- Herding diversionary move – Its intention was to roundup the enemy troops toward a common location.
Colonel Hieu knew the 1st Air Cav Brigade won’t be able to find and destroy the scattered three NVA regimental troops in the vast area that stretched from Pleime to Chupong with its newly developed air assault tactics.
- Enticement diversionary move – Its intention was to entice B3 Field Front to switch to an attack posture in order to have them gather its three regimental troops in assembling areas for re-equipment, training and rehearsal purposes to stage for the imminent second attack of the Pleime camp.
The order to execute the switch in operational direction from west to east was issued on 11/8 with a vague suggestion (Kinnard, page 67):
The purpose of the enticement move was made known to General Knowles on 11/10 (Kinnard , page 73):
Its intention became clearer to General Knowles on Nov 11 (Kinnard, page 76):
The ideal target for B-52 airstrikes was the staging area where troop concentration would be the most dense.
The window margin would be narrow: 11/13-14 or 11/12-14, (it turned out Colonel Hieu only had the 11/13-14 one) depending on the allotment time given for rehearsals.
And when order was issued for gathering troops in staging areas, the window margin would be in terms of 24 hours and less.
Thus the necessity to create the
- Distractive diversionary move – Its intention was to refocus B3 Field Front from the direction toward Pleime camp on to LZ X-Ray and had it retain its troops at staging areas longer to allow the B-52 to still find them there at their arrival due for Nov 15, after a long eight hour voyage from Guam to Central Highlands.
The number of Air Cav troops inserted at LZ X-Ray should be small so as not to make B3 Field Front to rushing in all of its three regimental troops.
The coordination of all these various diversionary moves with the purpose of attaining the objective set out by the operational concept – the use of B-52 airstrikes to annihilate the three NVA regiments - was made only possible with a solid intelligence of the enemy situation by the minutes, hours and days. That’s why it would be quasi impossible to duplicate this uniqueness operational concept. It’s only possible if conditions are exactly the same as Colonel Hieu’s.
Nguyen Van Tin