not present any strategic value. But it has been selected as a main objective because the enemy always tries to marry up tactics and propaganda, to adjust combat activities with psychological warfare. They intended to surprise us because they were convinced that the operations in An Lao and Kim Son, North of Binh Dinh had bound 6 battalions of the ARVN General Reserve, 4 battalions of the 22nd ARVN Infantry Division and three US helicopter companies to the coast. But our prompt maneuvers had shifted them into being surprised and losing the initiative.

- The second lesson from the battle of Pleime is that the VC are not exclusive masters of the jungle and mountains. For with modern engineer equipment and revolutionary tactics, the helicopters could land everywhere and landing zones constructed at any places, whether on tops of hills or amid dense jungles. It was for this reason that the VC had totally failed in their estimate about possible landing zones.

- In most cases, infantry protection is required to ensure the security of armored columns. The battle of Pleime, on the contrary, was a typical case in which the infantry elements considerably restricted the mobility and capabilities of the armored turrets. For this reason, Armor company commanders should not in the future cling to book-principles and had better expose themselves daringly instead of limiting their mobility with close infantry protection. This would provide not only liberty of action but also the arguments to defend one-self in case of being surprised.

- In phase III, the operations had been conducted through a close cooperation between ARVN and US Forces: that was the latest procedure ever put into application since the second World War. It is characterized by: joint intelligence and support activities, commonly-shared concept of operations and results, separate TAOR, separate command, separate deployment of forces, separate conduct of activities, separate reserve.

The Author of Why Pleime

The book entitled Why Pleime bears the name of Major General Vinh Loc as its author. This was something natural since he was II Corps Commander when the Pleime battle took place. However, the real author of the book's contents was Colonel Nguyen Van Hieu, II Corps Chief of Staff for the following reasons:

1. The book was the product of the after-action report prepared by the II Corps General Staff and signed by the II Corps Commander to be submitted to the Operation Center/Joint General Staff.

2. The writing of the book was finalized in April 1966, except the last chapter which was written in September of the same year. It would be quasi impossible for General Vinh Loc in his function as corps commander to find time to write the book in such a short time of barely four months after the end of Pleime battle, less he neglected the workload of a corps commander to sit down and write the book.

3. The book was further the product of a series of military briefings organized at II Corps Headquarters for the Allied Forces' military high ranking officers, Americans, Koreans, Taiwanese, from December 1965 to April 1966, with a multitude of Viet Cong documents captured and with reports of interrogations of VC prisoners and surrenders in the various battles at Pleime, Chu Pong and Ia Drang.

4. It was Colonel Hieu, although serving under General Vinh Loc's authority, that was the person who possessed the command and general staff stuff and skills to design, to carry out the counter-offensive planning in a pluralistic and complex battle that required tight and harmonious coordination with US 1st Air Cavalry. General Vinh Loc had the credit of knowing to wisely make use of Colonel Hieu and of giving free hand in the conduct of Pleime battle.

It is worthwhile mentioning that Colonel Hieu was not a type of behind-the-desk officer who distanted himself from the battlefield. On the contrary, he always got involved in tasks that might seem insignificant but were really important in the warfare apparatus. As an illustration of this character trait, the following are two instances.

It was the ARVN radio relay intercept team belonging to II Corps attached to US 1st Air Cavalry's unit at camp Pleime that passed on an intelligence tip to 1/7th Battalion revealing the presence of an enemy regimental sized troops located somewhere at Chu Prong massif's foot on a straight line drawn from Pleime to Chu Prong massif. The intercepted radio signals were a code message in Mandarin. (Moore, When We Were Soldier Once...and Young, page 63). No doubt Colonel Hieu who was fluent in Mandarin since he was born in Tianjin, China, had something to do with the sharing of this piece of intelligence to the American unit.

The fact ARVN Airborne Brigade jumped bull's eye upon the withdrawal route of the VC remnant troops at Ia Drang valley and harassed the two NVA 365th and 334th Battalions in operation Thần Phong 7 was because Colonel Hieu provided pinpoint intelligence tips to LTC Ngo Quang Truong who lead his airborne troops in "boxing in" the NVA troops, as accounted by General Schwarzkopf in his book, It Doesn't Take A Hero (1992).

5. The book was written in English. General Vinh Loc was versed in French but he was not versed enough and as competent as Colonel in English.

Conclusion

Not like articles and books narrating the Pleime battle by authors who either were not directly involved in the battle, or if they did, then it was only in a low level of battalion, regiment or division, and therefore could only provide a limited view angle of the battle, Why Pleime is the account of Colonel Hieu in his role of II Corps Chief of Staff, possessing the overall view of a field commander and the detailed view of a general staff mind. Therefore, Pleime reflects the most accurate and comprehensive view of the entire Pleime battle. Although the book was finalized in 1966, to this day, although it was only the ARVN viewpoint, Why Pleime nevertheless offers the most straightforward and complete perspective of Pleime battle.

Nguyen Van Tin
28 February 2007


(*)On December 5, 2011, I found the Vietnamese version, Pleime, Trận Chiến Lịch Sử in Cornell University library.

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