Two Perspectives of the March 1965 K'Nak Battle

1. Unveiling the Shroud Covering the Mystery of the Fierce K'Nak Battle

The Special Forces camp of K'Nak lied on three hilltops spreading along North-South and possessed many military advantages. Here the mountainous configuration is favorable to the setting up of defensive perimeters and to the positioning of troops, firepowers as well as establishing staging points for launching attacks. It has also numerous swamped valleys, bordered by river Ba and water creeks, which constitute natural obstacles the enemy has to overcome when attacking. The American and its ally have constructed a set of camps comprising defensive fortresses, a field airstrip and a firepower camp aiming at interdicting the communication between Binh Dinh and Gia Lai. Our troops had assaulted this camp many times in the past but all attempts had failed. Spring 1963, the Party Committee, the 5th Military Region Command and the Western Highland Command had decided to gather a vast amount of forces to attack this camp. Our force, outnumbering the enemy's force with a ratio of 3/1, comprised: 409th Sapper Battalion, a sapper unit from Binh Dinh province, 10th Regiment and the forward command unit of the 5th Military Region. The total amounted to over 750 men.

At 2:00 p.m. on July 3, 1965, our troops departed from Kong Ha Nung, more than 20 km away from K'Nak. At 6:00 p.m., they arrived at 500m from the dried creek. At 7:00 p.m., they closed in the camp. Around 11:00 p.m., our troops finished occupying determined positions. As planned, the sappers were supposed to begin by destroying the main positions. The infantrymen were supposed then to exert forceful thrust to finish off the battlefield. However, because the preparatory ground survey done a month ago by a recon unit had left behind compromising signs, the enemy had a clear knowledge of our pending attack. At 11:30 p.m., our troops tripped on claymore mines, and triggered luminous mines. Immediately, the enemy shot firepower over our entire formation. The enemy illuminated the entire dark sky that became like daytime with luminous rockets. Our troops attacked under extreme duress. They fought with outstanding courage and were able to overtake the high spots at the northern and southern ends; however, the main trust in between was only able to establish a "beach-head". Fierce firepowers spitting out of defensive bunkers succeeded in cutting down our assaults. At 12:00 a.m. on March 8, almost our entire troops were gunned down. Their bodies lied blanked the creek sides and the foothills of K'Nak. The surviving troops were forced to withdraw. The enemy continued their pursuing firepowers. Almost 500 wounded and dead were left behind by the retreating troops. The enemy piled the dead and burned them with kerosene or shoveled them into pits and flattened the whole thing with bulldozers.

Comrade Nguyen Van Am, 409th Battalion Political Deputy Commander, in charge of tending to wounded soldiers at Station Trung Phau (8 kms from enemy position) had had 50 graves ready. Each row contained 10 graves, separated by a 60-80 cm space; but only 8 comrades were buried in them, including Battalion Commander Ngo Trong Dai and hero Pham Van Thanh. These 8 comrades were wounded at the onset of the battle and thus were able to be evacuated to the rear. The medevac units and the front line civilian laborers were all montagnards; they, too, all perished, disrupting entirely the medevac tasks. With the counting of these forces, more than 1,000 men had left their bodies in the K'Nak battleground.

Hoang Anh Sưong
Mysterious Stories of the Psychic World
Thế Giới Mới 700,pp 8-9
August 28, 2006

2. The Viet Cong Attacked Kannak Special Forces Camp

Defeated along Highway 19, the VC next tried to overrun the Special Forces camp at Kannak. This camp north of Highway 19, and its sister camp south of Highway 19 at Plei Ta Nangh, had been placed in the An Khe Valley as outposts for Highway 19. While unable to stop infiltration of units to attack Highway 19, they threatened the rear of the Viet Cong units operating along the highway. They were a particularly dangerous threat to VC resupply and evacuation of wounded from these engagements along the highways.

The VC launched their attack on the Special Forces camp at Kannak at 0150 hours on 8 March. Captured documents indicate that elements of two battalions participated. They attacked in a bloody action reminiscent of the bitter outpost fighting in Korea at Pork Chop, T-Bone and Old Baldy in the spring of 1953. The two smaller outposts of the camp were initially overrun. One was later retaken by a counterattack by the CIDG. The central part of the camp held firm and the VC were driven off in complete disorder. They left 126 dead in the barbed wire and inside the outpost positions they penetrated. In addition to many new weapons including machine guns, 57 mm recoilless rifles, bipods of two 82 mm mortars and many grenades, bangalore torpedoes and demolition charges were abandoned by the defeated and disorganized VC. This action finally broke the back of the first phase of the Viet Cong's winter-spring offensive.

Colonel Theodore C. Mataxis
Attack and Counter-Attack on Highway 19
Army, October 1965
(Vietnam Center Archive)

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